



Studies in the History of the Ancient Near East

MIGRATION AND COLONIALISM IN LATE SECOND MILLENNIUM BCE LEVANT AND ITS ENVIRONS

THE MAKING OF A NEW WORLD

Pekka Pirkänen



VISIT...

LANZAROTE
Caliente.COM



Studies in the History of the Ancient Near East

MIGRATION AND COLONIALISM IN LATE SECOND MILLENNIUM BCE LEVANT AND ITS ENVIRONS

THE MAKING OF A NEW WORLD

Pekka Pitkänen





Studies in the History of the Ancient Near East

MIGRATION AND COLONIALISM IN LATE SECOND MILLENNIUM BCE LEVANT AND ITS ENVIRONS

THE MAKING OF A NEW WORLD

Pekka Pitkänen



Migration and Colonialism in Late Second Millennium BCE Levant and Its Environs

This book examines migration and colonialism in the ancient Near East in the late second millennium BCE, with a focus on the Levant. It explores how the area was shaped by these movements of people, especially in forming the new Iron Age societies.

The book utilises recent sociological studies on group identity, violence, migration, colonialism and settler colonialism in its reconstruction of related social and political changes. Prime examples of migrations that are addressed include those involving the Sea Peoples and Philistines, ancient Israelites and ancient Arameans. The final chapter sets the developments in the ancient Near East in the context of recent world history from a typological perspective and in terms of the legacy of the ancient world for Judaism and Christianity. Altogether, the book contributes towards an enhanced understanding of migration, colonialism and violence in human history.

In addition to academics, this book will be of particular interest to students of this period in the Ancient Near East, as well anyone working on migration and colonialism in the ancient world. The book is also suitable to the general public interested in world history.

Pekka Pitkänen is Senior Lecturer in the School of Education and Humanities at the University of Gloucestershire. He is the author of *Central Sanctuary and Centralization of Worship in Ancient Israel* (2003), *Joshua* (2010) and *A Commentary on Numbers: Narrative, Ritual and Colonialism* (2017). His current research interests include ancient Near Eastern history in the context of world history, the biblical books of Genesis-Joshua with their reception and ritual studies and other sociological and anthropological approaches to the study of the ancient world.

Studies in the History of the Ancient Near East

Series editor: Greg Fisher, University of California Santa Barbara, USA

Advisory Board of Associate Editors

Ra'anan Boustán, University of California, Los Angeles, USA; Zeba Crook, Carleton University, Canada; Elizabeth DePalma Digeser, University of California at Santa Barbara, USA; Matthew Gibbs, University of Winnipeg, Canada; John Lee, University of California at Santa Barbara, USA; Harry Munt, University of York, UK; Richard Payne, Oriental Institute, University of Chicago, USA; Lucy Wadeson, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium; Philip Wood, Aga Khan University, London, UK; Alan Lenzi, University of the Pacific, USA.

Studies in the History of the Ancient Near East provides a global forum for works addressing the history and culture of the Ancient Near East, spanning a broad period from the foundation of civilisation in the region until the end of the Abbasid period. The series includes research monographs, edited works, collections developed from conferences and workshops, and volumes suitable for the university classroom.

Children in the Bible and the Ancient World

Comparative and Historical Methods in Reading Ancient Children

Edited by Shawn W. Flynn

Near Eastern Cities from Alexander to the Successors of Muhammad

Walter D. Ward

Geography, Religion, and Sainthood in the Eastern Mediterranean

Erica Ferg

A Story of YHWH

Cultural Translation and Subversive Reception in Israelite History

Shawn W. Flynn

Migration and Colonialism in Late Second Millennium BCE Levant and Its Environs

The Making of a New World

Pekka Pitkänen

Migration and Colonialism in Late Second Millennium BCE Levant and Its Environs

The Making of a New World

Pekka Pitkänen

 **Routledge**
Taylor & Francis Group
LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published 2020
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

and by Routledge
52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

© 2020 Pekka Pitkänen

The right of Pekka Pitkänen to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

A catalog record for this book has been requested

ISBN: 9781138677036 (hbk)

ISBN: 9781315559803 (ebk)

Typeset in Times New Roman
by Apex CoVantage, LLC

To Sowon

Contents

List of figures

List of tables

Acknowledgements

Abbreviations

1 Introduction

A. The overall context and significance of the study, with a summary of chapters of the book

B. The area and its characteristics

C. Previous studies on the era

D. Overview of textual evidence

E. Overview of material evidence

2 The societal contexts of the ancient Near East and analysing migration, colonialism and violence

A. Societal types in the ancient Near East and their characteristics

B. Group identity, ethnic groups and nations, and states and empires

C. Technologies of control

D. Theories of migration and colonialism

E. How societies come into existence, develop and die out

F. Methodological summary

3 The imperial context of the second half of the second millennium BCE

A. Egypt

B. Mittani

C. The Hittites

D. Middle Assyria

E. Mycenae

F. Concluding remarks

4 The Sea Peoples and ancient Philistia

A. At the palatial centres

B. From the Aegean to the Levant

- C. An Egyptian encounter*
- D. Transformations in Philistia*

Ethnogenesis

- E. Expansion and encounters with the Israelites*
- F. Summing up the migrations of the Philistines and Sea Peoples*
- G. Aftermath*

5 Ancient Israel

- A. Sources and interpretation on the period*
- B. Israel in Egypt*
- C. Transformations in the Hill Country*

Ethnogenesis

- D. The rise of kingship*
- E. Expansion and empire*
- F. Aftermath*

6 Ancient Arameans

- A. The origins of the Arameans*

Mari and pastoralism in the northern Levant
Aramean ethnogenesis

- B. Interactions with Assyria*
- C. The spread of Aramean entities outside Assyria*

The Levantine sphere
The Hittite sphere

- D. State formation*
- E. Aramean expansion and colonialism*
- F. Aftermath*

7 Other migrations and societies

- A. Northern Syria and Phoenicia*
- B. Transjordan and the Negev in the southern Levant*

Edom

Moab
Ammon

8 Migration and colonialism, ancient and modern

- A. Summary and conclusions on the ancient world*
- B. Typological parallels with the modern world*
- C. Ancient Israel and its legacy*

From ancient Israel to Christianity
Zionism and the modern state of Israel

- D. Prospects for the third millennium*

Bibliography

General Index

Index of Ancient Sources

Figures

1.1 The Near East

3.1 New Kingdom Egypt

3.2 Late Bronze Age Anatolia, northern Syria and northern Mesopotamia (mid-fourteenth century BCE)

3.3 The Middle Assyrian empire

3.4 The Mycenaean world and Western Anatolia

4.1 Iron Age Palestine and Transjordan: main regions

5.1 The literary-thematic and chiastic structure of Genesis-Joshua

6.1 Mari and its environs

6.2 The Iron Age Neo-Hittite and Aramean kingdoms

Tables

1.1 Archaeological periods
2.1 Forms of organizational reach
2.2 Modes of colonialism
3.1 Chronology of Ancient Egypt
3.2 Hittite and Mittanian kings
3.3 Assyrian kings, 1400 BCE–609 BCE
5.1 Kings of Israel and Judah

Acknowledgements

This book is in a number of ways a culmination of the past 20 years of work that I have done on the Hebrew Bible and the ancient Near East. In terms of practicalities, it follows a book on Numbers that I wrote a few years ago. I have immensely enjoyed the research and writing process.

I would like to thank a number of people for helping me with the project. Aline Tenu graciously sent me a copy of her thesis on Middle Assyria at an early stage of the project and gave a number of additional tips on digging further into northern Levantine scholarship. Jesse Casana, Mark Weeden, Andrew George, Ömür Harmanşah, Bleda Düring, Francisco Núñez, Dariusz Piwowarczyk, Koert van Bekkum and Lawson Younger also helped with related materials and scholarship. I very much appreciate the response by Raymond Kelly to my queries relating to his monograph on the Nuer and Dinka. Thanks are also due to the University of Gloucestershire for reducing my teaching load in the academic years 2017–2018 and 2018–2019, which crucially helped me allocate more time for research. Philip Esler has been a source of support in matters that relate to research in general. I also voice my gratitude to the UCU Branch Chair Andrew Misiura for being supportive, and, very importantly, in practical terms flexible with the timing of my UCU duties while I was working on the book.

I would like to express special thanks to Mario Liverani for graciously and swiftly agreeing to review an early version of the manuscript and for his feedback. I am also very grateful to Raz Kletter for his review of an early draft and for his detailed comments that have helped stimulate my thinking and enhance the presentation, together with some suggestions for and also provision of related copies of additional material to incorporate in the discussion. And, the response of Greg Fisher, the series editor, was helpful, including in fostering me to articulate connections with the ancient world in fuller detail in the final chapter. Otherwise, the important work done by the Routledge editorial and production team, including Deborah Kopka, the project manager, and the anonymous copyeditor, should be highlighted explicitly.

As usual, I would like to thank my wife for her constant support. This book is expressly dedicated to her.

Abbreviations

- ABC A.K. Grayson, *Assyrian and Babylonian Chronicles*, Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2000; original edition 1975.
- ABD The Anchor Bible Dictionary
- AHw W. von Soden, *Akkadisches Handwörterbuch*, Wiesbaden, Germany: Harrassowitz, 1965–1981.
- Akk. Akkadian
- AL W.L. Moran, *The Amarna Letters*, Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992.
- ANE Ancient Near East(ern)
- ANEP J.B. Pritchard, ed., *The Ancient Near East in Pictures*, 2nd edition with supplement, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969.
- ANET J.B. Pritchard, ed., *Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament*, 3rd edition with supplement, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969
- ARE J.H. Breasted, *Ancient Records of Egypt*, 5 vols, Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 1906–1907.
- ASOR American Schools of Oriental Research
- BANEA British Association for Near Eastern Archaeology
- BAR *British Archaeological Reports*
- BASOR *Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research*
- BTB *Biblical Theology Bulletin*
- BZAR Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für Altorientalische und Biblische Rechtsgeschichte
- BZAW Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft
- CAD Chicago Assyrian Dictionary
- CANE J.M. Sasson, ed. in chief, *Civilizations of the Ancient Near East*, New York, NY: Simon & Schuster Macmillan, 1996.
- CHLI Hawkins, J.D., *Corpus of Hieroglyphic Luwian Inscriptions*, Volume I, in three parts, Berlin, Germany; and New York, NY: Walter de Gruyter, 2000.
- CoS W.W. Hallo and K.L. Younger, ed., *The Context of Scripture*. Leiden, Netherlands: E.J. Brill, 1997–2002.
- DDD K. van der Toorn, B. Becking and P.W. van der Horst, eds., *Dictionary of Deities and Demons in the Bible*, second, completely revised edition, Leiden, Netherlands: E.J. Brill, 1999.
- DLU G. Del Olmo Lete and J. Sanmartín, *Diccionario de la Lengua Ugarítica*, 2 vols, Sabadell: AUSA, 1996–2000.

DUL *Dictionary of the Ugaritic Language in the Alphabetic Tradition*, 2 vols, Leiden, Netherlands: E.J. Brill, 2003.

EA El Amarna

ET English Translation

FAT Forschungen zum Alten Testament

GHAT Göttinger Handkommentar zum Alten Testament

Ger. German

Gk. Greek

HAL L. Koehler and W. Baumgartner, *Hebräisches und Aramäisches Lexikon zum Alten Testament*, Leiden, Netherlands: E.J. Brill.

Hannig R. Hannig, *Die Sprache der Pharaonen: Grosses Handwörterbuch Ägyptisch-Deutsch (2800–950 v. Chr.)*, Mainz, Germany: von Zabern, 1995.

HDT G. Beckman, *Hittite Diplomatic Texts*, SBL Writings from the Ancient World 7, ed. Harry A. Hoffner, Jr (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1996; 2nd edition, 1999)

Heb. Hebrew

IEJ Israel Exploration Journal

JSOT *The Journal for the Study of the Old Testament*

JSOTSS *The Journal for the Study of the Old Testament*, Supplement Series

KAI H. Donner and W. Röllig, eds., *Kanaanäische und Aramäische Inschriften*, 3 vols, Wiesbaden, Germany: Otto Harrassowitz, 1964–2002.

KNUDTZON J.A. Knudtzon, *Die El-Amarna Tafeln*, mit Einleitung und Erläuterungen. Reprint of the 1915 edition, Aalen, Germany: Otto Zeller Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1964.

KTU M. Dietrich, O. Loretz and J. Sanmartin, *The Cuneiform Alphabetic Texts from Ugarit, Ras Ibn Hani and Other Places*, third edition, Münster, Germany: Ugarit Verlag, 2013.

LÄ W. Helck and E. Otto, eds., *Lexikon der Ägyptologie*, Wiesbaden, Germany: Otto Harrassowitz, 1972f.

LBA Late Bronze Age

Liddell-Scott H.G. Liddell and R. Scott, *A Greek English Lexikon*, 9th edition with Revised Supplement, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996.

LXX The Greek translation of the Hebrew Bible/Old Testament

MC J.-J. Glassner, *Mesopotamian Chronicles*, WAW 19, Atlanta, GA: SBL, 2004.

NAC New American Commentary

NCBC New Century Bible Commentary

NEAEHL E. Stern, ed., *The New Encyclopedia of Archaeological Excavations in the Holy Land*, 4 vols, Jerusalem, Israel: The Israel Exploration Society & Carta (and New York: Simon & Schuster), 1993,

- with supplementary volume 2006.
- OeAe D.B. Redford, ed., *The Oxford Encyclopedia of Ancient Egypt*, 3 vols, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001.
- OeANe E.M. Meyers, ed. in chief, *Oxford Encyclopedia of Archaeology in the Near East*, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1997.
- OHAL M. Steiner and A.E. Killebrew, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of the Archaeology of the Levant: C. 8000–332 bce*, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013.
- OTL Old Testament Library
- RIMA 1 A.K. Grayson, A.K. with the assistance of Grant Frame and Douglas Frayne. *Assyrian Rulers of the Third and Second Millennia bc (to 1115 bc)*, Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press, 1987.
- RIMA 2 A.K. Grayson, *Assyrian Rulers of the Early First Millennium bc I (1114–859 bc)*, Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press, 1991.
- RIMA 3 A.K. Grayson, *Assyrian Rulers of the Early First Millennium bc II (858–745 bc)*, Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press, 1996.
- RLA Reallexikon der Assyriologie.
- SBL Society of Biblical Literature
- Sum. Sumerian
- TLCANE K.A. Kitchen and P.J.N. Lawrence, *Treaty, Law and Covenant in the Ancient Near East*, 3 vols, Wiesbaden, Germany: Harrassowitz, 2012.
- TOTC Tyndale Old Testament Commentary
- UDB J.-L. Cunchillos, J.-P. Vita and J.-Á. Zamora, *Ugaritic Data Bank: The Texts*, translated into English by A. Lacadena and A. Castro, Madrid, Spain: CSIC, 2003.
- WAW SBL Writings from the Ancient World
- ZAR Zeitschrift für Altorientalische und Biblische Rechtsgeschichte



1 Introduction

A. The overall context and significance of the study, with a summary of chapters of the book

Human life has been marked by extensive changes in its historical trajectory. Sometimes change has been fairly incremental, at other times more rapid, even cataclysmic. Certain changes have been of a rather local nature, others more extensive, even global. Also, importantly, some changes have had a wider impact than others on what cumulatively happens in the future as a result of such changes. The move from hunting and gathering societies to agriculture and the change from agricultural societies to industrial ones are, at least arguably, the two great transformations that have had the widest impact on human history.¹ However, a change from Late Bronze Age societies to those in the Iron Age in the ancient Near East, the topic of this book, has also had a far-

reaching impact on later history. This change involved some cataclysmic events, such as the collapse of an international system of trade together with the collapse and loss of grip of empires in the ancient Near Eastern area. At the same time, the period was also marked by continuity and less overt transformations in a number of areas. One of the entities that arose, ancient Israel, has had a tremendous impact on the world through its sacred texts and the two religions that arose from it and its legacy, Judaism and Christianity, together with a third religion, Islam, that was influenced by a number of aspects of the other two. Christianity's impact on the world was above all accentuated by its adoption as the official religion of the Roman Empire in the fourth century CE and the subsequent era of Western explorations and colonialism since the fifteenth century CE that was then also accentuated by industrialisation in the West from the eighteenth century on. All of these developments fed back to the rediscovery of the wider ancient Near East in the nineteenth century, itself then having at the minimum typological² significance for understanding human life, for example considering that writing and the earliest civilisations of the world also developed in the area.³

Such a tangle of considerations can be seen in the context of history's interest in the study of the past in order to gain a greater understanding of human life. The endeavour is already of interest just for the sake of knowledge, to see how people lived in the past. However, it is part of human nature to even instinctively compare what happened and how people lived in the past with human experience in the present. And, of course, the study of history by human actors always takes place in the present time of those actors. In that, then, the interests of those actors in many ways decide what to study and how to go about it. If certain events of the past are considered significant, it will be more likely that more attention will be given to studying those events than to studying other events. Also, if the events in question are cataclysmic, it is easier to pay more attention to them as the topic can be seen as more exciting than more mundane affairs. On the whole, the bigger the changes, the more likely it is on average that they will have had a significant impact on subsequent events and ultimately the human present. In these respects, the book at hand should fit the bill nicely, as the following discussion should also demonstrate.

The study of the ancient Near East also involves a number of interesting but also challenging considerations from the standpoint of history writing that bear on this study. Modern historiography developed in the West from the Enlightenment on, building on existing societal historiographic traditions. One of these was the study of the classical world due to the transmission of manuscripts in an unbroken chain since antiquity through the Renaissance that accentuated their reading and even rediscovery with resulting cultural impact

on the West. The transmission of the biblical documents also was unbroken and continued in the West in the context of Western Christendom. The impact of the West on the rest of the world was greatly accentuated by the development of science and technology in Europe. It was the Portuguese explorations, made possible by advances in ship technologies, that started off the expansion of the West. Eventually, the West controlled most of the globe by the end of the nineteenth century.⁴ For the West, the history of Greece and Rome provided a model of civilisation to be emulated. As one would expect, in such a situation, the study of the classical world was considered of primary importance, with considerable resources naturally devoted to the subject.⁵ The study of the classical world was combined with the study of Christianity itself, including the Bible, even though the Enlightenment resulted in the waning of the power of Christianity to influence society as a whole. An important accompaniment to the study of Christianity was the development of biblical criticism from the late eighteenth century on, and with it the development of modern theology in the West. In the nineteenth century, interest was spurred in exploring lands where the biblical events took place, with the Napoleonic conquests of Egypt already having exposed to the West monuments and artefacts from ancient Egypt. Decipherment of the ancient Egyptian language followed, and exploration and excavation in Palestine and lands to the north and east of it also started to take place in the course of the century. This led to the rediscovery of the ancient Near East, and by the late nineteenth century, the subject of Assyriology was born. In due course, with the expansion of exploration and development in methods of study, the studies branched into a variety of sub-disciplines that exist today.

Such findings as the flood tablets of the Gilgamesh epic as a parallel to the Genesis flood story were fundamental in showing that the Bible had its roots in the ancient Near East, instead of being an isolated document as it would in many ways have been perceived before the rediscovery of the ancient Near East. The findings then would cast the Bible in a new light. At the same time, in the course of time, including as secularisation increased in the West, the study of the ancient Near East became a completely independent field from biblical studies. However, as the Bible itself has its origins in the area, it is clear that the study of the Bible cannot and should not fundamentally be decoupled from the study of the wider ancient Near East.

In the so-called postcolonial era of the twentieth century, the study of the classical world has experienced a relative decline in popularity. This undoubtedly has to do with the use of that study for the purposes of supporting the colonialist and imperial ideology of the West.⁶ Due to the postcolonial turn, it is no longer fashionable to refer explicitly to the classical world as providing models for the West in the same way that might have been

possible earlier. At the same time, the scope of the study of the past has been widened considerably. Ultimately, the scope of history now covers all areas of the world and time periods that pertain to human activity. This includes reconstructing history before writing was invented or taken into use by societies considered, and, especially as one goes backward in time in history, much of history has to be reconstructed based on both written and non-written material remains.

Nevertheless, in terms of education, much of the study of history in the West to date still focuses on the classical tradition as the foundation of Western civilisation, even when that study is now seen in a somewhat different light from how it was seen in the pre-postcolonial era. This in itself is significant as the West still incorporates a lion's share of world academic historical research and also continues to have a strong influence on the world, even if this influence may soon at least potentially be attenuated by, for example, the rise of the power of Asia in the twenty-first century. That there still is such a dominant focus on the classical world in the West is lamentable, as it is by now clear that the classical world itself was preceded by the ancient Near East and was also greatly influenced by it. Accordingly, events that took place in the ancient Near East can be seen as being of fundamental significance for Western civilisation and, at least due to the influence that the West has had on the world, for world history. In this connection, with the post-Christendom turn in the West, the study of the biblical documents as part of the study of the ancient Near East has also been waning in both scope and influence. However, here again, it is not necessary to require that the study of the Bible be connected with any religious commitments. Instead, for the purposes of historical study, one can focus on the history that the biblical documents portray as part of the ancient Near East, together with the study of the impact that the biblical documents have had on the world from their inception till the present.⁷

However, except for reasons that relate to the intellectual and sociopolitical history of the West, the study of the ancient Near East presents a number of challenges that may have contributed towards its relatively limited impact in the Western and world scene. One important issue is that the relatively young field is marked by certain undeniable complexity. Above all, there is a linguistic complexity that any potential student of the area will have to deal with. The area spans more than ten languages,⁸ with a number of them having differing scripts. Also keeping in mind that the first human languages were pictographic, logographic or syllabic, with alphabet invented only at a later stage, mastering all of the languages for a comprehensive proficiency in the study of the area requires a considerable investment. In addition, one should be able to be well-versed with the study of non-written remains, requiring a

good handle on archaeology. And, important works of academic scholarship on the area have been published in several languages, including English, German, French and Italian, adding to the work required in pursuing academic studies in the field. One may add to this the fact that the number of Akkadian cuneiform tablets that have been discovered runs in the tens of thousands. As the writing system is syllabic and typically on tablets that may, for example, be partially damaged, the task of just reading the documents is enormous, with many tablets still waiting for decipherment. Altogether, much of the effort in ancient Near Eastern study has been on simply decipherment and publication of tablets, and there has been only a relatively limited amount of effort spent on actually writing histories of the ancient Near East, especially in the context of spanning the whole area.⁹

This book on its part intends to help fill the gap of such history writing on the ancient Near East. Importantly, the book also aims to look at the ancient Near East in its widest possible context, that is, in the context of the world as a whole and of world history. From the perspective of the study of world history, then, this book can be seen as an area study.¹⁰ In that, the book will concentrate on a particular time period within the area in question. Within the parameters of time and area covered, the presentation will of necessity be selective, also delimiting the issues covered based on their overall relevance. Importantly, the book will also explicitly look at the significance of these events for the present. Naturally, the choice of the area, time period, events covered, viewpoints taken and significance of the events and the study as a whole for today cannot but involve a number of subjective judgements; however, this is part of the nature of historical study.¹¹ And, the book can, at least in a number of respects, claim only to elucidate plausibilities rather than certainties and cannot cover every detail; but again, this is normal for works of historical study.¹² In that, while written evidence from the ancient Near East exists and at times even seems extensive, it nevertheless has its limitations. For some periods, especially for the prehistorical era but also during the historical era, no texts are available. And, in most cases, one may conclude after any serious attempt to look at available texts that, while certainly most helpful, they are ultimately rather limited in their scope. The other type of evidence, material remains that are sometimes uncovered more or less by chance finds but more often by organised archaeological surveys and excavations, is needed to supplement any written sources.¹³ A combination of these two types of evidence can then be scrutinised based on social scientific approaches, for example. As one might guess, there are a variety of methods and approaches, and individual researchers may come to differing conclusions as to how the evidence should be interpreted.¹⁴ Any advance in academic scholarship as a human enterprise can be expected to move forward through such variety of

perspectives and opinions, and by accompanying debate and even discord.

So, the subject of this book is the changes that took place in the ancient Near East in the thirteen through tenth centuries BCE, covering the end of the Late Bronze Age and the Early Iron Age to the beginning of the second part of the Iron Age in terms of the usual periodisation that is conceptualised for the area.¹⁵ Generally, historical research has shown that a considerable transformation took place from a Late Bronze “international” (interregional) system of trade and commerce into a more regional and dispersed system of new Iron Age political entities that were on the whole smaller than previously, with such entities most notably including ancient Philistia, Aram and Israel. Exactly how and why the earlier system “collapsed” has already been studied previously, as have the new entities that arose. However, the question of how the new societies arose has not been addressed satisfactorily to date, and on the whole, the period has recently been described as still being an “unsolved riddle”.¹⁶ This book will look at the question from the perspective of migration and colonialism and will offer a new interpretation of a variety of aspects of the processes whereby the new entities arose, thus adding to previous scholarship on the topic.¹⁷ Towards the end of the book, specific comments will also be made on the legacy and typological¹⁸ significance of the new entities and processes by which they arose. Above all, the book will argue that settlement and conquest that accompanied migration played a vital part of the overall process and will provide a look at how the processes of conquest and settlement were similar and dissimilar to modern migrations and conquests.

In order to do so, the remaining part of this first chapter will look at the area as a whole and how it has been studied in the past, with a focus on the time period in question. This includes a survey of relevant textual and archaeological evidence. In the second chapter, a number of theoretical considerations important for the book will be brought forward. Migration and colonialism are processes that take place in social contexts. They can have far-reaching effects on the respective societies.¹⁹ On the whole, sometimes migration creates a new society, at other times a society can be destroyed by migration and colonialism. Accordingly, the chapter will set migration and colonialism in a wider context of how societies are born, develop and die. This will then act as a backdrop for the subsequent discussion. The third chapter will discuss the imperial context of the ancient Near East, focusing on the Egyptian, Middle Assyrian and Hittite empires. More or less, the processes that resulted in the formation of the new entities took place as these empires waxed and waned. The chapter will also comment on the Mittanian empire that existed in the area before it was taken over by the Hittite and Middle Assyrian empires, and on empires in Western Anatolia and Mycenae before the start of the migrations of the Sea Peoples at the Late Bronze–Early Iron Age transition.

All in all, one can consider that the empires of the area do set a significant context for the birth of the new entities.

From the fourth chapter on, the new entities will be discussed. The presentation starts with the migrations of the so-called Sea Peoples, focusing on the ancient Philistines as the most significant group among them in terms of a relatively lasting impact on the area and as one that has left a lasting legacy in terms of later history. That there was a migration is relatively uncontested;²⁰ however, for example, the extent to which it was a peaceful one or may have been accompanied by violence has been more disputed, and the chapter will look at these and other related issues. In the fifth chapter, the rise of ancient Israel will be discussed. This topic has already been extensively studied in the past, with a variety of theories that have been put forward, often accompanied by some very heated discussion. While the main focus will be on the origins of ancient Israel, the discussion will also include comments on the time of David and Solomon and the transformation from a decentralised tribal-based entity into a more centralised one based on a monarchy that may also for a short time had empire-like dominance over its neighbouring social groups. The written sources that ostensibly cover the period that are preserved in the Hebrew Bible will be analysed as an important part of historical reconstruction, again keeping in mind that the documents have been extensively studied in the past with a variety of views on how they should be read and to what extent they can be used for historical reconstruction. The sixth chapter will examine the third major new group that arose in the area, the ancient Arameans. In the context of a number of extensive studies that have focused on their political history, the chapter will major on social considerations in order to account for the Aramean expansion. In that, migration, colonialism and the issue of expansive processes will be considered. The final seventh chapter summarises the discussion in [Chapters 1–6](#), followed by some explicit comments on the significance of the study for modern contexts, featuring the issues of empires, migration, colonialism and violence as they pertain to human reality today. The legacy of ancient Israel and the ancient Near East as a whole will also be reflected on, followed by remarks on considerations that relate to the constitution of human societies today and on contemporary politics that can, at least at times, be marked by controversy and even cataclysm. Altogether, for one thing, the study hopes to show on its part how the ancient and modern worlds are much closer together in terms of human life and its concerns and events that take place than might appear at first sight to a casual observer today who is removed from the ancient world by geography, language and culture, and technological differences and three millennia of time that has passed in between.

B. The area and its characteristics

The Levant forms the core area of the ancient Near East for this study. Generally, it is seen as roughly consisting of the territory covered by today's Syria, Lebanon, Palestine/Israel and Jordan. It can also be taken in a wider sense of including the area covered by modern Egypt, Turkey and Iraq. In many ways, in the wider sense it is synonymous with the ancient Near East. For the purposes here, I will use the term Levant in the narrower sense. Yet, at the same time, the environs of the Levant in this study will include the areas pertaining to the wider definition. Some reference will also be made to Mycenaean Greece, with its area roughly corresponding to modern Greece, and to ancient Nubia that included the northern part of today's Sudan. In addition, some sporadic mention may be made in regard to places beyond this range.

Figure 1.1 The Near East

Source: Bryce and Birkett-Rees (2016).

From an academic perspective, studies on the Levant tend to be divided into two, those on its southern and on its northern part. The former tends to be concentrated on the area of Palestine/Israel and western Jordan, and the latter on Syria. Much of this seems to be due to the history of the disciplines. Study of the southern part is traditionally marked by the Hebrew Bible that has a long tradition in Western history, with modern textual studies of the Hebrew Bible already in full swing in the nineteenth century. The north was really discovered in an academic sense in the late nineteenth century through Western explorations and excavations. The archaeological discipline on the ancient Near East also arose at that time and soon applied to the whole ancient Near Eastern area. However, due to political developments, including the creation of the state of Israel,²¹ more archaeological work has been done in the southern Levant than in northern Levant. Furthermore, recent problems in Syria have made excavations difficult since 2011. And, due to the West's unique history with Christianity and also the relation of Judaism to the Hebrew Bible, Southern Levantine studies to date, whether overtly or more indirectly, have had to deal with the relationship of academics to faith communities. Northern Levantine studies have not really needed to deal with such issues and have always been seen as a secular discipline, at least more or less so.

Nevertheless, within this basic division in the scholarship of the Levant, with a focus on the late second millennium BCE, it is also fair to say that those studying Syria are more likely to engage with the study of ancient Anatolia as

well, for the simple reason that the Hittite empire extended to Syria in the Late Bronze Age. Assyriologists will on the whole deal with both the northern and southern parts, again probably due to the fact that the Assyrian empire covered both areas in the first millennium BCE. In the late second millennium, the middle Assyrian empire extended to Syria, so the interests of Assyriologists are more likely to impinge on the northern Levant during that period. Egyptology tends to be standing on its own as a discipline, also probably due to its somewhat independent history in comparison with the study of the rest of the ancient Near East. However, as the Egyptian empire extended to Canaan and southern Syria, and for example as the biblical sources indicate interaction with Egypt by the ancient Israelites, Egyptologists can also be discussing issues that relate to the Levant, especially its southern part. The ancient Israelites are described as having dealings with the Arameans, linking with the study of the northern Levant. Finally, there is some interaction between Mycenaean and Levantine studies, with a substantial amount of such interaction relating to the Late Bronze interregional system of which Mycenae was part, and due to the migrations of the Sea Peoples in the twelfth century BCE where a number of the migrants came from Mycenaean Greece, with a significant proportion having the Levant as their destination. So, altogether, while the studies of the northern and southern parts tend to be somewhat compartmentalised, there is also a good bit of interaction between them in the context of the wider Near East and beyond. As one might already guess based on these comments, this study itself will navigate all of these academic areas as part of its considerations. Importantly, such navigation involves interacting with differing approaches, viewpoints and perspectives, with this book taking a specific overall angle from the perspective of world historical research.

In terms of geography, the area is limited on the west by the Mediterranean Sea.²² After a narrow strip of the coastal plain, the land rises into a relatively narrow (30–50 km) ridge consisting of mountains, with the highest point reaching 3,000 metres in Lebanon and lower elsewhere. It is difficult to cross this mountain range. However, the ridge is cut by a number of valleys that enable east-west movement. At the same time, the valleys are not so frequent as to eliminate difficulties with travel on the whole using ancient methods of transportation. A tectonic fault line lies just east of the mountain ridge, with rivers running in it for a good proportion of its length. The Orontes River is the most important one in the north, while the shorter Litani River is found in the middle around Lebanon and the Jordan River in the south. The fault line coincides with the Great Rift Valley that starts from the Beqa' valley in Lebanon and runs all the way to Mozambique in South East Africa. East to the Great Rift Valley the land rises again, into the Anti-Lebanon Mountains in the

north and the Transjordanian Highlands in the south. After the anti-Lebanon mountain range and a gentle sloping down of the Transjordanian Highlands, desert starts in the East. In the north, at the very end of the Mediterranean littoral, close to modern Turkey, the Kurt Dağ rises in the east after a valley that follows the Amanus range as one goes west to east. Land south to the Kurt Dağ till the anti-Lebanon range consists of either relatively low mountains or plateau. From the perspective of the ancient Near East as a whole, the Levantine highlands and the accompanying rift valley can be considered as forming a distinct geographical region, with the narrow littoral forming a further region of its own.²³ Rainfall generally decreases towards the east and the south, with desert in the east and the very dry land in terms of rainfall in the Negev and Sinai areas in the south and southwest also counted as desert.²⁴ The land is on the whole suitable for both agriculture and pastoralism.

An important area to mention in the north is Upper Mesopotamia, also called the Jazira, an “island” between the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers. It is a distinct area consisting of rolling steppe that allows for rain-fed cultivation. However, pastoralism is also important, especially towards the south and on the whole in the more elevated parts of the terrain.²⁵ To the southeast of Jazira lie the major irrigated lowlands of Iraq, the Tigris-Euphrates valleys where rainfall is not sufficient for cultivation on its own.²⁶ Ultimately, this landscape is similar to the Nile valley in Egypt in that the river provided the main means of irrigation for its people, with rainfall not being sufficient on its own, especially as one goes towards the south from the coast there. As for Anatolia, it can be classified as a mountain region. There, ecological niches can be created at suitable locations, enabling both agriculture and pastoralism.²⁷ It would seem that there are some similarities with these areas to the Levantine highlands and the accompanying rift valley, even if, for example, Anatolia as an area is much larger. As for Greece, except for the mainland for which sea is never particularly far away, much of it consists of islands, especially towards the east and the south as one approaches Anatolia and Egypt, and seafaring of some type fits the bill there quite naturally.

The above survey has summarised the differing topographical/geographical areas and their characteristics. What is interesting also is that: the Israelites as a new entity more or less pertain to the highlands and the accompanying rift valley region, the Philistines to the coastal region, with their origins reaching all the way to the Mycenaean world more or less along the seacoasts,²⁸ and the Arameans to northern Mesopotamia/Jazira.²⁹ This picture is, of course, qualified somewhat as one looks at things more carefully; nevertheless, the observation is striking. It would seem to suggest that these people were most at home in a single ecosystem rather than spanning several of them. One can, of course, keep in mind that the bases of Egypt, Assyria and the Hittites in

Anatolia were similarly delimited within a specific geographical/topographical region, even if these entities as empires also expanded into adjacent lands.³⁰ If so, it would seem that a particular mode of life can at least potentially provide a unifying factor by which people can form into societies.³¹ A further interesting issue in this connection is that archaeological evidence suggests that such cultural division existed for the regions in question.³² Whincop's study of the pottery in the northern Levant and the northern part of the southern Levant indicates a basic distinction between inland Syria and the coast on the one hand and the northern part of the southern Levant on the other, with further distinctions within this framework.³³ When the northern part of the southern Levant concentrates on the Jezreel valley that has an easy access to the coast, one can see a basic distinction between inland Syria and the coastal areas more widely. When one also considers that the Iron Age I highland culture of the southern Levant was different from that of the lowlands that were more or less linked with the coast,³⁴ evidence from material culture suggests broad alignment with the three geographical areas of the coast, highlands and northeast Syria up to the Euphrates and towards the Jazira, with the northern highlands possibly being affected by the inland Syrian material culture.³⁵ One should here also note that the three areas were relatively isolated from each other in terms of access, as inland areas were blocked from the coast by more or less mountainous highlands which themselves would require a certain amount of effort to ascend.³⁶ All in all, then, the birth of the new entities and any accompanying migrations should be seen in the context of topographical/geographical regions.³⁷

C. Previous studies on the era

I will now summarise a representative selection of the most pertinent studies on the area that relate to the topic at hand. This will be followed by a summary of textual and archaeological evidence. References to further studies can be found in the works mentioned.³⁸ But, before doing so, it is worth noting a few issues that relate to the chronology of the era (outlined in [Table 1.1](#)). Historically, the chronology of the northern Levant has been dominated by the chronology of the southern Levant, itself subject to not a few debates and even uncertainties, including within the period covered in this book.³⁹ The same goes with Greek and Cypriot chronologies that also use differing periodisation and nomenclature from those in the Levant.⁴⁰ The discussion is complex and will not be engaged with to any substantial extent in this book, especially as

the focus here is on historical processes rather than single events.⁴¹ At the same time, one needs to keep these issues in mind as a backdrop at the minimum. While “standard” chronologies will be the broad position followed here, on occasions where chronology needs to be specifically considered, such as when considering correlation between the biblical documents and archaeology in relation to the United Monarchy in ancient Israel, some further remarks will be made in the course of the presentation.

Having commented on chronology, one should add as a reminder that considerations that relate to it are of course only a part of wider interpretative issues involved when building a cultural-historical picture of the ancient Near East. On the whole, the two types of evidence, textual and material remains that are extant from the ancient world, are always an incomplete record of the past and subject to interpretation. This is true even when interpreting material evidence can include employing methods from the so-called hard sciences, such as radiocarbon dating and statistical analysis.⁴³ Except for lack of coverage of data, sometimes

Table 1.1 Archaeological periods⁴²

Levant

Pre-Pottery Neolithic	ca. 8500–6000 BCE
Pottery Neolithic	6000–4300 BCE
Chalcolithic	4300–3300 BCE
Early Bronze I	3300–3050 BCE
Early Bronze II–III	3050–2300 BCE
Early Bronze IV/Middle Bronze I	2300–2000 BCE
Middle Bronze IIA	2000–1800/1750 BCE
Middle Bronze IIB–C	1800/1750–1550 BCE
Late Bronze I	1550–1400 BCE
Late Bronze IIA–B	1400–1200 BCE
Iron IA	1200–1150 BCE
Iron IB	1150–1000 BCE
Iron IIA	1000–925 BCE
Iron IIB	925–720 BCE
Iron IIC	720–586 BCE
Babylonian and Persian periods	586–332 BCE
Early Hellenistic	332–167 BCE
Late Hellenistic	167–37 BCE
Early Roman	37 BC–132 CE

Aegean

Late Helladic I	1700/1675–1635/1600 BCE
LH IIA	1635/1600–1480/1470 BCE
LH IIB	1480/1470–1420/1410 BCE
LH IIIA1	1420/1410–1390/1370 BCE
LH IIIA2	1390/1370–1330/1315 BCE
LH IIIB	1330/1315–1200/1190 BCE
LH IIIC	1200/1190–1075/1050 BCE

Cyprus

Late Cypriot IA	1650–1550 BCE
LC IB	1550–1400 BCE
LC IIA	1400–1300 BCE
LC IIB	1300–1225 BCE
LC IIC	1225–1150 BCE
LC IIIA	1150–1100 BCE
LC IIIB	1100–1050 BCE
Cypro-Geometric IA	1050–1000 BCE
CG IB	1000–950 BCE
CG II	950–900 BCE

archaeological and textual information may conflict, and in such cases it is the task of interpreters to suggest solutions that can be deemed as the most plausible for the situation in question. If so, overall theoretical frameworks taken by individuals and interpretative communities can be decisive guiding principles in arriving at specific conclusions. In the end, it is not possible to go back to the past to observe and check one's historical reconstructions. Instead, one may build a conceptual model that fits with data from the past. In such cases, one may consider that the extent to which available data fits with the model and the logical consistency of the model are deciding factors in

choosing between alternative proposals for solution. Altogether, as a variety of individuals will approach available data in a variety of ways, the best that one can do is to present good reasons and argumentation for adopting a particular outlook. Of course, certain details can be deemed less disputable than others; for example, the archival records unearthed from the ancient Near East clearly attest to extensive writing and administrative practice in the periods they originate from,⁴⁴ and it would then be the task of scholarship to see what the records tell about the administration itself, with probably some detailed conclusions being less certain than others. Documents themselves can also for one thing be unreliable; for example, campaign reports of ancient Near Eastern kings may be boastful and even copied from the reigns of previous kings, or the genre of fictional autobiography may be employed in terms of famous people in the area.⁴⁵ Or, as another example, texts may involve mythological features, in line with a quite extensive liking of mythology that the ancient Near Eastern people attest.⁴⁶ I shall make reference to issues that relate to the interpretation of archaeological and textual evidence where appropriate in the course of the discussion contained in this book. All works written on the area will employ their own specific approaches and perspectives, with some being closer to each other in those terms and others further apart.

Moving on to a summary of previous work proper, a few syntheses of the history of the ancient Near East as a whole exist. These include Amelie Kuhrt's *The Ancient Near East: c. 3000–330*, Marc van De Mieroop's *History of the Ancient Near East: ca. 3000–323 BC* and Mario Liverani's *The Ancient Near East: History, Society and Economy*.⁴⁷ These works include comments on the time period in focus here and provide standard overall guides to it. Of these, however, only Kuhrt includes the history of Egypt, the matter highlighting academic disciplinary differences and of Egypt being less affected by the overall cuneiform culture that covered the rest of the ancient Near East, undoubtedly due to its early more-or-less parallel development with the riverine area of Mesopotamia with its own writing system. For the history of Egypt, such books as Nicholas Grimal's *A History of Ancient Egypt* can be used for an overview, and further detail on all aspects of ancient Egypt is contained in the *Oxford Encyclopedia of Ancient Egypt*.⁴⁸ Mention may also be made here of Jack Sasson's edited collection *Civilizations of the Ancient Near East* that includes articles on a variety of aspects of the area and applicable time periods, with Egypt also covered.⁴⁹

There are a number of studies specifically on the period in question. A very readable synthesis is provided by Eric Cline, *1177 B.C.: The Year Civilization Collapsed*. The book really focuses on the international era of the Late Bronze Age before the collapse, in line with the author's work and publications more widely, even if some comments are also made on the birth of the new entities

in the Early Iron Age. Itamar Singer's *The Calm Before the Storm: Selected Writings of Itamar Singer on the End of the Late Bronze Age in Anatolia and the Levant* offers excellent information on the Late Bronze Age and its collapse but has only rather limited coverage of the subsequent era. A conference volume edited by Christoph Bachhuber and Gareth Roberts, *Forces of Transformation: The End of the Bronze Age in the Mediterranean*, offers a collection of articles looking at the Levantine coastal area and the wider Mediterranean. Within this geographical sphere, a University of London doctoral thesis by Carol Bell, *The Influence of Economic Factors on Settlement Continuity across the LBA/Iron Age Transition on the Northern Levantine Littoral*, studied how the transition affected trade and economic systems across the northern Levantine coastal area. Another congress volume edited by Fabrizio Venturi, *Societies in Transition: Evolutionary Processes in the Northern Levant between Late Bronze Age II and Early Iron Age*, focused on northern Syria and Tell Afis in particular. As Tell Afis is located in the inland area and the northeastern Syrian zone, and most of the other sites covered in the book pertain to the coast, the book has a wider coverage than just one topographical/geographical region. Aslihan Yener's *Across the Border: Late Bronze–Iron Age Relations between Syria and Anatolia*, a yet further congress volume, similarly includes coverage across the two zones in northern Syria; however, the scope also includes Anatolia, together with articles on areas east from Anatolia all the way to Assyria. The edited volume by Gershon Galil, Ayelet Gilboa, Aren Maeir and Daniel Kahn, *The Ancient Near East in the 12th–10th Centuries BCE: Culture and History*, offers a very solid collection of articles on the Near Eastern area as a whole in the early Iron Age and into Iron Age II, covering a variety of perspectives and geographical areas.⁵⁰

An important backdrop for history in the ancient Near East is the concept of empires. These can roughly be defined as societies that extend their dominance over other societies as well.⁵¹ The main empires relevant to the study here are the Egyptian, Hittite, Mittanian and Middle Assyrian empires. A synthesising history of empires in the ancient Near East as a whole, also from the perspective of ideology, *Ancient Empires: From Mesopotamia to the Rise of Islam*, is provided by Eric Cline and Mark Graham.⁵² A book-length study on Agade, the first known transregional empire that formed in the ancient Near East, is provided by Benjamin Foster's *The Age of Agade: Inventing Empire in Ancient Mesopotamia*. In many ways, the book focuses on providing a description of the era; however, it includes important insights on Agade than can be compared with empires more widely. A substantial study on the Middle and Neo-Assyrian empires by Mario Liverani, *Assyria: The Imperial Mission*, focuses on ideology and provides an excellent bibliography on the study of empires that spans all geographical areas and historical periods. An

archaeological-based study of the Middle Assyrian empire is provided by Aline Tenu, *L'expansion médio-assyrienne: Approche archéologique*. Nicholas Postgate's *Bronze Age Bureaucracy: Writing and the Practice of Government in Assyria* focuses on Middle Assyrian administration but also includes coverage of Nuzi, Alalah, Ugarit and Greece from the time. A study of the Egyptian empire that focuses on military installations in the New Kingdom period in the second millennium BCE, covering Syria-Palestine, Nubia and Libya, is provided by Ellen Morris, *The Architecture of Imperialism: Military Bases and the Evolution of Foreign Policy in Egypt's New Kingdom*. This work has been followed by a recent synthesis by the same author, *Ancient Egyptian Imperialism*, which spans from the predynastic period till the end of the Egyptian New Kingdom Empire in the eleventh century BCE. Predating Morris, another study that focuses on Egyptian imperial relations with Palestine is Carolyn Higginbotham's *Egyptianization and Elite Emulation in Ramesside Palestine: Governance and Accommodation on the Imperial Periphery*. Donald Redford's *Egypt, Canaan, and Israel in Ancient Times* includes comments on the Egyptian empire in Canaan. The Hittite and Mittanian empires seem to have been studied less from the perspective of comparative study of empires, but Trevor Bryce's *The Kingdom of the Hittites* and aspects of his *The World of the Neo-Hittite Kingdoms: A Political and Military History* and Gernot Wilhelm's *The Hurrians* can be mentioned here as good contributions.⁵³

A large number of studies exist on the Philistines and the Arameans, and a huge quantity on the ancient Israelites. I shall mention a few significant ones here; more will be referred to in the individual chapters. On the Philistines and the Sea Peoples, Trude Dothan and Moshe Dothan, *People of the Sea: The Search for the Philistines*, albeit written for popular audiences, provides the reader a history of research based on personal reminiscences of these two pioneers on the study of the Philistines.⁵⁴ The volume edited by Anne Killebrew and Gunnar Lehmann, *The Philistines and Other "Sea Peoples" in Text and Archaeology*, contains a voluminous collection of articles that cover a variety of aspects on the topic.⁵⁵ Two other recent collections to note here are *Change, Continuity, and Connectivity: North-Eastern Mediterranean at the Turn of the Bronze Age and in the Early Iron Age*, edited by Łukasz Niesiołowski-Spanò and Marek Węcowski, and *"Sea Peoples" Up-to-Date: New Research on Transformations in the Eastern Mediterranean in the 13th–11th Centuries BCE*, edited by Peter Fischer and Teresa Bürge.⁵⁶ Assaf Yasur-Landau's *The Philistines and the Aegean Migration* looks at the Philistine migration as part of the wider migration of the Sea Peoples from the perspective of both the origin of these people and also their routes and destinations, with a brief history of research included.⁵⁷ Łukasz Niesiołowski-Spanò's *Goliath's Legacy: Philistines and Hebrews in Biblical Times* focuses on

Philistia.⁵⁸ Ephraim Stern's *The Material Culture of the Northern Sea Peoples in Israel* covers the northern Israelite territory.⁵⁹ A recent doctoral dissertation by Brian Janeway, *Cultural Transition in the Northern Levant during the Early Iron Age as Reflected in the Aegean-Style Pottery at Tell Tayinat*, studied the Sea Peoples in the northern Levant, with a focus on Tell Tayinat.⁶⁰ One should also here note a voluminous list of publications on Tell-es Şafi/Gath by Aren Maeir, the director of the recent excavations there, and his colleagues.

On the Arameans, the most recent extensive single-volume study is provided by Lawson Younger, *A Political History of the Arameans: From Their Origins to the End of Their Polities*. Recent collected volumes of studies include *Wandering Arameans: Arameans Outside Syria, Textual and Archaeological Perspectives*, edited by Angelika Berlejung, Aren Maeir and Andreas Schüle, *Arameans, Chaldeans, and Arabs in Babylonia and Palestine in the First Millennium B.C.*, edited by Angelika Berlejung and Andreas Schüle, and *The Aramaeans in Ancient Syria*, edited by Herbert Niehr. Edward Lipinski's single-authored volume, *The Arameans: Their Ancient History, Culture, Religion*, remains a substantive contribution, as does Helen Sader's older doctoral dissertation, *Les états araméens de Syrie: depuis leur fondation jusqu'à leur transformation en provinces assyriennes*.⁶¹

A voluminous literature exists on ancient Israel from a variety of perspectives. A plethora of commentaries, monographs and articles examine the biblical documents themselves.⁶² On the more archaeological side, Israel Finkelstein's *The Archaeology of the Israelite Settlement* remains a classic study.⁶³ William Dever's *Who Were the Early Israelites and Where Did They Come From?* provides a well-informed popular, even if in a number of ways also polemical, account of the origins of Israel.⁶⁴ Ralph Hawkins takes an integrative approach based on archaeology in his *How Israel Became a People*.⁶⁵ The book includes a reasonably fair brief summary of the history of research on the topic of early Israelite origins.⁶⁶ Koert van Bekkum's *From Conquest to Coexistence: Ideology and Antiquarian Intent in the Historiography of Israel's Settlement in Canaan* combines an analysis of historiography and archaeological patterns.⁶⁷ Avraham Faust's *Israel's Ethnogenesis: Settlement, Interaction, Expansion and Resistance* looks at Israel's origins from the perspective of ethnogenesis.⁶⁸ Concerns relating to ethnicity are also attested in Anne Killebrew's *Biblical Peoples and Ethnicity: An Archaeological Study of Egyptians, Canaanites, Philistines and Early Israel, 1300–1100 B.C.E.*, even if from a wider regional perspective. Moreover, Killebrew's book includes wider considerations of the preceding Late Bronze Age.⁶⁹ A focus on the Late Bronze Age is also provided by the monographs by Emanuel Pfoh, *Syria-Palestine in the Late Bronze Age: An Anthropology of Politics and Power*, and Brendon Betz, *The Land before the Kingdom of Israel:*

The Southern Levant and the People Who Populated It, with the latter also looking at the Late Bronze-Iron Age transition. The recent edited collection by Lester Grabbe, *The Land of Canaan in the Late Bronze Age*, focuses on the earlier period but includes articles on the Early Iron Age as well.⁷⁰ *The Quest for the Historical Israel*, by Israel Finkelstein and Amihai Mazar, provides a good overview from an archaeological perspective of some recent issues that have been debated.⁷¹ This author's publications have also examined the topic, and these will be referred to in more detail in [Chapter 5](#) on ancient Israel.⁷²

D. Overview of textual evidence

The main document that was available for Europeans from the ancient Near East before the nineteenth century was the Hebrew Bible, or the Old Testament as it was called based on the Christian religion. The document had been passed on through history, first by the postexilic Jewish communities and then by both Jewish and Christian communities.⁷³ It should thus come as no surprise that the interpretation of the documents was tied with the Jewish and Christian religions. But, in any case, it was the first set of documents from the ancient Near East that was subjected to modern study. The methodology of that study can be considered to have been established in the nineteenth century, and much of subsequent scholarship has still been based on developments in interpretation at that time, an issue that I will comment on in more detail in [Chapter 5](#). However, for the moment, it is important also to note that available biblical manuscripts that are relevant to early Israel in the thirteenth through tenth centuries BCE date from the third century BCE at the earliest.⁷⁴ Accordingly, there is roughly a thousand-year difference between the events portrayed in the documents and their earliest attested manuscripts, and this for its part can account for controversies that relate to the question of when the documents were written and the variety of positions taken on the issue by recent interpreters.⁷⁵

As such, the available texts provide a good-sized portrayal of early Israel, especially when seen in comparison to documents that we now have available from the ancient Near East. The biblical books Genesis-Joshua⁷⁶ provide a history of ancient Israel from creation to the early part of the conquest and settlement of the land of Canaan that is geographically located in the southern part of the Levantine highlands and the accompanying rift valley, with the books of Exodus to Deuteronomy describing the exodus of the ancient Israelites from Egyptian slavery and their migration towards the land of

Canaan. The book of Judges provides an account of the ancient Israel in the highlands as a tribal-based entity between 1200 and 1000 BCE. The books of Samuel and the early chapters of the books of Kings describe the transformation of the tribal-based society into a monarchy, and the early stages of that monarchy before its division into two kingdoms in the tenth century BCE. The rest of the books of Kings describe the history of the divided monarchies all the way until their destruction, first the northern kingdom by the Assyrians in the late eighth century BCE and then the southern one by the Babylonians in the early sixth century BCE. The books of Chronicles cover the same events as Samuel-Kings, with a number of variations in detail. Finally, the book of Ruth portrays family events that relate to the ancestors of its first dynastic king, David.

A number of comments about the biblical evidence will be made ahead, but for the moment, the overall approach to the biblical texts taken in this book will be outlined here. A main key to interpretation is that the biblical books that portray the period⁷⁷ are seen here as primarily *political* documents, even when religion and belief in the divine can be an integral part of them, in line with common thinking and practice in the ancient Near East and pre-enlightenment societies more widely.⁷⁸ It is important to stress here that the biblical books were written by ancient Israelite authors with their contemporaries in mind, without any real knowledge about how the documents might be interpreted by later generations, especially in settings far removed from the contexts of the original writers. Accordingly, reconstructions of how the documents were meant to be understood in their original settings should not be dependent on modern religious and political considerations that can often be part of academic and popular discussions today.⁷⁹ One must try as much as possible to concentrate on the ancient world and its settings and concerns. It is, of course, true that any academic or historian will work in their contemporary contexts and may, for example, use theoretical frameworks for interpretation that have only been developed in modernity, or may even have been constructed by the very interpreter. However, the interpreter should nevertheless let the texts speak for themselves, rather than attempt to impose a conceptual construction that is alien to those texts and their original setting. In this, the evolutionary approach to the development of the ancient Israelite institutions and religion that derives from eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European post-enlightenment biblical scholarship epitomised by the works of Martin Lehrsrecht de Wette and Julius Wellhausen, is one such key alien construct that has had a hold of much of biblical studies for some two centuries now.⁸⁰ As an important part of this, the idea of Wellhausen that ancient Israelite worship evolved from free-spirited to ritualistic⁸¹ is completely contradicted by more recent ethnographic data,

according to which simpler societies tend to attest *more* complex ritual systems than advanced ones.⁸² The other key premise of Wellhausen was that the early Israelite society was simple in terms of its social structure and developed towards a more complex set of institutions from there.⁸³ It is correct that the early Israelite society had not developed the institutions of other ancient Near Eastern monarchies, with kingship arising only around 1000 BCE. However, it is not warranted to assume that the ancient Israelites were isolated from their overall Late Bronze–Early Iron Age ancient Near Eastern environment that already attested a complex set of societal developments, as the considerations of this volume will on their part also show. In fact, a rather straightforward reading of the biblical documents that portray the premonarchical time connects with a portrayal of a complex set of ritual arrangements with their accompanying cultic institutions, without, however, a complex set of political institutions attested in those documents. In this, in fact, the relevant biblical documents reflect and wish to advocate a relatively nonhierarchical societal structure that is fitting for a nonstate era.⁸⁴ In that sense, then, Wellhausen's views are to some extent apt, but only in a rather limited sense. On the whole, the Wellhausenian premise about development from simple to complex in ancient Israel should be seen as an unproven conceptualisation. A typological parallel can be made with beliefs about the racial superiority of Western peoples around the nineteenth century.⁸⁵ Such racial beliefs could work, and have still been operative to a certain extent to date, as Western peoples have had power over the world based on their relative technological advancement. They could then correlate that power with patterns of the observed physical outlook of the people of the societies that were less advanced technologically.⁸⁶ Similarly, the Wellhausenian basic premise about development from simple to complex is a neat and easily understood concept that also correlates with an overall concept of evolution and an overall trajectory of technological development of humankind. However, the confusion arises above all when the Wellhausenian trajectory is taken in isolation, with Wellhausen more or less not able to do otherwise as the additional considerations available from sociology and anthropology and studies of the rest of the ancient Near East were not (yet) available to him and his contemporaries.

The interpretation produced here suggests that the biblical documents that portray early Israel reflect the Late Bronze–Early Iron Age milieu.⁸⁷ In this sense, it is closest to so-called maximalist approaches, in contrast to mainstream approaches that tend to follow Wellhausenian assumptions about the history of ancient Israel and so-called minimalist approaches that see most everything about the history of ancient Israel as a late fictional construction.⁸⁸ However, even in the context of a more maximalist approach, it is important to recognise that the texts are literary products and should be read as such, taking

the existence of a variety of genres in them and the implications of that into account.⁸⁹ That being the case, many of the details should not be read literally but are better seen as semi-historical (or semi-mythical),⁹⁰ where historical details are mixed with fiction, with each individual detail having to be analysed on their own, even if often also as part of their wider textual and overall historical setting. Further comments on the reading of the relevant biblical texts will be made especially in [Chapter 5](#); however, some remarks will be made throughout the book in regard to select details of the biblical materials, especially when they at least potentially relate to independent extrabiblical ancient Near Eastern evidence. The reader is also referred to works by this author on a variety of issues that bear on reading the relevant biblical documents in their archaeological and ancient Near Eastern contexts. These works cover a variety of issues that cannot be touched upon here due to practical limitations of scope.⁹¹

An overview of textual materials uncovered since the modern discovery of the ancient Near East now follows. A good amount of evidence that relates to especially the southern Levant can be found in Egyptian documents. Campaign reports and inscriptions and toponym lists by New Kingdom pharaohs as part of establishing and maintaining control of the Egyptian empire there constitute a significant component in this, starting from Thutmose III and Amenhotep II in the fifteenth century BCE, then Seti I (fourteenth century BCE), Ramesses II (thirteenth century BCE), Merneptah (late thirteenth century BCE), and then by Sheshonq I (tenth century BCE) well after the end of the Egyptian empire in the Levant.⁹² The so-called Israel stele by Merneptah (ca. 1205) is the first mention of Israel in extrabiblical texts.⁹³ Also important is the account of Ramesses III's battle with the Philistines in the twelfth century BCE, recorded at Medinet Habu and in Papyrus Harris.⁹⁴

Texts of administrative nature in relation to the Egyptian empire in the Levant are also part of this corpus of documents that have survived.⁹⁵ Importantly, one can count the Amarna letters, the diplomatic correspondence by the Egyptian pharaohs Akhenaten and Amenhotep III in the fourteenth century BCE with its Levantine vassals and beyond, in this category. The archive consists of more than 300 letters written in Akkadian cuneiform.⁹⁶ Finally, one may mention the Story of Wenamun that provides background information about the Egyptian relationship with the northern part of its Levantine empire, especially Byblos at the close of the Twentieth Dynasty.⁹⁷

Assyrian documents written in cuneiform provide the main source of textual information from the northern Levant, especially the Jazira area in Upper Mesopotamia and its environs. Royal inscriptions from Assyria more or less provide the backbone of historical reconstruction from a political perspective.⁹⁸ These are often campaign reports but can also be of different

nature, including building reports, especially of temples. As the documents cover issues that relate to Assyria, only a part of them relate to Jazira that lies west of the Assyrian core area. Archival documents from the area can also be used to complement the picture from an administrative and wider societal perspective. These exist particularly for the period between mid-thirteenth century BCE and early to mid-eleventh century BCE.⁹⁹ Strictly speaking, royal inscriptions are part of the archival record. A final group of texts to mention here are Assyrian chronicles that may contain some information about Middle Assyria, even if their extent tends to be rather limited.¹⁰⁰ A number of these come from neo-Assyrian libraries. In general, few records are available for the period between 1050 BCE and 900 BCE from Assyria.

Hittite documents written in cuneiform provide information from Anatolia till 1200 BCE. In this, Hittite archives from Boğazköy are the biggest available source.¹⁰¹ Information that relates to Hittite interests in Upper Mesopotamia, including the establishment and affairs of their empire that extended to the upper Euphrates in the east towards the end of the Late Bronze Age, is embedded in this documentation.¹⁰² The archives in Emar and Ugarit can also be mentioned here, with both of them falling under the Hittite sphere as the empire expanded in the Late Bronze Age.¹⁰³ The materials from Ugarit have been studied extensively since their discovery in the mid-twentieth century. Except for the famous mythological texts, materials relating to historical reconstruction can also be discerned.¹⁰⁴ The production of these texts, however, completely ceased after the destruction of Ugarit at the start of the twelfth century BCE, and they thus cannot serve as sources for reconstructing the history of the Early Iron Age.

For the neo-Hittite period after 1200 BCE till the eighth century BCE, the Hieroglyphic Luwian inscriptions provide a main source of information.¹⁰⁵ This information is indispensable for tracing the history of the Neo-Hittite states that arose in the eastern part of the former Hittite empire. Further eastward from the neo-Hittite area, the Aramean inscriptions in alphabetic script from the ninth century BCE on are important.¹⁰⁶ However, the majority of available materials, including for historical reconstruction, come from Assyrian sources. The Aramaic inscriptions also come from after the period under study in this book, so they will be looked at only cursorily here. Altogether, Assyrian texts are more or less the sole source of written information for reconstructing the period between 1200 BCE and 900 BCE for the Arameans. This said, the biblical texts in Genesis 24–35, Judges 3, 2 Samuel 8–10, 1 Kings 10–11, 1 Chronicles 18–19 and 2 Chronicles 1 also make reference to the Arameans.¹⁰⁷

In Phoenicia, inscriptions exist from the tenth century from Byblos that allow for a reconstruction of a king list there.¹⁰⁸ Some very limited material

can also be recovered from the rest of Phoenicia and also northern Israel from the twelfth to tenth centuries BCE.¹⁰⁹ From the Judaeian Shephelah, the main inscriptions are the 'Izbet Šarṭah ostrakon, the Khirbet Qeiyafa ostrakon, the Gezer Calendar and the Tell Zayit abecedary, and from the central hill country, a few very short inscriptions exist, on the whole, these range from the twelfth to the tenth centuries BCE.¹¹⁰ They are all of alphabetic type. Except for the materials from Byblos, the inscriptions from Phoenicia and Israel cannot really be used directly for historical reconstruction but can help in assessing the state of literacy and writing in ancient Israel in the early period.¹¹¹

From Philistia, just two linear inscriptions containing more than one or two signs were found, both from eleventh-century BCE contexts, both of at least broadly of Cypro-Minoan type.¹¹² There is, however, a fair amount of material on the Philistines and the rest of the Sea People in Egyptian, Ugaritic and Hittite sources that pertain to the thirteenth to the tenth centuries, with the Medinet Habu inscription and Papyrus Harris as providing particularly important information.¹¹³ The biblical documents, especially of Judges-2 Samuel, also contain information about the Philistines.

Finally, it should be mentioned here that cuneiform sources have been found from the area of ancient Israel and Philistia from the Bronze Age, but also from the neo-Assyrian period.¹¹⁴ Again, none of these are directly relevant for historical reconstruction, especially for the period from the thirteenth to the tenth centuries. At the same time, one can see a break between the cuneiform tradition of the late Bronze Age and a move into writing in alphabet in the succeeding period that is relevant when discussing the origins of ancient Israel.

Altogether, one can summarise that textual evidence from the area exists but has its clear limitations. In such a situation, it is no wonder that people wish to employ any possible additional ways and means to obtain information that relates to the period. Material evidence, the subject of the next section, provides an important element of this.

E. Overview of material evidence

We already made comments on the area and its landscape as a whole, and also that archaeological excavations are divided into the southern and northern Levantine areas, with considerably more work done on the south than in the north, much due to the modern political developments in the area. Altogether, the amount of material from the south in particular is extensive, if not huge, and cannot be covered here in any detail. Instead, I will again concentrate on a

representative set of works covering the Levantine area and archaeological surveys and excavations there, with a focus on the period between 1300–900.¹¹⁵ An overall guide is provided by *The Oxford Handbook of the Archaeology of the Levant: C. 8000–332 BCE* and summary details on specific places and other issues by the slightly older *The Oxford Encyclopedia of Archaeological Excavations in the Near East*.¹¹⁶ Fairly detailed information about excavations in the south and their findings is provided by *The New Encyclopedia of Archaeological Excavations in the Holy Land*.¹¹⁷ This four-volume set was published in 1993, with a supplementary volume in 2008 that updated the information in the original set. Some excavations have been conducted since then, with information available in individual excavation reports and also on the internet. As for surveys, Adam Zertal's Manasseh Hill country survey covers the northern central highlands.¹¹⁸ Robert Miller's gazetteer on the north central hill country also provides a helpful brief overview of the area.¹¹⁹ The books by Dever, Finkelstein, Faust, Hawkins and Van Bekkum referred to in the foregoing include information about the archaeology of the hill country and beyond.¹²⁰ An example of issues that relate to recent debates about the relationship of the biblical text to archaeology, including in the tenth century BCE, is the volume by Israel Finkelstein and Amihai Mazar, *The Quest for the Historical Israel*, also already mentioned in the foregoing.¹²¹ The now somewhat older *Anchor Bible Dictionary* still includes a variety of pertinent information on the archaeology of the area relating to ancient Israel, and Amihai Mazar's *Archaeology and the Land of the Bible 10000–586 BCE* remains a useful overall synthesis to date.¹²² On the east side of the Jordan, Burton MacDonald's *"East of the Jordan": Territories and Sites of the Hebrew Scriptures* and *The Southern Transjordan Edomite Plateau and the Dead Sea Rift Valley: The Bronze Age to the Islamic Period (3800/3700 BC-AD 1917)* cover the area east and southeast of the Jordan River.¹²³ Thomas Petter's *The Land Between the Two Rivers: Early Israelite Identities in Central Transjordan* also includes information from the area east and southeast of the Jordan, as does Bruce Routledge's *Moab in the Iron Age: Hegemony, Polity, Archaeology*.¹²⁴ James Hoffmeier's *Ancient Israel in Sinai* includes a good number of considerations of the archaeology of the named area.¹²⁵ This author's commentaries on the biblical books of Numbers and Joshua incorporate remarks on all places mentioned in these books, thus covering most sites that relate to the early Israelite settlement in the biblical narratives.¹²⁶ Archaeological evidence relating to Egyptian activity in Palestine can be gleaned, for example, from Higginbotham's and Morris's works already referred to.¹²⁷

In the northern Levant, in addition to *The Oxford Handbook of the Archaeology of the Levant: C. 8000–332 BCE* and *The Oxford Encyclopedia of*

Archaeological Excavations in the Near East, one may consult *The Routledge Handbook of the Peoples and Places of Ancient Western Asia*.¹²⁸ Whincop's *Pots, People, and Politics* that was already referred to includes, except for its study of pottery typology, an analysis of northern Levantine sites in the area of today's Syria and Lebanon, with a selection of sites from northern Palestine/Israel also included.¹²⁹ Ömür Harmanşah's *Cities and the Shaping of Memory in the Ancient Near East* includes a description of main regional surveys in Upper Mesopotamia in the Late Bronze–Iron Age transition.¹³⁰ The recent volume edited by Mark Weeden and Lee Ullmann, *Hittite Landscape and Geography*, covers geographical and archaeological data that pertains to the Hittite empire, including its eastern part in the northern Levant.¹³¹ A map of surveys in the Hittite sphere is included in Owen Doonan's "Surveying Landscapes: Some Thoughts on the State of Survey Archaeology in Anatolia".¹³² Archaeological information from Upper Mesopotamia is also included in Tenu's *L'expansion médio-assyrienne*, already referred to earlier.¹³³

One may here summarise a few general questions that relate to the area under consideration. One is the question of continuity and change in terms of people and people groups and material culture, and the relation of changes in material culture to changes in people and people groups.¹³⁴ As part of changes in material culture, one distinctive overall development is the increase in the use of iron as a metal of choice in comparison to bronze in the Late Bronze–Iron Age transition. One question to ask is to what extent the expanded use of iron is merely the result of diffusion of the technology, or if it in some way also relates to changes in societies in the area. An increasing use of the alphabet is also a characteristic of this era, and again, one may ask the question of its relation to processes of diffusion and changes in people and people groups in a given area. In addition, there seems to be an overall increase in rural settlements as against urban concentrations with the coming of the Iron Age, at least in places, and one can ask the question of how these should be interpreted.¹³⁵ Finally, one may ask if climate change and, on the other hand, human activity and, for example, general erosion and sedimentation have had impacts that have been contributory factors to changes in the overall area.¹³⁶

Before moving on to the next chapter, one may note that the above survey also shows that while there has been an extensive amount of scholarship on the ancient Near East for more than a century, many of the studies on the ancient Levant and its environs in the thirteenth through tenth centuries BCE are relatively brief or concentrate on only a part of the overall area, or at least more or less only a part of the era in question from a chronological perspective. Also, while migration has already been studied, migration studies do not generally link with studies of colonialism.¹³⁷ Migration studies also tend to be limited to one specific area.¹³⁸ At the same time, while empires in the

area during the period in question have been studied quite extensively, even from the perspective of colonialism, their study has generally not been linked with migration studies, even when such issues as population transfers by Egyptian, Hittite and Assyrian empires have been covered. In addition, the issue of settler colonialism as a specific colonial formation that has recently attracted considerable attention in world historical studies has hardly been considered for the ancient world, except for ancient Israel by this author.¹³⁹ Altogether, an investigation of how migration and colonialism in their various forms may relate to the birth, expansion, development, contraction and dying out of societies has not been carried out from an integrative perspective for this area and period, if even at all. Providing such an analysis from a comparative social scientific perspective should provide new insights for the study of the area and period in question, and also for the study of migration and colonialism in general. The next chapter will look at theoretical issues that relate to migration and colonialism and the birth, expansion, development, contraction and dying out of societies. This will be followed by chapters that examine the Levant and its environs in the thirteenth through the tenth centuries BCE from the vantage point of the theoretical framework laid out in that chapter.

Notes

- 1 See e.g. Nolan and Lenski 2015; Lenski 2005; Scott 2017; Møller 2017 for these developments. The question of why industrialisation took place in Europe has been a central question in modern social sciences and their development; see Møller 2017:1, 148; the work more broadly includes analysis of possible reasons for the changes in Europe and a proposed related model; see also Lenski 2005:169–185 from a somewhat different perspective.
- 2 More or less in the sense of analogy.
- 3 For the spread of farming, see Bellwood 2013:123–157; cf. Scott 2017:37–67.
- 4 Cf. e.g. Ferro 1997/1994.
- 5 Cf. comments in Dietler 2010:27–53.
- 6 Cf. Dietler 2010:27–53.
- 7 I note that one might also here ask the question of whether the shunning of the ancient Near East as compared with the classical world is due to the classical world more or less fitting geographically with Europe, whereas

the ancient Near East is clearly outside Europe. But the events of the Bible clearly never took place in Europe, so this may be at least partly a moot point. Another issue is that the ancient Near East is sometimes seen as a “mythical” place in more popular imagination. However, such a view is mistaken, as it is ultimately about confusing mythological aspects of ancient Near Eastern artefacts with actual realities, and possibly the mythological aspects of the Bible have been one contributing factor in that. Perhaps the comments made in Said 2003/1978 should also be taken into account, in that the views that the West often had about the Near East, especially in the nineteenth century, were based on a romantic-mythical approach to the Orient and ancient Near East as its predecessor (including with a dose of perceived Western superiority), and some of such thinking may have carried on till the present time.

- 8 The most important ones being Akkadian, Sumerian, Egyptian, Hittite, Ugaritic, Hebrew and Aramaic, to which can be added, for example, Luwian, Hurrian, Elamite and Persian, and also to some extent Greek after the Greek conquest of the area, even though at around that time what is seen as the ancient Near East as a concept and an era was drawing to a close.
- 9 See Liverani 2014:5–7.
- 10 Cf. Manning 2003: esp. 145–162.
- 11 Cf. e.g. Manning 2003; Curthoys and Docker 2010.
- 12 Cf. e.g. Otto 2012.
- 13 How written and material evidence intermesh for the period in question in this study will be discussed throughout the book, with a concerted overall summary of each type of evidence at the end of this introduction.
- 14 The book will include comments with this aspect in mind throughout.
- 15 Chronology and periodisation are nevertheless also contested in their details; see later in this chapter for further details.
- 16 Galil, Gilboa, Maeir and Kahn 2012:IX.
- 17 At least to my knowledge, this is the first book-length study of the area for the period in question from an expressly social scientific perspective, focusing on migration and colonialism.
- 18 Even if really more or less in the sense of analogy.
- 19 Thus Manning 2013:2.
- 20 A notable exception has been Susan Sherratt; see e.g. Janeway 2013:20–21 for

a related commentary.

- 21 Note also the division and colonial takeover of the Ottoman territories in the area by Britain and France at the time of the First World War and its aftermath.
- 22 In many ways this summarises the descriptions in Wilkinson 2003: esp. 12–18; Younger 2016: esp. 1–23; and MacDonald 2000: esp. 21–34.
- 23 Wilkinson 2003:12 fig. 1.2, 17. I have used the term highlands and the accompanying rift valley instead of Wilkinson’s uplands and the adjacent rift valley.
- 24 See esp. Wilkinson 2003:18, fig. 2.1.
- 25 See Wilkinson 2003: esp. 12 fig. 1.2, 17, 100–127.
- 26 See Wilkinson 2003: esp. 12 fig. 1.2, 17, 71–99.
- 27 See Wilkinson 2003: esp. 12 fig. 1.2, 17, 185–209, and Weeden and Ullmann 2017 for a more detailed analysis of the area.
- 28 Note also that the Phoenicians were situated in the coastal region.
- 29 Much of this basic division is, of course, based on textual evidence, on which more in the following.
- 30 Note also the caging effect along rivers that helped create the first civilisations in Egypt and the Mesopotamian river valleys. See Mann 2012/1986: esp. 38, 73–89; cf. Scott 2017; Morris 2018:11–38.
- 31 For more on societies from a conceptual perspective, see ahead, Chapter 2.
- 32 Even when keeping in mind that as such pots do not necessary equate to peoples; cf. the discussion ahead.
- 33 See Whincop 2008: Vol. 1, 343–379.
- 34 See e.g. Finkelstein 1988:324–330, and cf. Chapter 5 for further comments around this issue.
- 35 However, no sites were examined by Whincop from the northern Levantine highlands/ mountain areas (see Whincop 2008: Vol. 2, map 2 for the sites examined). Therefore, the nature of any material assemblage from them must remain a guess, at least based on Whincop’s work which I assume would have tried to access all available data as much as possible; cf. his comments in Whincop 2008: Vol. 2, 1.
- 36 Even with a number of valleys connecting the coast and the inlands beyond the mountains, as just indicated.

- 37 This issue will be elucidated further in the course of the book.
- 38 On the whole, the literature is enormous, modern studies of the history and culture of the area have now been ongoing for more than hundred years. It is well acknowledged that no single individual can master the literature as a whole today. Accordingly, the selection here cannot be in any way exhaustive, just representative.
- 39 Cf. the comments in Whincop 2008:47–61; Thomas 2016. These include further references to related literature.
- 40 Cf. Whincop 2008:47–61. One should also keep in mind that correlation with Egyptian chronology forms a crucial part of determining Levantine chronologies, as do links with Mesopotamian chronology for Iron Age II.
- 41 A number of issues involved in the context of the wider region were presented in James 1991; for two recent summary treatments on Levantine and Aegean chronology, see Sharon 2014; Manning 2010.
- 42 Data for the Levant adapted from Mazar 1992:30 for pre-586 BC, and from NEAEHL, p. 1529, for post-586 BCE; most dates approximate. Data for the Aegean adapted from Manning 2010:17, 23; dates can only be approximate, and Cretan and Cycladic chronologies are not included here. Data for Cyprus based on Sharon 2014:56, 62, approximate dates.
- 43 Cf. comments in Bintliff and Pearce 2012 on archaeological method and theory.
- 44 Cf. e.g. Pedersén 1998.
- 45 Cf. e.g. Longman 1990.
- 46 See e.g. ANET; cf. also comments in Liverani 2014:3–5.
- 47 Kuhrt 1995; Van de Mieroop 2016; Liverani 2014.
- 48 Grimal 1992; OEAE.
- 49 CANE.
- 50 Bell 2005; Bachhuber and Roberts 2009; Singer 2011; Galil, Gilboa, Maeir and Kahn 2012; Yener 2013; Cline 2014.
- 51 See esp. Chapters 2 and 3 for further comments on empires.
- 52 Cline and Graham 2011. It is also of interest to note here that the tradition of continuing empires all the way to the present in Eurasia can be examined by reading Burbank and Cooper 2010 that covers the period from ancient Rome and China till the Second World War and McCoy 2017 on the US empire from the first half of the twentieth century on, and some comments

in relation to the more modern empires will be made in the concluding chapter of this book. Samuel Eisenstadt's influential, even if already a little older, study, Eisenstadt 1993/1963 should also be mentioned here.

53 Wilhelm 1989; Redford 1992; Higginbotham 2000; Bryce 2005; Morris 2005; Tenu 2009; Bryce 2012; Postgate 2013; Liverani 2014; Foster 2016; Morris 2018.

54 Dothan and Dothan 1992. The volume includes numerous beautiful illustrations, with a good portion of them in colour.

55 Killebrew and Lehmann 2013.

56 Niesiołowski-Spanò and Węcowski 2018; Fischer and Bürge 2017.

57 Yasur-Landau 2010.

58 Niesiołowski-Spanò 2016

59 Stern 2013.

60 Janeway 2013. Janeway does not seem to be aware of Whincop 2008, referred to in the foregoing.

61 Sader 1987; Lipinski 2000; Berlejung and Schüle 2013; Niehr 2014a; Younger 2016; Berlejung, Maeir and Schüle 2017;.

62 Some more comments on these will be made ahead, especially in Chapter 5 on ancient Israel.

63 Finkelstein 1988.

64 Dever 2003.

65 Hawkins 2013.

66 Hawkins 2013:29–48.

67 Van Bekkum 2010.

68 Faust 2006.

69 Killebrew 2005.

70 Pfoh 2016; Betz 2016; Grabbe 2016b.

71 Finkelstein and Mazar 2007.

72 See ahead, incl. esp. in Chapter 5.

73 For the variety of manuscripts, including in Hebrew and in translations to Greek and other languages, see Tov 2012:23–93, 115–154. The Qumran manuscripts from the third to first centuries BCE that were found only in the twentieth century and that include biblical texts can also be explicitly

mentioned here; see Tov 2012:93–115. This at least broadly ties with the rediscovery of the ancient Near East from the nineteenth century on.

74 Strictly speaking, the chronology of the biblical documents themselves indicates that early Israel originated in the highlands from ca. 1400 BCE on, however, it is generally thought in modern scholarship since the twentieth century that a date from the mid-thirteenth century is more appropriate.

75 See esp. Chapter 5 for further discussion around this matter.

76 Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, Deuteronomy and Joshua.

77 Save perhaps Ruth, which will not be commented on in this book.

78 See ahead for further comments on the overall trajectory of societal development in the history of humankind.

79 Further on such issues, see Chapter 8, but also with some comments in Chapter 5.

80 For more details about the development of modern scholarship on the Old Testament/ Hebrew Bible, see Chapter 5 (including with comments on de Wette).

81 See Wellhausen 1905/1878.

82 See Rappaport 1984/1968: esp. 236–237. Interestingly, one cannot but see a typological similarity with biblical rituals when reading Rappaport's descriptions about the ritual of the tribal Tsembaga people (see Rappaport 1984/1968: esp. 99–223 for the descriptions). Otherwise, on simple vs advanced in the context of technological development, see comments ahead, esp. in Chapter 2.

83 See Wellhausen 1905/1878.

84 On the issue of states, see esp. Chapters 2 and 3. On issues that relate to hierarchy, see ahead, *passim*.

85 Cf. e.g. the comments around the relationship of anthropology and colonialism in Wolfe 1999, *passim*.

86 Cf. the comments on race in Nolan and Lenski 2015:153–155.

87 For detailed argumentation for this, see esp. Pitkänen 2010; Pitkänen 2014a; Pitkänen 2014/2003; Pitkänen 2015; Pitkänen 2017a, and cf. comments ahead.

88 For more details, see Chapter 5.

89 For genre considerations as a whole, see Tate 2008, *passim*.

- 90 For the terms “semi-historical” and “semi-mythical”, see Pitkänen 2017a:15, 37. For the reading of Genesis 1–11 that comes closest to “full” myth, cf. e.g. Wenham 2003:9–34; Anderson 2017:73–96.
- 91 See esp. the monographs (Pitkänen 2014/2003), the commentaries (Pitkänen 2010 and Pitkänen 2017a) and the article-length studies (Pitkänen 2014a; Pitkänen 2015; Pitkänen 2016a).
- 92 English translations of the texts can be found in ARE, Vols. 2–3, 5; see also ANET, 227–263.
- 93 I will discuss the stele in further detail in Chapter 5.
- 94 See ARE IV, 1–412. Most important related extracts will be given and discussed in Chapter 4. For a list of sources on the Philistines, see ahead.
- 95 On these, see Morris 2005, *passim*; Higginbotham 2000:17–73.
- 96 Most of these can be found in KNUDTZON with Akkadian transcriptions. William Moran’s English translation of the correspondence (AL) includes those published since KNUDTZON, and a recent edition and translation to English by Anson Rainey (2015) also exists. For the archive itself, see Pedersén 1998:38–42.
- 97 Text in English translation e.g. in ARE V, 557–591.
- 98 See RIMA 1–3.
- 99 See Pedersén 1998:80–103 for an overview of the middle Assyrian archives; see also Postgate 2013, including comments on pp. 56–63 that provide a kind of overview on when the variety of documents were written. The materials have been only partially analysed and published (cf. the comments in Postgate 2013:86 on archives in Aššur).
- 100 See ABC and MC.
- 101 See Pedersén 1998:42–61.
- 102 The Mainz Hittitology Portal includes a catalogue of Hittite texts by classification, www.hethport.uni-wuerzburg.de/HPM/index.php [accessed 6/9/2018]. Of these, historical texts, letters and treaties (with treaties classified/classifiable under historical texts) are among the most pertinent for the empire period.
- 103 Overview of the archives in Pedersén 1998:61–68 (Emar), 68–80 (Ugarit).
- 104 The main edition of the texts as a whole is KTU.
- 105 CHLI provides an authoritative edition of these texts. Payne 2010:4 has a useful map on where the inscriptions were found and when.

- 106 See KAI for the inscriptions.
- 107 See esp. Chapter 6 for further comments around the biblical references.
- 108 See Lemaire 2012:291–295 for fuller details.
- 109 Lemaire 2012:295–296.
- 110 Lemaire 2012:297–303.
- 111 Cf. Lemaire 2012:303. Further comments on writing and literacy are made in Chapter 5.
- 112 Yasur-Landau 2010:309. These are discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. Cf. also e.g. Davis, Maeir and Hitchcock 2015.
- 113 For a full list that includes some limited material beyond these sources, see Adams and Cohen 2013:645–664. Cf. also comments above on Egyptian sources relating to the Levant more widely.
- 114 For details, see Horowitz, Oshima and Sanders 2006, with a summary table and map of the evidence on pp. 5–6. An updated edition in 2018, Eisenbrauns, includes four new tablets, from Hazor and Megiddo, and from Jerusalem for the first time.
- 115 Again, these publications have references to yet further works.
- 116 OHAL; OEANE.
- 117 NEAEHL.
- 118 Zertal 2004/2016.
- 119 Miller 2003:143–218.
- 120 Finkelstein 1988; Dever 2003; Faust 2006; Van Bekkum 2010; Hawkins 2013.
- 121 Finkelstein and Mazar 2007.
- 122 See ABD; Mazar 1992.
- 123 MacDonald 2000; MacDonald 2015.
- 124 Petter 2014; Routledge 2004.
- 125 Hoffmeier 2005.
- 126 See Pitkänen 2010; Pitkänen 2017a.
- 127 See Higginbotham 2000:74–128; Morris 2005, *passim*.
- 128 OHAL; OANE; Bryce 2009.
- 129 See Whincop 2008: esp. Vol. 1, 72–180; Vol. 2, 1–37; see also the map and table on Vol. 2, 351–352 for an overview of the sites.

- 130 See Harmanşah 2013:15–39. See also Koliński 2014:181–183.
- 131 Weeden and Ullmann 2017.
- 132 See Doonan 2012:119. The northern Ghab survey that is discussed in Casana 2012 is not included in Doonan, however.
- 133 Tenu 2009.
- 134 Cf. comments on this in Whincop 2008.
- 135 Cf. Finkelstein 1988; Roberts 1996; Wilkinson 2003; Harmanşah 2013. Further details on this issue will be presented ahead.
- 136 Cf. Wilkinson 2003:17–32; Cline 2014:142–147.
- 137 See Yasur-Landau 2010; Younger 2017; but cf. the article-length studies of Pitkänen 2014a and Pitkänen 2016a as exceptions to this.
- 138 See Yasur-Landau 2010; Pitkänen 2014a; Pitkänen 2016a; Younger 2017; but cf. Pit-känen 2014b.
- 139 See Pitkänen 2014a; Pitkänen 2014b; Pitkänen 2015; Pitkänen 2016a; Pitkänen 2017a; Pitkänen 2017b.

2 The societal contexts of the ancient Near East and analysing migration, colonialism and violence

Social scientific approaches are fundamentally based on comparing a variety of societies across time and space so as to discern common patterns and frameworks for the operation of societies. Modern social science originally arose in Europe, and an important, even decisive driver in its development was the desire to understand the rise of Europe in the latter part of the second millennium CE onto the pinnacle of world societies in terms of power and technological advancement.¹ At the early stages of the development of Europe in the nineteenth century, with the recently formulated Darwinian theory of evolution, non-Western peoples were seen as less developed human beings than Westerners who typically were also white in terms of their skin colour.² From a sub-disciplinary perspective, sociology concentrated on studying the industrialised West and anthropology the “primitive” non-Western peoples who were often non-literate. In the twentieth century, the evolutionary approach that originated from the nineteenth in terms of assumed significant differences between the differing humans on the planet was discredited. Anthropology and sociology also in a number of ways aligned themselves with each other.³ However, grounds still remained for an overall evolutionary process, based not on biological aspects but on a cumulative increase of information in the passing of time, generally resulting in an increasing complexity of societies in a world-historical trajectory.⁴

Clearly the earliest human societies can be classified as small bands of hunters and gatherers employing technologies that were rudimentary by today’s standards. The development of agriculture resulted in societies that attested significant social stratification.⁵ An important characteristic of these societies is that they were typically sedentary in contrast to hunting and gathering communities that were usually, even if not always, nomadic.⁶ In a sedentary situation, people would be limited to a particular area. In such a “caged” setting, social stratification could result if and when one segment of the society was able to gain control of resources as against much of the rest of the population.⁷ In the agrarian era⁸ which had been well under way in the ancient Near East by the time writing was invented around 3200 BCE, it would

be typical for the top two per cent of the society to control a lion's share of the resources available to the society, with much of the population living in often abject poverty.⁹ The reach of the (agrarian) state's coercive apparatus would determine the extent of its rule. The bigger it could be and the more population it could control, the bigger the armies it could also muster in comparison to other potentially competing societies in its immediate environment. Considering that rivers allowed quick transportation and thus an opportunity to extend the coercive reach of societies, it is no wonder that the first large societies, and with them the first civilizations, arose in the riverine valleys of Mesopotamia, Egypt, India and China,¹⁰ in contrast to such developments being much harder on purely land-based areas.¹¹ It seems that the ability to control larger populations would on its part also foster a further development of technologies of control that would then disseminate through the society in other ways. Clearly the development of writing to foster administration can be seen in this context.¹² In a larger society, specialisation of crafts and trades could also be possible, in itself at least potentially fostering technological development. Such development could also positively affect such areas as arts and music, considering that the upper class would have a good amount of leisure time available to them.¹³ Writing itself would also enable the recording of myths and legends that the society might possess.

Not everyone would be willing to submit to the rule of the state. With early states, it was important to also prevent people from leaving the purview of the state. Hence states would guard their borders as much to prevent people from leaving as someone entering without permission.¹⁴ Those who could leave might be able to join peoples that were outside the purview of the state. For them, life could offer a freer existence. On the downside, freer societies would by virtue of such freedom be less coercive and therefore generally smaller and accordingly also be less powerful. If so, and more broadly for smaller societies, people in them would always be potentially in danger if a bigger and more powerful society would seek to extend its control over them. But such peoples could also try and resist the encroachment of bigger societies, sometimes more successfully, at other times less so. In the period and area that is discussed in this book, both the larger states and smaller entities existed.

The early development of agriculture was marked by a number of developments towards states that did not necessarily prove to be lasting ones.¹⁵ But eventually states did advance, and by about 1600 BCE, the beginning of the Late Bronze era, states could be considered to be in at least reasonable control of the ancient Near East.¹⁶ This can be contrasted with the period after 1200 BCE when the main Near Eastern states either collapsed or receded in terms of their extent, and new social entities arose. In light of the above, it should be clear that the existing states that had controlled the Levant lost all or part of

their control of the area, and that this can be linked with the loss or attenuation of the coercive ability of the states in question and the formation of new entities with their individual characteristics that could either challenge the existing states or replace them in the territories where they arose and spread to.

In the following, I shall proceed based on a social scientific perspective that considers societies as collective entities that are somehow held together and can be born, develop and die out. Exactly what this means is a question to be answered, and this chapter will look at a number of theoretical issues on how societies undergo such developments. The remaining chapters then look at the societies in question for the area and period and analyse their history based on the theoretical framework laid out in this chapter. Some reference to those entities will nevertheless be made in this chapter so as to contextualise the theoretical discussion. And, on the whole, the theoretical part is in any case based on observations of how societies behave in general based on what we know about human societies in their historical continuum. Accordingly, the presentation here relies on a comparative method in order to develop some properties of world societies. The results are then brought back specifically to the societies in focus in this book.¹⁷

As part of that, the presentation will also consider to what extent the principles extracted via the comparative method may apply to the ancient Near Eastern societies in question. But, it will also attempt to see if one can make some logical deductions as to how such societies would have behaved where no direct data is available based on an assumption of their behaving more or less similarly than some other societies that can be deemed to be comparable to them in another time and place. In this, the advantage is that for the comparator society, more observational data may be available, leading to more accurate and definite details about its characteristics. Or, a comparable society may simply have been studied more than the one under scrutiny here, with some reasonable results available about it. The behaviour of the well-known comparator society or societies can then be extrapolated as applying to the society under scrutiny. In analogy with the concept of extrapolation in scientific measurements, it is assumed that general principles that pertain to the known part also apply to the unknown details. It is clear from science that this is not always the case, but extrapolation with scientific measurements tends to proceed if it is thought probable that the extrapolation can provide a prediction, or at least a reasonable estimate. With historical study it is, of course, not possible to travel back to the past to conduct scientific measurements of the data, accordingly, one can speak only in terms of reasonable plausibilities than certainties. However, with carefully established methods of comparison and an equally careful look at how and to what extent

principles obtained from such comparisons can fit known data pertaining to the specific example under question combined with carefully reasoned extrapolation where there is no data should enable a researcher to establish some good plausibilities at the minimum. In any case, in reality, it is completely fair to say that the general method of comparison and matching, and even extrapolation, is more or less followed in practice in historical study, including for the ancient Near East.

I will start by outlining the types of societies encountered in the ancient Levant and its environs in the period in question and some of their relevant key characteristics, linking with the overall spectrum of world societies across time and space and comments already made in the foregoing. I will then ask the more theoretical question of what defines a person's belonging to a group, of which a society is one manifestation. There will also be a link with the issue of ethnicity as one way to define a group. I will then have a closer look at technologies of control as ways and means of holding societies together, also linking with comments already made. This will be followed by a discussion of theoretical considerations of migration and colonialism. Finally, the question of how societies come into existence, develop and die out will be directly asked. A short methodological summary will round things up.

A. Societal types in the ancient Near East and their characteristics

The four main types that can be conceptualised for human societies are hunting and gathering, horticultural, agrarian and industrial societies. We already indicated earlier that human history can be seen in a trajectory of movement first from hunting and gathering to horticultural and agrarian societies and then from agrarian to industrial.¹⁸ Here, horticultural is similar to agrarian but tends to incorporate less effective technologies in agriculture in the absence of the use of the plough; accordingly, horticultural societies tend to be smaller and less powerful than agrarian societies. In addition to the four basic forms, a number of special societies that do not show any further developmental trajectory can be discerned, namely, fishing, herding and maritime type.¹⁹ The classification indicates the main subsistence activity of each type of society without denying the possibility that other forms of production can also be utilised by such a society.

As was already implied, the ancient Near East by the Bronze Age was part of a well-established agrarian era in human history, with another 4,500 years

or so to go before the development of industrialisation and the birth of industrial societies took place in Europe. In this era, the core technologies and societies in the area at the time were agrarian, and agriculture formed the backbone of economy. Horticulture certainly supported the agrarian economy but was not a main source of livelihood on the whole. In the mix of available sources of livelihood, a further important component was animal husbandry. In some cases a substantial portion of economy could be based on animal husbandry with certain groups even at least potentially perceived as nomadic by the ancient Near Eastern people themselves. Examples of such peoples are the Amorites of the late third and early second millennium BCE and the variety of pastoral groups in nineteenth- and eighteenth-century BCE Mari in the Mesopotamian area.²⁰ The origins of the Arameans themselves, a significant group looked at in this book, are considered to be pastoral.²¹ The issue of pastoralism is not limited to these peoples but is in some way or another involved as a means of production throughout the ancient Near East.²² The Phoenicians are a significant example of a maritime society in the area, however, as their history in the period in question does not seem to have been particularly impacted by migrations and colonialism, only limited attention will be paid to them in this book.

The agrarian societies of the ancient Near East can be considered to be comparable to agrarian societies in the rest of the world in time and space, even if they attest a relatively early version of such societies in terms of technological development.²³ It seems, however, that they have continuities with hunting and gathering societies in that, for example, there can be an emphasis on the family and tribe. In relation to this, for example, they may attest patrimonialism as a central ideological concept,²⁴ even if bureaucratisation and depersonalisation can also be seen to be taking place during the era, certainly at least with the larger societies.²⁵ The continuity with hunting and gathering societies is in itself understandable in the context of a cultural base and continuum in which increase of information and technological evolution takes place. The continuity can also be seen in the context of a belief in the supernatural and accompanying mythology about divine beings that is clearly attested by hunting and gathering peoples. Nevertheless, for example at Ugarit, the understanding of divine is also coloured by an agrarian social structure, notably in terms of the social ordering of the gods mirroring that of the earthly city state.²⁶ In terms of ritual, the era attests a complexity of ritual and (often accompanying) recourse to threats of divine punishment, with the blessings and curses of international treaties providing a good example.²⁷ This is understandable in the context of a comparatively low level of technologies of social coercion, hence ritual prescriptions of behaviour and threats of divine punishment can naturally be

seen to relate to at least attempted means of social control.²⁸ In terms of demographics, cities already exist in the period, even if most of the population resides in the countryside.²⁹ Iron as a harder and more durable metal starts to make its way in the transition from the Late Bronze to the Iron Age, even if its use becomes more or less widespread only in Iron Age II, around the end of the time period under scrutiny here.³⁰ Considering that the onset of iron can be considered as marking a watershed in the development of simple agrarian societies into advanced ones,³¹ altogether, then, the time period between 1300 and 900 BCE can be seen in the context of a transition from one agrarian era into another.³²

While the era attests no hunting and gathering groups, the pastoral groups pertaining to it may in particular have nomadic characteristics.³³ But, in fact, pastoralism in the ancient Near East is really a more mixed economy than a fully nomadic enterprise. It is marked by seasonal migration to areas of pasture and a more sedentary approach otherwise, and by virtue of that, the way of life can be categorised under a rubric of seminomadism. In nineteenth- and eighteenth-century BCE Mari on the middle Euphrates, the seminomadic pastoral groups typically stayed by settled communities during the summer months and moved with their flocks to pasture areas in higher areas in Upper Mesopotamia during the rainy winter season.³⁴ Similar patterns can be inferred, for example, for the Koksu of central Asia in the third and second millennium BCE³⁵ and are attested with the Nuer and Dinka peoples in the Upper Nile area in the second half of the second millennium CE.³⁶ Importantly, the seminomadic groups in Mari were considered as separate tribes, with a tribal organisation undoubtedly linking with the preceding hunting and gathering era of human history.³⁷ Clearly economic exchange could take place between pastoralists and more settled communities, and on the whole there was a mutual dependency between them.³⁸ At the same time, there could also be conflicts, with raiding of settled communities by pastoralists a common feature of such conflicts.³⁹

B. Group identity, ethnic groups and nations, and states and empires

It is clear that humans often tend to act in groups rather than just individually. Such activity generally involves cooperation of some kind, and of course cooperation requires some type of organisation as well.⁴⁰ Cooperation in groups is not restricted to humans only.⁴¹ However, humans have unique

cognitive abilities in comparison to other species, especially the ability to create symbolic cultures that can also be passed on to succeeding generations through learning and collective accumulation of information.⁴² The existence of cooperation at already e.g. colonial invertebrate level combined with the existence of human cognitive abilities suggests that human group activity may combine instinctive and more cognitively formulated factors.

Examples of human groups that involve cooperative activities among their members include families, communities, political parties and religious groups.⁴³ It is clear that such groups as hunting parties, and in modernity sports teams, can be more or less temporary, sometimes dissolving immediately after a specific event for which they may have been formed. Already based on this, clearly humans can also belong to more than one group. For example, they might play in two sports teams at the same time if they like two differing types of sport. Other groups can be more permanent. It is fairly obvious that families tend to be of rather permanent nature, as they are based on biological relationships that cannot be dissolved as long as the members are alive.⁴⁴ They also involve instinctive aspects, such as a mother's love and care for an infant.⁴⁵

Ethnicity can be seen as an important extension of familial relationships.⁴⁶ It is a significant form of human grouping, considering that it seems to be attested across time and space, with the idea of ethnicity being an extension of family hinting towards such universal attestation, and also that, for example, much violence has been attested between ethnic groups, including in modern times.⁴⁷ There has been extensive discussion and debate about ethnicity in modern academic study.⁴⁸ The main issues involved in the debate include the question of how ethnicity can and should be defined and the question of to what extent ethnicity is a given and to what extent it is socially constructed and thus malleable.⁴⁹ A further issue is the question of how it is determined who belongs to an ethnic group and who does not,⁵⁰ linking with the more general question of defining the boundaries of human groups in terms of belonging.

As regards defining ethnic groups, I will follow here the well formulated, comprehensive and helpful definition given by John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith.⁵¹ According to Hutchinson and Smith, ethnic communities or *ethnies*⁵² habitually exhibit, albeit in varying degrees, six main features:

1. A common *proper name*, to identify and express the “essence” of the community.
2. A myth of *common ancestry*, a myth rather than a fact, a myth that includes the idea of a common origin in time and place, and that gives anethnie a sense of fictive kinship, what Horowitz terms a “super-

family”.

3. Shared *historical memories*, or better, shared memories of a common past or pasts, including heroes, events and their commemoration.
4. One or more *elements of common culture*, which need not be specified but normally include religion, customs or language.
5. A *link* with a *homeland*, not necessarily its physical occupation by the *ethnie*, only its symbolic attachment to the ancestral land, as with diaspora peoples.
6. A *sense of solidarity* on the part of at least some sections of the *ethnie*’s population.⁵³

In terms of how ethnicity is constructed, according to the so-called primordial approach, ethnic ties are based on birth and other “givens” and are rather seen as static and immutable.⁵⁴ On the other hand, according to the instrumental approach, ethnic ties are socially constructed and a function of circumstances and expediency (including material gains).⁵⁵ As Hutchinson and Smith summarise, the primordial approach has been criticised for being overly static and naturalistic, whereas in reality ethnicity is more malleable, including over passage of time and change of historical and cultural circumstances.⁵⁶ At the same time, instrumentalists can be seen to look at matters only in terms of materialism and expediency which ignore the senses of permanence which people themselves have about their ethnic identity.⁵⁷ However, it is also true that, as Hutchinson and Smith point out, the approaches of scholars are often not either purely primordial or instrumental, but rather it is a matter of emphasis.⁵⁸

One further important issue with ethnic groups is the question of who is defined as a member of the group and who is not. In this, a person may consider themselves to be a member of a group; however, the group in question may either accept this or reject such a notion. Similarly, for example, a group may consider itself to be a group; but again, people outside the group or some other group may wish to not recognise it as a group, or may not recognise all of its members as belonging to such a group. These types of situations may also fluctuate with time. Accordingly, an exact definition of group boundaries, and thus of ethnic groups also, is not always possible.⁵⁹ But, all in all, where there is a group, there has to be some way of distinguishing it from other groups, and these boundary-marking features must be somehow recognisable both for members of the group and for outsiders.⁶⁰ Boundary markers can include kinship, shared value systems, common language, way of clothing and similar physical features.⁶¹ It is the unique combination of such features for each ethnic group under specific circumstances that mark a boundary.⁶² At the same time, differences in any of such categories do not as

such necessarily mean the existence of a boundary.⁶³ Important here is also that there is individual variation as regards the strength of ethnic identities,⁶⁴ and that members of an ethnic group may view boundaries differently from outsiders.⁶⁵

It seems clear that the question of primordialism versus instrumentalism can more or less be seen in the context of the characteristics of humans to both have behavioural patterns that relate to biology and their cognitive abilities in creating symbolic cultures. In this, if ethnicity is seen as an extension of the family, then human familial instincts already suggest the potentiality of cooperation between members of ethnic groups, and in this sense it seems no accident that the earliest human societies were constituted of kin-based groups.⁶⁶ On the other hand, in many ways there is no set pattern that humans should instinctively follow in terms of a number of aspects of culture (e.g. shaking of hands as a greeting), accordingly, it is clear that certain cultural features can be seen as being based on some cognitively constructed symbolic meaning, and by virtue of that, such features can be considered as at the minimum potentially malleable. There can also be a mixture of instinctive and socially constructed features. For example, securing food and defence against predators and other enemies may be an instinctive feature of humans; however, exactly how food is obtained or produced or how groups arrange their collective defence clearly involves socially constructed characteristics. In respect to defence, for example, the production of nuclear weapons is based on human collective learning and experience and accompanying development of technology over millennia. In this sense, it is then also clear that ethnic groups can engage in common activities that involve cooperation between the members of such groups.

The point about common ancestry being based on myths ties in with the fact that human experience has included the concept of adoption throughout history. That is, someone without a biological affinity has been accepted as becoming a member of a family, and this can at least potentially be seen to be extendable to ethnic groups. Marriage, especially when exogamous as opposed to endogamous, of course belongs to this category and is even comparable to adoption. At the same time, people can create fictive kinships where they claim that they belong to a particular ethnic group.⁶⁷ While such fictional claims are difficult with nuclear families, as distance from a nuclear family grows, it is harder to verify or falsify such claims especially if the claimant speaks the same language, follows the same customs and looks similar in terms of their physical appearance.⁶⁸ In this sense, and as was already just indicated, it should be obvious to expect that ethnic groups are often demarcated by language, as it is difficult to cooperate with someone whose language one cannot understand, and also harder to feel solidarity with them than with

those whose language one can comprehend. Similarly, physical differences can lessen a sense of familiarity and potential ability for feeling mutual solidarity, and this on its part can contribute towards an understanding of the existence of racism.⁶⁹ Altogether, it seems clear that it is possible for people to move across ethnic boundaries; on the other hand, the actual parameters and circumstances around such adoption (or assimilation) can be complex, depending on the mix of primordial and instrumental factors in each case. Considering the complicating factors that can be involved, one should be able to expect that, while movement across ethnic boundaries is possible and does take place, it may also be difficult in a number of cases.

The concept of nationalism closely relates to ethnicity. It is not always easy to distinguish between the two,⁷⁰ but perhaps the following definition can be helpful:

Nationalism . . . remains the pre-eminent rhetoric for attempts to demarcate political communities, claim rights of self-determination and legitimate rule by a reference to “the people” of a country. Ethnic solidarities and identities are claimed most often where groups do not seek “national” autonomy but rather recognition internal to or cross-cutting national or state boundaries.⁷¹

Based on this, one may highlight that territoriality is an important concept that relates to a nation. It seems clear that if belonging to a nation is defined based on belonging to an ethnic group, a nation can at least more or less equate with an ethnic group. But ethnic groups can span more than one nation,⁷² and nations can consist of more than one ethnic group. On the whole, it seems fair to expect that national affiliations may override more personal or group identities such as family, kinship, gender and ethnicity and that they link individuals to the often homogenised national whole, whereas ethnicities will flow from membership in such more immediate groups.⁷³ Altogether, one can say that there is a progression in terms of level of immediacy from family to ethnicity to nationhood.

From the perspective of sociology, the above discussion links to the concept of defining what societies are. Again, these can be defined in a number of ways;⁷⁴ however, the one most closely followed here is that

human societies are *autonomous* groups – groups that are not subject to political authority or control of any larger, more inclusive group. In short, *a human population is considered a society to the degree that it is politically autonomous and its members engage in a broad range of cooperative activities.*⁷⁵

From this definition it is clear that nations can be considered as societies,

including when they are constituted of more than one ethnic group. Ethnic groups or families, then, living as part of nations, would not be societies in this sense. However, hunting and gathering groups could consist of more or less extended family groups in control of a specific territory and would therefore qualify to be seen as societies and also even as nations, as might then also be the case with other types of societies such as herding societies. Altogether, nations are generally seen as amalgamations of smaller societal units. That the discussion of nations (and nationalism) has most often taken place in the context of modern industrial societies of European origin has frequently skewed the discussion of the concept(s) and even the existence of nations in favour of these recent entities, sometimes even to the exclusion of seeing them as also applicable to premodern societies.⁷⁶ Clearly the remarks and conceptual definitions made here suggest that one does not need to limit oneself to modernity in this respect, even when it is also clear that there is a level of complexity to modern industrial societies that was not attained by earlier types of societies, necessitating suitably modified approaches according to the society or societies being considered.⁷⁷

A further entity that is important to a discussion of the ancient world and the area and period in question here is the concept of a state. Again, there is variation and disagreement in defining the concept. According to Møller, the most important distinction in this respect is between “minimalist” and “maximalist” definitions of a state.⁷⁸ The minimalist definition can be formalised as follows:

States are “coercion-wielding organizations that are distinct from households and kinship groups and exercise a clear priority in some respects over all other organizations within substantial territories”.⁷⁹

Against this, the more maximalist definition can be characterised as describing the state as an entity that “possesses a monopoly on the legitimate use of force within a specific territory”.⁸⁰ Except for monopoly on force internally and for territoriality, the definition also implies sovereignty externally.⁸¹ As Møller suggests, the maximalist definition might not at first appear particularly demanding; however, the legitimate monopoly on force tends to imply “modern” organs that include the military, the courts and the police.⁸² This type of modern apparatus has not existed for the vast majority of states, especially premodern ones that fit the minimalist definition.⁸³ However, one can still ask the question of to what extent the monopoly of force by modern states over their territory is total, and in any case the more minimalist definition can be seen to be applicable to ancient states. Ultimately, one can also see the maximalist version as an intensification of the minimalist one in

favour of the most dominant source of force in the minimalist definition, again in line with the idea of overall societal development in world-historical trajectory.

The concepts of nation and state are quite similar. At least broadly speaking, with a nation, the issue of identity seems to be in the fore, whereas with states the definitional focus is on coercive control. Geographic boundaries are relevant to both, but seem to be even more emphasised with states. It appears to be no accident that the word nation-state is used of many national entities that are also states, especially in modernity.⁸⁴

Finally, we need to define the concept of an empire. Again, there are differences to this; however, a starting point would seem to be to conceptualise empire as

A system of interaction between two (or more) political entities, usually states, one of which, the dominant metropole, exerts political control over the internal and external policy of the other(s), the subordinate periphery (or peripheries).⁸⁵

To the basic definition one may add the following considerations from Burbank and Cooper:

Empires are large political units, expansionist or with a memory of power extended over space, polities that maintain distinction and hierarchy as they incorporate new people. The nation-state, in contrast, is based on the idea of a single people in a single territory constituting itself as a unique political community. The nation-state proclaims the commonality of its people – even if the reality is more complicated – while the empire-state declares the nonequivalence of multiple populations. Both kinds of states are incorporative – they insist that people be ruled by their institutions – but the nation-state tends to homogenize those inside its borders and exclude those who do not belong, while the empire reaches outward and draws, usually coercively, peoples whose difference is made explicit under its rule.⁸⁶

Based on the above, empires can at least more or less be seen as the highest levels of social organisations in the continuum from families to ethnic groups to nations, sitting above nations. That empires foster difference rather than uniformity would seem to preclude one from seeing them as societies in a strict sense, however, the issue is not entirely clear-cut, and, from another perspective, their cores (or metropolises) clearly can be demarcated based on a societal type.⁸⁷ On the whole, it is clear that all of these social groups exist for the time period in question. Except for the obvious presence of families, the Egyptians, Canaanites, Philistines, Israelites and Arameans can be considered as ethnic groups, at the minimum potentially so.⁸⁸ States might include the city

state of Ugarit and the empires of Mittani, Egypt, the Hittite empire and Middle Assyria. The empires can be seen as extended states, with the states being agrarian societies. At the same time, empires can also create states if an empire manages to at least sufficiently homogenise people within its realm.⁸⁹

An important issue that relates to the study of these social groups in the context of the ancient world is that such studies generally put great emphasis on attempting to reconstruct the existence and characteristics of these groups based on available material evidence, due in no small part to at least a relative dearth of textual evidence from early societies.⁹⁰ There has been a huge amount of discussion and debate on especially to what extent ethnic groups and their characteristics can be detected based on material evidence that survives from the past and has been unearthed by the archaeological discipline.⁹¹ This question will be referred to throughout this book, including when discussing the ancient Philistines, Israelites and Arameans, with comments on methodological issues made also below in this chapter. However, it would immediately seem reasonable to conjecture that the more there is a difference between two ethnic groups in terms of their material culture, the more one might be able to see that reflected in the material remains of the territory where such groups may have been active, and this issue will be kept in mind and reflected on in the considerations that follow. On the whole, migration studies, to be looked at in more detail ahead, suggest that in some cases archaeological cultures may correspond to social groups, and in other cases they might not.⁹²

C. Technologies of control

Having discussed the issue of how groups and societies can be defined, we now come to the important question of what holds them together and how their operation may be controlled. I will start by elaborating how recent studies on the sociology of violence spearheaded by Siniša Malešević can help elucidate issues that relate to social control. The main thesis in Malešević's *Sociology of War and Violence* is that the scale of warfare has increased with the progression of societal development in a historical trajectory.⁹³ Two related vital concepts are centrifugal ideologisation and cumulative bureaucratisation of coercion. The former relates to the ideological power that those who control societies can exert on their respective populations, and the latter to the ability of societies to administratively control their members. These forms of power are obviously exerted by societal elites; however, Malešević does indicate that

the success of propaganda is not automatic but needs related solidarity by the masses in order to succeed.⁹⁴ A good example of this is the failure of totalitarian communist propaganda and the success of propaganda in Western democratic societies.⁹⁵ In general, one can ask to what extent one should assume that centrifugal ideology is “true” in the sense of giving a true, fair and accurate representation of the world, especially in cases where it is not easy to immediately verify claims that are presented. It would seem that what ultimately counts is not factuality, but whether those to whom it is addressed believe the ideology or not. In that sense, such ideologies can be considered as comparable to religious ideologies, and myths can be part of the ideologisation employed.

An interesting aspect that results from Malešević’s analysis is the identification of the pervasiveness of violence as a constitutive element of societies. Ultimately, violence or threat of violence lies at the heart of societal organisation. Malešević’s analysis also shows that one’s analysis of violence may be affected by prevailing intellectual fashions. Thus, importantly, the role of violence was minimised in the post-World War II climate in the West in mainstream sociological studies.⁹⁶ Its ubiquity has then only recently been recognised again and reasserted.

Malešević’s studies are broadly in line with the trajectory of social development as advocated by Lenski. More or less, increasing technological development has enabled the development of what one might call technologies of control. The two aspects of ideologisation and coercion would seem to fit with the idea of control. If a person can be persuaded into doing something, there is no need to coerce them.⁹⁷ With increasing technological sophistication, writing first enabled the impersonal transmission of information, in terms of not needing to hear an account directly from another human that would otherwise also need to be physically present at the location of communication. Such information could also be recorded in a way that transcended its necessity to be stored in the human brain only. A body of information, if produced based on cultural knowledge, would also at the least potentially increase the stability of a social system, as it could act as an additional repository of cultural knowledge. Towards the modern period, the invention of the printing press would enable the dissemination of such knowledge to wider groups of people than before. Improved methods of transportation, such as better ships, could also enhance the reach of communications. The invention of telegraph and phones and the internet hugely increased the global flow of information, with social media recently being able to connect people from various parts of the globe more or less instantaneously. While it is correct that internet may also lead to a “democratisation” of control of information, modern mass media is nevertheless still in many ways controlled by societal

elites, and it is no accident that modern states show a considerable interest in this issue, with many of them, for example, having national news and television channels. The development of coercive apparatuses such as the police and the military with their improved logistics with transportation and communication technology, together with the proficiency of modern states for surveillance of their citizens has increased the ability of states to control their populations.⁹⁸ In the ancient world itself, while people did not have modern means of persuasion and coercion available, they nevertheless possessed a certain level of technological advancement in that respect. For example, the existence of caging – that is, the ability to confine people to a particular territory, so it clearly seems – enabled the emergence of early states.⁹⁹ Campaign reports by the ancient Near Eastern kings serve as an example of centrifugal ideologisation.

At the same time, while Malešević suggests that violence has increased with increasing societal sophistication, Lenski, for example, suggests based on a recent study of simple horticulturalists that the rate of homicide among them was more than 50 times that in the United States, which for many years has had the highest murder rate of any modern industrial society.¹⁰⁰ In addition, recent studies of hunter gatherer societies suggest that they, too, were violent.¹⁰¹ The point here is nevertheless that the reach and at least potential destructiveness that states as human social groups may be able to wield attests to an increased level of violence or its threat. The genocides of the twentieth century and the capability that humans have to destroy the whole planet on their part attest to this fact.¹⁰² Altogether, it would seem that violence has been with humanity all along, even if modern methods of war have made mass killing easier, and the large size of societies also tends to imply a large number of potential (and actual) casualties.

The insights given by Malešević provide a basic perspective on how societies employ ideology and coercive methods. These, of course, ultimately also relate to the use of power. As to some more specific ways that power works and is wielded, Michael Mann has studied its use through the trajectory of human history.¹⁰³ Clearly Mann's analysis is broadly in line with that of Lenski and Malešević in that there has been an overall cumulative increase of power available to societies with the passing of time. Mann divides his analysis of the accompanying sources of social power into four categories of ideological, economic, military and political power (IEMP).¹⁰⁴ One can immediately compare the ideological component with the concept of centrifugal ideologisation by Malešević. Economic, military and political power, on the other hand, can be seen in the context of coercion, cumulative in its historical dimension. Mann's analysis further seeks to highlight that societies are organised power networks. For his overall analysis, he produces a matrix

where power can be intensive or extensive, or on the other hand authoritative or diffused, as illustrated by the following chart on forms of organisational reach:

	<i>Authoritative</i>	<i>Diffused</i>
<i>Intensive</i>	Army command structure	A general strike
<i>Extensive</i>	Militaristic empire	Market exchange

Table 2.1 Forms of organizational reach

What is helpful in this categorisation is that it highlights how power can, so to say, be immediate and total (top left cell) or on the other hand less immediate and more implied (bottom right cell), or can be manifested in between these poles (bottom left and top right cell). Military, economic and political power are quite structural, even if they also involve dynamic elements.¹⁰⁵ Political power and organisation refers to centralised, institutionalised, territorial regulation but may also include international diplomacy.¹⁰⁶ Ideological power is sociospatially transcendent, and it should be obvious that it is primarily diffused.¹⁰⁷

If one then makes the reasonable assumption that any society will manifest all these forms of power outlined by Mann, one can also consider that a society may have a variety of spheres of control. For example, a powerful ideology may reach beyond the physical confines of a state, and in modernity with its enhanced means of communication, it is likely that ideology can at least in some form reach the whole globe. A state may have a military that more or less totally controls its core area; while its armies may be able to either establish military posts in more distant areas or at least occasionally campaign in them, its control over those areas will be less intense than in the core area. In terms of economics, again, a society may be able to at least partially impose its way of trading on some of its neighbouring areas or have influence over them without that system being as strongly followed as in its core area. And, the territorial regulation of a state is likely to be limited to the core area of that state; however, it may be able to impose its will on others at least to some extent through diplomacy.¹⁰⁸ All this, then, also leads to the question of how societies should be delimited in terms of their territory. In case of states, it is usually about the core territory over which the state has coercive control; however, it should be clear that the issue is at least on the whole more complex than that. For example, empires in particular will hold at least a certain amount of coercive control beyond their core territories, and, on the other hand, with some decentralised societies such as groups of hunters and gatherers who may be nomadic, it may not be easy to demarcate the exact spheres of their control. In this sense, the idea of cumulative bureaucratisation is also important, as ancient states and empires, for example, would have less

powerful means of control at their disposal, and therefore their control over their core areas and beyond might be less total in comparative terms than with modern states and empires. It would also seem reasonable that less power would tend to imply a smaller sphere of control for ancient entities than for more modern ones. Accordingly, one might expect that ancient states would on average be less tightly controlled and less extensive geographically than modern ones, and this seems consistent with historical evidence over the past four millennia or so.¹⁰⁹

For Mann, in line with Marxists and neo-Weberians, social stratification ties with the overall creation and distribution of power throughout society.¹¹⁰ This is important in terms of what is possible and for whom in that respect. According to Lenski, the goals of a society controlled by a dominant class that has the power to decide the direction of the coordinated efforts of the society are the goals of that particular class.¹¹¹ This seems obvious, as those who are in power are able to decide on things. However, the power is by no means absolute. A hunting and gathering society where a chief rules predominantly by charisma and persuasion is a clear example of this. If the people governed by a chief do not wish to follow the leader, they may simply refuse to cooperate, and the leader typically will have little or no coercive methods at their disposal to force their will. However, the issue of power of the ruled, or the masses, still remains with the more technologically advanced and structurally hierarchical societies as well.¹¹² This issue was in particular studied by the early twentieth-century Italian intellectual and politician Antonio Gramsci. Arrested as a member of the Communist Party during the time of fascist control in Italy, he wrote many of his reflections while in prison, where he also died.¹¹³ A key issue in his reflections that could be disparate and sometimes conflicting was the question of why general working-class revolutions failed in the industrialised West, with the “bourgeois” state remaining resilient in the face of many political and economic crises that took place in the decades that followed World War I.¹¹⁴ For Gramsci, the key concept in answering the question was the idea of hegemony, which for him referred to the idea of a domination that operated with consent from the masses. In this, culture is of utmost importance. This would recognise that the state is culturally constructed and is dependent on specific cultural practices, orientations and ideologies for its reproduction, while at the same time making possible specific social orders and ways of life.¹¹⁵ This, then, can lead to the idea propounded by Routledge that “successful” states operate by the elites and ruling classes appropriating existing cultural resources and using them for hegemonic purposes.¹¹⁶ The important point is that such hegemonic orders must be acceptable to the masses; hence it is clear that it would also be in a state’s interest to shape the thinking of the masses, and this is where, for

example, education comes in, whatever form it may take, from raising children in families to any state-organised schooling.¹¹⁷ From this perspective, adopting and building hegemonies based on a religion that is popular with the masses might be one way to proceed. Ethnicity can also serve as a hegemonic building block, as does nationalism that transcends ethnicity in cases where more than one ethnic group resides in the territory of a nation. In all of these cases, one would expect the society to suitably tailor these concepts for its purposes.¹¹⁸ The concept of a historical bloc refers to a particular hegemonic order at a certain point in history.¹¹⁹ Considering that cultural attitudes do not change easily, for example due to new members of society being educated into the thinking and norms of the society in question, it should be clear that if a hegemonic order has been established, it will possess inertia that operates within a particular space over a specific time that can be at least relatively extensive. In other words, a historical bloc and hegemonic system is marked by an inherent tendency towards continuity.

Also, on the whole, once an effective hegemonic order has been established, it will appear commonsensical and self-evident for those who are part of that order.¹²⁰ Nevertheless, at the same time, sometimes there may be people movements that shape a society and the elites will at times have to take them into account in their decision making.¹²¹ In other cases, revolutions may be able to topple existing hierarchies or even result in changes in social structure. At the same time, the fact that revolutions, at least in agrarian societies, have rarely been effective in changing actual social orders, at least to any substantial extent but usually only those in power,¹²² can be understood from the perspective of culture and hegemony and their continuity. The issues can also be seen in the context that human societies can be identified as sociocultural systems that are characterised by both continuity and change.¹²³ In that, overall technological development over at least a relatively long period of time seems to have been the main determining factor in the development of societies from the simple and relatively egalitarian hunting and gathering communities to the more complex and hierarchical agrarian and industrial societies.¹²⁴

Routledge has applied the concept of hegemony to the operation of ancient states, demonstrating its usefulness for their study, with a particular focus on an archaeologically based analysis.¹²⁵ On the whole, an integrative approach based on insights from Malešević, Mann and Routledge can help towards analysing the question of how power is constructed and wielded, and what the role of elites and masses is in the operation of a society. In the next section, I will proceed to a scrutiny of migration and colonialism. These two areas link with questions looked at in this and the preceding two sections. The presentation will also introduce and summarise some specific methods for

analysing migration and colonialism. A section that takes a broader view on how societies may change will then follow, with a summary of the social scientific approach taken concluding the chapter.

D. Theories of migration and colonialism

Migration studies are currently a lively field. They do not, at least not currently, constitute a single approach.¹²⁶ However, they provide a fruitful set of approaches, for example, in the sense that such recent studies have emphasised the role of migration in human history. They particularly take into account the study of historical sources, archaeology, linguistics and genetics, depending on the availability of each component in each case of migration looked at.¹²⁷ And, they cut across the whole of human history across time and space, including in prehistoric times.¹²⁸ These studies suggest that human migration was extensive, and a vital component in the spread of humankind and in the formation of the foundations of today's world.¹²⁹ Interestingly, it is only in recent times that this pervasiveness has been recognised, including due to recent advances in biological sciences, especially genetics.¹³⁰ As Bellwood describes, "The very different view of the 2010s reflects the huge advances in the biological sciences in recent years, especially in genetics, since DNA research now makes it very obvious that migration has always been of great significance."¹³¹ A main point is that prehistoric studies show that migration took place, and it seems very plausible that the first humans migrated from Africa to inhabit the globe.¹³² On the other hand, we know that humans have migrated extensively during the more modern historical era, with the Western colonisation of the Americas since the late fifteenth century as a case in point. Considering this, it would as such seem odd if migration were not also a feature of human history in the time between prehistory and more modern history. And, indeed, such developments in migration studies seem to have affected the study of the ancient world as well where antimigrationist approaches were dominant in the late twentieth century.¹³³ In this respect, for example, studies of African history that look back through some 10,000 years into the past do not see any such breaks in terms of migration.¹³⁴

Migration theorists classify migrations into differing types, with four main categories that can be identified.¹³⁵ One of these is home-community migration, where individuals move from one place to another within the home community.¹³⁶ This type of migration is essentially not cross-cultural. Another type is whole-community migration. This consists of the displacement of all

the members of a community.¹³⁷ While humans do not have a pattern of community migration that is inherent or universal, some communities called as nomadic do migrate habitually.¹³⁸ Pastoral seminomadism in the ancient Near East at least partially belongs to this category. A third type of migration is cross-community migration.¹³⁹ This happens when selected individuals and groups leave one community and move to join another community. As they go, they adjust to the receiving community but also bring their culture and customs with them.¹⁴⁰ A fourth category is colonising migration. This is where individuals from one community depart and establish a new community that, rather than adjusting to the new community, replicates the community of origin.¹⁴¹

It is then clear already from this that migration and colonialism tie with each other. I shall accordingly next introduce considerations that relate to colonialism. Related definitions already involve a number of conundrums. With the modern world primarily in focus, according to Osterhammel,

A *colony* is a new political organization created by invasion (conquest and/or settlement colonization) but built on pre-colonial conditions. Its alien rulers are in sustained dependence on a geographically remote “mother country” or imperial centre, which claims exclusive rights of possession of the colony.¹⁴²

Colonialism is a relationship of domination between an indigenous (or forcibly imported) majority and a minority of foreign invaders. The fundamental decisions affecting the lives of the colonized people are made and implemented by the colonial rulers in pursuit of interests that are often defined in a distant metropolis. Rejecting cultural compromises with the colonized population, the colonizers are convinced of their own superiority and their ordained mandate to rule.¹⁴³

In contrast, especially with the ancient context in mind, Dietler defines the terms as follows:

I use the term *colonization* to indicate the expansionary act of imposing political sovereignty over foreign territory and people.¹⁴⁴

By *colonialism*, I mean the projects and practices of control marshaled in interactions between societies linked in asymmetrical relations of power and the processes of social and cultural transformation resulting from those practices.¹⁴⁵

Dietler adds,

Hence, colonization is, ultimately, solidified or maintained through colonialism, but colonialism can also operate without the formal subjugation

of foreign territories that colonization implies. Or it may precede an eventual colonization. The nature and effectiveness of such practices defined as colonialism, and their potential permutations, may be extremely variable from one colonial context to another, ranging from such things as trade, to missionary activities, to warfare and raiding, to political administration, to education. Similarly, the processes of transformation are highly variable, and they always entail a host of unintended consequences for both indigenous peoples and alien colonists. Both parties eventually become something other than they were because of these processes of entanglement and their unintended consequences.¹⁴⁶

It is the “interactions between societies linked in asymmetrical relations of power and the processes of social and cultural transformation resulting from those practices” that would fit with the context of colonising migration. The idea of “of imposing political sovereignty over foreign territory and people” also fits. A metropolis may or may not have been present in the ancient world. It should be obvious that mass-coordinated migration, such as that which led to the recent European colonisations of Australia and North America, could not have occurred in prehistory. There simply would not have been such necessary structures as transport technology or related extensive bureaucracy in place.¹⁴⁷ At the same time, the forced migrations of the Egyptian, Hittite and Assyrian empires do demonstrate that at least a kind of mass transport could be available in the ancient world in the Bronze and Iron Ages.¹⁴⁸ In fact, the definition of colonialism or colonisation when a metropolis is in place very much ties with the concept of empires as transnational entities ruled by a core state, with that core state classifiable as a metropolis.¹⁴⁹ In other words, empires by nature create colonial situations, or at the minimum tend to do so. In cases where no actual political-based metropolis existed, a cultural one may nevertheless exist in the sense of people moving out from it without any centralised authority directing the migrations. In practice, a combination of the two modes may also be present. The influence from the metropolis will be largely unidirectional in cases where the migrants do not keep links with their place of origin or do not return there. Also, if there is no metropolis that continues to inject new people into colonies, any external cultural influences to the migrants are likely to come from their interactions with the local peoples, or from internal cultural change through innovations or the like.

As for settler colonialism, from a theoretical perspective, it should be seen as separate from “ordinary” colonialism (for which the term “franchise” colonialism is also often used), even though the two often overlap and help define each other.¹⁵⁰ Many of the developments in the study of settler colonialism are very recent, with the field still in a number of ways at an

incipient, even though already fruitful stage.¹⁵¹ As Wolfe describes it, settler colonialism is a specific complex social formation.¹⁵² One important defining characteristic in settler colonialism is the concept of a settler. Settlers come to stay, whereas colonial sojourners, such as administrators, military personnel, entrepreneurs and adventurers, return.¹⁵³ There is also a crucial distinction between settlers and migrants. Settlers are *founders* of political orders and carry their sovereignty with them, while migrants are *suppliants* who face a political order that is already constituted.¹⁵⁴ In addition, as Veracini describes it, “while settlers see themselves as founders of political orders, they also interpret their collective efforts in terms of an inherent sovereign claim that travels with them and is ultimately, if not immediately, autonomous from the colonising metropole”.¹⁵⁵ A further characteristic of settler colonialism is that whereas colonialism is a master-servant relationship where the colonised people are often used for exploitative purposes, in a settler colonial situation, the indigenous person is characterised by their *dispensability*.¹⁵⁶ In other words, indigenous peoples can and in fact are actively made to “vanish”, and this is effected by a varying set of actions called *transfer*.¹⁵⁷ These range from liquidation and deportation to various ways where indigenous peoples are in effect assimilated to the settler collective, whether culturally, administratively or conceptually.¹⁵⁸ Settler colonialism is a structure rather than an event, where an initial invasion gives rise to a prolonged process of eliminating the indigenous population.¹⁵⁹ The dynamics of the settler colonial situation are further defined by a tripartite division between the settler collective and indigenous and exogenous others. The exogenous others are made of immigrants and representatives of metropolis.¹⁶⁰ While indigenous others are a threat to the existence and legitimacy of the settler collective, there can be a selective inclusion of exogenous others as there is the possibility of collaboration.¹⁶¹ However, there can also be undesirable exogenous others who may be subject to deportation or segregation,¹⁶² and abject others who are permanently excluded from the settler collective and have lost their indigenous or exogenous status.¹⁶³ A “successful” settler society, then, “is managing the orderly and progressive emptying of the indigenous and exogenous others segments of the population economy and has permanently separated from the abject others”.¹⁶⁴ In many ways, the whole process involves replacing an old society or societies with a new one(s); in other words, a settler colonial society can also be called a supplanting society.¹⁶⁵ The study of settler colonialism can help understand some innersocietal assimilation and eliminatory processes as well, such as the Nazi genocide and the elimination of witches in medieval Europe.¹⁶⁶ On the whole, settler colonialism can be compared with the concept of natural selection at a societal level, or inter-societal selection.¹⁶⁷

If a settler colonial society encroaches on the territory of another society

and causes an expulsion of people, this is clearly a form of forced migration.¹⁶⁸ Forced migration can also occur if a state decides to resettle people from one area to another. Such action can also be done by empires, including when they expand, and this ties with expulsion from the perspective of the area from where people are uprooted. Otherwise, if people flee in situations of war, that can also be counted under forced migration.¹⁶⁹ Even if the decision to leave is technically a voluntary one, if the war has made the situation on the ground increasingly difficult, for example due to destruction of property and food supplies, in practice the migration is forced. Moving people in from another part of the empire should also be seen in the context of settler colonialism as this typically works towards destroying communities at both the source and destination of the migrants and serves towards homogenising the empire, something that at least typically is a clear aim of the imperial central authorities when acting so. However, in this case, the new people are somewhere in between indigenous others and exogenous others. At the source of the forced migration they are indigenous others, but at destination they are not indigenous. Their solidarity with the empire is clearly less strong than with voluntary migrants into settler societies; however, they are also less likely to feel strong solidarity with peoples that they encounter at destination other than, say, their compatriots who might have been moved to the same place. The overall picture, then, seems to be somewhat mixed with forced migration. But, again, it can on the whole be seen in the context of settler colonialism.

In relation to migration and colonialism, one should also highlight that the initial migration of humans tended to be into uninhabited places (save for the case where *Homo Sapiens* replaced Neanderthals).¹⁷⁰ In such situations there would be no indigenous people to replace and no settler colonial situations. That might also be the case when nomadic and seminomadic groups might migrate and set up camp in the area of a state without any major interaction with the people of the state, including any serious attempts by the state to establish coercive control over such people. This shows how home community migration, whole-community migration and colonising migration are inherently monocultural, even though no culture is completely uniform but exhibits variations (subcultures) within it. Cross-community migration most obviously involves cultural interaction, in that case predominantly from the receiving community to the migrants, even when the migrants can bring some of their customs to the receiving community. As just outlined earlier, in colonising situations (with pre-existing indigenous peoples in place), there is also a cultural mix. However, the situation is different in terms of the power that the incoming people hold as against the community into whose area they move. Also, the relative number of people between the immigrants versus the indigenes varies, being small with “ordinary” colonialism, but large(r) with

settler colonies in comparison to the local people. And yet, large-scale cross-cultural immigration can also take place, and in such cases the people may form ethnic enclaves where immigrants who speak the same language, itself often then tying with a specific ethnicity, group together.¹⁷¹ One can then imagine that if an ethnic enclave gains sufficient power, it may claim political autonomy, and a settler colonial situation might result even when one may not have been intended to be the case initially by the incoming migrant. In this connection, and more widely with community migrations to new places, one may consider the following comment by Bellwood: “while initial groups of prehistoric migrants were necessarily small, their demographic growth, once they reached new and encouraging circumstances was in many cases *absolutely phenomenal*”.¹⁷² Such circumstances might also apply to colonial situations.¹⁷³

On the whole, as just indicated, in cases of societal expansion, one society will encroach on the territory of another unless the expansion is into an uninhabited area. In such processes, territory will often be contested. Such contested territories are then called frontiers.¹⁷⁴ In frontier areas, as they are by definition contested, any rule of law may be attenuated and violence and unrest increased. A fair amount of study on frontiers has been conducted in the past,¹⁷⁵ even if there seems to have been a certain stagnation in addressing the topic recently.¹⁷⁶ It should be clear that the concept of frontiers naturally ties with overall considerations of migration and colonialism.

It would appear that genetics does not currently offer huge direct advantages in studying migrations in the area and period of study here. The data set of available evidence does not seem to be sufficient to determine general patterns over the area and time period in question.¹⁷⁷ Nevertheless, some general comments can be made. While the initial migration of humans tended to be into uninhabited areas, migration studies also suggest that human migration involved a substantial amount of natural selection, including cases where *Homo Sapiens* replaced Neanderthals.¹⁷⁸ All this can be compared with colonising migration and settler colonialism, even if a lack of written sources naturally excludes an analysis of ideological aspects of settler colonialism. The processes can also be compared with Lenski’s intersocietal selection. In this connection, according to migration studies, natural selection did not necessarily consist of complete replacement, but, for example, genetic studies show that there was admixture.¹⁷⁹ There is also the concept of Demic diffusion which suggests that once populations that have migrated into a new area move out from their initial centres of residence, they increasingly mix genetically with indigenous populations.¹⁸⁰ In that case, Demic diffusion as such may preserve the original cultural traits of the immigrants even when the genetic composition is tempered towards indigenous levels.¹⁸¹ All these concepts then

fit with the overall notions of cultural exchange and assimilation that relate to theories of colonialism.

As for linguistics, its use would seem to be able to at least potentially offer some insights for studying migration during the period in question, especially for the Arameans and the Philistines. I shall present here overall considerations that relate to the use of historical linguistics in the study of migration. In many ways, the study of African history and prehistory since the 1960s has provided a seminal ground for the development of historical linguistics,¹⁸² even if the field traces its origins to the work of the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure in the early twentieth century.¹⁸³ The basic idea is that languages originally consisted of protolanguages that then diverged into yet further languages.¹⁸⁴ The protolanguages and their descendants in effect constitute language families.¹⁸⁵ Historical linguistics attempts to reconstruct the protolanguages from a combination of a living record of extant languages and historical records of known languages.¹⁸⁶ Once the locations of the known languages are mapped, one can try to see where the protolanguage and any of its subsequent developments along the way of its developing into the daughter languages were located.¹⁸⁷ Once those locations are specified, if there is a difference with the location of the protolanguage and its daughter languages, this indicates migration.¹⁸⁸ An important part of the methodology is loanwords. If a language includes loanwords from another language, this implies contact, and even if one of the languages or language families that have been loaned to another language is not attested in the location where the other is, this can indicate migration.¹⁸⁹ Locating the variety of languages also uses archaeological evidence in that there is an assumption that certain language groups may be tied with a particular cultural style of material evidence.¹⁹⁰ This last point obviously may be tied with the pots versus peoples argument, and due caution is warranted in the use of the method.¹⁹¹

Historical linguistics on the whole often tends to be able to establish a relative dating, but it is difficult for it to be specific about the exact time frames involved.¹⁹² However, archaeological correlations and the use of a method called glottochronology can help to establish more absolute chronologies. Glottochronology, itself relying on lexicostatistics, assumes a general pattern of language change and the idea that the more related languages are different the longer they have diverged from each other, based on the idea that with time, some words drop out of use from languages and are replaced by new words.¹⁹³ The method is not entirely reliable,¹⁹⁴ but it seems fair that it can be taken as indicative at a minimum.¹⁹⁵

The most applicable aspect of historical linguistics for the area and time period discussed in the present work seems to be the study of how migration relates to sociolinguistic considerations. This in particular relates to linguistic

considerations that relate to social status. I already indicated that colonialism is linked with an incoming group of people that obtains power over indigenous peoples. In this, if the new group has a different language or languages from the indigenes, certain social processes that are also reflected at the linguistic level are likely to take place, tending to be different from cases of cross-cultural migrants who are more of the suppliant type that face an existing political order without trying to challenge it but rather accept that they should adapt to it. Based on such aspects as linguistic borrowing and historical records in situations where there is sufficient information available, a variety of general patterns that occur can be detected.¹⁹⁶ For the period in consideration here, we can take those general patterns and extrapolate them into the specific situations that may occur with the cases investigated, of course also verifying that they fit with the available historical data. This will be the case in particular with the Philistine migration for which only minimal historical data is available. We can expect that the Philistine migrants were speakers of non-Semitic languages who encountered a Semitic-speaking environment, with plausible accompanying sociolinguistic patterns to be expected.¹⁹⁷ In addition, issues relating to linguistic differentiation may also be relevant. This is particularly the case with the Arameans, whose origins may be illustrated by such considerations, even when direct linguistic data is not available for the period under consideration.¹⁹⁸

I next outline a specific example of migration and colonialism in a premodern preindustrial setting. From a technological perspective, it occurred in an African tribal situation where the tribes concerned possessed only a low level of technology.¹⁹⁹ The two tribes in question, the Nuer and the Dinka, were also of a seminomadic nature. In addition, there was no difference in their respective technological advancement, and their languages were related, even if mutually unintelligible. Initially, they more or less coexisted with each living in specific territories. However, in the nineteenth century, the Nuer expanded over large areas that had till then been possessed by the Dinka. That the spread of the Nuer at the expense of the Dinka took place is clear as it has been well documented. The monograph by Raymond Kelly has investigated the expansion and its causes,²⁰⁰ and I shall summarise and comment on the issues involved in the following.²⁰¹ The case can serve as a comparator for the ancient Near Eastern world of the thirteenth through ninth centuries BCE especially due to similarities in terms of the tribal character or at least heritage of the ancient Near Eastern societies, the similar technological level of the peoples involved, the lack of state structures,²⁰² similarities of language between a number of groups, and the existence of pastoralism and seminomadism in the ancient Near East. Of course, for example, states and empires were also involved in the ancient Near East between 1300 and 900 BCE; however, the

period between 1200 and 1000 BCE in particular is marked by their relative weakness and lack of control of the area in question. Altogether, one can then see what conclusions might be warranted based on any similarities, without forgetting that there will be differences also with the respective situations. It is above all the detail involved, much of which is well documented and verifiable, the incorporation of anthropological considerations and the level of at the minimum typological similarity with ancient Near Eastern societies and settings in the period in question here that make the study by Kelly an excellent source and comparator for a number of considerations in this book.

The Nuer and Dinka, each divided into a number of subgroups consisting of politically autonomous tribes, are located in the Upper Nile in the southern part of Sudan, with most of the territory in question now located in South Sudan.²⁰³ The languages of the two peoples are more closely related to each other than either is to any further Nilotic language, having between forty and sixty per cent of shared cognates.²⁰⁴ Glottochronology would indicate that the languages started to diverge some 2,000 years ago. The cutoff point, an eighty per cent mark of shared cognates,²⁰⁵ where the languages would have become mutually unintelligible would probably have occurred around 700–1300 CE, even though one cannot put any considerable weight to these dates.²⁰⁶ The point is, however, that there are good reasons to think that the two peoples had the same protolanguage and diverged from there, nevertheless remaining geographically proximate.

Oral traditions by the Nuer and Dinka indicate that the two groups were present around the localities in question by about 1500 and that the area occupied by them was about doubled during the period 1500–1800 CE, with migrations involved.²⁰⁷ In the nineteenth century, then, the Nuer expanded some 500 kilometres towards the east, increasing their territorial domain about fourfold, from some 22,000 to 90,000 square kilometres, with the bulk of this enlargement achieved between 1820 and 1880, in the time span of some 60 years.²⁰⁸ The expansion was accompanied by periodic raids by the Nuer on the Dinka,²⁰⁹ already in itself reminding one of raiding that is typical of seminomadic peoples, including the Amorite tribes around Mari in the early second millennium BCE.²¹⁰ The favourite season for Nuer raids was at around the end of the rainy season (late September).²¹¹ This fits with the overall seasonal pattern of the Nuer and Dinka in that during the rainy season (April–September), they would be located in permanent settlements marked by a focus on agriculture, whereas the dry season would mark movement into temporary camps for pasture.²¹² This, then, obviously fits with the harvest season, even if raids could also take place at other times of the year, including at the time of planting as another favourite occasion.²¹³ Even though their overall seasonal cycle and migratory patterns were similar, the social

organization of the Nuer enabled larger contingents of men to be gathered together for raids.²¹⁴ Famine for the Dinka was a typical outcome of the incursions.²¹⁵ Conversely, Dinka attempts at raiding the Nuer were typically defeated by the Nuer.²¹⁶ As Kelly describes, with cattle forming an important category of movable property that could be achieved by raiding,

Systematic Nuer cattle raids, conducted on an annual basis, created a periphery of debilitated Dinka communities that yielded readily to Nuer territorial appropriation. Seasoned Nuer raiding parties were pitted against famine-ridden Dinka groups struggling to survive through periods of scarcity resulting from previous raids. Under the circumstances it is not surprising that the Dinka were unable to mount any effective resistance to continuing Nuer territorial expansion. As this expansion proceeded, displaced Dinka groups were pushed into adjacent areas where they came into conflict with the existing population whose land and grazing rights they infringed. These conflicts undoubtedly contributed to a lack of unity in meeting subsequent Nuer attacks. Successful Nuer cattle raids thus engendered conditions favorable to territorial expansion, and the continuation of this expansion was further facilitated by the aftermath of prior Dinka defeat. The expansion process fed on the conditions it created.²¹⁷

It seems that the number of Dinka that were killed was quite small. It would include Dinka warriors, but also older women and babies.²¹⁸ At the same time, women and children, both boys and girls, could be taken captive, with boys notably integrated in the lineages of the captors.²¹⁹ It seems clear overall that captives taken would typically be assimilated to the Nuer population, and that this would account for the increase in numbers among the Nuer.²²⁰ It would otherwise be difficult to explain what happened to the Dinka in the conquered areas as the number of casualties was relatively small and there was no sufficiently large increase in population in the adjacent areas, to account for the fate of the population as solely consisting of death and migration away as a consequence of the Nuer raiding.²²¹ In addition, there was a larger-than-expected increase in size with the eastern Nuer tribes that were in the areas of expansion.²²² Nor are there reports of extraordinary famine-related deaths among the Dinka.²²³ In relation to this, it is known that at times Dinka would voluntarily enter the Nuer territory, especially due to the better availability of food,²²⁴ and often assimilate as a consequence.²²⁵ Immigrant Dinka tribesmen could often be consorts of Nuer widows and women that involved so-called ghost marriage, with the children of these relationships counted as children of the deceased husband or ghost husband.²²⁶ Such children would then be Nuer rather than “Dinka-Nuer”.²²⁷ This of course would serve to incorporate the

children of male immigrants into the lineage system of the Nuer.²²⁸ All in all, we can see that the Nuer society was receptive to assimilating the Dinka, employing specific cultural methods to achieve that. At the same time, during the expansion, pockets of Dinka existed that were assimilated only later, with the process continuing well into the twentieth century.²²⁹

As to the reasons for the expansion, after reviewing a number of previous explanations,²³⁰ Kelly suggests that Nuer bridewealth payments that were on average larger than with the Dinka were the reason for the expansion.²³¹ The reasons for such differences were cultural and economic.²³² The requirement for more cattle as a major component of such payments provided an impetus for raiding the Dinka.²³³ In addition, the payments would be proportionally more distributed to the bride's patrikin than matrikin, with the Dinka more geared towards the latter.²³⁴ On the whole, increased demands of cattle could really be met only by raiding the Dinka.²³⁵

In terms of tribal organisation, the Nuer include one more segmentary (hierarchical) level of organisation than the Dinka (three against two for smaller and four against three for larger tribes).²³⁶ In addition, Nuer minimal segments (sections at the third level from the highest) can include a significantly greater number of people than their Dinka counterparts.²³⁷ They also tend to contain more local groups than the Dinka.²³⁸ Also, any fission with the Nuer tends to keep the Nuer interrelated with the dominant clan of the lineage through a suitable inclusion of patrilineality,²³⁹ whereas Dinka fission typically results in the loss of relatedness.²⁴⁰ In this, significantly, the bridewealth payments reflect the relative importance given to patrilineal and matrilineal aspects of the respective tribal systems.²⁴¹ Altogether, the sociocultural composition of the Nuer tribes results in a larger average size of the Nuer tribes that translates into an advantage in warfare. Warfare, on the other hand, is employed as a result of that same sociocultural composition also necessitating a comparatively larger number of cattle for bridewealth that can most conveniently be obtained by raiding the Dinka. Also, Nuer cattle that consists of, on average, large male animals in comparison to the Dinka is food-limited and tends to increase up to the point that it reaches the limits imposed by dry season grazing that is available.²⁴² The accompanying shortages then lead to Nuer encroachment into Dinka territory, appropriating their dry season pastures. While the raids tend to focus on wet season pastures, the resultant weakening of the Dinka also helps with the appropriation of the dry season pastures.²⁴³ A new round of expansion would then take when cattle that could now breed in enlarged pasture areas would again result in shortages.²⁴⁴

On the whole, the system of the Nuer can be described as being in a constant, or at least periodic, disequilibrium that that expansion could attempt to address; however, such addressing would feed back into creating more

disequilibrium.²⁴⁵ The overall result of the drive towards expansion that the societal system exhibits is a fairly rapid colonial expansion over an extensive geographic area. The process as just described can be compared with settler colonialism as described in the foregoing. However, it is clear that no metropolis is driving the expansion, but that the expansion is more or less spontaneous and does not involve visions of larger territory that the societal unit(s) would like to attain.²⁴⁶ In other words, the well-documented example of the Nuer and Dinka demonstrates that settler colonialism can be the result of what are essentially uncoordinated actions by societal units that are not driven by an overarching purpose of expansion. This, of course, is at least more or less in line with the suggestions derived from the study of prehistoric migrations.²⁴⁷ It would also appear that a mixture of coordinated and uncoordinated actions can be at play, and one can keep the concept of hegemony in mind in such cases. The initial European originated settlement of North America was unlikely to have involved a grand plan of conquering the whole continent; however, by the early nineteenth century, the concept of manifest destiny was attested by the then rapidly expanding United States of America.²⁴⁸ One can also imagine that the ambitions of smaller societal units would be less likely to include grand plans for expansion over large areas, including as such small units would generally only be able to extend their power over small areas anyway, as opposed to potential opportunities available to larger societal units.

The Nuer expansion seems to have started with changes in the proportional emphasis given to matrilineal and patrilineal relationships in relation to bride-wealth payments, with patrilineal relations gaining prominence.²⁴⁹ These changes then resulted in a larger size of the Nuer communities, setting a stage for the rapid territorial expansion of the nineteenth century.²⁵⁰ After the 1880s the introduction of rinderpest into the area reduced the typical payments far below the ideal, even though the ideal was still firmly preserved at the latter date.²⁵¹ Although the Nuer tried to carry on raiding the Dinka, the massive losses for both the Nuer and Dinka did not allow the expansion of cattle numbers. This then lessened the need for additional grazing areas, alleviating the need for Nuer expansion.²⁵² Altogether, this sequence of developments shows that expansion of societies to the areas of other societies may spurt off relatively suddenly, then last for a period of time and subsequently come to a halt, at least more or less so.

E. How societies come into existence,

develop and die out

I shall now proceed to considerations that pertain to how human societies come into existence, develop and die out. In general, one can think of societies as organisms with some analogies to other organisms, including humans themselves.²⁵³ It was noted earlier that societies in a “proper” sense of the term should be seen as autonomous groups, and in that sense the ones of interest here include nations, states and empires, and also ethnic groups when they, at least more or less, coincide with nations. Accordingly, when considering the birth, development and dying out of societies, one should analyse such processes that relate to the developmental trajectories of ethnic groups, nations, states and empires.

I already noted in the foregoing how societies are kept together based on a combination of ideology and coercion. In this respect, it should be further noted that the foundations of ethnic groups and even nations can be considered as predominantly ideological,²⁵⁴ even when coercive methods may also be employed,²⁵⁵ whereas states and empires clearly involve a strong component of actual coercive force that works together with ideology. Accordingly, any consideration of the developmental trajectory of these societal entities needs to take into account aspects of both ideology and coercion.

As ethnic groups are based on families as natural social units and can at least more or less form into autonomous groups on their own, and on the other hand entities such as nations, states and empires can contain one or more ethnic groups, considering how ethnic groups form constitutes a central part of any analysis of the formation of societies. The academic study of such formation, or ethnogenesis, is relatively recent; however, an extensive literature on the subject now exists.²⁵⁶ In many ways the study of ethnogenesis originates from the study of the Americas in the postcolumbian period, even if its scope has recently widened as well.²⁵⁷ The considerations of ethnogenesis also often tend to be tied with the interpretation of material evidence.²⁵⁸ The link with archaeology should at least ultimately be natural, as one of the key questions in regard to ethnicity and archaeology is to what extent ethnicity can be detected and reconstructed based on archaeological data, linking with considerations already made in that respect. Interestingly, Voss notes how there has been a “relative lack of archaeological attention to ethnogenesis among elite and dominant communities”; in other words, the study of ethnogenesis in its postcolumbian context that is also colonial has tended to focus on examining what happened to socially less powerful communities, and that implies the indigenous communities of the Americas.²⁵⁹ Considerations

from the study of historical linguistics can be added here in contexts where the immigrant communities from a language group that is different from that of the indigenes form a dominant segment of the society in question.²⁶⁰

Keeping in mind that societies are by their nature organised groups, with at least some type of organisation involved, for a society to come into existence then involves the formation of group identity and an organising structure. With ethnic groups, the ideology and organising structure starts from biology; they are an extension of families as natural social units.²⁶¹ One might then assume that generating a new idea of common descent is of primary importance when new ethnic groups form, even if cultural and linguistic aspects are also particularly significant. In this, at least for periods after the development of early humans, new formations have to be based on already existing formations as new people born have a biological heritage, and a cultural and linguistic heritage, together with a sense of past history and a link with physical surroundings imprinted on them as they grow up. In other words, new ethnic groups will have to be formed based on existing ethnic groups, and the same really applies to any national groups and states and empires. As Voss suggests, “Models of ethnogenesis apply best to those situations in which prior modes of identification are transformed and replaced by new identity practices”, emphasising that identity has a practical aspect to it in terms of what people do.²⁶²

Altogether, there are a variety of ways new ethnicities can come into existence. One way for that to happen is if two or more groups merge. This can be either voluntary or a result of external factors, such as expulsion as a result of colonialism.²⁶³ Equally, groups can split, either voluntarily, due to internal strife, or as a result of external pressures.²⁶⁴ In this, specific splitting can take place through linguistic differentiation that usually takes centuries.²⁶⁵ A substantial transformation of a group in terms of identity might also be a possibility, at least in theory, even if such changes can also be seen in the context of societal change more broadly. In order to form a new ethnic group, one would expect that the components of ethnicity are reconfigured for the new group. This might include a new name. Also, the group might constitute its descent anew. Such reconstitution might include new fictional ancestors and descent lines. Or, with a splinter group, one of the people in the new group may become its new ancestors, especially over a number of generations.²⁶⁶ New shared historical memories may be created. Some cultural changes may moreover happen, for example, when two or more groups merge. If the new group forms in a new location, the link with homeland may also change. It would seem that a variety of combinations of the above factors is a possibility. A full list of possible ways of ethnogenesis has been given by Voss:

(1) the emergence of well-defined ethnic practices and discourses in contexts where ethnicity was not previously a focus of social identity; (2) transformations of ethnic identity through new relations between a population and a newly dominant institution, as often occurs on colonial frontiers; (3) processes of fusion and aggregation in which diverse people are joined together in a shared ethnic identity; (4) processes of fission and disaggregation in which people with a former shared ethnicity separate into multiple new ethnic identities; (5) processes of migration and displacement through which place-based identities lose relevance and are supplanted by new ethnic identities; (6) the transformation of non-ethnic identities – religion, nationality, occupation, and so forth – into ethnic identities; (7) the development of a new ethnic identity through the shared experiences of oppression from or resistance to a dominant group or institution; and (8) the development of a new ethnic identity to legitimize or maintain unequal access to power or resources.²⁶⁷

At a national, state and empire level, creation of new power structures would transform existing arrangements into new entities. For example, a collection of tribal groups could be transformed by a new centralised government that manages to establish coercive control over the area in question. This can often be a result of technological development, including in a world-historical trajectory, that enables such coercive entities to arise, even if this does not need to be the case always. If so, a new state will have formed. Or, a state may manage to extend its control over other states, creating an empire.

Transformations within ethnic groups, nations, states and empires would proceed around these rubrics. Modifications to ethnic characteristics can take place along any of the dimensions just outlined without changing their fundamental nature. As is already clear from the case of ethnogenesis, migration and colonialism can contribute towards such changes,²⁶⁸ even if cultural diffusion can also take place without migration.²⁶⁹ In this connection, as Voss points out, “ethnogenesis often blurs with other models of social and cultural change, such as diaspora, hybridity, assimilation, bricolage, mestizaje, acculturation, syncretism, and creolization”,²⁷⁰ concepts themselves linked with migration and colonialism. Changing patterns in the government of nations, states and empires may alter their nature, without as such necessarily changing the people that constitute them, even if again migration, colonialism and cultural diffusion can be contributory factors to any developments. Revolutions may change the power structures of societies, even if revolutions often merely end up changing those in power.²⁷¹

Societies tend towards longevity as new people born to them or those assimilated are taught the workings of those societies, with children in particular often internalising the overall outlook and operational

characteristics of the societies.²⁷² In some cases, societies can, however, collapse and die out. If an empire loses its ability to exert coercive and ideological-hegemonic control over populations, the empire may shrink or completely collapse. The same may happen to states and even nations.²⁷³ In the absence of war in such developments, there will be no casualties. Equally, if an ethnic group voluntarily merges with another group, that ethnic group has died, but without any loss of life. The same may be the case if an ethnic group splinters. Diseases and natural disasters can also contribute to societal collapse, with loss of life more or less possible as part of the processes involved.²⁷⁴

However, it is also possible that an ethnic group will be assimilated into another group. If that is completely voluntary, the situation can be compared with cultural diffusion, where people adopt a new culture or features of it. However, in colonial situations, the dominant group often forces its culture and societal structures on the native group.²⁷⁵ In this sense, also, the issue of hegemony tends to be less applicable in colonial settings, even when the conquering group may wish to use indigenous collaborators and of course keep a hegemonic attitude within its own group so as to secure its consent. With franchise colonialism, dominance tends to be comparatively less intensive; however, over a long period of time, assimilation to even a considerable degree may occur. Some of the assimilation may be coercive, as with (or through) imposing certain social structures on the dominated population. Violence is usually also involved in establishing control over the dominated population, unless that population submits voluntarily, which is also a possibility. But, there can be cultural influence by the colonised on the coloniser as well, plus any unintended consequences may, or even are likely, to result.²⁷⁶ With settler colonialism, the amount of violence is typically accentuated, with the colonisers imposing their social structures on the dominated society so that the indigenes and thus ultimately the dominated society will vanish from the territory that the invading society takes over.²⁷⁷ The methods of transfer used, or making the indigenes vanish, fall into three principal areas of killing, expulsion and assimilation. Issues that relate to the systematic destruction of a specific group, then, in particular link with the concept of genocide, which in relation to a specific ethnic group can be labelled as ethnocide. From a historical perspective, the term genocide was defined in the UN Genocide Convention (1948) as follows:

In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such:

- (a) Killing members of the group;

- (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
- (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.²⁷⁸

This definition was, however, not quite what was suggested by the originator of the concept, Raphael Lemkin, whose work during the Second World War in relation to the Nazi occupation of Europe was foundational for developing an understanding of the notion.²⁷⁹ According to Lemkin (who also coins the word genocide itself in the passage),

New conceptions require new terms. By “genocide” we mean the destruction of a nation or an ethnic group. This new word, coined by the author to denote an old practice in its modern development, is made from the ancient Greek word *genos* (race, tribe) and the Latin *cide* (killing), thus corresponding in its formation to such words as tyrannicide, homicide, infanticide, etc. Generally speaking, genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation, except when accomplished by mass killings of all members of a nation. It is intended rather to signify a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves. The objectives of such a plan would be disintegration of the political and social institutions of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of national groups, and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and even the lives of individuals belonging to such groups. Genocide is directed against the national group as an entity, and the actions involved are directed against individuals, not in their individual capacity, but as members of the national group.²⁸⁰

Also,

Genocide has two phases: one, destruction of the national pattern of the oppressed group; the other, the imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor. This imposition, in turn, may be made upon the oppressed population which is allowed to remain, or upon the territory alone, after removal of the population and the colonization of the area by the oppressor’s own nationals.²⁸¹

The definition by Lemkin has clear links with settler colonialism in particular especially in hindsight of the recent development of settler colonial studies. The more restrictive UN definition is more directly focused on physical and

perhaps mental harm caused to individuals as part of a specific group, without really taking into account the wider context of the group. Certainly, in some cases, such as with the Nazi genocide of the Jews, such a wider context is obvious, also keeping in mind that much of the initial study of genocide took place in order to study the Holocaust, and this has remained the case till now, even if the scope of the study has also widened.²⁸² At the same time, genocide, as with the Holocaust, can easily be seen from an innersocietal perspective, especially if one approaches things based on the narrower definition. In contrast, the wider definition in particular fits with colonialism and especially settler colonialism and includes cultural destruction that results from forced assimilation,²⁸³ in addition to typically destroying the livelihood and morale of people through displacement, and any killing of people in the conquered society. The narrower definition then importantly fits with the victorious nations of the Second World War who would, according to Lemkin's concept, have been guilty of crimes of genocide themselves, for example in relation to the settler colonial conquest of the northern American continent first by Britain and then the independent colonies of the United States of America.²⁸⁴ This issue alerts one to the fact that genocide can be a highly politicised and controversial concept, and the same can be the case with issues that relate to ethnicity and ethnocide.²⁸⁵ On the whole, genocide and colonialism relate to group violence, with varying levels and intensity to that violence.²⁸⁶ Importantly, genocide can be seen as a conflict;²⁸⁷ accordingly, few genocides if any can be seen as one-sided. An example of violence by victims of genocide includes the Warsaw ghetto uprising by Jews in the German Reich. In terms of intensity, again, modern technologies enable more effective killing, probably culminating to date in the gas chambers of the Nazi regime, and one may ask to what extent genocide could have occurred in the ancient world.²⁸⁸ In this, one may, however, keep in mind that even chimpanzees have been shown to employ genocidal means against other chimpanzee groups.²⁸⁹ Therefore, the possibility of genocide or at least genocidal action in the ancient world should not be excluded *prima facie*.²⁹⁰

F. Methodological summary

The foregoing discussion has highlighted a number of aspects that relate to migration and colonialism and societal change. It is clear that migration and colonialism are involved in most types of societal changes that were discussed. Even so, there are also cases of cultural diffusion without any, or at least only a

minimal amount of migration, or just perhaps temporary migration such as by individual merchants for the purposes of trade. On the whole, from a theoretical standpoint, a variety of dimensions can be extracted from the perspective of migration and colonialism in terms of their intensity.

First, if one looks at the demographics involved, one can see that in cases of “ordinary”, or “franchise” colonialism,²⁹¹ a small number of colonisers rule over large populations in the colonies. In contrast, in the case of settler colonialism, indigenous peoples are made to vanish in favour of the invaders. It would seem that these two modes in effect provide opposite poles in terms of how the relative cultural, if not actual, demographics between invaders and indigenes operate. But it is easy to imagine that certain situations might fall in between these poles, even on a sliding scale. Spanish colonialism in central and South America might provide a good example of such an “intermediate” position.²⁹² Particularly in cases of that type, the interactions between peoples involved would be likely to result in a number of unintended and unexpected consequences on the ground, such as the emergence of the people group of latinos in South America as a result of inter-marriage.²⁹³ This may also include adaptations that can be considered as creative and thus counted as innovations by the societies in question.²⁹⁴ But, in all of these cases, cultural interaction will take place at least to some extent both from the coloniser to the colonised and vice versa. In terms of migration, in franchise colonialism the amount of migration relative to the native populations tends to be on a small scale, whereas in settler colonial situations it tends to be on a large scale, with intermediate situations also possible. In a franchise colonial situation, it is typical for the invaders to take over a number of centres, sometimes even inside existing indigenous communities. The extent of the centres is small in comparison to the areas where indigenous communities live. This can also be compared with ethnic enclaves in cases of cross-community migration, even when those enclaves are not in positions of power in relation to the host society but subject to it. In settler colonialism, by contrast, as indigenous people are made to vanish, only small enclaves of them, if any, may remain as the settler colonial process advances. Each colonial situation also involves a unique mix of assimilation, expulsion and killing. While initial conquest may involve a fair amount of killing and expulsion, and perhaps other repressive measures, in colonialism of the franchise type these tend to be at least comparatively reduced once overall control has been established. In settler colonialism, however, there may be a comparatively high rate of assimilation, killing and expulsion that continues as part of making indigenous peoples vanish. Indigenous labour may nevertheless be utilised also in the latter case.²⁹⁵ Finally, some processes of colonialism may be faster, others slower. At one extreme, gradual migration of peoples from outside and then either a

takeover by them or a creeping expansion into the territory of the indigenous societies may take place, or there may be a sudden invasion of a conquering army that sweeps over a territory and at the same time seeks to destroy the peoples it encounters. It seems clear that modern technology would enhance the possibility and potential intensity of the latter pole, with the German expansion during the Second World War serving as an illustrative example.²⁹⁶ [Table 2.2](#) summarises these considerations.

On the whole, then, when one tries to conceptualise the nature of colonialism, it would seem helpful to take into account these characteristics. Each colonial situation, then, may have their unique mix in relation to these factors. One may, then, also ask to what extent one may classify a situation as “pure” franchise colonialism or settler colonialism. It would seem clear that many if not most situations are likely to fall in between the two poles; however, it may also be the case that they can be classified as predominantly falling under either franchise or settler colonialism.

Finally, from a contemporary perspective, one can ask the question of to what extent humanity should accept violence that leads to the destruction of individuals and societies and to violently forcing them to follow the behavioural patterns of others. Also, one may ask to what extent one may allow violence for one’s own group as against tolerating it from other groups, keeping in mind that social species generally possess an instinct to give primacy to themselves as against others,²⁹⁷ and violence often ties with this. In the connection, as acceptance of one’s own group as violent may reduce its ideological- and, through that, practical-oriented power, it should not be seen as surprising if societies may seek to minimise the acknowledgement of such aspects in relation to themselves. It should then be clear that academic study of migration and colonialism may be controversial in terms of modern ethics and politics, an issue that will be examined in more depth in [Chapter 8](#). But, for the moment, it seems clear that as things become more violent, especially in terms of killing, one starts to get closer to processes that can be associated with genocides. Here, the question of conceptualisation comes in. The UN definition that is more restrictive is not broached as easily as Lemkin’s definition. Accordingly, if one thinks of genocide as ethically problematic and even as a crime, the question is when actions should be classified as a genocide and also a crime. As such conceptualisation is done by humans, undoubtedly one can expect that power and political jockeying cannot but form part of the equation.²⁹⁸

[Table 2.2](#) Modes of colonialism

	<i>Franchise colonialism</i>	<i>Mixed mode</i>	<i>Settler colonialism</i>
Degree of cultural change from indigenous culture to invader culture	Low	Moderate	High
Relative composition of immigrants to indigenes	Low	Moderate	High
Proportion of areas controlled by immigrants vs indigenes as more or less separate societal enclaves	Low	Moderate	High
Mix of assimilation, expulsion and killing and the rate of use of indigenous labour	Tends more towards utilisation of indigenous labour, but assimilation, expulsion and killing may also be involved	Moderate	Tends more towards assimilation, expulsion and killing, but may also use indigenous labour
Rate of changes over time	Relatively slow	Moderate	Relatively fast

Notes

- 1 Møller 2017:1, 148 sees it as *the* driver.
- 2 Cf. comments already made on this issue in Chapter 1.
- 3 An important issue with the study of non-Western societies is that in most cases one could discern clear cultural differences; hence anthropology has always more or less explicitly included the study of cultural differences and their implications.
- 4 Lenski 2005; Nolan and Lenski 2015. The reservations expressed in Mann 2012/1986:34–72 and Scott 2017:1–35, especially in relation to the development of the first agrarian societies and states, should be noted. However, the key point made by Nolan and Lenski is that the amount of information that humankind possesses has been increasing cumulatively and that has brought with it far-reaching changes to human life at both individual and collective levels, even when the trajectory of development has not always been linear or can be qualified as “deterministic”, especially when looked at for certain shorter periods of time (see Nolan and Lenski 2015:84–85). Note also that for Lenski, the idea of evolution in a societal context “contains no assumptions about moral progress or any other form of human betterment” (Lenski 2005:7).

- 5 See Scott 2017.
- 6 Cf. Nolan and Lenski 2015:100–102.
- 7 See Scott 2017.
- 8 I will not pay much attention here to horticultural societies that in a number of ways are similar to agrarian societies, even if generally smaller from a comparative perspective than the latter (see e.g. Nolan and Lenski 2015).
- 9 Lenski 1966:210–230; Scott 2017:150–182. The *habiru* mentioned in the third and second millennium BCE texts seem to correspond with the so-called expendables at the very bottom of the social pyramid of agrarian societies. Cf. Lenski 1966:281–284; Routledge 2004:76–77; Bryce 2009:269.
- 10 Cf. Mann 2012/1986:73–89, with brief comments on Mesoamerica also included on pp. 74–76.
- 11 Cf. the comments on the logistics of moving armies in the ancient world in Mann 2012/1986:137–142.
- 12 See Woods 2010:7; cf. Scott 2017:146–147.
- 13 Cf. Scott 2017:151–152.
- 14 See Scott 2017:137–139. The institution of slavery would, of course, be part of such control of population movement; cf. Scott 2017:150–182. Cf. also e.g. the narrative in Exodus 5–14.
- 15 See Scott 2017:1–36, 183–218.
- 16 Cf. Scott 2017:14.
- 17 Cf. e.g. Morris 2018 for a broadly similar method.
- 18 See Nolan and Lenski 2015 for analysis.
- 19 See Nolan and Lenski 2015:202–210.
- 20 See e.g. Fleming 2004; Porter 2012; Kärger 2014.
- 21 More on this in Chapter 6.
- 22 See e.g. Bar-Yosef and Khazanov 1992.
- 23 See comments on them in Nolan and Lenski 2015, *passim*.
- 24 I.e. referring to a variety of relationships in familial terms, with leaders potentially identifying with fatherhood; for further details, see Schloen 2001.
- 25 See Nolan and Lenski 2015:161–163 with respect to Egypt, and Postgate 2013:333–336 with respect to Middle Assyria, from this perspective.

Accordingly, then, one may ask if, or at least to what extent, Weber's ideal types really apply to the era (Schloen 2001 relies much on Weber as an underlying theoretical framework).

26 See e.g. Esler 2017:30.

27 As examples of such ritual, see e.g. Miller 2004; Feder 2011; Pardee 2002. On treaties, see tLcANe.

28 Cf. Rappaport 1984/1968: esp. 207–210, 236–237.

29 More on the issue of cities ahead.

30 See e.g. Whincop 2008:30–33.

31 See Nolan and Lenski 2015: esp. 169–180.

32 Note that the so-called axial age in the ancient Near East is more or less defined as beginning after the transition into Iron Age II; see Schloen 2001:95.

33 Cf. the comments in Nolan and Lenski 2015:205–207 and in Richerson, Mulder and Vila 1996, Chapter 5 on herding societies. Note that Nolan and Lenski 2015:206 point out that the size of herding communities is similar to that of hunters and gatherers.

34 See Kärger 2014.

35 See Frachetti 2008.

36 See Kelly 1985: esp. 83–84.

37 Cf. the fuller discussion on pastoralism in Mari in Chapter 6.

38 See Scott 2017:219–256.

39 See Scott 2017:219–256; cf. Nolan and Lenski 2015:207; for raiding in Mari, see Kärger 2014, *passim*. Note that the Philistines can also be seen in the context of seaborne nomadism and raiding; see Scott 2017:239–240.

40 Nolan and Lenski 2015:8.

41 See Nolan and Lenski 2015:8 who list the colonial invertebrates, the social insects and many species of nonhuman vertebrates, especially mammals, birds and fish, as examples outside the human sphere, referring to the biologist E.O. Wilson. As Nolan and Lenski (*ibid.*) also point out, cooperation does not mean that humans cooperate in every activity, nor that competition or conflict is necessarily absent.

42 Nolan and Lenski 2015:13–15.

43 Nolan and Lenski 2015:9.

- 44 People can, of course, try to ignore them at specific points in their life, or may sometimes not be aware of them; for example, in cases of a child lost in infancy, even if in the case of a lost child, parents would be unlikely to forget the matter.
- 45 See Nolan and Lenski 2015:8.
- 46 See Horowitz 2000/1985: esp. 55–94.
- 47 Cf. Horowitz 2000/1985.
- 48 For an excellent recent summary with references to literature, see Southwood 2012:19–41.
- 49 Cf. Hutchinson and Smith 1996:4–8.
- 50 See Southwood 2012:21–31.
- 51 See Hutchinson and Smith 1996:5–6 for the reasoning. This approach was already followed by Pitkänen 2004; Kletter 2006 and (at least more or less) Southwood 2012. The next few paragraphs are based on Pitkänen 2004.
- 52 A term used by Hutchinson and Smith.
- 53 Hutchinson and Smith 1996:6–7. Hutchinson and Smith refer to Ch. 2 of 1985 edition of Horowitz 2000/1985 in relation to Item 2, and to Ch. 2 of Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford: Blackwell 1986) in relation to Item 6.
- 54 Hutchinson and Smith 1996:8.
- 55 Hutchinson and Smith 1996:9.
- 56 Hutchinson and Smith 1996:8.
- 57 Hutchinson and Smith 1996:9.
- 58 Hutchinson and Smith 1996:9.
- 59 Cf. the discussion in Southwood 2012:21–31, noting the seminal contributions of Frederik Barth for the studies of ethnicity in this respect.
- 60 Nash 1996:24–25.
- 61 Nash 1996/1989:25.
- 62 See e.g. Horowitz 2000/1985:41.
- 63 See e.g. Weber 1996/1978:38; Horowitz 2000/1985:41–51; Stephan and Stephan 2000.
- 64 Cf. Geertz 1996/1963:42.
- 65 See e.g. Halualani 2000; Stephan and Stephan 2000.

- 66 Cf. the discussion in Nolan and Lenski 2015:102–103.
- 67 Cf. Horowitz 2000/1985:64–65; Nolan and Lenski 2015:103. One example given by Horowitz (2000/1985:57) is the case of Nigerian Yoruba who, searching for a commonality in the context of intergroup strife, turned to a myth of common ancestry for all the subgroups.
- 68 An interesting example of this within an ethnic group, that also illustrates how ethnicity is an extension of family, is the case of Mossi migrants from Upper Volta to Kumasi, Ghana, in Africa, creating fictive family relationships with other Mossi there, helping them become part of the community in Kumasi (see Horowitz 2000/1985:78). In this case, the Mossi in Kumasi were on their part happy to accept and perhaps even participate in such claims, ostensibly for instrumental purposes of augmented cooperation of the community.
- 69 Discussions around race can be complex; for some comments, see Southwood 2012:36–41.
- 70 Cf. the discussion in Southwood 2012:32–34.
- 71 Southwood 2012:33, quoting Calhoun 1993:235 [*non vidi*].
- 72 Note also that if just a single member of an ethnic group that constitutes a nation moves to another nation, the ethnic group does span more than one nation.
- 73 Southwood 2012:33–34, referring to Calhoun 1993:229 [*non vidi*].
- 74 For example, the use of the term has been adopted by academic groups calling themselves societies.
- 75 Nolan and Lenski 2015:9–10, emphasizes theirs. Nolan and Lenski (2015:10) also note that autonomy is clearly a matter of degree, giving the example of the global economy that interlinks all societies from an economic perspective. Nevertheless, Nolan and Lenski (2015:10) note that modern societies still maintain considerable political autonomy, most notably in domestic affairs.
- 76 Cf. the discussion in Smith 1986:6–18 and comments made in the introduction to book at hand here; cf. also Grosby 2002.
- 77 This is in line with the approach of Nolan and Lenski 2015 who analyse the characteristics of differing types of societies in a trajectory of societal development.
- 78 Møller 2017:11.
- 79 Møller 2017:11–12, quoting Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European*

80 Møller 2017:12, referring to Weber.

81 Møller 2017:12, referring to G. Poggi, ‘The Nation-State’, in *Introduction to Comparative Politics*, edited by D. Caramani, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 85–107, 64–65 [*non vidi*].

82 Møller 2017:12.

83 Møller 2017:12. Cf. also the discussion on early states in Scott 2017: esp. 23–24, 117–119.

84 Cf. Møller 2017:17, also using the word territorial state as a synonym for nation-state.

85 From Cline and Graham 2011:4 who themselves quote Doyle 1986:12 [*non vidi*], slightly modified to include the possibility of the metropole dominating more than one entity as an explicit part of the definition and taking into account another definition by Doyle (1986:45 [*non vidi*]), quoted in Liverani 2017:1, “Empire is a relationship, formal or informal, in which one state controls the effective sovereignty of another political society. It can be achieved by force, by political collaboration, by economic, social or cultural dependence. Imperialism is simply the process of establishing or maintaining an empire.”

86 Burbank and Cooper 2010:8.

87 Cf. also the comments in Nolan and Lenski 2015:9–10 on autonomy, quoted above. Nolan and Lenski would probably see modern nation-states as societies; however, some of these can be part of an empire; for more comments on this, see Chapter 8. See also comments that pertain to societal development further in this chapter.

88 Cf. e.g. Killebrew 2005; Younger 2016.

89 See Morris 2018:12–14, 35–36. This issue will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.

90 Cf. comments made in Chapter 1.

91 See Pitkänen 2016a with a focus on the early Israelites, esp. 19n16, referring to e.g. Isserlin 1983; Faust 2006; Kletter 2006 and Kletter 2014.

92 Bellwood 2013:30–32.

93 Malešević 2010.

94 Malešević 2010:211–212.

95 Malešević 2010:212–214.

- 96 Malešević 2010:19, 45–46, 49.
- 97 Note the link here with coercion and persuasion, carrot and stick, and cf. e.g. comments in Morris 2018:139.
- 98 Cf. e.g. Foucault 1977/1975. Further comments in relation to the modern world will be made in Chapter 8. But, note that the overall historical trajectory also seems to at least broadly fit with the Weberian trajectory of rationality and bureaucratisation (cf. e.g. Parkin 2002:77–78 and *passim*).
- 99 See Scott 2017, and cf. related comments already made in the foregoing.
- 100 Nolan and Lenski 2015:153.
- 101 See Allen and Jones 2014.
- 102 On genocides and modernity, see Levene 2005a; Levene 2005b. The issue of genocide will be discussed more widely in the section on migration and colonialism.
- 103 Mann 1986–2013.
- 104 Mann 2012/1986:1–33.
- 105 See Mann 2012/1986:24–27.
- 106 Mann 2012/1986:11, 24.
- 107 See Mann 2012/1986:23–24.
- 108 Cf. Mann 2012/1986:22–27.
- 109 Note that the empire of Agade seemed to be covering a fairly large area of Mesopotamia, to be surpassed only by the first-millennium empires. But this would seem to be at least broadly consistent with the differences that the utilization of bronze and iron technologies would imply, with Agade and the second-millennium empires belonging to the Bronze Age and the first-millennium empires to the Iron Age era, even if any considerations would probably not be limited to this aspect of technology. The modern empires of the second half of the second millennium could be global; at least this is the case with the British and US empires. No empire to date has been able to control the whole of the globe, however.
- 110 Mann 2012/1986:10.
- 111 Lenski 1966:41.
- 112 Cf. comments above in relation to the work of Malešević.
- 113 See e.g. Schwarzmantel 2015; cf. e.g. Jones 2006.
- 114 Summarised in Routledge 2004:27–28.

115 Routledge 2004:28. Gramsci thought that the West had successfully created a civil society that stood behind the state and could support it in crises, whereas such civil society did not exist in the East (Russia), enabling it to be changed through a revolution. Altogether, for Gramsci, “state=political society + civil society, in other words hegemony protected by the armour of coercion” (Routledge 2004:28, quoting Gramsci).

116 Routledge 2014:36–47.

117 Cf. Routledge 2014:36–38.

118 The transformation of Christianity in the fourth century CE into Christendom might serve as one interesting example of using religion for hegemonic purposes.

119 Routledge 2004:32–33; Routledge 2014:42–44.

120 Cf. Routledge 2014:38–39.

121 Cf. Hardt and Negri 2000:163 and *passim*. Hardt and Negri speak of monarchic and aristocratic power in addition to democratic power, with the first two relating to the power of elites and the final to the power of the masses. The analysis of Hardt and Negri suggests that there should be some kind of equilibrium of these powers; a disequilibrium is unfavourable.

122 Cf. Lenski 2005:199; Nolan and Lenski 2015:183–184. Note also how the communist revolution lasted only some 70 years in Russia. I shall merely mention the cases of France and the United States in the eighteenth century here without trying to comment on them further; but cf. Chapter 5 for some further remarks.

123 Nolan and Lenski 2015:26–72.

124 Cf. Nolan and Lenski 2015.

125 Routledge 2004; Routledge 2014.

126 See e.g. Harzig and Hoerder 2009; Manning 2013. The first six paragraphs of this section are adapted from Pitkänen 2014a:4–5; Pitkänen 2014b:234–237; Pitkänen 2016a:10–13.

127 See e.g. Bellwood 2013.

128 See e.g. Bellwood 2013.

129 See Bellwood 2013; also e.g. Manning 2013.

130 Bellwood 2013:XV.

131 Bellwood 2013:XV.

- 132 Bellwood 2013:36–70.
- 133 Cf. Younger 2016:63–70. Overall, Younger in his sizable monograph considers that migration was involved in the spread of the Arameans and also presents evidence for it; see further on this issue in Chapter 6.
- 134 See Ehret 2011.
- 135 See Manning 2013:5–7; cf. Harzig and Hoerder 2009:10–11 who categorise under six differing labels which ultimately can be encompassed within the four categories given here.
- 136 Manning 2013:5–7; cf. Harzig and Hoerder 2009:10. Community can here be broadly seen to correspond to a society, or at least a sociocultural unit of a society. It should be noted here that one challenge in integrating a variety of academic discourses is that terminology used in one discourse may not have an exact one-to-one correspondence in another. However, I trust that it is possible to see sufficiently close correspondences that enable comparison and integration of discourses.
- 137 Manning 2013:5–7.
- 138 Manning 2013:5.
- 139 Manning 2013:6–7.
- 140 Manning 2013:6.
- 141 Manning 2013:7; cf. Harzig and Hoerder 2009:8–11.
- 142 Osterhammel 2005:10.
- 143 Osterhammel 2005:16–17.
- 144 Dietler 2010:18.
- 145 Dietler 2010:18.
- 146 Dietler 2010:18.
- 147 Cf. Bellwood 2013:18, 245. On mass transport in modernity, see Belich 2009: esp. 106–144.
- 148 See ahead, esp. Chapter 3 for further details on these.
- 149 Cf. the foregoing.
- 150 See Veracini 2010:1–15.
- 151 See Veracini 2010:1–15 for a summary of past research, and Veracini 2017 for comments that relate to the impact that studies of settler colonialism have had. Currently, the journal *Settler Colonial Studies*, published by

Routledge, provides a major platform for the study of settler colonialism.

152 See Wolfe 2006:390, 401.

153 Veracini 2010:6.

154 Veracini 2010:3, also with reference to the work of M. Mamdani.

155 Veracini 2010:53.

156 Veracini 2010:8.

157 See Veracini 2010:16–17; italics mine. This relates to the concept of “logic of elimination” or “structural genocide” (rather than simply genocide) as expressed in Wolfe 2006:401, 403. Note also that while the exploitation of the labour of the indigenes is not the primary objective of the colonisers, such exploitation can take place as part of the process of elimination (see Wolfe 1999:29); cf. also Hixson 2013:36–42 for examples from North America.

158 Veracini 2010:35–51, listing 26 different forms of transfer.

159 Wolfe 1999:2, 163; Wolfe 2006:402.

160 Veracini 2010:123n13.

161 Veracini 2010:26.

162 Veracini 2010:27. The African slaves in the Americas (segregation), and the French Acadians in colonies taken over by the British (deportation) would belong to this category.

163 Veracini 2010:27–28.

164 Veracini 2010:28.

165 See Day 2008.

166 See Wolfe 2006:403. Speaking somewhat metaphorically, one may suggest that the external and internal are ultimately two sides of the same coin.

167 Cf. Nolan and Lenski 2015:151–152.

168 I thank Georgina Jardim for highlighting this point.

169 One may also note migration induced e.g. by natural disasters; however, the focus here is on human induced causes. I thank Raz Kletter for highlighting the distinction.

170 This could also sometimes be the case somewhat more recently, e.g. Iceland and Faroe Islands in the ninth century CE (cf. e.g. Diamond 2011/2005:184–185).

- 171 E.g. Chinatowns in the more modern era.
- 172 Bellwood 2013:247, italics mine; see also *ibid.*, 15 for examples.
- 173 In the more modern world, the United States in particular provides an interesting comparison; see Belich 2009: esp. 49–70, 177–185. Cf. also Kakel 2011, according to which the conquest of North America was achieved in bedchambers rather than on battlefields (p. 122); cf. the comments in Bellwood 2013:15–16.
- 174 Even if the concept can again be somewhat vague and even variable from the perspective of its definition and use, see e.g. Imamura 2014.
- 175 E.g. Turner 1893 as a seminal study; Leyburn 1935; Lattimore 1962; Kopytoff 1987; cf. the comments made in Hagman and Korf 2009.
- 176 See Imamura 2014 for a concise set of related comments.
- 177 For example, with early Israel, there is a lack of burials from Iron Age I that can be detected today, cf. Faust 2004; but cf. Gonen 1992 on burials in the Late Bronze Age. Cf. also Chyleński, Grynberg and Juras 2018: esp. 447–448 in relation to the Philistines and Sea Peoples in particular.
- 178 Bellwood 2013:36–68, esp. 52–53, 66–67; cf. comments made just above. The rest of this paragraph is based on Pitkänen 2016a:13.
- 179 See Bellwood 2013: esp. 246.
- 180 Bellwood 2013:21–22.
- 181 Bellwood 2013:21–22.
- 182 See Ehret 2011:4–7.
- 183 See Crowley and Bown 2010:3.
- 184 See e.g. Bellwood 2013:22–26.
- 185 See e.g. Bellwood 2013:23.
- 186 See e.g. Bellwood 2013:23 and, in more detail, Crowley and Bown 2010; Ehret 2011; cf. also Renfrew 1987.
- 187 See e.g. Ehret 2011: esp. 14, 22–50.
- 188 See e.g. Ehret 2011: esp. 14, 22–50. Note that reconstructing earlier layers of languages and language families can also be linked with the development of technology, see *ibid.*
- 189 See e.g. Ehret 2011: esp. 15, 82–104.
- 190 See e.g. Bellwood 2013:22–35; Ehret 2011; Renfrew 1987.

- 191 See Bellwood 2013:30–32 and cf. comments already made earlier.
- 192 See e.g. Ehret 2011:105.
- 193 See Renfrew 1987:113–118; Crowley and Bown 2010:136–151; Ehret 2011:105–132. Crowley and Bown 2010:151–161 list yet further computational and statistical methods that have been developed.
- 194 See Renfrew 1987:116–117; Crowley and Bown 2010:149–151.
- 195 See Ehret 2011:125–127.
- 196 See Ehret 2011:82–104.
- 197 See Chapter 4 for further details.
- 198 See Chapter 6 for further details.
- 199 It is correct that they knew of iron, however.
- 200 Kelly 1985.
- 201 Note also the summary and comments in Bellwood 2013:10–12.
- 202 With state structures of the ancient Near East, the more modern state structures could serve as comparators, in particular in the agrarian era, but perhaps also in some respect in the industrial era. For the Nuer and Dinka, Kelly (1985:267–271) points out that external contacts were not significant in the context of the Nuer expansion.
- 203 See Kelly 1985:13–15, with a map of the area on pp. 14–15.
- 204 Kelly 1985:10.
- 205 On this marker of mutual intelligibility, see Casad 2005:1264.
- 206 Kelly 1985:11; cf. Ehret 2011:128. Glottochronology generally assumes that languages replace about 20 per cent of their core lexicon over a 1,000-year period (Crowley and Bown 2010:148), and the dates quoted in Kelly can be compared against that measure.
- 207 Kelly 1985:12–22.
- 208 Kelly 1985:23, with details about the expansion on pp. 23–36.
- 209 Kelly 1985:36–58.
- 210 Cf. the foregoing and Kärger 2014, *passim*; cf. also Chapter 6 ahead for a section on Mari and its environs.
- 211 Kelly 1985:46, 84.
- 212 Kelly 1985:83–84, which see for a more detailed account.

- 213 Kelly 1985:46–47, 49.
- 214 Kelly 1985:47, 51–53.
- 215 Kelly 1985:49–50.
- 216 Kelly 1985:53.
- 217 Kelly 1985:55.
- 218 Kelly 1985:55–56.
- 219 Kelly 1985:56–57.
- 220 Kelly 1985:64.
- 221 Kelly 1985:58–64. Kelly indicates that direct mortality pertained to about 1 per cent of the Dinka (p. 60) and flight to less than 50 per cent (p. 63).
- 222 Kelly 1985:64.
- 223 Kelly 1985:67.
- 224 Kelly 1985:67.
- 225 Kelly 1985:65.
- 226 Kelly 1985:280n46, quoting Evans-Pritchard. Such an institution, that as such is conducive to assimilation, does, however, not seem to be attested in the ancient Near East. But, cf. nevertheless the concept of levirate marriage that also falls within the category of ghost marriages among the Nuer and Dinka, with levirate marriage attested in Genesis 38, Deuteronomy 25:5–10 and Ruth in the Hebrew Bible.
- 227 Kelly 1985:280n46.
- 228 Kelly 1985:280n46.
- 229 Kelly 1985:266. More exactly, pockets of both Dinka and Anuak existed, with the latter pertaining to the easternmost area of the expansion (see Kelly 1985:28). I have not included the Anuak in the narrative here, however, as it would involve detail that is interesting and slightly distinctive, but unnecessary for the comparative points made in this book. For such further details, see the presentation in Kelly 1985. On the whole, the Dinka can clearly be seen as the main people affected by the Nuer expansion.
- 230 See Kelly 1985:69–109.
- 231 See Kelly 1985:110–156.
- 232 For details, see Kelly 1985:151–154.
- 233 Kelly 1985:119.

- 234 Kelly 1985:132–133.
- 235 Kelly 1985:118.
- 236 Kelly 1985:164–165, 166.
- 237 Kelly 1985:165.
- 238 Kelly 1985:167.
- 239 Kelly 1985:183.
- 240 Kelly 1985:168–170.
- 241 Kelly 1985:182.
- 242 Kelly 1985:151–152, 227.
- 243 Kelly 1985:227–228.
- 244 Kelly 1985:228.
- 245 Kelly 1985:240. Kelly refers to the work of Rappaport on adaptive systems (Rappaport 1979)
- 246 Kelly emphasises that no such vision was attested (Raymond Kelly, personal communication, April 2018).
- 247 Cf. Bellwood 2013 and comments made in the foregoing.
- 248 Cf. e.g. Hixson 2013:66–67.
- 249 Kelly 1985:214–216.
- 250 Kelly 1985:224.
- 251 Kelly 1985:146, 266–267.
- 252 Kelly 1985:124.
- 253 Cf. Nolan and Lenski 2015:7.
- 254 Even if also rooted in the biological, cf. comments made earlier in this chapter.
- 255 Coercion of at least some kind could for example be employed when excluding those perceived as outsiders from the ethnic group in question. Conflicts between ethnic groups are also well known (Horowitz 2000/1985).
- 256 See e.g. Hu 2013; Voss 2015.
- 257 See Voss 2015:657; cf. Hill 1996.
- 258 See e.g. Hu 2013; Voss 2015; Voss 2005; Stojanowski 2010; Stojanowski 2013.
- 259 See Voss 2015:666.

260 See Ehret 2011: esp. 82–104, and cf. the earlier discussion.

261 Cf. above.

262 See Voss 2015:659.

263 See e.g. Albers 1996.

264 See e.g. Sattler 1996.

265 Cf. e.g. Ehret 2011 and comments earlier.

266 Cf. the concept of founder rank enhancement in Bellwood 2013:14–15 that relates to this when the new line in a new place becomes independent; cf. also Bilby 1996.

267 Voss 2015:658.

268 Cf. e.g. Manning 2013:10–13.

269 As argued for e.g. in Frachetti 2008.

270 Voss 2015:659.

271 Cf. comments made earlier in this chapter.

272 Cf. the discussion on hegemony and related historical blocs in the foregoing.

273 Cf. Diamond 2011/2005.

274 Cf. Diamond 2011/2005. On the whole, Diamond (2011/2005:11–15) on his part lists five main causes: environmental damage inflicted by the social group (often accidentally at that), climate change, hostile neighbours, decreased support by friendly neighbours and, finally, the question of how a society responds to challenges it faces, with a bad response obviously being a contributory factor to a collapse.

275 Cf. also McAnany and Yoffee 2010 who note how this aspect is not sufficiently addressed by Diamond 2011/2005.

276 Cf. Dietler 2010:18 and comments made in the foregoing.

277 Cf. discussion in the foregoing.

278 Available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume_78/volume-78-i-1021-english.pdf [accessed 31/7/2019]; cf. Shaw 2015:36–45.

279 On Lemkin, see e.g. Shaw 2015:13–35.

280 Lemkin 2008/1944:79.

281 Lemkin 2008/1944:79.

282 See Shaw 2015:45–83.

283 Cf. Short 2016.

284 Cf. Short 2016: esp.18–27, 226n29; Levene 2005a:36–42. It seems clear that the narrower focus resonated with the Nazi genocide of the Jews that was and remains a bulwark of ideological legitimization of the winning nations of the war against Germany and helps convince others that their dominance in the post-World War II world is justified.

285 Cf. e.g. Horowitz 2000/1985; Hu 2013; Voss 2015.

286 Cf. Docker 2008.

287 See Shaw 2015.

288 Cf. Kiernan 2007; Docker 2008.

289 See Docker 2008:17–28 (esp. 20, 25), referring to Jane Goodall's *The Chimpanzees of Gombe* (1986); referred to in Pitkänen 2014a:6.

290 For some examples and related further considerations, see ahead.

291 Colonisation in Dietler's sense.

292 Cf. Bakewell 2010.

293 See Bakewell 2010:211–215.


294 See e.g. Bakewell 2010:220, mentioned in fuller detail in Chapter 3, note 53.

295 See Wolfe 1999:29; cf. also Hixson 2013:36–42 for examples from North America, as referred to earlier in this chapter, note 158.


296 For some related fuller details, see e.g. Kakel 2011, with historiography of the Second World War as such being extensive.


297 Cf. Nolan and Lenski 2015:8; Lenski 1966:24–42.

298 For one thing, cf. in this context the so-called history wars in Australia (see e.g. Curthoys and Docker 2010:220–237).



Middle Kingdom	Seventh and Eighth Dynasties		2180–2160 BCE
	Ninth and Tenth Dynasties (Herakleopolitan)		2160–2025 BCE
	Early Eleventh Dynasty (Theban)		2125–2055 BCE
	Late Eleventh Dynasty (all Egypt)	Mentuhotep II	2055–1650 BCE 2055–1985 BCE
	Twelfth Dynasty	Amenemhet I	1985–1773 BCE
Second Intermediate Period	Thirteenth Dynasty		1773–after 1650 BCE
	Fourteenth Dynasty		1773–1650 BCE 1650–1550 BCE
	Fifteenth Dynasty (Hyksos)		1650–1550 BCE
	Sixteenth Dynasty (Hyksos)		1650–1580 BCE
	Seventeenth Dynasty (Theban)	Kamose	1580–1550 BCE
New Kingdom	Eighteenth Dynasty	Thutmose III, Amenhotep II, Amenhotep III, Amenhotep IV (Akhenaten)	1550–1069 BCE 1550–1295 BCE
	Nineteenth Dynasty	Seti I, Ramesses II, Merneptah, Seti II	1295–1186 BCE
	Twentieth Dynasty	Ramesses III, Ramesses VII	1186–1069 BCE
			1069–720 BCE
Third Intermediate Period	Twenty-First Dynasty (Tanite)		1069–931 BCE
	Twenty-Second Dynasty (Bubastite/Libyan)	Sheshonq I	931–725 BCE
	Twenty-Third Dynasty (Thanite/Libyan)		813–720 BCE
Late Period	Twenty-Fourth Dynasty		724–333 BCE 724–711 BCE
	Twenty-Fifth Dynasty (Kushite)	Piye	750–656 BCE
	Twenty-Sixth Dynasty (Saite)		664–525 BCE
	Twenty-Seventh to Thirty-First Dynasties		525–333 BCE





3 The imperial context of the second half of the second millennium BCE

In the previous chapter I surveyed a variety of concepts that can contribute towards an understanding of migration and colonialism. To understand the variety of issues involved necessitated taking an integrative social scientific approach. In this chapter, I shall proceed into looking at the actual ancient Near Eastern societies in their geographic and temporal dimensions. The discussion starts with a summary analysis of the imperial context of the ancient Near East. This particularly pertains to the Late Bronze Age, after which these empires collapsed or receded and a number of new societal entities arose.

The age of empires in the ancient Near East had already started about a thousand years earlier. Agade, the first known transregional empire in the world, formed around 2350 BCE through the conquests of Sargon.¹ However, there were already precursors before it.² Clearly the formation of empires can be seen in the context of the development of technologies of control beyond the level of regional states that had formed in the area some thousand years earlier, themselves having their precursors in the agricultural revolution.³ The empire of Agade managed to control the fertile crescent from the shores of the northeast Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf at its height under Sargon's third successor Naram-Sin.⁴ Interestingly, strong imperial propaganda as an example

of early centrifugal ideologisation accompanied Agade,⁵ and it at least in a number of ways served as a model for later generations.⁶ But, in the end the empire was relatively short lived, falling by about 2200 BCE during the reign of the Naram-Sin's son and successor Sharkalisharri.⁷ After a hiatus of some hundred years, the third dynasty of Ur was able to control southern Mesopotamia for a century from 2100 BCE on.⁸

There was no major empire that dominated the area between 2000 BCE and 1600 BCE. However, as Cline and Graham point out,

beginning around 1500 B.C., if not slightly before, the Bronze Age story can no longer be told simply in isolated parts. From this point until just after 1200 B.C., all regions of the Near East and even beyond were integrated into history's first international system, an age of Realpolitik and great powers.⁹

The main players in the Levantine context were Egypt, Mittani, the Hittites and Assyria.¹⁰ The Mittani empire collapsed by about 1350, leaving Egypt, the Hittites and Assyria to contest the area.¹¹ The Mycenaeans in the west, even if in a number of ways on the periphery from a Levantine perspective, are also of some clear significance in the equation as they participated in international trade and diplomacy of the age and acted as a source of the Sea Peoples who migrated to the Levant. The discussion here starts with Egypt, then proceeds to Mittani, followed by the Hittites and then the Assyrians, and concludes with some comments about Mycenae in its environment. Of these, the first four are more or less clearly empires, but the issue is slightly more equivocal with Mycenae.¹² Altogether, this period of control of the ancient Near East as a whole by empires was a first of its kind in the history of the area, lasting for some 300 years, even though Agade had controlled a good-sized section about a millennium earlier for some 150 years. The Late Bronze Age in the Near East can then be seen in the context of a crystallisation of the intensification of the ability of humans to exercise political control over larger distances. As part of that, the era can be seen as exhibiting the actualisation of the possibility of a kind of equilibrium and a system of interaction between a number of competing empires across an area.

A. Egypt

Egypt provides an interesting example of issues that relate to empires and colonialism. The related developments also took place quite early in time, with the Egyptian empire dissolving during the Twentieth Dynasty in the twelfth

and eleventh centuries BCE. There is good coverage of the topic in Egyptological studies; however, these studies have often not been considered by scholars working on comparative studies of imperial systems.¹³ Much of the lack of wider appropriation seems to be due to the relative insularity of Egyptology, also attested by it often not being included in regional histories of the ancient Near East, let alone world history more generally, especially in the sense of accommodating a number of the more specialist perspectives.¹⁴

Three significant dimensions can be identified within the trajectory of ancient Egyptian empire. The first pertains to its early state development, the second to its empire in Nubia and the third to its hold of the Syro-Palestinian area during the New Kingdom (1550–1050 BCE).¹⁵ While it might at first sight appear that issues relating to the Syro-Palestinian area are most directly relevant for the topic under study here, the developments that relate to early state formation and the colonial enterprise in Nubia are in fact extremely illuminating, and even paradigmatic when taken together with the Syro-Palestinian case. Accordingly, it is crucial to make some comments on them here.

The Egyptian state emerged in the late fourth millennium BCE. As Morris describes, in the Nagada II period (ca. 3500–3200 BCE), Upper Egypt was a land divided amongst a number of competing polities.¹⁶ It seems that the large-scale diversion of power from regional units first took place in the Nagada IIIA period (ca. 3200 BCE), and especially through the person of Narmer. From there, Lower Egypt up to the first cataract was also unified.¹⁷ As early Egypt unified, a state was being extended over a number of disparate communities. With time, these

Figure 3.1 New Kingdom Egypt

Source: Bryce and Birkett-Rees 2016.

communities homogenised in terms of their culture and outlook,¹⁸ if not even language.¹⁹ Even so, undoubtedly a certain amount of cultural unification had already taken place before the formation of a unified state.²⁰ But the unification induced by the early state can be seen as an example of an empire creating a state.²¹ In other words, if an empire brings together disparate communities and unifies them, then an empire has created a state, even when a state may at first have created an empire in its expansion over the lands of the disparate entities. This also emphasises how empires and states are closely interrelated. Naturally, we can see an empire creating a state as a colonial process, in that, as an alien entity takes control over a territory and homogenises it in its own image, the process is on the settler colonial side of the spectrum, keeping in mind that in a settler colonial situation, an initial invasion is followed by a prolonged process of eliminating the indigenous

population.²² The number of people killed or driven out does not have to be high, even though that may happen as part of a takeover and imposition of the conqueror’s social pattern on the conquered. In the wider sense of the term, a genocide is taking place.²³ This said, if the area where especially a state extends its power consists of a similar cultural group, the changes implemented are concentrated on socioeconomic rather than cultural dimensions, and the issue of genocide would be less applicable. However, violence would still often be involved, except when any of the populations in the new areas might submit voluntarily. In this connection, it seems that early Egypt before unification was divided into small competing entities that did also interact with each other, including in the cultural realms.²⁴ Accordingly, one may ask the question of to what extent the concept of genocide, at least in its wider sense, would be applicable when unification occurred.²⁵

Table 3.1 Chronology of Ancient Egypt²⁶

Overall period	Subperiod	Pharaohs mentioned in the text	Dates (mostly approximate)
Predynastic Period			5500–3100 BCE
	Badarian		5500–4000 BCE
	Nagada I		4000–3500 BCE
	Nagada II		3500–3200 BCE
Protodynastic Period			3200–3000 BCE
Early Dynastic Period	Nagada III		3200–3000 BCE
			3000–2686 BCE
Old Kingdom	First Dynasty (Thinite)	Narmer	3000–2890 BCE
	Second Dynasty (Thinite)		2890–2686 BCE
			2686–2160 BCE
	Third Dynasty		2686–2613 BCE
	Fourth Dynasty		2613–2494 BCE
First Intermediate Period	Fifth Dynasty		2494–2345 BCE
	Sixth Dynasty		2345–2185 BCE
			2181–2055 BCE

The First Dynasty also expanded into the Nubian area between the first and second cataracts of the Nile. The issue is interesting and illustrative, as the river Nile undoubtedly provided a means of interconnecting a variety of communities, as part of that also enabling the unification of Egypt.²⁷ The first cataract would provide a natural barrier to such interactions and unification; however, the early First Dynasty seems to have been able to extend its power

past that barrier, up to the second cataract that provided another barrier. In the process, the invaders from the north apparently even eliminated the indigenous population of the area.²⁸ If so, and even if this were an instance where the Nubians simply moved away from the places conquered to escape the new societal arrangements by the invaders,²⁹ one can characterise the developments as a clear instance of settler colonialism,³⁰ with indigenous peoples “vanishing” in either case.³¹ Much of the interest in taking over the area seems to have stemmed from its richness in natural resources, including copper and gold.³² Direct access to those resources would clearly seem to have been a more attractive proposition than trading through middlemen.³³ In this sense, as Morris points out, conquest can be seen as an extension of trading, a process also attested elsewhere in relation to the operation of empires.³⁴

Other than the early experimentation between the first and second cataracts, Egyptian colonialism in Nubia attests a further distinctive phase during the Middle Kingdom (2055–1773 BCE). There had been active resettlement of Lower Nubia, the area between the first and second cataracts, by a predominantly pastoral population by the late Old Kingdom, then also involving trade relationships between the Egyptians and Nubians.³⁵ The area was conquered after the reunification of the country by Mentuhotep II after the First Intermediate Period (ca. 2160–2040 BCE).³⁶ A series of elaborate fortresses was then constructed from the time of Amenemhet I (ca. 1985–1956 BCE) on between the first and second cataracts.³⁷ Archaeological evidence from the time indicates that the material cultures of the Egyptians and the locals (so-called C-group)³⁸ remained clearly distinct from one another.³⁹ At the same time, interestingly, the locals seem to have evinced something of a strong interest in Egyptian material culture in the preceding First Intermediate Period, and also in the following Second Intermediate Period. The state of affairs suggests isolation of the two cultural groups from each other during the Middle Kingdom, with this apparently being by choice, probably by both groups.⁴⁰ An example of official rhetoric by the Egyptians that has been uncovered characterises the Nubians as craven-hearted wretches whom no one respects.⁴¹ A type of harsh military occupation and exploitation of local resources in a style of franchise colonialism then seems to have characterised this period.⁴²

It is remarkable, then, that after both the Old Kingdom and Middle Kingdom impositions on the area by the Egyptians, interest in things Egyptian by the locals resumed in the respective succeeding First and Second Intermediate Periods. However, perhaps the resumption of trade under renewed conditions of relative equality between Egypt and Lower Nubia during times of political weakness of Egypt could have been a contributory factor. In any case, interest shown by the locals in Egyptian culture during the Second Intermediate Period resulted in a state of affairs by the mid-eighteenth dynasty in the early part of

the New Kingdom, where it is often impossible to distinguish based on archaeological remains whether a house or grave belonged to an Egyptian or a Nubian.⁴³ Reasons for the rapprochement seem to include intermarriage, with soldiers in the Egyptian military ending up settling in the area after any loss of more formal contact with the central government, and the use of locals as soldiers in the Egyptian army.⁴⁴

When the New Kingdom conquered Nubia, then, it adopted a somewhat different strategy from that of the Middle Kingdom. Military occupation was less accentuated than during Middle Kingdom times. There was much focus on building civilian fortress towns, and that was not to the exclusion of locals. The empire also extended to Upper Nubia till the fourth cataract, even if focused on the area between the second and third cataracts.⁴⁵ The building of Egyptian centres in the newly appropriated area was on a model similar to areas already held.⁴⁶ From an administrative perspective, the Egyptian state in a sense replicated itself in Nubia. Also, local people were used as collaborators for the state.⁴⁷ From a religious perspective, Egyptian gods were promoted and temples built for them in Nubia.⁴⁸ Arguably, Nubia became part of Egypt as an Egyptian province. This on the whole fits with a state extending itself over an area as an empire and homogenising it, reverting to a state. However, in the case of Nubia, it would seem clear that the Nubians nevertheless retained a somewhat distinctive identity. Interestingly, some centuries later, in the Twenty-Fifth Dynasty in the eighth century BCE, the Nubian king Piye conquered Egypt.⁴⁹ What is particularly interesting is that the Egyptians had as part of their colonial actions promoted the worship of Amun in Nubia. When Piye conquered Egypt, one of his focuses was to restore the prominence of Amun.⁵⁰ Piye then also strengthened the worship of Amun in Napata at Gebel Barkal, a place that had been promoted for such purposes by the Egyptians in the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty.⁵¹ Altogether, even when the Egyptian New Kingdom empire dissolved, the Nubians kept following many Egyptian customs from before the time of dissolution and then played on them in the context of their later conquest and hold of Egypt.⁵²

That the Nubians nevertheless did retain their identity as Nubians shows that their Egyptianisation was not complete, in contrast to the areas in Egypt proper. One reason in this may have been language. Nubians spoke a language that was different from the Egyptians, and while there was bilingualism, it seems clear that a language shift did not take place. From the perspective of colonialism, the developments in Nubia took place over a period of more than two millennia. During this time, Egyptian control over the area waxed and waned. Egypt's colonial approach also varied, partly depending on the amount of control it had over Nubia at each time, but also on imperial policy. During the Old Kingdom period, Egyptian actions clearly seem to have been of the

settler colonial type. During the Middle Kingdom, the colonial mode would seem to fit more to the franchise type. During the First and Second Intermediate Periods, cultural diffusion would have been operative. In the New Kingdom period, then, the Egyptians actively promoted Egyptianisation, however at least to some extent employing less coercive methods than before. Nevertheless, there was a substantial amount of Egyptianisation, and in that sense the developments resonate with settler colonialism, just as would be the case with the Egyptian area itself after unification in the Early Dynastic period. The New Kingdom mode of colonialism also included the resettling of people from other parts of the empire to Nubia as forced migration, contributing to the population mix of the area.⁵³ That settler colonialism was not complete would at least in some ways seem to be comparable to such twentieth-century developments as French colonisation in Algeria and the Japanese hold over Korea,⁵⁴ even if in neither case did the colonised country identify with the colonisers. It can be argued that through colonialism and cultural diffusion, Nubia in a number of ways ended up becoming closer to Egypt than Algeria and Korea to their colonisers.

By contrast, Egypt's rule over Syria-Palestine was less tight than that over Nubia and also lasted a much shorter time. While there are reasons to think that the early Egyptian state did extend its hold over southern Canaan, at least in terms of trade,⁵⁵ real Egyptian control of the area started off in the New Kingdom. The conquest of Syria-Palestine seems to have been more of an accidental by-product of the expulsion of the Hyksos from Egypt after 1550 BCE.⁵⁶ Egyptian control of the Southern Levantine area was broadly limited to the lowlands, with many of the mountain areas of southern Canaan beyond the coercive reach of the empire. Egypt's control of the north was also relatively weak, with client states potentially able to switch alliances and also in actuality at times doing so.⁵⁷ In that sense, the north, including for example the kingdom of Amurru, can be seen in the context of its being in a frontier zone from the perspectives of empires.⁵⁸ On the whole, the Egyptians employed indirect rule by local rulers. This was ultimately different in principle from their practice in Nubia, and their control over the rulers was weaker. As archaeology provides evidence only for limited Egyptianisation of Canaan, and when one combines this with the fact that the hold of the state was as a whole weaker than in Nubia, it would seem reasonable to assume that indigenous leaders, and people in general, were in a position to subvert Egyptian rule much more than in Nubia, even when Egyptian control was also weaker in Upper Nubia than in Lower Nubia.⁵⁹ Egyptian presence in especially southern Canaan was nevertheless augmented by an extensive network of military bases,⁶⁰ and, also, for example, as in Nubia, the Egyptians sought to educate local leadership by arranging their children to be brought to Egypt and

schooled there. This would in addition serve as holding the children of the rulers hostage so as to help guarantee their loyalty.⁶¹

Altogether, it seems clear that the weaker control of the state in Syria-Palestine together with only a limited time for imperial rule to establish its hold in the area rendered the imperial project different from Nubia. It appears that one can characterise the enterprise as franchise colonialism, where the Egyptians more or less were limited to the extraction of natural resources from the area. However, even the natural resources were limited in comparison to those in Nubia, and much of the goods obtained by taxation were kept locally rather than sent to Egypt.⁶² The number of Egyptians settling in Canaan was also mostly limited to troops and administrative personnel. All in all, the Egyptian empire had neither sufficient power nor political will to try to Egyptianise Syria-Palestine,⁶³ even if undoubtedly some Egyptianisation occurred and was also directly attempted.⁶⁴ Once the Egyptian empire was gone from the twelfth century on, so was much if not most of the Egyptian influence, with apparent torching of military bases involved as the sun set on the empire.⁶⁵

In sum, a variety of developments took place in regard to the Egyptian empire in Nubia and Canaan, and its own process of internal colonisation in the early time is also of significance for the study of empires and colonialism. A variety of complex processes can be seen to have taken place where a number of the issues that relate to acculturation have been inferred based on archaeological data in interaction with extant textual materials.⁶⁶ We can see that the complex processes ranged from limited control and accompanying franchise colonialism to a tight hold and concomitant settler colonialism. We also referred to the migration of Egyptians to Nubia and resettlement of peoples around the empire by the imperial authorities. Egypt from the early dynastic time till the end of the New Kingdom then constituted an empire and a colonial power whose fortunes and modes of colonialism waxed and waned depending on both its internal and external circumstances. The country was even itself then colonised by its former colony in the early part of the first millennium BCE, followed by an incorporation into the Assyrian, Persian and Greek empires.⁶⁷

B. Mittani

In the context of the focus of this book, the Mittanian political entity was gone by about 1250 BCE, some three quarters of a century before the Late Bronze

collapse. However, it was an important entity from about 1600 BCE till its demise and illustrates some of the issues that relate to migration and colonialism in the area. At its largest, the entity controlled the northern Mesopotamian area.⁶⁸ However, especially through its conflicts with the Hittites and the Middle Assyrians, Mittani contracted and eventually succumbed, vanishing from existence.⁶⁹

The Hurrians who formed the base of Mittani were a people who spoke a language that was related to Urartian. The classification of these two languages remains unclear and seems to relate to a language family of its own.⁷⁰ A reference to the Hurrians is first attested in the Near East in the late third millennium BCE; however, it is not clear how long they might already have inhabited the area by then.⁷¹ The early sources indicate an origin for the Hurrians in the eastern part of the ancient Near Eastern area, especially around the northern parts of the Zagros Mountains, and this seems to be reasonable considering the linkage with Urartian and the Urartians who are also attested in the area.⁷² Over the course of the ensuing centuries, Hurrian-speaking people then migrated over a wider area of the Near East.⁷³ The change to attestation of Hurrian components in a variety of places where they were not manifested before⁷⁴ and the way we know the spread of languages and language families is reconstructed, including in prehistory and in Africa, strongly speaks for such a conclusion.⁷⁵ That the Hurrian documents that were written in Akkadian include Hurrian words and expressions fits with the pattern of intensive word borrowing.⁷⁶ Such a development typically involves a time of contact of centuries and also bilingualism,⁷⁷ even though it could also happen as a result of a rapid conquest by a small minority community whose language then died out,⁷⁸ with the latter being the case with the Kassites in the midsecond millennium BCE.⁷⁹ Another related interesting question is whether there was migration of Indo-Aryan people with the Hurrians into the wider Near East.⁸⁰ It would seem that the borrowing of the word *maryannu* and other vocabulary that relates to horsemanship could be due to trade and diffusion so as to not implicate any demographic change, to help with the at least relatively new concept of chariotry in the area.⁸¹ At the same time, such changes could also happen due to a small intrusive minority entering the wider population.⁸² Also, a question to be answered is why the personal names of the royal family and the names of a number of gods honoured by them are of Indo-Aryan origin.⁸³ It would seem odd that rulers of a country would name themselves based on another language from another geographical area. I can only assume that the royal family would have had a link of some kind with Indo-Aryan speakers.⁸⁴ One possibility I can hypothesise here, in addition to Indo-Iranians founding Mittani,⁸⁵ is that the royal dynasty imported Indo-Aryan professionals relating to chariotry to the court and admired the

associated power, and then could at times name themselves based on Indo-Aryan words and expressions.⁸⁶ It is also perhaps possible that some in the court would have also married with Indo-Aryans, with children named according to the wishes of the Indo-Aryan spouse. Altogether, a certain extent of Indo-Aryan migration could have been involved.

Figure 3.2 Late Bronze Age Anatolia, northern Syria and northern Mesopotamia (mid-fourteenth century BCE)

Source:Bryce and Birkett-Rees 2016.

Table 3.2 Hittite and Mittanian kings⁸⁷

<i>Hittite kings</i>	<i>Mittanian kings</i>
Hattusili I (ca. 1650–1620 BCE)	
Mursili I (ca. 1620–1590 BCE)	
Hantili I	Kirta (?)
Zidanta I	Shuttarna I (?)
Ammuna	
Huzziya I	
Telipinu	
Tahurwaili (end of sixteenth century BCE)	
Alluwanna (early fifteenth century BCE)	
Hantili II	
Zidanta II	Barattarna
Huzziya II	Parshatatar
Tudhaliya I	
Hattusili II (end of fifteenth century BCE)	Shaushtatar
	Artatama I
Tudhaliya II (early fourteenth century BCE)	Shuttarna II
Arnuwanda I	(Artashumara)
Tudhaliya III	
Suppiluliuma I (ca. 1370–1342 BCE)	Tushratta I (ca. 1375–1350 BCE)
Arnuwanda II (ca. 1342–1340 BCE)	Artatama II
Mursili II (ca. 1340–1310 BCE)	Shuttarna III
	Shattiwaza
Muwatalli (ca. 1310–1280 BCE)	Shattuara I
Urhi-Teshub (ca. 1280–1275 BCE)	Wasashatta
Hattusili III (ca. 1275–1260 BCE)	Shattuara II
Tudhaliya IV (ca. 1260–1220 BCE)	
Arnuwanda III (ca. 1220–1200 BCE)	
Suppiluliuma II (ca. 1200–1182 BCE)	

In this connection, the origins of Mittani as a political unit itself are more or less shrouded in mystery from the perspective of extant textual and archaeological remains.⁸⁸ The situation is exacerbated by the fact that textual evidence about Mittani from the perspective of the Mittanians themselves is limited. The main source is the so-called Tushratta letter (EA 17) from the Amarna archive written by the Mittanian king in Hurrian to the Egyptian pharaoh Amenhotep III. Administrative texts from Alalah also exist, composed

in Akkadian with influence from Hurrian.⁸⁹ In many ways, one has to rely on what non-Mittanians say about Mittani in order to reconstruct its history. In this, Hittite sources provide the most significant body of information.⁹⁰ As far as archaeology is concerned, the evidence is more or less unclear.⁹¹ However, from the perspective adopted in this book, it would seem that the process was of Hurrian immigrants forming ethnic enclaves within a wider Near Eastern mix of peoples and then being able to wrest political power to themselves. In the process, the Hurrians also were able to control other people groups. External threats, especially by the Hittites, could also have helped galvanise the Mittani entity.⁹²

There is some reason to ask the question of whether the Mittanian polity should be considered a state or an empire, as Mittani more or less controlled an area where Hurrians were a significant component of the population.⁹³ From this perspective, it would probably better to speak of a state. However, for example, that Mittani would regulate treaties between two political entities, such as was the case with Alalakh and Kizzuwatna,⁹⁴ would clearly seem to resonate with the idea of an empire. Also, as the political entities taken over by Mittani cannot be considered as homogenous in relation to each other, one is again reminded of empires. Altogether, it seems reasonable to consider Mittani an empire rather than “simply” a state.

More broadly, as regards the control that Mittani would have exercised over the territory that was nominally in its possession, one may remember that in Egypt, and also at least parts of Nubia, the riverine-based state had a good control of the Nile valley. However, with Egypt’s empire in Canaan, there were areas that were either more or less outside the control of the state, or only weakly controlled by it, such as the highlands or the northern part of the empire. The control of Mittani can be seen similarly, as a heterogenous mix of tighter and looser control.⁹⁵ Perhaps the area around Washhukkanni the capital would have been at the core. Then, especially if Washhukkanni was by or around the Habur River, the core state would have been around this area especially in the riverine sphere, even if, of course, it would not need to have been limited to it, as Habur was not surrounded by deserts as in Egypt. Nevertheless, the location of that capital and the extent of more direct control of the state beyond the capital is not known with any certainty, even if records from Terqa apparently laying fairly close to Washhukkanni indicate a kind of co-kingship by the local king with the king of Mittani and records from Halab (modern Aleppo) indicate direct rule by Mittani.⁹⁶ On the other hand, as already indicated, the available examples of a treaty between Alalakh and Kizzuwatna, and also Alalakh and Tunip, that pertain to areas that were further away from the centre,⁹⁷ and in this case clearly more or less at the geographical periphery at the time of the greatest geographical extent of the

empire, clearly indicate independence from Mittani. That one of the documents from Alalakh refers to men in association to towns in the land of Alalakh going to the land of Mittani also implies that the land of Alalakh was seen as separate from the land of Mittani.⁹⁸ Moreover, people were classified as either Hanigalbateans or as “citizens” of other polities in the empire.⁹⁹ At the same time, the parity treaties between Alalakh and Kizzuwatna and between Alalakh and Tunip are done under the authority of the king of Mittani. What is interesting also is that records and correspondence indicate that there are legal decisions made in regard to Alalakh (and also apparently to a neighbouring polity) that are the purview of the Mittanian king.¹⁰⁰ Similar conditions also pertained to the Eastern side of the empire at Nuzi and Kirkuk, including powers of the king of Mittani to intervene in the territorial organisation of Arraphe.¹⁰¹

From an economic perspective, the client states brought tribute to Mittani. This is explicitly the case with Emar based on existing records,¹⁰² and one can infer that the same would have pertained to other polities also, considering that collecting tribute was typical in the ancient Near East. As for military cooperation, Egyptian records indicate that Mittani was able to gather up a coalition of lands to fight for a cause.¹⁰³

At the demise of Mittani, the Assyrians took over the core of its territory. They themselves had been vassals of Mittani earlier. Hittite military campaigns during the reign of Tushratta that included the capture and looting of the capital Washhukkanni, together with a court plot against Tushratta and his assassination, had seriously weakened the kingdom.¹⁰⁴ Ashur-Uballit, the king of newly ascendant Assyria in the mid-fourteenth century BCE, took advantage of the situation and attacked and captured Arraphe in the eastern part of the Mittani empire.¹⁰⁵ Adad-Nerari, Shalmaneser I and Tukulti-Ninurta I then in the thirteenth century campaigned against what was left of Mittani, with Shalmaneser, or at least Tukulti-Ninurta, incorporating Hanigalbat into the Assyrian state around 1250 BCE.¹⁰⁶ The limited knowledge available about Hurrians in the area starts to decrease even more from this time on.¹⁰⁷ It would seem most logical to suggest that Hurrians were one way or another assimilated into the Assyrian and Aramean polities that succeeded Mittani, and there is evidence of deportations of Hurrians from Jazira to Assyria proper by the Assyrians, including to Kar-Tukulti-Ninurta.¹⁰⁸ It could be that the Hurrian language experienced a renaissance of some kind during the Mittanian kingdom, even when much of the writing was in Assyrian in line with apparent bilingualism.¹⁰⁹ However, it would seem that when Mittani died out as a political entity, the Assyrians and Arameans imposed their language and culture on the Hurrians, many of whom, one may surmise, were already bilingual in Akkadian, with a language shift taking place in favour of

Akkadian and Aramaic in a manner broadly comparable to Akkadian supplanting Sumerian some centuries earlier.¹¹⁰ At least a certain amount of slaughtering and expulsions of Hurrians would also have taken place, considering that the archaeological landscape indicates a number of clear changes to occupation at least in some places with the transition from Mittanian to Assyrian rule, and that the inscriptions of Tukulti Ninurta I indicate that the king killed and forcibly removed people from the area, in addition to causing material destruction.¹¹¹

C. The Hittites

As Bryce describes, by the end of the third millennium there were three known groups of people in Anatolia speaking Indo-European languages. These were the Luwians in the west, the Palaians in the north and the Nesites in central and eastern Anatolia,¹¹² even if how and when the Indo-Europeans arrived in Anatolia is not clear.¹¹³ A pre-Indo-European group of the Hattians also existed in the area.¹¹⁴ It was Nesite (Hittite) that became the language of the Hittite kingdom that was established in the early to mid-seventeenth century BCE.¹¹⁵ It remained the language of royalty for the whole period of the Hittite kingdom.¹¹⁶ It was also used at least by the administrative hierarchy. But Hattic, Luwian and Hurrian were also spoken, and other languages notably as a result of bringing in prisoners of war in forced migration.¹¹⁷ Altogether, Bryce suggests that the Hittites did not have a single ethnic core or a single common language.¹¹⁸ This seems a reasonable suggestion, as ethnic divisions often coincide with linguistic differences.¹¹⁹ It also seems reasonable to suggest that common language or a common cultural or ethnic identity was not the unifying factor for the Hittites but geography, living in the area of the Hittite kingdom.¹²⁰ It was a clearly defined region, and the people within it were differentiated from other subjects of the king living further afield in vassal states.¹²¹ The Hittite kingdom would then clearly seem to be an attestation of an ancient nation and nationalism.¹²² It should be highlighted that in the Hittite case, this was clearly based on multiethnicity. In contrast, Egypt can serve as an example of a nation-state from the time where the population at least in its core area below the first cataract would have been much more homogenous, even when there were other population elements as well in that area.¹²³

It was Hattusili I who is counted as the founder of the unified Hittite state (Old Kingdom) even when he had predecessors who had already started on

such a trajectory. At his time, the state roughly covered the eastern side of Anatolia.¹²⁴ His son Mursili I campaigned in northern Syria, temporarily extending the power of the Hittites into that area.¹²⁵ In the New Kingdom, it was Suppiluliuma I who then extended the reach of the Hittites further in the mid to late fourteenth century BCE. Importantly, he established control over northern Syria, much at the expense of Mittani.¹²⁶ In particular, Carchemish became an important Hittite stronghold, with the Hittite royal line continuing there after the empire's collapse in the first quarter of the twelfth century BCE.¹²⁷ Suppiluliuma's son Mursili II consolidated things further, especially towards the west and in the south of Anatolia.¹²⁸

On the whole, the political vicissitudes of the empire from then on till its end included issues relating to dynastic succession, rebellions and potential invasions by neighbouring kingdoms.¹²⁹ It seems that the empire was ultimately a particularly fragile one, and that may have contributed to its sudden collapse.¹³⁰ Creating a network of control from a base on the central plateau in a relatively inaccessible part of Anatolia would have been difficult with Late Bronze technologies. As part of this, locations at higher elevations would in themselves already have presented challenges for the imposition of state power. Accordingly, one might expect that there would be an emphasis on employing ideological techniques, and this turns out to be the case. Examples include loyalty oaths and treaties.¹³¹ Of the latter, some 50 or so are extant,¹³² offering the largest body of such documents from a single area in the ancient Near East as a whole that have survived. Most of the treaties stipulate the relations between the Hittite king as a suzerain with a political entity that is a subordinate vassal to the king, even when some are parity treaties, such as with the treaty between Hattusili III and Ramesses II.¹³³ Interestingly, extensive sections on blessings and curses that take recourse to the divine are part of the system of ideological persuasion.¹³⁴ The same could be said about the historical introductions that were typical of the treaties. To oaths and treaties may be added the custom of diplomatic marriages that was employed extensively by the Hittites.¹³⁵ Altogether, archaeological evidence indicates an overall imperial culture in the Hittite empire, even when a good amount of heterogeneity and local variation was involved.¹³⁶

As for migration, as already indicated, the Hittites did import people in the empire as war captives.¹³⁷ This would have provided additional labour or simply helped populate sparsely inhabited areas, or repopulate areas after losses of life in wars and also through at least one plague.¹³⁸ On the main, as one might already expect based on parallels elsewhere in the ancient Near East, taxation and corvée labour were crucial for providing the state income and resources, and people were an essential resource to achieve that, even if tribute was received from vassal kingdoms and material wealth as booty from

successful military expeditions as well.¹³⁹ The Hittites could also transplant peoples from rebellious areas elsewhere with “pacification” in mind.¹⁴⁰ The practice of transportation, or forced migration, was extensive.¹⁴¹ Nevertheless, there seem to have been few issues with integrating the people that had been transported.¹⁴² According to Bryce, a large number of the men who were of military age would probably have become part of the king’s own militia. Other people transported could be assigned to temple duty in the various cult centres of the land. Others might have been assigned on various state works projects or on a farm that had been abandoned by its tenant.¹⁴³ It would seem that the already-existing heterogeneity of the land in terms of its constituent populations would have helped in the integration, even if at the same time that heterogeneity would in the longer term be likely to remain a problem in view of holding the empire together. That captives would predominantly be integrated in the lower strata of society would also undoubtedly help towards keeping them under control.

Already before the empire collapsed, Hittite control in northern Syria was fading.¹⁴⁴ Nevertheless, even after the collapse, Carchemish in particular retained a continuity with the preceding Hittite realm. It and a number of other northern Syrian and southern Anatolian areas would form a group of so-called neo-Hittite states.¹⁴⁵ Notably, Luwian was used in these areas, as attested by a variety of hieroglyphic inscriptions in that language from the area between the twelfth and the eighth centuries BCE.¹⁴⁶ Luwian was used for such purposes already in the Late Bronze Age in Anatolia, and the practice then became a defining feature of neo-Hittite states, at least from the perspective of modern historiography.¹⁴⁷

As the implication is that the use of Luwian spread eastward, one may ask to what extent this reflected migrations of Luwian speakers into the corresponding areas. It would seem that much of any migration was part of the developments that related to the expansion of the empire towards the later neo-Hittite areas. As Bryce suggests, already in the mid-fourteenth century when Suppiluliuma attained control of the area and established the viceregal seat at Carchemish, there would have been settlers coming to the Carchemish region. These likely would have included a number of administrative personnel dispatched there by the Great King in support of the new regime. Such administrative personnel would have included a good number of scribes, clerks, and other officials.¹⁴⁸ One could also expect that other settlers from the main Hittite area and other Anatolian regions would have contributed to the influx of newcomers to the Carchemish region.¹⁴⁹ As Bryce suggests, it may well be that many if not the great majority of the new settlers spoke Luwian as their first language.¹⁵⁰ As Carchemish’s location was strategically important on the Euphrates that also in the thirteenth century BCE provided a border

between the Hittite and Assyrian empires,¹⁵¹ troops would have been located there, consisting of soldiers from the homeland or deportees acquired during Hittite military campaigns as prisoners of war from a variety of regions.¹⁵²

In any case, many of the Hittite kings' deportees came from lands that were occupied by Luwian-speaking groups, for example the Arzawa lands of western Anatolia.¹⁵³ It was not unusual to reallocate populations to outlying regions of an empire, as is demonstrably the case with Egypt settling people from Syria-Palestine in Nubia.¹⁵⁴ Accordingly, at least some Luwians could have been resettled in the regions controlled by Carchemish and other neo-Hittite areas.¹⁵⁵ There is also reason to think that Luwian hieroglyphic inscriptions that have been found in various parts of Anatolia and that date mostly to the thirteenth century BCE reflect a considerable if not majority component of Luwians in the Hittite population at that time.¹⁵⁶ The existence of the earliest datable hieroglyphic monumental inscription at Aleppo c. 1300 BCE may indicate the presence of Luwians in north-central Syria already by the beginning of the last century of the Hittite empire.¹⁵⁷

Altogether, it seems that there are good reasons to think of the possibility of a sizable migration of Luwian speakers to the neo-Hittite areas. But, it is of course possible to think that further Luwians from Anatolia moved to the neo-Hittite areas after the collapse of the Hittite empire.¹⁵⁸ However, there is no direct evidence for any substantial migration of the sort after the empire's demise.¹⁵⁹ On the whole, though, the appearance of cremations in northern Syria during the Iron Age that tally with the existence of cremations in Hittite Anatolia during the Late Bronze Age, together with the continuity of architectural styles with Anatolia, could be interpreted in support of migration. But the issue is not clear, as cultural diffusion is also possible, especially in regard to the question of any possible sudden influx of people at the time the empire collapsed.¹⁶⁰ In addition, archaeological evidence of Hittite presence in northern Syria during the Late Bronze Age is extremely meagre, and accordingly, one can ask to what extent pots may correlate to peoples in this area.¹⁶¹ All this said, there is nevertheless reason to consider that Luwian speakers migrated from Anatolia to northern Syria from since the time of Suppiluliuma, even when one cannot be sure of the exact details of how many of them arrived and when.¹⁶² While Bryce suggests that the Luwian-speaking inhabitants of these kingdoms probably constituted only a minority of their populations,¹⁶³ that the neo-Hittite dynasties exhibited cultural continuity with the Hittite world suggests that the new rulers were looking at the past Hittite kingdom for ideological legitimisation. It seems unlikely that such ideological legitimisation would have succeeded in attaining hegemonic status if it were not at least to some extent supported by the general population, and in this sense the empire had homogenised the areas.¹⁶⁴ The situation can be compared with

Nubia, where the state in the first millennium based itself on Egyptian symbols in a postcolonial setting.¹⁶⁵ If so, Luwian is likely to have been part of the hegemonic order, and this would speak for at least substantial appropriation and also appreciation and by that virtue even likely promotion of the language within these kingdoms. In contrast, writing in Hittite cuneiform ceased after the collapse of the empire,¹⁶⁶ and this could on its part be in line with the idea that in the postcolonial situation, certain markers of the empire were rejected but others continued. The later takeover by Arameans from a dynastic standpoint in Hamath around 800 BCE could then be seen as indicating that a sufficient number of Arameans had migrated to that area which in any case was located at the border of Aramean and Neo-Hittite realms, even though such a suggestion must ultimately remain a conjecture.¹⁶⁷

D. Middle Assyria

Akkadian, in the form of the Assyrian dialect, was spoken in the Assyrian empire. The language is first attested in the twenty-sixth century BCE.¹⁶⁸ Akkadian was also one of two main languages of Agade, the first transregional empire in the Near East. The use of the language was promoted during the time of the empire alongside Sumerian,¹⁶⁹ the other significant language spoken in Mesopotamia, especially its southern part, with the earliest texts in the Near East written in Sumerian in the late fourth millennium BCE. Akkadian gradually replaced Sumerian as the spoken language, and by the early second millennium BCE, Sumerian was not spoken any more.¹⁷⁰ However, Sumerian continued as a literary language well into the first millennium BCE, and on the whole, the two languages interacted with and influenced each other.¹⁷¹ The Assyrian empire developed in the second millennium BCE. In line with a tradition that traced the origin of the present in the distant past, notably attested in the Sumerian king list, Assyria similarly saw its origins in an early time, as attested by the Assyrian king list.¹⁷² Such orientation towards the past in the consciousness of Akkadian speakers, but also those using Sumerian, included looking back at the time of Agade already in the late third millennium.¹⁷³ In that sense, then, when the Middle Assyrian empire emerged in the fourteenth century BCE, it already had a long cultural tradition before it, and also a political tradition that from a historical perspective is most notably attested by the Old Assyrian trading network that spanned northern Mesopotamia from Aššur to eastern Anatolia in the first two centuries of the second millennium BCE.¹⁷⁴ Nevertheless, even when the Assyrian king list

includes Shamshi-Adad who managed to control the whole of Upper Mesopotamia in the eighteenth century BCE,¹⁷⁵ his actual association with Assyria appears to be less than clear, with the Assyrian state remaining a small entity in terms of its direct political control.¹⁷⁶ Also, as already mentioned, Assyria was subjected to Mittani till about 1350 BCE, with Assyria's vassal status probably starting around 1440–1420 BCE.¹⁷⁷ After freeing itself from Mittanian domination, Assyria eventually reduced Mittani to the status of a vassal and incorporated the area of Hanigalbat in the Assyrian state in the thirteenth century BCE.¹⁷⁸ The control of the Middle Assyrian state over that area lasted only a century, with Assyria reducing back to its core in the east from the mid-twelfth century BCE on, only to be expanding again towards the west and beyond in the neo-Assyrian period from the tenth century BCE on.¹⁷⁹ Certainly, Tiglath-Pileser I succeeded in campaigning in the West in the early eleventh century BCE, even stating that he had reached the Mediterranean,¹⁸⁰ however, he was not able to establish a permanent control in the areas there that had by his time already more or less slipped away from Assyrian control.¹⁸¹

Figure 3.3 The Middle Assyrian empire

Source: Bryce and Birkett-Rees 2016.

An interesting development can be seen at the beginning of Middle Assyrian control of Hanigalbat. At first what was left of Mittani was in essence reduced to a vassal state. However, after Mittani rebelled, it was incorporated in the Assyrian state. In general, at this stage, there were only very limited areas under Assyrian control that carried on as vassals, most of the territories were more closely integrated in Assyria.¹⁸² In the longer run, after Neo-Assyria had re-established control of the area, Hanigalbat became Assyrianised and more or less indistinguishable from Assyria as a whole.¹⁸³ In this sense, the Assyrian empire eventually created a state in regard to Hanigalbat.¹⁸⁴ But, in the Middle Assyrian period, Hanigalbat was part of the (Middle) Assyrian empire.

The integration of the areas in the state of Assyria contrasts with the preceding Mittani period that was more heterogeneous in terms of imperial control. If we consider the dimensions of ideology and control, Middle Assyria sought to utilise both of these methods.¹⁸⁶ Düring provides a useful summary, even if framed slightly differently from a conceptual perspective from the approach taken in this book. At the level of bureaucratic coercion, a number of techniques can be seen to have been employed:¹⁸⁷

1. The construction of an imperial road and relay system, to facilitate communications, trade, and military campaigns.

Table 3.3 Assyrian kings, 1400 BCE–609 BCE¹⁸⁵

Ashur-nadin-ahhe II	1400–1390 BCE
Eriba-Adad	1390–1364 BCE
Ashur-Uballit I (middle Assyria)	1363–1328 BCE
Enlil-Nirari	1327–1316 BCE
Arik-den-ili	1317–1306 BCE
Adad-nirari I	1305–1274 BCE
Shalmaneser I	1273–1244 BCE
Tukulti-Ninurta I	1243–1207 BCE
Ashur-nadin-apli	1206–1203 BCE
Ashur-nirari III	1202–1197 BCE
Enlil-kudur-usur	1196–1193 BCE
Ninurta-apil-ekur	1192–1180 BCE
Ashur-dan I	1179–1133 BCE
Ninurta-tukulti-Ashur	1133/1132 BCE
Mutakkil-Nusku	1133/1132 BCE
Ashur-resh-ishi	1132–1115 BCE
Tiglath-Pileser I	1114–1076 BCE
Asharid-apil-Ekur	1075–1074 BCE
Ashur-bel-kala	1073–1056 BCE
Eriba-Adad II	1055–1054 BCE
Shamshi-Adad IV	1053–1050 BCE
Ashurnasirpal I	1049–1031 BCE
Shalmaneser II	1030–1019 BCE
Ashur-nirari IV	1018–1013 BCE
Ashur-rabi III	1012–972 BCE
Ashur-resh-ishi II	971–967 BCE
Tiglath-Pileser II	966–935 BCE
Ashur-dan II	934–912 BCE
Adad-nirari II (neo-Assyria)	911–891 BCE
Tukulti-ninurta II	890–884 BCE
Ashurnasirpal II	883–859 BCE
Shalmaneser III	858–824 BCE
Shamshi-Adad V	823–811 BCE
Adad-Nirari III	810–783 BCE
Shalmaneser IV	782–773 BCE
Ashur-dan III	772–755 BCE
Ashur-nirari V	754–745 BCE
Tiglath-Pileser III	744–727 BCE
Shalmaneser V	726–722 BCE
Sargon II	721–705 BCE
Sennacherib	704–681 BCE
Esarhaddon	680–669 BCE
Ashurbanipal	668–631 BCE
Ashur-etli-ilani	630–627 BCE
Sin-shar-ishkun	627–612 BCE
Ashur-uballit II	611–609 BCE

- 2 The construction of forts and fortification systems, to facilitate the control of alien territories and control access to imperial lands.
- 3 The agricultural development of regions previously little cultivated, by means such as the establishment of agricultural estates, agricultural colonization and the construction of (complex) irrigation systems. This

can be linked with the development of the imperial core through policies of agricultural development and settlement of populations.

- 4 The development of industries and mining that served the needs of the imperial military or the state apparatus.
- 5 Demographic policies, in which existing population centres are in part replaced by new ones, and populations are broken up through deportation and colonization policies that serve to frustrate the cultural capacities of conquered populations to form an alternative to the culture of empire.
- 6 The techniques of administration, such as the development of a homogeneous system of administration that facilitates control by the imperial core and the deployment of administrators throughout the imperial lands.

In terms of ideology, the following can be listed:¹⁸⁸

1. Religious and ideological ideas that legitimise imperial domination not only to the dominators but also to those that are being dominated.
2. A culture of empire in which the imperial culture is distinguished and considered superior to that of dominated societies, but in which there is the possibility to opt into imperial culture by outsiders and associating with the empire carries clear benefits for all. The creation of monumental capitals and also towns and monuments in the conquered areas would in its part serve this purpose.

Naturally, the employment of Akkadian in the imperial administration would also already by implication serve ideological purposes, even when Akkadian was already a *lingua franca* in the Late Bronze era even without state control. In relation to this, except for Aššur itself, tablets from a number of regional centres in Hanigalbat are attested.¹⁸⁹ In the connection, there is also direct evidence of Assyrian migrants in the centres that are under Assyrian control,¹⁹⁰ and material culture, especially pottery, broadly reflects the spread of Assyrian administrative control, even when the match is not always exact.¹⁹¹ A further item listed by Düring, the “policy of co-opting local elites into the interests of empire, by providing these with clear incentives for collaboration”¹⁹² to my mind relates to both ideological and coercive dimensions. One may add here the practice of diplomatic marriages, on their part both creating a perception that the powers thus connected are related through family ties and also in effect holding family members of the rulers thus linked as hostages can be seen to serve both ideological and coercive functions.¹⁹³ Of course, it is not always possible to at least entirely separate

ideological and coercive dimensions from each other anyway.

What, then, is new in the approach that Middle Assyria took? If one compares its approach to Egypt, not all that much can be seen as innovative.¹⁹⁴ As we have seen, Egypt used the tactic of extending its administration into surrounding areas so as to unify and homogenise the state north of the first cataract already in its early dynastic period. It also employed the methods in Nubia, achieving strong administrative and cultural integration of Nubia with Egypt; however, this integration was never complete.¹⁹⁵

Nevertheless, in its immediate regional context, Assyrian methods seem to have provided the first time that a state was seeking to systematically expand over a substantial area that had not been in its purview before.¹⁹⁶ From both a practical and an ideological perspective, we may add that the Assyrian state did build on the legacy of Mittani in terms of settlement patterns and broad administrative divisions that existed in the area. At the same time, Middle Assyria also, for example, destroyed some settlements and founded new ones, including establishing a number of fortified *dunnu*.¹⁹⁷ Nevertheless, the *dunnu* can then be compared with the extensive network of Egyptian military bases and also especially New Kingdom settlements in Nubia.¹⁹⁸ As another highlight for Middle Assyria, the amount of extant administrative documentation that attests to imperial bureaucracy allows a good view on many relevant issues.¹⁹⁹ But, again, this can be compared with Egypt.²⁰⁰

At another level, it seems that the Middle Assyrian state was not able to extend complete control over the territory of Hanigalbat.²⁰¹ If one compares Assyria with Egypt in this respect, the most striking difference seems to be the nature of the territory in question. Egypt was essentially a riverine-based state, and the river provided a relatively easy means of transportation and communication that fairly straightforwardly enabled “caging” and with it state development and the unification of the country.²⁰² In this, it is important to keep in mind that the Nile was surrounded by deserts, so that all settlement in effect had to be in the relatively narrow river valley. That a different sociopolitical entity started upstream the river from the first cataract that required some considerable effort to traverse should come as no surprise, even when Egypt indeed did expand in that direction also already from the earliest historical times on.²⁰³ By contrast, the area of Hanigalbat in Upper Mesopotamia included large areas of inhabitable steppeland, even when there were also rivers. Such a terrain was much harder to traverse and thus also control using Bronze Age technologies of transportation than a riverine environment. Accordingly, establishing nodes of administrative centres in the area together with accompanying settlements as the Assyrians did would have been a logical way of attempting to integrate it in the state.²⁰⁴ It turned out that in the Middle Assyrian period, the network was not extensive enough so

as to be able to achieve complete integration of the area. The network would leave areas between them that were less if at all in control of the Assyrians.²⁰⁵ In this, the steppeland was particularly suitable to a seminomadic lifestyle which undoubtedly made it harder to control its inhabitants.²⁰⁶ Mountain areas or anything else inaccessible would also prove harder for the state to reach, just as was the case elsewhere in the ancient Near East.²⁰⁷ This in itself would already suggest that the extent that the Assyrian state would have been able to exert its control would vary depending on the location in question, and this indeed seems to have been the case.²⁰⁸ In that, one can broadly compare and contrast Egyptian imperial dealings in Nubia with Syria-Palestine. The issue of practical politics should also be taken into account,²⁰⁹ as is the case with Tabete that was seen as a loyal vassal and was therefore quite exceptionally left to be a relatively independent vassal entity in the empire, instead of incorporating it into the state.²¹⁰ The campaigning of Tiglath-Pileser I westward in the early eleventh century BCE, mentioned earlier, can be seen in the context of temporary military power in the context of politics, and not as bureaucratic control.²¹¹ Altogether, then, it would seem that a fairly consistent approach towards Hanigalbat would have been attempted by the Assyrian state; however, this would have been modified by circumstances on the ground and *ad hoc* type considerations. Issues that relate to certain specific difficulties facing the Assyrians in keeping Hanigalbat under their authority will be discussed in the chapter on the Arameans.²¹²

E. Mycenae

The Mycenaean of the Late Bronze Age were speakers of a form of archaic Greek. This language is attested in the so-called Linear B corpus that has been found throughout the Greek mainland and in Crete. The Linear B script is however preceded by the so-called Linear A script, mostly located in Crete, even though some items have also been found on the Greek mainland. Linear A in turn is preceded by the so-called Cretan hieroglyphic script. Neither Linear A nor the Cretan hieroglyphs have been properly deciphered; however, one can clearly infer that they originate with the Minoan civilisation in Crete and that their language is something other than archaic Greek in the Linear B corpus. Also, keeping in mind the chronology of the finds, one can assume that Linear B is a continuation of Linear A, and, as Linear B becomes dominant in the Late Bronze Age, the late Bronze Age is marked by the preeminence of Greek speakers in Mycenae and Crete.²¹³ The Linear B corpus also includes

features that seem to derive from non-Greek influence.²¹⁴ The question of when Greek speakers actually migrated into the Greek mainland is a more complicated one that is also tied with the question of overall Indo-European migrations, with proposals ranging from 3200 BCE to 1600 BCE.²¹⁵ The issue is undoubtedly made more difficult as it is only the Linear B materials that have been deciphered. Also, the Linear B corpus of approximately 6,000 extant specimens of which most are tablets that relate to Mycenaean palatial administration, but also with some inscriptions on vessels, does not include historical-oriented materials.

On the whole, then, the Greek mainland and Crete were part of a predominantly Greek-speaking entity between ca. 1425 and 1200 BCE. The Linear B corpus, as just indicated, above all attests to palatial administration during this time.²¹⁶ The most notable centres in mainland Greece were Pylos, Tiryns, Midea, Orchomenos, Thebes, and Athens.²¹⁷ The records, on clay tablets, indicated the distribution of goods and manpower in the region.²¹⁸ The tablets survive because they, having been unbaked originally, were burned in the destructions of the Mycenaean palatial centres around 1200 BCE.²¹⁹ In this connection, the records pertain mostly to the final years of these centres.²²⁰ Clearly the issue here has to do with accidents of survival, and one also cannot know what other documents might have been written on more perishable materials.²²¹ Postgate suggests that there is in particular a resemblance with Assyrian harvest records or some of the monitoring texts of the so-called Offerings Archive in Assyria.²²²

Figure 3.4 The Mycenaean world and Western Anatolia

Source: Bryce and Birkett-Rees 2016.

An interesting feature of the tablets is that they suggest that palatial administration was highly uniform throughout Greece. The same terminology and the same systems of taxation and distribution are found in them. Uniformity even extends to the shapes and sizes of the clay tablets.²²³ Each palace ruled over a relatively small region typically delimited by natural features, with administrative subdivisions in the region.²²⁴ The tablets also indicate leadership in the palatial states by a person called *wanax*, with a *lawagetas* apparently being a second-in-command.²²⁵ Obviously, then, we are dealing with organised agrarian societies in Mycenae in the Late Bronze Age.²²⁶

A main question that has been asked about Mycenae is whether it was a loose collection of individual city states or whether it was a unified kingdom.²²⁷ In the latter case, one can also ask the question whether the entity was an empire. The issue about unity in Mycenae is related to the so-called Ahhiyawa question. This is an entity that is referred to in the Hittite texts from

the reigns of Tudhaliya I/II and Arnuwanda I in the late fifteenth–early fourteenth centuries BCE to the reigns of Tudhaliya IV and Suppiluliuma II in the thirteenth century BCE.²²⁸ Certainly, the word Ahhiyawa sounds similar to Achaia that is at a later time associated with Greece.²²⁹ Also, as Beckman, Bryce and Cline point out, if Ahhiyawa does not refer to archaic Greece, an important Late Bronze culture is not mentioned anywhere in the Hittite documents; and on the other hand, there is no plausible indication of where the important entity of Ahhiyawa that is mentioned in the Hittite documents is situated.²³⁰

From the perspective of the Hittite texts, Ahhiyawa was involved with affairs at the western end of Anatolia. In the ebb and flow of things, the area can be considered to have been a frontier zone between the Hittite empire and the Mycenaeans.²³¹ As Kelder describes,

In this politically unstable region, Ahhiyawan activity was to haunt Hittite aspirations for superiority over western Anatolia over the course of almost two centuries. From the scraps of the Hittite texts, one can recall a story of continual Ahhiyawan interference in Anatolian affairs, of support to anti-Hittite uprisings, and of raids on various Hittite vassal cities, including Troy.²³²

Such interactions are also attested by Mycenaean pottery in Western Anatolia, even when actual Mycenaean settlement seems to have been limited to only a few places.²³³ The Linear B tablets also refer to the area; for example, at Pylos, women from Miletus are recorded as slaves,²³⁴ and on the whole it appears that Miletus was the main centre in Western Anatolia for Ahhiyawa.²³⁵

Egyptian texts also shed light on Mycenae. In the time of Thutmose III in the fifteenth century BCE when Egypt had expanded into the Levantine area, there is a record of envoys coming from the land of *Tnj* (generally vocalised as Tanaju), with a Cretan style silver jug included in the gifts brought by them.²³⁶ An inscription from the reign of Amenhotep III at Kom el Hetan near Luxor a few decades later indicates that Tanaju refers to Mycenae.²³⁷ References to Tanaju then, in effect, disappear from Egyptian records.²³⁸ As a number of places on the Greek mainland seem to be mentioned in the Kom el Hetan text in association with Tanaju, this indicates that Tanaju did encompass more than one palatial centre.²³⁹

Archaeological data indicates uniformity in palatial architecture throughout Greece, even when this not the case with domestic units,²⁴⁰ and the use of Greek and uniformity in the tablets was already noted. Pottery style is also distinctively uniform, attesting Minoan influences.²⁴¹ This style then ceased after the palatial collapse, with earlier styles again reattesting themselves.²⁴² The texts also indicate that there was religious uniformity in the palatial

period, even when archaeological evidence of temples and shrines is very limited.²⁴³ Large-scale public works, including dams, harbours and roads, are also attested.²⁴⁴

One can then say that Mycenae attested a uniform culture based on both textual and archaeological records. It also seems most plausible that a supraregional state existed. However, the precise extent of this state is an open question. If one were to assume that one of the palatial states took over the rest of the area, this would easily explain how uniformity was created in the region. An empire would be creating a state in an area that was in this case already connected.²⁴⁵ It is true also, though, that one could think that at least some of the various regions were simply connected and took cultural influences from each other, and might perhaps even have collaborated with each other as needed. In this, one can think of the later era of Greek city states in the first millennium.²⁴⁶ Perhaps, as Beckman, Bryce and Cline suggest, the issue must be left open.²⁴⁷ Nevertheless, whatever form and shape Ahhiyawa/Tanaju took, it seems that it had imperial interests in Western Anatolia, with aspects of at least franchise colonialism involved.

F. Concluding remarks

The foregoing survey of empires in the late second millennium indicates that they were vigorous agrarian states with administrative capabilities. Often they were also interested in expansion, as long as that was possible in terms of the military and bureaucratic reach they could have. Their activities invariably brought them into conflict with their neighbouring entities, and diplomacy and warfare were employed. It should also be noted here that there was active trade that went on in the area.²⁴⁸ The Near Eastern world before the collapse around 1200 BCE was a highly organised and encompassing system, even when at the same time the system was not ubiquitous from the perspective of its inhabitants. A number of spheres could remain outside state control, such as mountainous areas and spaces that were beyond the hinterlands of main population centres controlled by the empires as extended states. When the international system collapsed, this above all meant that the control of the empires over the area was greatly reduced. It did not, however, cease completely as was already indicated. In such a situation, those elements that had previously been under state control could now have greater options available for them in extending their power and influence, whether by design or by processes that were not planned but might nevertheless result in

significant changes. Some of the problems that states had could also be due to elements formerly under state control managing to attest themselves.

The next three chapters will look at the most conspicuous newly emerging entities from the shadows and remnants of state control in the area, together with a fourth chapter on any other entities arising or continuing in the region. In this, one does not need to assume that everything collapsed in the Late Bronze–Early Iron Age transition; on the contrary, in some parts life may, or is even likely to, have more or less gone on as before. I will start the examination of the changes in the area from 1200 BCE on with a focus on the ancient Philistines as part of the migration of the Sea Peoples. In that, it appears that a collapse in the Mycenaean palatial area triggered a chain reaction that caused the demise of the Hittite empire, moved people along the sea and coastal routes towards the east and south and resulted in the establishment of a new political entity, Philistia, on the southern coast of the Levant.

Notes

- 1 On Agade, see Foster 2016; Liverani 2014:133–154.
- 2 See Cline and Graham 2011:15–16; cf. also comments on Egypt in the next section.
- 3 Cf. comments, Chapter 2; cf. Scott 2017:117 that places the appearance of the first states to around 3300 BCE.
- 4 See Foster 2016, and esp. *ibid.*, 82–83 (referring to Buccellati) on the inventions of empire techniques that accompanied the development.
- 5 See Foster 2016: esp. 82–83 (referring to Buccellati), 188–202.
- 6 See Foster 2016:245–286.
- 7 See Foster 2016:22–25.
- 8 See Liverani 2014:155–175.
- 9 Cline and Graham 2011:23. Cf. Scott 2017:14 who comments that definite state hegemony in the ancient Near East had developed by 1600 BCE.
- 10 Cline and Graham (2011:26–27) also include the Kassite Babylonia and Elam as significant players in the ancient Near East, however, they are of less direct significance for this study and so will not be considered in any depth here.
- 11 See also the summary maps in Liverani 2014:279.
- 12 See ahead for further details; cf. Beckman, Bryce and Cline 2011:1–6.

- 13 See Morris 2018:2–3.
- 14 Cf. comments, Chapter 1; cf. also Morris 2018:3.
- 15 There is also the issue of Libya; however, Egyptian imperial interactions there pertain mostly to the Nineteenth and Twentieth Dynasties (see Morris 2005: esp. 611– 621, 774–776), and I do not deem the issues to be of an equally illustrative nature to those that relate to early state formation, Nubia and Syria-Palestine. One may also note Morris’s comments on the Dakhla oasis in the desert west from the Nile (Morris 2018:39–65).
- 16 Morris 2018:13.
- 17 Morris 2018:13.
- 18 Morris 2018:24–36.
- 19 I will not attempt to elaborate on the issue of language here, on the whole, Egyptian is an Afroasiatic language, and its origins are reconstructed for roughly the area the area of today’s southern Egypt, see Kitchen, Ehret, Assefa and Mulligan 2009; Ehret 2011:135–169.
- 20 See e.g. Grimal 1992:34–35.
- 21 Morris 2018:11, 35.
- 22 See Chapter 2.
- 23 Cf. comments in the foregoing, Chapter 2.
- 24 See Morris 2018:13–17.
- 25 One may here keep in mind that Lemkin’s work particularly referred to the German occupation of Europe during the Second World War. Had Germany held on, later historians might have seen it as a unifier of Europe.
- 26 Based on OEAE 3:621–622 and Morris 2018:XI.
- 27 Cf. Mann 2012/1986:108–115.
- 28 Morris 2018:18–20.
- 29 See Morris 2018:20. More broadly, flight was an option available to early peoples for whom state control was not ubiquitous in terms of geographical areas; cf. comments in the foregoing, Chapter 2.
- 30 Morris 2018:20 uses the term eradication imperialism.
- 31 Cf. comments on settler colonialism in the foregoing, Chapter 2.
- 32 See Morris 2018:18.
- 33 Morris 2018:18.

- 34 Morris 2018:3, 11, 14–18, 35.
- 35 Morris 2018:67–69. Upper Nubia refers to the area south of the second cataract of Nile.
- 36 Morris 2018:71.
- 37 Morris 2018:71–77.
- 38 The C-group is associated with a predominantly pastoral population; see Morris 2018:67.
- 39 Morris 2018:84.
- 40 Morris 2018:84.
- 41 See Morris 2018:84, even when this rhetoric by Senusret III on a border stone at Semna just south of the second cataract strictly speaking refers the Nubians further south at Kerma.
- 42 Cf. Morris 2018:84–86.
- 43 See Morris 2018:89.
- 44 Morris 2018:92–101.
- 45 The Dongola Reach between the third and fourth cataracts was not included in the empire. The Nubian area on the whole, except for the cataracts, was geographically similar to Egypt in that a narrow fertile area by the river was surrounded by deserts.
- 46 Morris 2018:102–103.
- 47 Morris 2018:104–109.
- 48 Morris 2018:238–246.
- 49 See Adams 1984:67–68; Grimal 1992:335–341.
- 50 Adams 1984:68; Grimal 1992:335; Morris 2018:238.
- 51 See Morris 2018:238.
- 52 See Morris 2018:247–248.
- 53 See Morris 2018:236. Even so, Morris (2018:30–31) notes the likely employment of the practice already within Egypt itself, and particularly the Delta area within it, in early Dynastic times.
- 54 See the corresponding chapters in Elkins and Pedersen 2005; also Veracini 2006:41–63. Morris herself (2018:231–247) makes comparisons with Spanish North America, and undoubtedly a number of the parallels she makes are appropriate. However, her point about how settlements were

done in North America as transplantations of Spanish and European tradition is not entirely accurate in terms of the Americas as a whole, as the Laws of the Indies were formulated only after town building had commenced in the Americas (see Bakewell 2010:220). On the whole, the origin of the grid pattern is not clear and can be seen in the context of “unintended” consequences of colonialism (cf. Pitkänen 2014b: 244).

55 See Morris 2018:20–24.

56 Morris 2018:117.

57 See Morris 2018:161, 170–175.

58 The area is discussed in more detail in Chapters 6 and 7. But it may be mentioned here that in this case, there was no substantial increase of violence in terms of Amurru; instead the kingdom was able to play imperial powers against each other.

59 Cf. Morris 2018:161, 165–186.

60 See Morris 2018:192–207; and Morris 2005, *passim*.

61 See Morris 2018:105–106, 154–157.

62 Morris 2005:689–690; Morris 2018:144–148; cf. *ibid.*, 69–70.

63 Thus also Morris 2018:207.

64 See also Higginbotham 2000.

65 See Morris 2018:217; Morris 2005:709.

66 Cf. Morris 2005; Morris 2018. Note also that the attestation of Egyptian early New Kingdom presence in Canaan is archaeologically very limited, with much of it necessary to reconstruct from textual evidence. Much of the reason for the invisibility is that the Egyptians appeared to appropriate local resources at this stage rather than introducing their own, see Morris 2018:149–154.

67 On these developments, see Grimal 1992:341–388.

68 See the map in Liverani 2014:290

69 See Liverani 2014:291–293 for a short summary of the related political developments.

70 See Wegner 2007:35–36.

71 See Wilhelm 1989:7–10.

72 See Wilhelm 1989:7–10; cf. *ibid.*, 17.

73 See Wilhelm 1989:12–17. Note however the comments on a theory of origin for the Hurrians that involves eastern Anatolia in Bryce 2005:55.

74 Wilhelm 1989:12–17.

75 Cf. Renfrew 1987; Ehret 2011; Bellwood 2013. The impassionate comments in von Dassow (2014:14) can, from an ideological perspective, be seen to be associated with an antimigrationist approach, on which see also comments in the foregoing, Chapter 2.

76 Cf. Ehret 2011:91–95.

77 See Ehret 2011:92.

78 See Ehret 2011:94.

79 See Sommerfeld 1995 on the Kassites.

80 Wilhelm 1989:17.

81 Cf. Ehret 2011:84–87. For a list of such terms and wider comments on technological innovations at the time, see Liverani 2014:272–278.

82 Ehret 2011:87.

83 Cf. Wilhelm 1989:17–19.

84 Similarly von Dassow 2014:13; cf. de Martino 2014:69.

85 See Schwartz 2014:272, citing Anthony, on this possibility.

86 Cf. Ehret 2011:101–102.

87 Based on Liverani 2014:251, 292, 332, 352.

88 Cf. de Martino 2014.

89 For a full overview, see Wegner 2007:21–32; on Nuzi, Postgate 2013:344–345; see also von Dassow 2014:12 for fuller nuancing.

90 See Wegner 2007:31–32 for a summary of the texts.

91 See Koliński 2014.

92 See Eidem 2014:138, quoting von Dassow.

93 See the comments in Cancik-Kirschbaum, Brisch and Eidem 2014, 1–8, even when they do not seem to include any particularly strong reference to social scientific theories of states and empires.

94 See von Dassow 2014:15.

95 Cf. also the comments in von Dassow 2014:14–19.

96 See von Dassow 2014:18–22.

- 97 See von Dassow 2014:15.
- 98 For comments on the text, see von Dassow 2014:16.
- 99 See von Dassow 2014:23–26.
- 100 See von Dassow 2014:15–16.
- 101 See von Dassow 2014:17.
- 102 See von Dassow 2014:17–18.
- 103 Von Dassow 2014:18. This refers to the battle of Megiddo with an accompanying siege at the time of Thutmose III. Cf. Morris 2018:123–127.
- 104 See Koliński 2015:9.
- 105 See Koliński 2015:10.
- 106 See Liverani 2014:350; Koliński 2015:10; Kühne 2015:60. For further details on middle Assyria, see the following.
- 107 See Wilhelm 1989:41.
- 108 Zadok 2012:572.
- 109 Cf. Schwartz 2014:268. Gelb, Purves and MacRae 1943:284 note how in Nuzi, there were a number of instances where parents with Akkadian names gave Hurrian names to their offspring.
- 110 Cf. Ehret 2011:94–97.
- 111 Cf. Brown 2014; Koliński 2014; Koliński 2015 on some of the archaeological evidence. Tukulti-Ninurta I states (RIMA 1:236; cf. Koliński 2015:11), with the land of the Šubaru by all accounts referring to northern Mesopotamia and thus including Hurrians, “All the land of the Šubaru, the entirety of Mount Kašiiari as far as the land Alzu, which previously, during the reign of Shalmaneser (i), king of the universe, my father, had rebelled and withheld tribute, had united itself under one command. I prayed to the god Aššur and the great gods, my lords, (and) marched up to Mount Kašiiari. (As) with a bridle I controlled the land of the Šubaru, the land Alzu, and their allied kings. I conquered the great cult centre of the land Purulimzu. I burnt them (the inhabitants) alive (and) the remnants of [their] army I took as captives. I conquered four strong capitals of Ehli-Tešub, king of the land Alzu, (and) six rebellious cities of the land Amadanu. Captives (and) property I carried off from them (and) brought to my city, Aššur. Ehli-Tešub king of the land Alzu took fright in the face of my majesty and, taking his courtiers and his sons, he abandoned his entire land (and) went secretly to the (very) border of Nairi, to an unknown land. The remnant of

their army which had fled in the midst of battle, fearing the violence of my warfare, ran to the rocky mountains to save their lives. 180 of their fortified cities I destroyed, ravaged, burnt, (and) turned into ruin hills. I added the regions of the lands Alzu, Amadanu, Nihanu, Alaia, Tepurzu, and Purulimzu to my land. I took from them hostages, subdued (them) at my feet, and imposed upon them) *corvée*.”

112 Bryce 2005:11.

113 Bryce 2005:11–15; cf. also Renfrew 1987 and Bellwood 2013:157–163.

114 Bryce 2005:12.

115 Bryce 2005:16.

116 Bryce 2005:18.

117 Bryce 2005:18.

118 Bryce 2005:18–19.

119 Cf. comments, Chapter 2.

120 Bryce 2005:19.

121 Bryce 2005:19.

122 Cf. the discussion on nations and nationalism in the foregoing, Chapter 2.

123 Cf. the foregoing.

124 See Liverani 2014:256–260.

125 See Liverani 2014:260–261.

126 See Liverani 2014:303–305.

127 See Liverani 2014:305; Bryce 2012:53; cf. Klengel 1992:113–114.

128 See Liverani 2014:304–307.

129 For a summary, see Liverani 2014:307–311.

130 One may here also consider that the Hittites appear to have become increasingly dependent on grain imports during the last century of the empire. See Bryce 2005:322, 331–332.

131 Cf. Liverani 2014:311–314.

132 See TLCANE for the treaties, including transcriptions and translations.

133 Cf. Liverani 2014:315.

134 Cf. comments in the foregoing, Chapter 2.

135 See Liverani 2014:315.

- 136 See Glatz 2009.
- 137 Cf. comments in the foregoing; also see Liverani 2014:316.
- 138 Cf. Liverani 2014:315–316; Bryce 2005:217–218.
- 139 Cf. Beckman 1995:538.
- 140 See Bryce 2005:217–218; cf. Collins 2007:50, 108–109.
- 141 Bryce (2005:217) claims in regard to transportation that “nowhere else did it operate as extensively as in the Hittite world”.
- 142 See Bryce 2005:217–218.
- 143 Bryce 2005:218.
- 144 See Liverani 2014:310.
- 145 See the maps in Liverani 2014:449, Bryce 2012:46 as summaries. See also Figure 6.2.
- 146 See Payne 2010:4 for a map of these.
- 147 Cf. Liverani 2014:448; Payne 2010:4.
- 148 Bryce 2012:53–54.
- 149 Bryce 2012:54.
- 150 Bryce 2012:54.
- 151 Even if the western border of the Assyrian empire in a number of ways was slightly more to the east, at Balih. See e.g. Brown 2014:87; Tenu 2009.
- 152 Bryce 2012:54.
- 153 Bryce 2012:54.
- 154 See Morris 2018:236 and the discussion on Egypt in the foregoing.
- 155 Bryce 2012:54.
- 156 Bryce 2012:55; cf. *ibid.*, 22–29.
- 157 Bryce 2012:54–55, also referring to van den Hout.
- 158 Bryce 2012:55.
- 159 Bryce 2012:55–60.
- 160 See Bryce 2012:58.
- 161 See Bryce 2012:58–59.
- 162 Cf. Bryce 2012:60.

163 Bryce 2012:60.

164 Cf. comments in the foregoing, including Chapter 2, on hegemony and empires creating states.

165 Cf. the foregoing.

166 See Bryce 2012:56.

167 This issue, together with the potential implications of bilingual inscriptions towards the end of the time of the neo-Hittite states, will be discussed more in Chapter 6.

168 See Huehnergard 1995:2117.

169 See Foster 2016:213–214.

170 See Edzard 1995:2109.

171 See Edzard 1995:2107–2109.

172 For the Sumerian king list, see MC:117–127, and for the Assyrian king list, MC:136–145.

173 See Foster 2016:245–286.

174 On this trading network, see e.g. Aubet 2013/2007: esp. 267–363.

175 Cf. comments on Mari in the following, Chapter 6.

176 See e.g. Charpin 1995:813, 816; Villard 1995:873–874; cf. Fleming 2004, *passim*.

177 Koliński 2015:9.

178 Cf. the foregoing.

179 Cf. Kühne 2015:59–60.

180 See RIMA 2:37, and cf. the discussion in Harmanşah 2013:93, 184.

181 Cf. Liverani 2014:463–467.

182 See Koliński 2015:13, mentioning the three vassal entities of Tabetu, Katmuhu and the Ruqahu tribe.

183 See Kühne 2015: esp. 69–70.

184 Cf. the discussion in the foregoing in regard to Egypt.

185 Based on Liverani 2014:352, 459, 486.

186 Cf. comments in the foregoing, Chapter 2.

187 Düring 2015b:304–305, with slight modifications, mostly in that I count the techniques of administration as part of a coercive apparatus. Cf. also

- 188 Düring 2015b:305, with slight modifications, mostly in that the list is shorter and that the creation of towns and monuments serve an ideological purpose; cf. Harmanşah 2013. Cf. also Liverani 2017 on the whole.
- 189 See Postgate 2013 for an extensive analysis; cf. Pedersén 1998:80–103.
- 190 See e.g. Salah 2014 for Dur-Katlimmu.
- 191 See Tenu 2009:43–47 and *passim*; cf. Düring 2015:301–302; Tenu 2015:82.
- 192 See Düring 2015b:305.
- 193 Cf. Morris 2018:154–158 that also mentions Assyria in the context.
- 194 Cf. the discussion in the foregoing and Morris 2018. Düring 2015:303–304 suggests that the Egyptian empire was less strong on ideological aspects of empire (“culture of empire”), I am not sure, however, if the conclusion is warranted.
- 195 Cf. comments in the foregoing.
- 196 Cf. Düring 2015:303–304.
- 197 See Tenu 2015. Note that *dunnu* has the basic meaning of power, force, strength; see CAD 3, 184.
- 198 Cf. esp. Morris 2005; Morris 2018: esp. 89–116.
- 199 See Postgate 2013.
- 200 Cf. Morris 2005, *passim*; Morris 2018, *passim*.
- 201 See Düring 2015:308–311.
- 202 Cf. esp. Chapter 2 and the discussion on Egypt in this chapter.
- 203 Cf. the discussion in the foregoing.
- 204 Cf. Düring 2015:307–308; B.J. Parker 2015.
- 205 Cf. Koliński 2015:26, referring to Brown 2014:94–95.
- 206 This issue will be discussed more in Chapter 6.
- 207 Cf. comments in the foregoing, including Chapter 2 and the discussion on the Egyptian empire in Syria-Palestine in this chapter.
- 208 See Düring 2015:307–311.
- 209 Cf. Mann’s P in the IEMP model, cf. discussion in Chapter 2.
- 210 Koliński 2015:12–14, and cf. comments in the foregoing.
- 211 Cf. Mann’s M, but also P, in the IEMP model, cf. discussion in Chapter 2.

- 212 Chapter 6.
- 213 Cf. Finkelberg 2005:1.
- 214 See Finkelberg 2005:4–5. Finkelberg (*ibid.*) suggests that the suffixes -nth- and -ss that occur in a number of place names in Greece, Crete and Asia Minor should be identified as “typically Anatolian or, to be more precise, Luwian”.
- 215 See Finkelberg 2005:5. Cf. also Renfrew 1987; Bellwood 2013:157–163.
- 216 Postgate (2013:410) notes how there are no private or legal documents included.
- 217 See Kelder 2010:7.
- 218 See Kelder 2010:1.
- 219 See Kelder 2010:1.
- 220 Kelder 2010:8.
- 221 See Postgate 2013:410 who notes that Linear A documentation on Crete clearly implies the use of parchment in that context also.
- 222 Postgate 2013:411. For the Offerings Archive where the concern was primarily with the receipt and processing of a set range of foodstuffs that were supplied by the provinces of the Assyrian state, see *ibid.*, 82, 89–146.
- 223 Kelder 2010:8.
- 224 Kelder 2010:8–9.
- 225 See Kelder 2010:11–16.
- 226 Cf. Yasur-Landau 2010:35–38.
- 227 See Beckman, Bryce and Cline 2011:3–6.
- 228 See Beckman, Bryce and Cline 2011:1.
- 229 Cf. Beckman, Bryce and Cline 2011:3.
- 230 Beckman, Bryce and Cline 2011:3.
- 231 Beckman, Bryce and Cline 2011:281–282.
- 232 Kelder 2010:23.
- 233 See Beckman, Bryce and Cline 2011:281–282; Kelder 2010:49–60.
- 234 Kelder 2010:18. For a fuller list of foreigners in Linear B tablets, see Yasur-Landau 2010:40.
- 235 Kelder 2010:23.

236 See Kelder 2010:36, 37.

237 See Kelder 2010:37–38.

238 See Kelder 2010:38.

239 See Kelder 2010:39.

240 See Kelder 2010:107–110.

241 See Kelder 2010:112–113.

242 See Kelder 2010:113–114. On issues that relate to the study of Mycenaean pottery more widely, see Janeway 2013:4–26.

243 See Kelder 2010:114–116.

244 See Kelder 2010:116–118. Kelder notes how the roads seem to be especially built for quick movements of troops, in particular chariots.

245 Cf. comments in the foregoing on empires creating states.

246 See Beckman, Bryce and Cline 2011:6.

247 See Beckman, Bryce and Cline 2011:6.

248 Cf. e.g. Cline 2014, *passim*.



4 The Sea Peoples and ancient Philistia

A. At the palatial centres

The Aegeans were clearly used to seafaring and trade, and their migration to the Levant after 1200 BCE pertains to the coastal area of the Near East, even if there is some penetration towards inland as well. The Aegean between Greece and Anatolia is dotted with islands, and this naturally would mean that the Greeks would be familiar with seafaring. In the Late Bronze Age, seaborne trading was extensive in the eastern Mediterranean area, with the Aegeans taking part in it.¹ The Uluburun shipwreck on the Anatolian coast from the thirteenth century BCE in particular allows for reconstructing a number of details in respect to that trade.² It appears that the ship was travelling between Egypt or Canaan and the Aegean, along the south coast of Anatolia. The materials on board included storage jars full of barley, raw glass, resin, spices, possibly wine, and close to a ton of raw tin and ten tons of raw copper for making bronze.³ In addition, the Linear B tablets speak of rowers, indicating that these were a rather standard group of people that could be employed by the Mycenaean palatial administration. It is possible that these could even be used for establishing new settlements.⁴ Moreover, shipbuilding is mentioned in the tablets, and iconographic evidence depicts ships.⁵ Of course, as already indicated, the Mycenaeans also had land-based activities in the mainland. And, it would be rather unlikely that the Ahhiyawans would have been able to promote their interests in western Anatolia if they were unable to move troops into the area.⁶

The Mycenaean palatial culture more or less collapsed relatively suddenly around 1200 BCE. Archaeological evidence bears to this state of affairs. As Cline summarises,

In the Argolid and Corinthia there were destructions at Mycenae, Tiryns, Katsingri, Korakou and Iria . . . in Lakonia at the Menelaion; in Messenia, at Pylos; in Achaea, at Teikhos Dymaion; in Boeotia and Phokis, at Thebes, Orchomenos, Gla . . . and Krisa, while the following sites appear to have been abandoned without destructions: Argolid and Corinthia: Berbati, Prosymna, Zygyouries, Gonia, Tsoungiza; Lakonia: Ayios Stephanos; Messenia: Nichoria; Attica: Brauron; Boeotia and Phokis: Eutresis.⁷

In addition, further destructions took place from 1190 to 1130 BCE at Mycenae, Tiryns, Lefkandi and Kynos.⁸ The reasons for the destructions are not entirely clear, even though the destructions by fire at Pylos and Mycenae could suggest violence.⁹ An earthquake had already afflicted Mycenae at around 1250 BCE; however, this did not effect a collapse.¹⁰ Earthquake is also seen as a cause for a partial destruction of Tiryns at ca. 1200 BCE,¹¹ and on the whole it appears based on archaeoseismology that there were a series of earthquakes in Greece and the rest of the Aegean and the Eastern part of the Mediterranean for about

50 years from 1225 to 1175 BCE.¹²

The palatial culture was replaced by a somewhat humbler culture on the whole; nevertheless, archaeological evidence indicates that in some areas there could be local developments that involved a fair degree of architectural complexity.¹³ But, on the whole, one can speak of decentralisation in the Greek mainland, and also in Crete.¹⁴ At the same time, the island polities in the Cyclades were not strongly affected and attest a certain amount of internal development.¹⁵ Extant remains with imagery suggest an overall continuity with the palatial era for the overall area, but with some minor transformations and an apparent increase in expressions of violence that could indicate contestation between smaller and more fragile political units.¹⁶

Except for the potential role of earthquakes, the causes for the collapse are considered as not being known. There is no explicit evidence for internal revolts or archaeological evidence for invasions by outsiders.¹⁷ Climate change and drought and resulting famine is a further possibility; however, while there is some evidence for drought, one cannot be sure that this caused the Mycenaean collapse.¹⁸ But, it seems that famine was an issue with the collapse of the Hittite empire. This is attested by the Hittite king having been dependent on Syrian and Egyptian grain at the time just before the collapse of the Hittite empire.¹⁹ It appears that a fair bit of this grain travelled through Ugarit which itself had its own problems with its food supply.²⁰ The migrations of the Philistines seem to have cut off this food supply route, and that could have helped facilitate collapse in Anatolia.²¹

In terms of Mycenae, we come to the question of what holds societies together. As was discussed, there is a combination of centrifugal ideologisation and bureaucratisation of coercion, tied with a hegemonic approach that can convince people to cooperate. It is obvious that in Mycenae, at least one of these aspects will have failed sufficiently so as to cause the system to collapse. The absence of palatial records on their own could be seen as a result of accidents of survival; however, their cessation can be linked with destructions and abandonment of sites. In general, Late Bronze archives are associated with larger centres.²² They attest to administering adjoining areas by a centre, however large the adjoining areas may be. One can here also keep in mind that it is writing that enables centralised bureaucracy, and that no large states or empires did or could exist before its invention around 3200 BCE. Conversely, the rise of the palatial system is at least broadly linked with the development of Linear B and its spread in the Greek mainland. In terms of writing technologies in the Late Bronze Age context, in most places, including Mycenae, alphabet was not yet used.²³ Instead, a combination of syllabic and ideographic signs was employed, with ideographs being a legacy of the earliest form of writing, and learning each script would have needed specialised scribal

training. It would seem that if the destruction and abandonment of the sites caused the dispersal of scribal activity, it would not be possible to hold administration together, at least to a degree that could be done previously. Once administration would fall, each of the palatial states would also fall. Such a scenario seems plausible.²⁴ The destructions at certain sites by fire would to my mind suggest that there could have been unrest of some type. That sites were simply abandoned would appear to imply the disruption of supply chains as towns cannot manage without trade, even when many of the ancient towns were dependent on agriculture in their adjacent hinterlands. In this, it is typically the elite that takes advantage of surpluses, and scribal people would be part of that elite. Elite can in normal conditions typically coerce such compliance even in times of famine; accordingly, I can only assume that some kind of disruptive unrest was involved. In this connection, a simple change in those in power would typically leave societal structures intact, so one would expect that more than that happened.

Finkelberg's work based on linguistics is of relevance here. She suggests that before the palatial collapse there was a dialectal continuum in Greece but the continuum was fragmented after the collapse.²⁵ This clearly suggests that a considerable amount of migration took place after the palatial era. Even if one cannot be certain as to exactly when such migration happened subsequent to the collapse, the dialectal fragmentation nevertheless suggests movement of peoples around the Greek area in contrast to the preceding era that was more stable in that respect. In this connection, the possibility of an external invasion cannot be ruled out, as conquerors do not always leave archaeological evidence behind.²⁶

It would seem that in contrast to internal revolts, wars are events that can bring about substantial changes. Conquering armies would cause widespread problems in terms of destroying agricultural resources and also disrupting normal societal functions. While a conquering army could try to elicit local collaboration, with extending such an approach in continuing colonial situations, it could also employ a more or less explicit tactic of disruption. Such armies might then even explicitly attempt to cause problems for the administrative hold of the territory in question.²⁷ The problem with peasant revolts in that respect is that they tend to be able to muster fewer resources than the ruling elites who are well organised,²⁸ whereas invading armies could exhibit power at the highest available levels in the context of the technological level of the region at the time. As such, after destructions and disruptions, people would also tend to be more prone to migrate, as families would experience loss of supplies including food, or some of their properties could be outright destroyed. At the same time, controls put in place by centralised authorities in terms of migration would dissolve.²⁹ Some forced migration by

any conquering entities is also a conceivable possibility, considering that it was practiced elsewhere in the ancient Near Eastern area.³⁰ A degree of change in cultural footprint could also be the result of intermixing of invaders with locals. Such changes would be minor and not especially distinctive if the invaders were not very different from the existing population. This would fit in the case of a Dorian invasion, for which there are indications in the much later Greek tradition.³¹ If the number of the invaders was at least relatively limited, that would also limit changes in culture, keeping in mind that archaeological evidence in the area indicates both continuity and some limited change. It is also possible to conceive that interpalatial warfare would have erupted in the area; however, one would ask the question of whether that would be enough to cause widespread systemic change.³² Altogether, the disruptions would in the round have been great enough so that it would neither be possible to re-establish a palatial administration, including utilising scribes that might have been left alive, nor resurrect scribal training in the area.³³

B. From the Aegean to the Levant

Migration theorists can often incorporate questions of push and pull when looking at the motivations of people who migrate, and some consideration of such factors should be useful here.³⁴ The obvious push should be the collapse of the palatial order and its associated disruptions. In this, as already indicated, after the collapse, restrictions on people moving would have been removed, or at least greatly attenuated.³⁵ People would be free to try a new life in a different locale. One could then ask why people would migrate towards the Levant.³⁶ At a certain level, this could happen because individuals would simply want to try out their luck. Also, if some moved and at least a degree of news from or of them would be forthcoming, this could help others decide to also move.³⁷ An interesting factor to add is the ease, or at least possibility, of transportation.³⁸ The Mycenaean seafaring technology allowed transportation over the sea into the Levant,³⁹ even though a fair bit of the migration also took place by land routes.⁴⁰ It seems that the land option is likely to have become more open after the collapse of the Hittite empire.⁴¹ In addition, Ugarit collapsed around 1200 BCE, and this would have enabled better access past that area.⁴² It is, of course, also postulated that the Sea Peoples may have been involved in the fall of Ugarit.⁴³ Conversely, there may have been a trade embargo that the Hittites had asked of Amurru in relation to the Mycenaeans in the late thirteenth century BCE. The treaty between Tudhaliya IV and

Schausgamuwa may have stated, “You shall not allow any Ahhiyawan ship to go to him (i.e. to the king of Assyria)”,⁴⁴ even though an alternative reading could simply indicate a mention of a warship without any direct reference to Ahhiyawa.⁴⁵ The possibility of a trade embargo is strengthened by a dearth of finds of Hittite objects in the Mycenaean world and Mycenaean objects in the Hittite lands, in contrast to finds of objects associated with other major players of the era in Hittite Anatolia and in the Aegean.⁴⁶

Alashiya (Cyprus) is also mentioned as an enemy in the Hittite texts, with the Hittites even invading it, twice, in the years preceding the end of their empire.⁴⁷ Here again, once the Hittite empire collapsed, access to the Levantine mainland through Cyprus would have been made easier. In this respect, while there were destructions in Cyprus over some 25 years from 1200 BCE on, these did not seem to have caused comparable widespread problems for the island.⁴⁸ While the causes of the destructions are not entirely clear, with the Hittites in addition to potential migrants and even earthquakes as possible causes, material evidence after 1200 BCE indicates migration from the Aegean. Such features as pottery and cooking jugs, halls and hearths, loom weights, handmade burnished ware and iconography are attested, increasing within a short period of time after 1200 BCE (LC IIC to LC IIIA).⁴⁹ This clearly suggests people settling there; however, archaeological evidence also suggests that the immigrants mixed with the indigenous Cypriots.⁵⁰ In addition, one can think that not everyone arriving in Cyprus from the Aegean would have needed to stay there but could have travelled on. In the process, they could and also would have been joined by locals.⁵¹

As for Anatolia, there is some evidence of an increase of Aegean features on the west side of the Anatolian peninsula, the area previously contested by the Ahhiyawans and the Hittites.⁵² In the east, around Cilicia and the Amuq, Tarsus was destroyed close to the end of the late Bronze Age, and substantial Aegean features are attested after that, specifically in eastern Aegean style.⁵³ Similar features, even if to a lesser degree, appear elsewhere in the region of Cilicia.⁵⁴ I agree with Yasur-Landau in that it would be odd if locally made Aegean style materials could have increased substantially based on domestic demand unless migration were involved,⁵⁵ and this applies to other places besides Tarsus. As for Amuq, a clear change towards Aegean material culture appears in the twelfth century BCE in the area.⁵⁶ Tell Tayinat serves as a special location in this respect, with Aegean features becoming prominent around the end of the twelfth century BCE.⁵⁷ Also, the material culture in the nearby Alalakh that was abandoned at the end of the Late Bronze Age included monumental architecture, whereas Tayinat that was rebuilt after 1200 BCE, following a gap of several hundred years, lacks such features.⁵⁸

In this respect, an interesting and well-analysed feature is the inscription by

King Taita that was found in Aleppo, dating to the eleventh and tenth centuries BCE.⁵⁹ The inscription reads, “King Taita (am) I, the Hero, Palistin-ean King”.⁶⁰ The inscription had originally been read slightly differently, but the reading of Palistin has been confirmed.⁶¹ The king, or his successor with the same name, is also mentioned in two other inscriptions from the area, from Meharde and Sheizar.⁶² In these Taita bears the title of “Hero” and his land is called Walistin.⁶³ He is also explicitly called a king of that country in the Meharde inscription.⁶⁴ Walistin is further mentioned in a fragmentary inscription from the ninth century BCE from Tell Tayinat.⁶⁵ Considering the Aegean-style material evidence at Tell Tayinat, it appears that the name of the country is of Aegean origin, reflecting immigration to the area. At the same time, it is notable that the material culture changes into a Syro-Hittite style from about 1000 BCE.⁶⁶ This suggests that the Aegean immigration was of a transitory nature and affected the area only for a century or two. In this respect, the iconography of the Taita inscription is clearly of a Syro-Hittite style and the inscription written in Luwian, clearly suggesting that the influence of the Aegeans by that time had already waned to a considerable degree. That is, if the Aegeans were prominent at the time, from the perspective of hegemony, one would expect some stronger measures by the king in terms of gaining their favour.⁶⁷ Nevertheless, the Aegeans had left their mark in the name Palistin, and it appears that this name was maintained for the subsequent kingdom of Patin in the area.⁶⁸ In this respect, it would be difficult to imagine how there could have been a name change if the immigrants did not for at least a short time have control in the area. It is unlikely that a name change would result based on simple cross-cultural immigrants who would have been suppliants to an existing order and situated at the low end of the societal spectrum. A similar process may have been involved with the area of Hiyawa (with the name clearly resembling Ahhiyawa) that is situated just east of Tarsus.⁶⁹

At some more southern locations, a new, more humble settlement was established at the nearby Ras Ibn Hani after the destruction of Ugarit, with Mycenaean pottery seemingly comprising over fifty per cent of the total of painted pottery.⁷⁰ Tell Kazel, which is identified as Sumur of the kingdom of Amurru, was violently destroyed. After abandonment in the late thirteenth century BCE, a short transitional Late Bronze–Iron Age settlement that was destroyed attests locally made HBW (handmade burnished ware) pottery, with parallels with Aegean and Cyprus.⁷¹ In addition, there were imports from western and northwestern Anatolia and from Cyprus.⁷² It would appear that Tell Kazel at the time had links with Western Anatolia and some immigration. However, the composition seems unique, and accordingly, the events at Tell Kazel would have unfolded somewhat differently from other locations

associated with the Sea Peoples. No destructions are evident in Phoenicia.⁷³

As for the northern Palestine coast between Phoenicia and Philistia, according to Stern, a distinctive material culture that derives mostly from Cyprus can be detected.⁷⁴ The great majority of the artefacts unearthed were manufactured locally. It appears that the occupation of this area by the Sea Peoples took place later than that by the Philistines in the south as pottery relating to the early phase of the Mycenaean III C ware is absent.⁷⁵ All of the sites that contained strata from the Late Bronze Age in the coastal area of Palestine from the Yarkon northward, in the Akko plain and in the western Jezreel valley, came to an end in destruction.⁷⁶ On the other hand, the settlements associated with the northern Sea Peoples were destroyed at the end of the eleventh or the beginning of the tenth century BCE, and the area from then on attested an Israelite-style material culture.⁷⁷ The presence of the northern Sea Peoples was accordingly a transitory one that lasted only some 100–150 years, and the situation in the area can be broadly compared with that in Palistin. Stern also points out that the material culture reflects a mixture of newcomers and existing traditions,⁷⁸ and this is also much in line with Palistin. At the same time, alternative interpretations of material evidence at especially Dor have been proposed, suggesting that detecting the migrations of the Sea Peoples in this area may be more fraught than in other areas.⁷⁹

C. An Egyptian encounter

The foregoing comments have related to the Sea Peoples in the northern part of the Levant and its environs. However, they did also migrate towards the south. In this, their interaction with the Egyptian empire is significant and also directly referred to in the textual and pictorial record. In particular, the famous inscriptions at Medinet Habu from the time of Ramesses III indicate invasions of Egypt by them. A particularly famous relief pertains to Year 8 of Ramesses III's reign (ca. 1178 BCE) and depicts battles in the southern Levantine coast.⁸⁰ There is also relevant information included in the Papyrus Harris.⁸¹ According to the great inscription in Year 8, second pylon,

The foreign countries made a conspiracy in their islands. All at once the lands were removed and scattered in the fray. No land could stand before their arms, from Hatti, Kode, Carchemish, Arzawa, and Alashiya on, being cut off at [one time]. A camp [was set up] in one place in Amor.⁸² They desolated its people, and its land was like that which has never come into being. They were coming forward toward Egypt, while the flame was prepared before them. Their

confederation was the Philistines, Tjeker, Shekelesh, Denye(n), and Weshesh, lands united. They laid their hands upon the lands as far as the circuit of the earth, their hearts confident and trusting: “Our plans will succeed!”⁸³

Also,

I organized my frontier in Djahi, prepared before them: princes, commanders of garrisons, and *maryanu*. I have the river-mouths prepared like a strong wall, with warships, galleys and coasters, (fully) equipped, for they were manned completely from bow to stern with valiant warriors carrying their weapons.⁸⁴

Papyrus Harris, also from the time of Ramesses III, states,

I extended all the frontiers of Egypt and overthrew those who had attacked them from their lands. I slew the Denyen in their islands, while the Tjeker and the Philistines were made ashes. The Sherden and the Weshesh of the Sea were made nonexistent, captured all together and brought in captivity to Egypt like the sands of the shore. I settled them in strongholds, bound in my name. Their military classes were as numerous as hundred-thousands. I assigned portions for them all with clothing and provisions from the treasuries and granaries every year.⁸⁵

The Year 8 inscription is accompanied by reliefs that show the Pharaoh battling the Sea Peoples. For one thing, the text clearly indicates that the northerners migrated towards Egypt. For another, the Egyptian Pharaoh indicates that the immigrants did have designs about Egypt. The text clearly suggests that the Sea Peoples actively sought to conquer rather than just migrate; in other words, they had a colonising orientation rather than a mindset of seeking to enter Egypt only as cross-cultural migrants. The text also indicates that the Pharaoh made preparations for the encounter, itself indicating that he was aware that the migrants were approaching.

The Year 8 inscription suggests two locations for the battle. The reference to river-mouths clearly seems to be about the northern delta of the Nile. The other reference is to Djahi which is taken as Canaan, even though it is difficult to be more specific.⁸⁶ It is often thought that the text and its accompanying reliefs do not refer to a single battle but collate a number of encounters into a single narrative.⁸⁷ This is certainly possible. Nevertheless, it does not take away the fact that the Sea Peoples had a military orientation in either case. In this connection, the reliefs depict both warriors and “civilians” among the invaders. Notably, the civilians are accompanied by ox carts. The use of such carts should be considered as natural in supporting the transportation of people; in another sense it is interesting to see them included. The ox carts are seen to

have an Anatolian origin.⁸⁸

The Year 8 inscription names five groups of Sea Peoples: Philistines, Tjeker, Shekelesh, Denyen and Weshesh. The identification and origins of each of these groups have been discussed extensively.⁸⁹ Other groups that can be associated with the Sea Peoples are Lukka, Sherden, Eqwesh, Teresh and Karkiša.⁹⁰ From the names, a broad Aegean and Anatolian connection can be deduced. The Philistines are associated with the Aegean Pelasgoi that, however, cannot be localised more precisely.⁹¹ The origin of the Tjeker is not clear, but it is interesting to note that in the well-known Egyptian Tale of Wenamun, the main protagonist meets a Tjeker prince who was a ruler of Dor.⁹² The origin of the Shekelesh is not evident, even though they can be associated with Sicily, perhaps based on their migration in that direction.⁹³ The Denyen could come from Adana in Cilicia, even though this is in no way certain.⁹⁴ It is difficult to see where the Weshesh could have come from.⁹⁵ The Lukka can be localised in southwestern Anatolia.⁹⁶ As for the Sherden, they cannot be placed with any certainty, even though they may possibly be associated with Sardinia, perhaps based on their migration in that direction.⁹⁷ The Eqwesh may relate to Ahhiyawa, even though the link remains hypothetical.⁹⁸ The Teresh may originate from northwestern Anatolia, even when one cannot be sure.⁹⁹ Finally, Karkiša sounds very similar to a country in Western Anatolia during Hittite times.¹⁰⁰ The Sherden and the Lukka already feature in the Egyptian records from the time of the Amarna letters and Ramesses II as maritime raiders.¹⁰¹ The names on their part clearly indicate that the Sea Peoples consisted of a variety of groups. Combined with Aegean-style pottery that has been found from the Levantine coastal areas, Cypriot-style material culture especially in northern Palestine and ox carts of Anatolian origin, there are good reasons to think that the immigrants came from these areas that cover the Aegean, Cyprus and southern Anatolia, and even the northern Levant if people from there joined in.¹⁰² At the same time, it should be noted that the immigrants mostly pertain to the maritime circuit; that is, there is no clear evidence of them from the Hittite heartland or from the Jazira in the northern part of the Levant. The encounters prior to the main Philistine migration in the twelfth century, in addition to trade and diplomatic contacts, also reinforce the idea that the Eastern Mediterranean world was connected and that news could travel around the area.

A key related point is that the groups would have been diverse enough to preclude a common language which itself then would make it rather unlikely that they had a common approach to migration.¹⁰³ The collapse of the palatial polities and an apparent resulting decentralisation would suggest this from the perspective of the Greek mainland, and the same would seem to have been the case after the collapse of the Hittite empire on the Anatolian peninsula. The

situation is then comparable to, for example, the case of the Nuer and the Dinka rather than with organised states. In the latter case, migration was controlled centrally; in the former, it happened in a manner that could be characterised as spontaneous and driven by the masses rather than by any centralised organisation.

Such expansion can be linked with push and pull factors affecting migration as already indicated. In that respect, an important element in the equation has not yet been touched on, however. In the maritime circuit, the situation in the north was not a very good one. Mycenae had collapsed, as had the Hittite empire, with famine already having been a problem in Anatolia. In reality, those lands would not prove to be a great destination for migrants. However, the situation would be different as one travelled towards the south. The Egyptians in particular did not have major problems around the year 1200 BCE and were in fact providing grain for the northerners, in addition to the Syrians doing so. In such a situation, it would not be surprising if migrants who would be likely to be looking for a better life would attempt to reach areas that were perceived as being well off.¹⁰⁴ The foregoing survey already indicated that some of them settled in Syria. But, one might also expect that a number of them would have set their sights on Egypt, and the encounters attested in the Egyptian records clearly fit the bill. The Medinet Habu reliefs indicate invasion by land and by sea. Clearly there was a land route that came down towards the south via Anatolia and past Cyprus. There could also have been a maritime party that followed the Anatolian coastline and then carried on via Cyprus or past it and advanced down to the Nile delta. In either case, in line with the diversity indicated by the textual record, some of the migrants could have joined at or originated from locales along the route, including Cyprus.¹⁰⁵ However, it is also possible that some would have come down southwards via Crete, with a portion of the migrants potentially originating from there. If so, such migrants could potentially land at the Nile delta, but more likely on the Libyan coast. In the latter case, one would be able to conceive that the Sea Peoples could at least potentially join with Libyans that they might encounter once they arrived to the area.¹⁰⁶ A passage from the time of Ramesses III in the Year 5 inscription that describes his first Libyan war seems to indicate thus.¹⁰⁷ Also, there is mention of an alliance of Libyans and the Sea Peoples, among them Sherden, Lukka, Eqwesh, Teresh and Shekelesh, from the time of Merneptah.¹⁰⁸

It is interesting that the Egyptian records from the time of Ramesses III then also state that the migrants had caused some major havoc along their way. According to the Year 8 inscription, “no land could stand before their arms”. The inscription then lists a variety of places where the Sea Peoples had caused carnage or had laid waste and perhaps stayed at along the way. It is reasonable

to think that the description reflects realities in the northern Levant, even if it can also have a hyperbolic tint in line with typical ancient Near Eastern rhetoric in such settings. That the rhetoric can be somewhat exaggerated is confirmed by there not being evidence of destruction at Carchemish.¹⁰⁹ But, in reality, one does not need to read the text as indicating a destruction at Carchemish. Instead, one way to interpret the passage is that Carchemish was not strong enough to defeat the Sea Peoples. It may even have been mentioned precisely because it was a strong political entity so as to enhance the rhetoric of the Pharaoh who then himself would defeat the invaders.

That both warriors and “civilians” were included among the people, especially as seen in the pictorial reliefs, would at first sight seem somewhat remote for modern people who are used to military acting on its own.¹¹⁰ However, had the migrating people tried to move on their own, one may ask if it would have been easy for them to pass through communities that they encountered along the way and also secure provisions from them. This might have been possible for individual travellers, but less likely for any larger groups of people. That is, one could ask if locals would be pleased to see a mass of people who would have been likely to have been impoverished and if they would have been keen on feeding them without receiving anything in return.¹¹¹ In such situations, having warriors as an accompanying escort should come handy. And, as the migrating people would need provisions, it would not be surprising if they were to resort to raiding, and that is exactly what the Egyptian records indicate, as such already in times earlier than Ramesses III, and the descriptions in the Medinet Habu reliefs are broadly matched by archaeological evidence about destructions in the area around 1200 BCE. Of course, if the migrants as a relatively large group of people would raid, they could also cause disruptions in, for example, agriculture and supply chains in areas many of which would already be at the brink of famine, potentially then also making people flee or succumb to illnesses, resulting in depopulation in affected areas.¹¹² Such additional induced migration could then have caused yet further disruptions. And, in reference to the camp at Amor,¹¹³ one might expect that such people could set up camp at certain places for longer periods than just for stopping for the night.

Papyrus Harris separately states that Ramesses III took captives of the Sea Peoples, brought them to Egypt and settled them in strongholds (*nhtw*). Elsewhere, the papyrus recounts that some of Libyan captives were given to troop commanders, and others, especially women and children, were made slaves.¹¹⁴ When one combines this with the already established custom of making foreign troops that were captured by the Egyptians to serve in the Egyptian army, the text suggests that the Sea Peoples were made to fight for the Egyptians.¹¹⁵ There is also a reference to a reversion of the speech of

captured Libyans; this evidently indicates that they were made to learn Egyptian and were also forced to use it.¹¹⁶ Altogether, the references are to forced migration and forced assimilation of the invaders into the Egyptian society. Ultimately, the immigrants are placed in the lower strata of society, with forced rank-and-file soldiers not far different from slaves unless promoted in some way, which at least as such could also have been possible.¹¹⁷ The soldiers are then even forced to fight against their own people!¹¹⁸ Forced migration also reminds one of examples of transfer of people from one end of the Egyptian empire to another, not to speak of the Hittites and Assyrians.¹¹⁹ Foreign troops were also hired as mercenaries, thus with the Sherden at least since the time of Ramesses II, according to Egyptian records.¹²⁰

It seems obvious that one does not need to assume that everyone from the Sea Peoples was taken captive. Those that were thus acquired were settled within the Egyptian empire and Egyptianised, while others would keep their freedom. Altogether, the rhetoric of the Pharaoh is hyperbolic and embellished, but one does not need to assume that it is completely fictional, either. The truth is likely to lie somewhere in between the two extremes, but it may at times be difficult to know exactly how much it may veer on the side of truthfulness or fiction.

D. Transformations in Philistia

Philistia provides the best-known location for the settlement of the Sea Peoples. This already traces to their prominence in the biblical narratives of Judges and Samuel. Also, the distinctiveness of the Aegean-based material culture was noted from early on in the southwestern part of Palestine.¹²¹ However, in the light of the preceding discussion, Philistia ultimately simply presents one locale to which the Sea Peoples migrated. Nevertheless, Philistia is also special in the sense that where any polities established by the Sea Peoples in the western part of the Levant proved transitory, with northern Palistin apparently as the longest-standing entity in the north for some 150–200 years, the southern Philistines did survive well into the first millennium.¹²²

It seems clear that the key to detecting the Philistines in the material record is the distinctive nature of the material culture of the Aegean but also Cyprus and at least aspects of Anatolia from that in other parts of the Levant. We already noted that the appearance of locally produced materials in substantial quantities reinforces the idea of migration rather than sudden emulation of artefactual styles that people were already familiar with through trade. In that

sense, pots equal peoples in this case. On the other hand, one can ask the question of whether every migrant to Philistia would have kept using artefacts in the style of their origin, and also, whether nevertheless some locals could also have emulated the Philistine material culture. We may keep in mind here the case of Middle Assyria, where it is considered that there was a broad correlation between Assyrian hold of the Jazira and Assyrian-style pottery in such a manner.¹²³

From the perspective of social stratification, the Middle Assyrian areas clearly were dominated and administered by the Assyrians. The Assyrians also could both utilise existing settlements and found new ones.¹²⁴ At the same time, one may keep in mind that Egyptian presence in Canaan in the early New Kingdom was poorly attested, with local buildings used by the Egyptians.¹²⁵ Considering all this, it is not necessary to assume that one would necessarily have to expect a reorganisation of sites where the Philistines might take control. Some towns and communities could even have submitted voluntarily. And, as with, for example, the Assyrians, and with the Egyptians in Nubia, one would not need to assume that every immigrant to Philistia would occupy the highest social strata of society. In fact, considering that only a small percentage in agrarian societies would occupy

Figure 4.1 Iron Age Palestine and Transjordan: main regions

Source: Bryce and Birkett-Rees 2016.

the highest social levels, any immigration that went beyond colonial administrative personnel would be expected to reflect existing social strata at source. Even if, in some cases, new social arrangements could arise at destination, with new people becoming leaders and rulers.¹²⁶

Altogether, then, one would not have to expect destructions everywhere in Philistia. At the same time, taking into account that there were destructions around the western Levantine area that at least broadly fit with the era of the migration of the Sea Peoples, one might similarly expect at least the possibility of some type of destruction in Philistia also. And, destruction levels and subsequent new settlement patterns are certainly attested at Ekron and Ashdod.¹²⁷ In addition, as Killebrew notes, at Tel Mique-Ekron specifically,

The transition from an approximately 10-acre village or small town confined to the northeast acropolis during the thirteenth-early twelfth centuries (Strata IX–VIII) to a large fortified settlement (Stratum VII) is dramatic and marked in its earliest phases by the appearance of a new city plan together with a distinctly Aegean-style material culture. Stratum VII marks the beginning of the urbanization of Tel Mique-Ekron and its associated Aegean-style material culture. In the initial phase of Stratum VII, a mudbrick wall 3.25 m in width

was constructed. The earliest phase of this fortification system has been uncovered in Fields I and X, the latter located on the western slope of the tel. Inside the Stratum VII city wall, the eastern slope of the acropolis (Field INE) served as an industrial area, as indicated by the excavation of several pottery kilns used in the production of Mycenaean IIIC:1b pottery.¹²⁸

Especially in the context of the foregoing discussion about the Sea Peoples, it is extremely difficult to conceive such a change between one phase and another as resulting from anything other than the arrival of new people who initiated and managed the building of the new phase. The destruction layer can then easily be suspected to relate to the change of political control. Interestingly, there is also evidence of depopulation of the Philistine countryside.¹²⁹ This is in line with desolation in the eastern Mediterranean as attested in the Year 8 inscription at Medinet Habu.¹³⁰ There is no need to deny that this most likely was a result of the Philistine migration. This could either be something that was expressly pursued by the Philistines or a by-product of their arrival and consequent disruptions in the area. The depopulation of the Caribbean as a result of the arrival of the Spanish there in the late fifteenth century CE and destructions effected in the wake of the Mongol conquests in the thirteenth century CE can be offered as parallels.¹³¹ This also fits with the tradition expressed in the Hebrew Bible that the previous inhabitants were destroyed by the Sea Peoples.¹³²

That the Philistines took control of the area is supported by the biblical description of their leaders as *seranim*. The term is seen as Indo-European, related to the Luwian *tarwanis* or the Greek *tyrranos*.¹³³ As Yasur-Landau suggests, the most natural time for such a word to come into use would be the twelfth century BCE, when a new foreign leadership came to Philistia.¹³⁴ This issue then also relates to the question of the language of the Philistines. In respect to the issue, only three relevant inscriptions, all of them short, have been uncovered from Philistia. Two of them originate in eleventh-century BCE contexts and are identified as Cypro-Minoan, even when they cannot be seen as “standard” specimens of writing in that script.¹³⁵ The third is the by now famous inscription from Tell es-Safi-Gath that was found in an early Iron Age II context (tenth and ninth centuries BCE) that has been proposed to include the name Goliath,¹³⁶ itself linking with the stories in 1 Samuel in the Hebrew Bible.¹³⁷ The inscription is in an archaic alphabetic script. While the evidence is scanty, one can suggest that at an early stage, non-Semitic writing was used but at a later stage alphabet was introduced. In this, the archaic form of that alphabet seems to be shifting into a more formalised Phoenician style alphabet by the late ninth century BCE.¹³⁸

In terms of language more widely, clearly the immigrants would have been

non-Semitic speakers. As they seemed to move towards Semitic writing with the passing of time, it seems reasonable to postulate that they may also have experienced a language shift in the course of time where their original languages died out, and this is confirmed by inscriptional evidence from the late Iron Age when very few traces of their previous languages existed.¹³⁹ Such language shifts do have parallels in history. In that respect, Ehret lists the cases of Ngoni and Mbunga from nineteenth-century southern Tanzania as two examples where

An incoming, aggressively militarized, small minority community, centralized socially and politically around military institutions, violently conquered a larger pre-existing local set of communities. They destroyed the earlier small political units and social relations and incorporated the inhabitants into new institutional relationships. The languages of the majority people continued in use; the conquerors' language died out within three to four generations.¹⁴⁰

Ehret further lists the case of the ninth-century Danish invasions in Northern and Central England as a third example. In that event, the Danish soon died out, even though Ehret thinks it may have lasted two or three generations longer than with the Ngoni in southern Tanzania.¹⁴¹ In all these cases, the conquering languages left many loanwords into the languages of the main population; however, this cannot be tested for the migration to Philistia due to the lack of textual evidence. Even so, the loanword *seren* in Biblical Hebrew would seem to at least broadly fit the bill here, also as the biblical documents indicate that the Philistines at least partly dominated the Israelites for a time in the eleventh century BCE.¹⁴² The case of the Kassites in the Middle Babylonian period provides a further parallel of such a process, even when the Kassites left only a limited number of loanwords in the Akkadian language.¹⁴³ Taken together with Egyptian inscriptional evidence about the conquering nature of the Philistines, the linguistic evidence is very well in line with the idea that the Philistines did take control of the area, even when it is not possible to establish more exactly how quickly the Philistine languages died out.

At this point, one can try to take some stock in regard to the question of how the migration and settlement of the Philistines may relate to general colonial processes that were outlined in [Chapter 2](#), including the summary table given at the end of that chapter.¹⁴⁴ It seems that the degree of cultural change from indigenous culture to invader culture can be classified as moderate, with a number of features of indigenous culture remaining in place. The relative composition of immigrants to indigenes seems to be roughly moderate, even when one cannot be sure of exact details.¹⁴⁵ Similarly, it is difficult to gauge the proportion of areas controlled by the immigrants in

separate social enclaves, but one would expect that this would quite likely reflect the relative composition of the immigrants to the indigenes, so a heuristic estimate of moderate will be used here. It is difficult to ascertain on the whole the extent of assimilation, expulsion and killing, and the rate of use of indigenous labour. However, in the ensuing decades and centuries, a distinct Philistine culture emerged that was neither Aegean nor Canaanite, with the first aspect already assumable if the migrants consisted of a mixture of peoples.¹⁴⁶ As for the final element in the table, the rate of change, it seems to be fast in the beginning but slowing down subsequently. This would be in line with the likelihood of the existence of initial violent processes that mostly turned into more peaceful and diffusionist ones later on.¹⁴⁷ The mix of the criteria as a whole would then indicate a moderate classification and thus a mixed mode of colonialism. In such cases, one would expect that “unintended” consequences might also feature, and this seems to be the case in Philistia, for example, in that the composition of the immigrants themselves was not planned, in line with an overall absence of a role by any central governments. And, of course, as new people were born, including with possible intermarriage between the immigrants and indigenes, new cultural permutations are likely to have resulted. One may also keep in mind that all societies can in any case attest internal innovation and change.

One may further consider that the available evidence indicates that the main migration took place in the twelfth century BCE, in the span of some two to three generations.¹⁴⁸ Accordingly, a metropolis existed for only a short time, and it was never a state-sponsored one. This state of affairs is roughly comparable to Middle Assyria that had a hold of the Jazira for only some 100 years. That hold was not sufficient to Assyrianise the area. In contrast, the territory was Assyrianised during the era of the neo-Assyrian empire, for which the time of control of the area was longer.¹⁴⁹ At the same time, one may also remember how extensive Egyptian control in Nubia for centuries was not enough to Egyptianise the area when such homogenisation had already taken place north of the first cataract in the early dynastic period. I already noted how especially differences in language between Egypt and Nubia seem to have been a key contributing factor in maintaining a distinction between them.¹⁵⁰

In the case of the Philistines, the incoming migrants simply did not attest enough social power to completely change the constitution of the area they migrated into, and that their original languages died out is in line with this. Altogether, then, one can summarise that the colonial mode seems to have been a very mixed one. If one then also considers that in settler colonialism, an initial invasion is followed by a prolonged process of eliminating the indigenous population,¹⁵¹ in this case, one may perhaps rather say that an initial invasion was followed by mutating the indigenous population, together

with the immigrants. In that, the case of Spanish South America is worth considering. Probably the most unexpected development there was the admixture of the Spanish and the indigenous Central and South Americans into latinos, from both a genetic and a cultural perspective.¹⁵² This can be seen in contrast to British-led colonisation of North America that was strongly settler colonial,¹⁵³ with little intermixing and with European culture being predominant.¹⁵⁴ But, with Philistia, one should also keep in mind that there was no metropolis that had control over the colony, in contrast to both Spanish Latin America and British North America. It is true that the United States gained its independence in the late eighteenth century, some 150 years after the initial settlement in New England, and the Latin American countries in the early nineteenth century, some 300 years after the initial Spanish invasions. However, in both cases, considerable ties to the previous metropolises nevertheless remained. With the Philistines, there were no political ties to a metropolis to start with, and it also appears that any other ties with the Aegean and the northern Levant were on the main severed after the main migration had taken place.¹⁵⁵

From a demographic perspective, much of the settlement in Philistia was focused on larger sites, with the countryside experiencing depopulation in the twelfth century BCE as was already indicated. The main sites did exhibit an urban character, even though it is also important to note that a number of aspects of urbanism are attested only from the eleventh century BCE.¹⁵⁶ Textual and archaeological evidence attest to the existence of five dominant centres in the area, Gaza, Gath, Ekron, Ashdod and Ashkelon, with the actual locations of those sites having been identified more or less conclusively.¹⁵⁷ Related texts in the Hebrew Bible clearly name them as leading sites.¹⁵⁸ Additional evidence comes from the Onomasticon of Amenemope, a document apparently composed in the late Twentieth Dynasty (late eleventh century BCE). The Onomasticon is a collection of words, titles and toponyms that are broadly grouped together by subject. Categories in the list include natural features, toponyms of Egypt and foreign lands, types of humans, titles and occupations, architecture, types of land and crops, and food and drink. As at least ten copies have been discovered on a variety of media, such as papyri, ostraca, a strip of leather and a writing board, it seems clear that the Onomasticon of Amenope was used as a standard school text.¹⁵⁹ Gaza, Ashkelon, and Ashdod are mentioned in the Onomasticon, and, interestingly, the Sherden, Tjekker and Peleset also feature just a few locations after Gaza.¹⁶⁰ Keeping in mind that Gaza served as headquarters of Egyptian administration in Canaan in the New Kingdom since the time of Thutmose III (fifteenth century BCE), with a military base located there,¹⁶¹ its listing in the Onomasticon in apparent association with the Sea Peoples is significant. It suggests that by this time

Egyptian control of Philistia had been more or less completely lost, certainly, no evidence for an Egyptian presence is attested in Canaan, and even Sinai, after the reign of Ramesses VII that ended by 1130 BCE.¹⁶² The Onomasticon, then, seems to suggest that Gaza, Ashkelon and Ashdod were Philistine towns at that time.¹⁶³ Related archaeological data from Gaza is as such not clear, much due to lack of excavation, and is thus not in opposition to the textual evidence.¹⁶⁴ On the whole, one should also note that Ashkelon and Gath were, in addition to Gaza, attested as significant towns already in the Late Bronze Age.¹⁶⁵

The texts of the Hebrew Bible in particular indicate that the five Philistine centres were both independent and could act in concert. On the whole, the idea is that as a result of the migration to Philistia, new entities were born that were both independent and exhibited a solidarity with each other. More widely, for example, the difference in material culture in northern Palestine would seem to suggest the possibility of migrants from differing areas at source concentrating in differing areas at destination. In the more modern world, for instance, it is well known that Scandinavian immigrants could concentrate in the areas of what are now Michigan and Minnesota. Or, a Welsh settler colony was established in Patagonia in 1865, well before Argentinian control of the area in the 1870s, and it was only in 1910s that it was fully controlled by and integrated into Argentina.¹⁶⁶ To what extent this is true of Philistia is less known. However, one can suspect that the population concentrations in this sense do not need to be assumed to have been homogeneous in the area; in fact, one would be surprised if they were, also in terms of the ratio of newcomers as against the indigenes in each location. While it may not be possible to be much more definitive in this respect, we already mentioned that the Sherden and Tjekker are mentioned in the Onomasticon of Amenope in connection with Gaza. Whatever the case, no central government that could have had an overall political control over the Philistines seems to have formed. All in all, each of the entities, somewhat different as they may have been in terms of their unique characteristics and subcultures, would have been likely to feel part of a common Philistine “new world”.¹⁶⁷

Ethnogenesis

At least in the initial phases of the settlement, clearly one can expect that the newcomers would have been distinguished and would also distinguish themselves from the indigenous locals. However, especially in the colonial

situation that was of a mixed nature, new identities could emerge, as was already indicated. If this is the case, an examination of the features of ethnicity can be a useful analytical tool. Even so, it is also possible that some cultural features are not direct results of colonialism but may be the result of cultural diffusion or innovation on the spot. On the whole, if new identities emerge to a sufficient degree, an ethnogenesis will have taken place.¹⁶⁸

In order to examine the potentiality of ethnogenesis in Philistia, it seems best to look at the variety of features that can be associated with ethnicity and to examine what changes could have taken place in relation to them in Philistia.¹⁶⁹ In this respect, one should first note that it can be difficult to reconstruct ancestral ties, historical memories, symbolic attachment to ancestral land and sense of solidarity from the archaeological record only.¹⁷⁰ Some textual information would be useful in the enterprise if that were available. The archaeological record can nevertheless also suggest certain plausibilities. As regards the first feature of ethnicity, a unique common name Philistia seems to be employed, especially based on the biblical record.¹⁷¹ While the name pertains to the area, the reference is also used as indicating group identity.¹⁷² In that case, clearly the designation is done by the outgroup, the Israelites. As already indicated, the Egyptian records, again written by an outgroup from the perspective of the Philistines, indicate the existence of the Peleset as a people group, starting from the time of Ramesses III. In addition, it appears that, amongst the ten or so known groups of Sea Peoples, the Sherden and Tjekker are associated with Philistia.¹⁷³ And, an Egyptian inscription from the Third Intermediate Period does speak of a “Padeset” who is “emissary of Canaan of the Philistines”.¹⁷⁴ It is reasonable to assume that the Philistines themselves could easily have used these designations as well, including in the context of subgroups within Philistia, even when other designations could also have been employed by them.¹⁷⁵ As no relevant textual evidence exists from the Philistines themselves, in line with the almost complete lack of textual evidence from them more widely, one cannot make more detailed conclusions. However, altogether, it seems clear that the Philistines did distinguish themselves from others by a common name or names.¹⁷⁶

In terms of the name Philistia and the resulting group designation, as discussed in the foregoing, there are good reasons for seeing the northern kingdom of Palistin as having been named based on the migrations of the Sea Peoples, and in this case one can highlight that the name clearly seems to be quoted by a representative of the area rather than a representative of an outgroup,¹⁷⁷ and this gives credence for the idea that the southern Philistines also identified themselves by the names of Philistia and Philistines. In addition, as no substantial migration of Aegeans is attested before 1200 BCE, it seems unlikely that the name of the two places would have been coined based on an

Aegean ethnonym before 1200 BCE. Here one can also note that the Hebrew Bible refers to Philistia in a context where events before 1200 BCE are portrayed as taking place;¹⁷⁸ however, one can think that the word was used based on the existence of the Philistines on the southwestern Levantine seacoast at the time when the events were put in writing rather than when the events were portrayed as taking place.¹⁷⁹ Altogether, it is plausible that the new name Philistia and the designation Philistines were a result of the migration of the Sea Peoples to the area in the twelfth century. In this, it would seem likely that the Peleset were a majority group among the migrants, considering that the name of the area was coined based on the name of their group, even at two locations in the Eastern Mediterranean at that.

As regards the second feature, common ancestry, it is possible that the Philistine entities saw themselves in terms of genealogies that described their descent in relation to the known surrounding world. This was certainly the case with the Israelites, who expressed their understanding of a common descent through the genealogies and stories in Genesis.¹⁸⁰ As for the Philistines, they may have had similar concepts, even if this cannot be directly verified. However, Finkelberg suggests that relationships with surrounding countries were built into genealogy in Greek tradition.¹⁸¹ Finkelberg further suggests that the extant Greek genealogies, even though dating from a late period, include reflections from the Bronze (Heroic) Age.¹⁸² In addition, it would seem clear that the Philistines would have traced their origins to the Aegean, but there may also be links to Anatolia and even Cyprus to some extent. One obviously cannot construct a possible genealogy for them due to lack of textual evidence. However, also considering the orientation of the era towards familial relationships,¹⁸³ one can think that it is at the minimum possible that they would have had such genealogies, at least in an oral form. Interestingly, a comparison with early modern Latin America suggests that founders in new places could also be considered as ethnic ancestors,¹⁸⁴ rather than particularly looking at an earlier time, and this could at least partly apply to any of the Philistine groups in their putative ethnogenesis.¹⁸⁵

As for the third feature, shared historical memories, based on both textual and archaeological evidence on the rise of the Philistines as arising from migration, it seems fair to claim that the Philistines would in their foundation stories trace their origins to Aegean, and possibly partly to Anatolia and Cyprus.¹⁸⁶ One may also note that, in the (later) Greek foundation stories, there was often an initial wave of settlement or exploration and then only later more extensive settlement,¹⁸⁷ with this feature having a possible parallel with the Aegeans knowing about the eastern Mediterranean based on their interactions with it in the preceding Bronze Age. If the Philistine society or societies considered themselves as new entities, as seems more than likely, then

a link with a story of migration as part of identity formation would be quite natural. A selection of historical events, such as, for example, battles with the Egyptians, would also be likely to enter the collective social memory of the Philistines. Altogether, it would be inconceivable that the Philistine society would not have a collective memory of some kind.

In terms of the fourth feature, elements of common culture, the archaeological record indicates a number of common features that trace themselves to the Aegean, Anatolia and Cyprus. Of course, these as such relate to material culture and are not uniformly attested at the sites, but their existence does attest to such accompanying customs as immigrant foodways, and those would have been contributing to the mix of the Philistine *metissage*. Also, for example, some of the narratives in Judges-Samuel, for example the David and Goliath story in 1 Samuel 17, clearly seem to attest Aegean-style features with the Philistines.¹⁸⁸ Or, the description of Samson as grinding for the Philistines as a punishment in Judges 16:21 is similar to a custom attested in Anatolia.¹⁸⁹

As regards the fifth feature, a link with a homeland, it mostly relates to diaspora peoples and seems thus less relevant with the Philistines, unless some of them saw themselves as refugees from their areas of origin. Nevertheless, some type of stories about the original homelands of the Philistines could easily have entered their traditions.

In terms of the sixth feature, a sense of solidarity, as indicated earlier, the five main centres of Philistia attested this characteristic. Such solidarity is likely to have extended to any of the differing groups migrating in. In this, the settler colonial concept of exogenous others can illuminate the situation. Especially in the beginning stages of the migration, once the Philistine societies would have been established, any new arrivals from the Aegean and the northern Levant would have been seen as exogenous others and integrated in the Philistine community. Of course, the Philistines already seem to have been a mixed entity at the initial stages of their arrival. People other than the Sea Peoples could at least potentially also have been accepted as exogenous others. Even if at a later stage when a fair bit of intermixing of the Philistines with the indigenes is likely to have taken place, David during his sojourn in Gath, as described in the Hebrew Bible, can be seen as an example of an exogenous other.¹⁹⁰ However, David's collaboration with the Philistines was only temporary and was also characterised by deceit on his part and ultimate mistrust towards him by the Philistines.¹⁹¹ In another sense, David's related actions can, of course, also be seen in the context of his being a political refugee who escaped to another society so as to evade capture by the then currently prevailing authorities (Saul). All in all, as the Hebrew Bible portrays things, it would seem that the Philistines would have seen David as a person

who might not stay loyal, whereas immigrants from the Aegean would have been likely to have been trusted more easily. The overall cultural similarity with the rest of the Israelites and an overall identification with them would have made it likely that David might return to the Israelites at any opportune time, as indeed proved out to be the case, whereas migrants from the Aegean would be more likely to identify more or less permanently with the Philistines, nor would they have had an easy route to escape and join a nearby society.

On the whole, then, there are good reasons to assume that a new ethnic identity or identities arose in Philistia along the lines sketched out here. For the Sea Peoples, Philistia presented a new world where new opportunities were available. Some of the reasons for their landing in Philistia may be result of their having heard of Philistia as a good destination for migration. However, their ending up in Philistia could also have been at least partly accidental. Once the Egyptians stopped the advance of the Sea Peoples towards Egypt and its at-least-perceived riches, it may have been that many of the migrants simply decided to stay in Philistia at the blocked end of the road that they had travelled. This may, then, be one reason, if not the main reason, why there were comparatively more migrants in Philistia than in other parts of the Levantine coast; and, linked with that, in contrast to the other locales, why the newly formed Philistine society managed to carry on beyond the end of Iron Age I when at least material traces of them were more or less extinguished at other locations.

E. Expansion and encounters with the Israelites

The documents contained within the Hebrew Bible, especially Judges 13–16, 1–2 Samuel and 1 Chronicles, include a considerable amount of material that potentially relates to the Philistines and their interaction with the ancient Israelites in Iron Age I–Early Iron Age II. Later affairs with the Philistines from an Israelite perspective are depicted especially in 1–2 Kings and 2 Chronicles. The bulk of the relevant data in relation to the earlier period, and really on the whole, is contained in 1–2 Samuel. The narratives of 1–2 Samuel are paralleled in 1 Chronicles, as are the narratives in 1–2 Kings in 2 Chronicles, even though the books of Chronicles exhibit their own distinctive features.¹⁹² The so-called Samson cycle in Judges 13–16 provides a piece of supplementary information in a folkloristic style in the overall context of the book of Judges. On the whole, the books of Samuel in particular have generally been seen as including

genuine historical material about the early monarchy, even when their final form has been considered to originate from a time centuries after the events they portray.¹⁹³ Accordingly, completely discounting these texts from consideration would mean the exclusion of a good amount of potential historical evidence.¹⁹⁴ It is better to take the texts into account, letting them speak for themselves but also approaching the comments made in them critically.¹⁹⁵ It is not necessary to resolve all issues that relate to the texts here; instead, some comments will be made on selected details in them as part of the analysis.

The biblical documents clearly indicate that the Philistines expanded from their initial base in Philistia. From a chronological perspective, the Philistines are first portrayed as dominating the Israelites in the eleventh century BCE. Their domination is first depicted in the Samson story in the book of Judges, with Samson portrayed as the last judge before the transition to the monarchy (Judges 13–16), even when the Philistines are already referred to as being a problem slightly before the time of Samson (Judges 10), and ostensibly even in the early period of Judges (Judges 3:31).¹⁹⁶ The domination continues till the time of Saul and David. The Israelites do manage at least initially to stem their advance during the time of Saul (1 Samuel 14); however, the two societies continue to be in conflict (1 Samuel 14:52). Saul himself is killed in battle with the Philistines (1 Samuel 31). It is left to David to defeat the Philistines, however, it is not clear based on the Hebrew Bible as to if and to what extent he might have dominated them in respect to the Philistine territories themselves.¹⁹⁷ The reference to David's son Solomon as having ruled from the Euphrates River to the land of the Philistines (1 Kings 4:21) is not entirely clear, either, in respect to whether the Philistines were actually included in his realm and whether they brought him tribute. In this connection, for example, that 2 Samuel 8 mentions that David set garrisons or prefects (*nšb̄ym*) at Damascus and in Edom (2 Samuel 8:6, 14)¹⁹⁸ but is only rather vague in regard to the Philistines is significant.¹⁹⁹ Also, that material culture at Gath did not change substantially at the time of David would suggest that any Israelite dominance over Gath was at most only political and probably more or less short-lived in the time of David (cf. 1 Chronicles 18:1).²⁰⁰ At the same time, the eleventh-century BCE expansion of urbanism in Philistia fits with the chronology of domination of Israelites by the Philistines.²⁰¹ Expansionism is often fuelled by increase in social power, and archaeology is in line with such an increase of social power in Philistia in the eleventh century BCE, in this case correlating with the biblical texts.

An interesting episode that relates to the initial domination by the Philistines is provided by the comment in 1 Samuel 13:19 that there were no blacksmiths in Israel because the Philistines had not allowed it. As the text

reports it, this was because the Philistines thought that the Israelites could use metal, presumably iron, for making weapons.²⁰² The situation can be compared with the modern nuclear proliferation treaty that seeks to limit nuclear weapons to those countries that are at the top level of the hierarchy of world societies.²⁰³ In that sense, the description is completely plausible. While there is no archaeological evidence to support what is said,²⁰⁴ as the texts do not indicate how long the Philistine embargo lasted, this could have been a fairly short time. Accordingly, one does not need to think that the state of affairs needs to show in the material record, with the overall trend clearly being towards ironworking at the time. The text actually seems more plausible in an Iron I context where the use of iron was still not very common; it would appear that it would have been difficult for the Philistines to enforce such a ban in a situation of widespread use of the metal. One may also here think of the apparent trade embargo by the Hittites against Ahhiyawa and Assyria mentioned in the foregoing.

The Hebrew Bible also indicates that the Philistines and Israelites were relatively demarcated from each other. When Samson, the protagonist of the folkloristic story in the book of Judges, wishes to marry a Philistine woman, his parents are against it (Judges 14:1–3). Nevertheless, the marriage was a possibility, even when the Philistines sought to subvert the situation (Judges 14:10–18), and as the story goes, this then led to further conflict (Judges 14:19–16:31). Also considering the account about David in Gath, one may ask to what extent there could have been a “middle ground” between the two societies where individuals could interact without any major conflicts.²⁰⁵ The texts of the Hebrew Bible portraying the eleventh and tenth centuries BCE do not seem to support the existence of such a middle ground, but instead concentrate on conflict.²⁰⁶ On its part, the apparent eschewing of intermarriage by both parties in the Samson story seems to attest to such a state of affairs, already based on the narrative world of the time portrayed, considering that the rate of intermarriage tends to be a mirror of closeness between societies.²⁰⁷ One should also consider the account about the Danites in Joshua 19:40–48 (cf. Judges 18) that indicates how the tribe of Dan was allotted land in the area that roughly coincided with the territory where the Philistines settled. This particular text indicates that the territory of the Danites was lost (יָסַף) to them. Clearly the text is compatible with the Philistine immigration as a result of which the Danites were not able to settle in the area. Instead, they then settled in the north (Joshua 19:47).²⁰⁸ The text could also be read as indicating that the Danites were not willing to settle in an area that they could not control, with the Philistines being too strong for them. In that connection, one could moreover read the text as implying that the Danites as a people identifying with the rest of the Israelites were not willing to intermix with the Philistines,

and this then attests to demarcation between the two societies.

On the whole, then, to what extent can one say that there was a colonial relationship between ancient Israel and Philistia in Iron Age I in the context of Philistine domination? A clue in this respect is provided by 1 Samuel 13:3 that states that there was a garrison or prefect (*nšyb*)²⁰⁹ at Gibeah that appears to have been located more or less in the heart of the Benjaminite territory.²¹⁰ This is also plausible as Saul and his son Jonathan were Benjaminites and the portrayed set of events in 1 Samuel 1–20 more or less take place in or around Benjamin and the central hill country.²¹¹ A garrison or prefect was also stationed in Bethlehem according to the Hebrew Bible (2 Samuel 23:14; 1 Chronicles 11:16).²¹² Considering parallels with empires, clearly the existence of Philistine garrisons or prefects well in the territory of another society indicates accompanying colonial domination by the Philistines. However, with apparent limited integration of the two societies, as attested by the apparent lack of intermarriage and dearth of migration of Philistines to Israel, it seems that, based on the descriptions in the Hebrew Bible, the colonial domination can be considered as having been on the franchise colonial end of the scale. Exactly what benefits the Philistines would have extracted from the Israelites is not stated, but considering the agrarian setting of the societies, taxation of the Israelites would seem to have been likely so as to support the Philistines.²¹³ At least part of the urban growth in Philistia could have been supported by such taxation. As with the book of Judges, the extent of the territory in ancient Israel that the Philistines dominated is not clear, especially towards the north that would not have been reached easily by the Philistines using the technologies of the day.²¹⁴ Altogether, the idea of colonial control of this type by the Philistines over ancient Israel as expressed in the Hebrew Bible seems an entirely plausible one.

F. Summing up the migrations of the Philistines and Sea Peoples

The migrations of the Sea Peoples were multifaceted. As one academic aptly summarises it, in places where the Sea Peoples settled,

there were new cultures and new populations to be interacted with, and a complex process of identity and cultural negotiation to be engaged in. However, while population shifts can be seen in the material record – including the movement of groups bearing elements of Aegean, Cypriot, and

Anatolian-style material cultures – it is unlikely that any “string of Sea Peoples polities [sprang] up in the Iron Age I along much of the Levantine and Asia Minor coasts” following the end of the Late Bronze Age. Instead, though newcomers are visible in the material record at some sites (but hardly all), the engagement with material influences and the negotiation of status and identity that took place across this massive area in this period were incredibly diverse in nature. Some areas seem to have gained access to new elements of foreign material culture, either via trade or the movement of peoples. Others coexisted with newcomers, some of whom bore with them Aegean-style material culture which has been variously connected to the Greek mainland, the [East Aegean-West Anatolian] Interface, and/or Cyprus.²¹⁵

Moreover,

At the other end of the spectrum, some of these Aegean-affiliated groups appear to have settled in relatively large numbers and created new polities, such as those on the southern coastal plain of Canaan that came to make up Philistia. Even within and across these, though, significant variance can be seen in the nature of both the intrusive material culture and the relationships with the indigenous population. Part of this is certainly due to the “mixed multitude” nature of what have been frequently referred to as the “Sea Peoples” as reflected in the material culture of sites in Cilicia, the ‘Amuq, and Philistia (and perhaps in areas of the coastal Levant between them), as well as the increasingly-recognized complexity of their migration.²¹⁶

The first option suggested by Emanuel seems more or less to correspond to trade and cross-cultural migration where the incomers were more or less integrated with the local populations. The second case would seem to indicate ethnic enclaves with perhaps a degree of autonomy by some of them. Perhaps a rough parallel can be made with the Old Assyrian merchants in Anatolia²¹⁷ or, in a more modern setting, for example Chinatowns. The third case then corresponds to a situation where the immigrants were able to gain political power. Even then, though, many of them could concentrate in ethnic enclaves that would, however, on average be likely to have been larger and more influential in comparison to the indigenous population *in situ*.²¹⁸ Identity and cultural negotiation would then occur in each of these cases. A key issue would be the relative power of the immigrants in comparison to the indigenes. This would find its correlation in relative numbers between the two groups; however, that would not be the only consideration, as political developments would also be significant. That is, in some cases even a smaller group can gain control of a larger one through apt political manoeuvring.²¹⁹ It appears that the

immigrants gained political power in two places, at Palistin in the north and at Philistia in the south. The Sea Peoples in northern Palestine are also a good candidate, even though the situation cannot be verified based on textual evidence and with the archaeological evidence also contested. The northern entity,²²⁰ however, seems to have lasted only till the end of Iron Age I, whereas the southern entity with its polities (the Pentapolis of Gaza, Gath, Ekron, Ashdod and Ashkelon) was able to carry on till the end of Iron Age II. It could well be that the number of immigrants was comparatively higher in the south than in the north; on the other hand, it is also possible that the northern neo-Hittite polities and peoples exhibited a cultural and political will and strength that the Sea People entity could not withstand for a sustained time. In the south, the Philistines in fact generated such strength that they were able to engage in colonial expansion. Their arrival is also remarkable in the sense that they were able to advance in a territory that was on the whole under Egyptian colonial control.²²¹ This, of course, also demonstrates the limits of the power of Egypt that then in reality also faded away in the area in the middle of the twelfth century BCE. It would not seem impossible that if the arrival of the Philistines and their setting up their polity cut off Egyptian communications and logistical routes on the southwestern Levantine coast, this would have diminished the ability of Egypt to control their Levantine empire, contributing to its collapse there.

Finally, one can take stock here of the question of pots versus peoples in more detail. It was already indicated that the material culture of the Sea Peoples was distinctive and the increase in the quantity of their pottery (and other material culture) quite sudden, with pottery locally made. This was a main reason why one can think of them as having migrated based on archaeological data. The textual record is, of course, clear about such migration already based on Egyptian evidence. At the same time, one may emphasise that it is not possible to be certain that every occurrence of a piece of material culture that derives from the Sea Peoples would necessarily have been used by a migrant or their descendant, and, conversely, at the minimum one cannot exclude the possibility that some people who were local might have liked the style and used it. The situation is then very similar to what was postulated in relation to the correlation of material culture in Middle Assyrian times that is distinctively Assyrian in the Jazira area in northern Mesopotamia. In Assyria, the existence of Assyrian administrative control is securely known based on administrative records.²²² Altogether, we can conclude that textual and archaeological evidence about the Philistines and the Sea Peoples provides a logical and consistent picture of migration. Such migration, together with issues that relate to colonialism, is also fully consistent with and could be elucidated further based on a social scientific approach to migration and

colonialism developed in this book.

G. Aftermath

Some further comments shall be made here on the later vicissitudes of the Sea Peoples. Most traces of them disappear from textual and archaeological record from the onset of Iron Age II (ca. 1000 BCE) on, except for Philistia. There after the time of Solomon, the books of Chronicles in particular indicate some successes by the Israelites against them, especially by the eighth-century BCE kings Uzziah and Hezekiah (2 Chronicles 14:14; 17:11; 26:6; 2 Kings 18:8). Conversely, the Philistines could also have some success against the Israelites (2 Chronicles 21:16–17; 28:18).²²³ That the Israelite texts really relate only to select episodes of real domination and that the Philistines would be able to mount raids into Israelite territory and even take towns into their possession would, however, suggest that there was no permanent Israelite domination over the Philistines. Instead, both entities existed side by side, with some conflicts and raiding and destruction of property, and resulting apparently minor shifts of border. The picture of overall interactions between Philistia and Israel in Iron Age II seems broadly similar to that of England and France from the fourteenth century CE on, for example.²²⁴ Altogether, what is said by the ancient Israelite documents is plausible in this sense, even when the books of Chronicles in particular are not always given credit for their historical portrayals.

The expanding Assyrian empire reached Philistia in the eighth century BCE. Tiglath-Pileser III records how he received tribute from Mitinti of Ashkelon and Hanno of Gaza.²²⁵ Mitinti, however, seems to have been less than loyal and dethroned in favour of his son.²²⁶ Sargon II, the successor of Tiglath-Pileser III after a short reign by Shalmaneser V, also campaigned in the southern Levant. He reports that he defeated Hanno, king of Gaza, and captured him.²²⁷ He deposes Azuri, the king of Ashdod, and installs his younger brother Ahimiti as king of Ashdod.²²⁸ The locals, however, elevate Iamani as the king of Ashdod, but he is reported as fleeing from the approaching Assyrian army, and Sargon II then installs an Assyrian governor over the polity.²²⁹ In the process, Gath is also conquered.²³⁰ The next king, Sennacherib, states that he deports the then king Sidqia and his family from Ashkelon and installs a former king in his place. Sennacherib also restores on the throne of Ekron a pro-Assyrian king, Padi, who had been deposed by the people of Ekron, punishing those supporting the alternative king.²³¹ The overall

picture clearly seems to indicate that the Assyrians were content to simply rule over Philistia without deporting any significant populations, as no reference to deportations are made in regard to them and, on the other hand, taxes (tribute) are referred to.²³² In the context of the discussion in this book, clearly the Assyrian actions can be seen in the context of franchise colonialism. Archaeological evidence also attests to continuity of material culture in Philistia at the time, with some Assyrian influences.²³³

It was only at the onset of the Babylonian empire that the Philistines were destroyed. The Philistines were conquered and sent to exile. And yet, they were not completely destroyed. There seems to be some evidence of Philistine occupation that continued, albeit on a vastly reduced scale, at Ekron and Ashdod.²³⁴ The Philistines fell victims to a neo-Babylonian policy of homogenising their empire through population transfers.

Notes

- 1 Cf. Yasur-Landau 2010:43–44.
- 2 See Cline 2014:74–79. Yasur-Landau 2010:43 notes that there are four extant shipwrecks from the end of the fourteenth century BCE to the end of the thirteenth century BCE.
- 3 Cline 2014:74.
- 4 See Yasur-Landau 2010:44–48.
- 5 See Yasur-Landau 2010:48–50.
- 6 See comments, Chapter 3. Troop movement would undoubtedly be as such achievable via land through the north; however, even then, there would be somewhat of a detour and one would have to be able to cross the Strait of Bosphorus anyway, and one may keep in mind that the palatial states were concentrated on or around the Peloponnese.
- 7 Cline 2014:128, quoting Middleton 2010:14–15.
- 8 Cline 2014:128, referring to Middleton 2010 (apparently p. 15).
- 9 See Cline 2014:129–131 for Pylos and Mycenae, concluding that one cannot be sure of the causes of fire in these cases.
- 10 See Cline 2014:129–131.
- 11 See Cline 2014:131–132.
- 12 See Cline 2014:141.

- 13 Yasur-Landau 2010:60–83.
- 14 See Yasur-Landau 2010:81–82.
- 15 Yasur-Landau 2010:81.
- 16 See Yasur-Landau 2010:83–95.
- 17 See Cline 2014:147–149.
- 18 See Cline 2014:142–147.
- 19 See Liverani 2014:318; cf. Singer 2011:664.
- 20 See Cline 2014:144–145; Liverani 2014:318.
- 21 More on this ahead.
- 22 Cf. Pedersén 1998.
- 23 Ugarit, with its alphabetic cuneiform, is a notable exception.
- 24 This is not to suggest that governance without writing is impossible (cf. e.g. the examples given in Diamond 2011/2005), but it would be expected to be much harder than with writing available as a tool.
- 25 See Finkelberg 2005:7, 109–143.
- 26 See Finkelberg 2005:145–146. We already noted this issue in relation to early New Kingdom Egypt in Canaan; see Chapter 3 note 65. But, cf. e.g. Middleton 2010 (esp. pp. 41–45) for more sceptical views about invasions and migrations as causes for the Mycenaean palatial collapse. (Cf. also *ibid.*, 68–91 for his views on postpalatial migrations, generally from a perspective that seems to be classifiable as at the minimum relatively antimigrationist.)
- 27 The initial stages of the US attack on Iraq in the early 2000s serves as a modern example of this.
- 28 See Lenski 2005:153.
- 29 Cf. Lenski 2005:156 and comments made in the foregoing on ancient states controlling the movement of peoples.
- 30 Cf. the foregoing.
- 31 See Finkelberg 2005:143–149. I will not attempt to address why the Dorians might have invaded. However, Finkelberg does suggest that a massive wall was built across the isthmus north of the Peloponnese before the time of the Mycenaean collapse. For one thing, perhaps the material resources that Peloponnese and the Mycenaean palatial world possessed could have attracted potential invaders. In any case, invasions clearly are a not

infrequent feature of human societal interaction.

- 32 Cf. the First World War that, cataclysmic as it was in many ways, did not by any means disrupt the overall civilizational outlook of Europe even when it did effect some considerable changes there.
- 33 One may perhaps nevertheless be somewhat cautious as to how quickly Linear B scribal activity died out in the area, but, in any case, if there was a degree of prolongment, accidents of survival have not allowed to obtain knowledge about the matter.
- 34 See Yasur-Landau 2010:97–102 specifically for the Philistines; cf. *idem.*, 30–32 more generally. Note, however, the criticisms of the push-pull model expressed in Har-zig, Hoerder and Gabaccia 2009:53, 62–64; cf. also Belich 2009:128–133. Basically “push” is about what makes people go out at the source, and “pull” is what attracts people (or is perceived to attract) by the destination.
- 35 Note that the removal of restrictions does not fit either “push” or “pull”.
- 36 I shall not try to elaborate here on other possible directions of migration from the Aegean, but at least in principle, they should not be excluded, if not expected; cf. some minimal comments in the following.
- 37 Cf. also the “booster literature” and boosterism more widely in Belich 2009:147–148, 153–156, 184, 203.
- 38 Cf. Belich 2009:132–133 for a later time.
- 39 See Yasur-Landau 2010:102–113. Yasur-Landau notes the importance of rowers, tallying with the Rower Tablets and contemporary pictorial representations (cf. also *idem.*, 44–50 and related comments in the foregoing).
- 40 See Yasur-Landau 2010:114–120.
- 41 Thus Yasur-Landau 2010:116–118.
- 42 Cf. Yasur-Landau 2010:118.
- 43 See Cline 2014:149–152.
- 44 See Cline 2014:71, 98.
- 45 See TLCANE 1:602–603 for the text, and TLCANE 2:60–61 for a commentary. Note also the erasure of the king of Ahhiyawa from the tablet in question (see *ibid.* and Beckman, Bryce and Cline 2011:60–61); see also Beckman, Bryce and Cline 2011:62–63 who on their part read/restore Ahhiyawa for the passage in question. Moreover, see Yasur-Landau

2010:42–43. The treaty otherwise directly categorises the king of Assyria as an enemy and prohibits merchants of Amurru from going to Assyria and Assyrian merchants from coming to Amurru; see TLCANE 1:602–603; Beckman, Bryce and Cline 2011:60–61, 68.

46 See Cline 2014:70–71. Cf. also the comments in Cline 2009:24–30 on trade between the Aegean and Mesopotamia; it seems to have been comparatively limited during the Late Bronze Age.

47 See Cline 2014:99–100; cf. Singer 2011:671.

48 See Cline 2014:132–135.

49 Yasur-Landau 2010:142–153. The identification of handmade burnished ware with Aegean migration should, however, be considered as tentative; see *ibid.*, 147–149 for details.

50 See Cline 2014:134–135; Yasur-Landau 2010:150.

51 See the following for more on the composition of the migrants, especially in Philistia.

52 See Yasur-Landau 2010:156–158.

53 See Yasur-Landau 2010:159–160.

54 Yasur-Landau 2010:160.

55 See Yasur-Landau 2010:160–161. Yasur-Landau 2010:158–159 also points out how there is little evidence of trading contacts from the Aegean in Tarsus. Janeway 2013:301–302 notes the same for the adjacent Amuq area. Both fit with the idea that the Hittite empire was more or less isolated from the Ahhiyawans in terms of trade (cf. comments in the foregoing).

56 See Yasur-Landau 2010:161–162.

57 See Janeway 2013: esp. 298–299; Emanuel 2015.

58 See Emanuel 2015:17–18.

59 See Bryce 2012:128–129; cf. Hawkins 2011:38, 41, the foremost expert on the hieroglyphic Luwian inscriptions, who falls on the eleventh-century side.

60 Hawkins 2011:45.

61 See Hawkins 2011:41.

62 See Hawkins 2011:41; Bryce 2012:129.

63 See Hawkins 2011:51–52; Bryce 2012:129.

64 See Bryce 2012:129.

- 65 See Bryce 2012:129; CHLI:365–367.
- 66 Cf. Whincop 2008: Vol. 1:94.
- 67 Cf. discussion about hegemony in the foregoing.
- 68 Cf. Hawkins 2011:52; cf. Bryce 2012:130.
- 69 Cf. Yasur-Landau 2010:163.
- 70 See Yasur-Landau 2010:165–166.
- 71 See Yasur-Landau 2010:166.
- 72 See Yasur-Landau 2010:167.
- 73 See Yasur-Landau 2010:168–169. For further comments on Phoenicia, see Chapter 7.
- 74 See Stern 2013, with a summary in *ibid.*, 63.
- 75 See Stern 2013:63.
- 76 Stern 2013:63.
- 77 Stern 2013:64.
- 78 See Stern 2013: esp. 14, 63.
- 79 See Yasur-Landau 2010:170–171; Sharon and Gilboa 2013.
- 80 On the location(s) of the battles, cf. Hoffmeier 2018.
- 81 See just ahead.
- 82 Or, Amurru.
- 83 ANET:262; cf. ARE IV:37–38; text in KRI V:39–40; transliteration and translation in Peden 1994:28, 29.
- 84 ANET:262; cf. ARE IV:38; text in KRI V:40; transliteration and translation in Peden 1994:30, 31.
- 85 ANET:262; cf. ARE IV:201; transliteration and translation in Peden 1994:214, 215; also Morris 2005:731.
- 86 See Yasur-Landau 2010:174, but cf. also Hoffmeier 2018.
- 87 See Yasur-Landau 2010:174–175.
- 88 See Morris 2005:696, but note the comments in Yasur-Landau 2010:118–119 that offer some potential qualifications.
- 89 See e.g. Redford 1992:250–253; Yasur-Landau 2010:180–186.
- 90 See Adams and Cohen 2013.

- 91 See Yasur-Landau 2010:180.
- 92 See Bryce 2009:712. Also cf. the comments on Dor in the previous section, however keeping in mind that the historical value of the Tale of Wenamun is not clear.
- 93 See Bryce 2009:638–639.
- 94 See Bryce 2009:191.
- 95 See Bryce 2009:764.
- 96 See Bryce 2009:424 for a summary.
- 97 Cf. Bryce 2009:633–634.
- 98 See Bryce 2009:218–219.
- 99 See Bryce 2009:700. Bryce notes a connection with Taruisa found in the Hittite texts in the region of the Troad as one possible option.
- 100 See Bryce 2009:368–369.
- 101 See Morris 2005:359–360, 617.
- 102 Cf. Yasur-Landau 2010:192–193.
- 103 Even if it might have appeared as such for Ramesses III, at least in some respects.
- 104 Cf. present Hispanic migration to the United States. Note that Egyptian texts from the time of Merneptah indicate that famine was a reason for Libyans trying to enter Egypt (see Morris 2005:618: “According to the Egyptians, the Libyans had entered the Delta in order to ‘seek the necessities of their mouths’ [KRI IV, 4: 15] and once in the Delta had spent ‘their time roaming the land, fighting to fill their stomachs daily’ [KRI IV, 4: 14–15]”); cf. also comments in the following on Libyans.
- 105 Cf. Yasur-Landau 2010:102–104 for the possible routes. Cf. also the comments on especially the northern Palestinian sea people in the foregoing.
- 106 Similarly Morris 2005:618.
- 107 See ARE IV:24–25, in reference to the soul of Peleset and Tekel coming as warriors, despite the objections expressed in Brug 2010:11–12.
- 108 See Morris 2005:379–381, 616–618; ARE III:243.
- 109 Bryce 2012:55; cf. Whincop 2008:22–24, 66, 120–123.
- 110 Cf. also the depictions in Numbers 1–2 in the biblical materials.
- 111 Cf. the depictions in Numbers 20:14–21; Deuteronomy 2:24–3:10.

- 112 Cf. Morgan 2007:69–71 in relation to the Mongol invasions.
- 113 Cline 2014:3 reads as Amurru.
- 114 See Morris 2005:731–732. The reference is to Papyrus Harris I, 77: 3–6.
- 115 Morris 2005:732–733.
- 116 See Morris 2005:700.
- 117 Cf. Morris 2005:761; cf. Morris 2018:214–216.
- 118 See Morris 2005:699; cf. *ibid.*, 734–735.
- 119 Cf. Morris 2005:473 and the foregoing, Chapter 3.
- 120 See Morris 2005:699, 740; cf. *ibid.*, 705.
- 121 See Yasur-Landau 2010:2 who states Bliss’s and Macalister’s finds at Gath in 1899 as the starting point, and see e.g. *ibid.*, 216–281; Faust 2015 for further details of a variety of aspects of that material culture, including the famous monochrome and bichrome pottery styles of Iron Age I, cooking installations, kilns, loom weights and influences in building styles.
- 122 For further discussion on the demise of the entities established by the Sea Peoples, see the following.
- 123 See the foregoing, Chapter 3.
- 124 See Tenu 2015:79 and the foregoing, Chapter 3.
- 125 See Morris 2018:149–154; cf. Chapter 3.
- 126 Cf. the founder rank enhancement, as noted in Bellwood 2013:14–15; more on that ahead.
- 127 See e.g. Barako 2013:41; Killebrew 2005:208.
- 128 Killebrew 2005:209 (references to secondary literature and an accompanying figure omitted in the quotation). Note also the comments on monumental building in Philistine style at Ekron in Stone 1995:19.
- 129 See e.g. Yasur-Landau 2010: 284–285.
- 130 Cf. above.
- 131 On the Caribbean, See Bakewell 2010:109–125; cf. Stannard 1992; on the Mongols, see Morgan 2007:64–72, already partly referred to above.
- 132 See Deuteronomy 2:23. It seems reasonable to assume that the Sea Peoples were called collectively as Caphtorites in the Hebrew Bible, even when their origin was not strictly speaking Caphtor which seems to refer to Crete (cf. Bryce 2009:552–553). One may compare the designation of North

Americans as Indians in this respect.

133 See Yasur-Landau 2010:312.

134 Yasur-Landau 2010:312.

135 See Yasur-Landau 2010:309.

136 See Maeir 2012:368–370.

137 See esp. 1 Samuel 17.

138 See Maeir 2012:368–370.

139 See Maeir 2013:220, 224.

140 Ehret 2011:94.

141 Ehret 2011:94.

142 For further discussion on the relations between Israel and Philistia, see the following.

143 See Sommerfeld 1995: esp. 925–926; cf. also comments on the Kassites in the foregoing, Chapter 3.

144 See Table 2.2, p. 60.

145 See Yasur-Landau 2010:294–295. Stone 1995:22–23 notes how Mazar has suggested a low and Stager a high proportion.

146 More on this issue ahead.

147 See below for more comments on this issue.

148 Cf. the summary in Yasur-Landau 2010:337–338.

149 Cf. the foregoing, Chapter 3.

150 See above, Chapter 3.

151 See above, Chapter 2.

152 See Bakewell 2010: esp. 223–224, 324, 326. Bakewell (2010:224) notes the categories of *mestizos*, mulattoes, *zambos* and in time other intermediate *castas*.

153 Cf. Table 2.2 in Chapter 2.

154 See Belich 2009; Hixson 2013.

155 Cf. Ben-Shlomo 2010 that on its part shows how iconography attests to acculturation of the Philistines in terms of material culture, even when the Iron Age II period shows some continuity with Iron Age I as well. At the same time, influences from the Aegean and Anatolian from Iron Age II do

not seem evident, at least from the perspective of material remains.

156 See the discussion in Yasur-Landau 2010:282–294.

157 See Yasur-Landau 2010:282–283.

158 See esp. 1 Samuel 6:17. More on the evidence in the Hebrew Bible on the whole ahead.

159 See Morris 2005:735.

160 See Morris 2005:738–739.

161 See Morris 2005:55 and *passim*.

162 Cf. Morris 2005:738.

163 Thus Morris 2005:738–739.

164 Cf. Morris 2005:527, 737; Yasur-Landau 2010:286.

165 See Yasur-Landau 2010:283.

166 Veracini 2010:68.

167 However, cf. Niemann 2013:254 on plausible competition between these entities, even though this would ultimately not be a problem for the analysis here.

168 This section based on and adapted from Pitkänen 2014b:255–258.

169 Cf. the discussion in Chapter 2, including the list by Hutchinson and Smith in Section B, p. 33.

170 Cf. comments in Pitkänen 2004; Kletter 2006:573–580.

171 Even if the name Philistia may not have been entirely unique in a wider context, cf. the kingdom of Taita of Palastin/Palistin in the north, as discussed in the foregoing.

172 See e.g. 1 Samuel 4:1; 5:1; 6:1, etc.

173 Cf. the foregoing.

174 See Emanuel 2015:23, also referring to Singer.

175 Cf. Suomi vs Finland and Hanguk vs Korea in the modern world; cf. also Deuteronomy 2:20.

176 On the whole, can one really assume that a group, especially a larger one, would not have a name for itself?

177 Cf. also e.g. Singer 2012 on Palastin/Palistin in the north.

178 See esp. Genesis 26.

- 179 For more on the biblical documents, see also Chapter 5.
- 180 For further details on this, see Chapter 5.
- 181 See Finkelberg 2005:24–41.
- 182 Finkelberg 2005:24–41.
- 183 Cf. Schloen 2001 and the discussion in Chapter 2.
- 184 See Bilby 1996.
- 185 Cf. also the concept of founder rank enhancement in Bellwood in Bellwood 2013:14–15 and related discussion in the foregoing, including Chapter 2.
- 186 Cf. also Weinfeld 1993:2–9 which suggests comparable founder/migration traditions (note also grave traditions in Weinfeld 1993:14–15) in (later) Greek and Roman realms.
- 187 Weinfeld 1993:6–9.
- 188 See e.g. Stager 2006:381; Yasur-Landau 2012:557n31; Singer 2013:20.
- 189 See Collins 2007:123. Note also the potential set of loanwords in biblical Hebrew, possibly also in regard to some proper names in ancient Israel, as discussed in Niesiołowski-Spanò 2016:180–240 (general loanwords), 244–248 (proper names), 258–259 (summary table).
- 190 See 1 Samuel 21:10–15; 27:1–7.
- 191 See 1 Samuel 27:8–12; 29:1–11.
- 192 See Chapter 5 in the following for further comments on Chronicles.
- 193 Cf. e.g. Halpern 2001:131–132; for further comments and nuancing around this issue, see Chapter 5.
- 194 Cf. e.g. Halpern 2001:74–75.
- 195 For further comments on the nature of these documents, see Chapter 5.
- 196 The reference to Shamgar in Judges 3:31 is somewhat enigmatic (cf. Niesiołowski-Spanò 2016:101), and I would consider that this short passage could be somewhat displaced chronologically in the book. That the passage starts with *wʿhryw* (“after him”) could suggest that it refers to a time later than the early period of the Israelite settlement when the Philistines may not yet have been in the land (cf. comments in Chapter 5 on the chronology of the ancient Israelite settlement). Or, the reference to the Philistines could be anachronistic, based on geography (cf. e.g. the references to the Philistines in the book of Genesis, e.g. Genesis 26:1; cf. ahead). Cf. also comments in e.g. Block 199:172–175; Sasson 2014:242–245.

- 197 For further comments on this issue, see ahead.
- 198 It is difficult to be sure whether *nšyb* means garrison or prefect, either meaning is possible (see Klein 1983:91, 125). Klein sides on the meaning of garrison for these passages (*ibid.*, 91).
- 199 Cf. e.g. comments in Halpern 2001: esp. 144–159, on these issues.
- 200 Cf. Maeir 2012:380–385.
- 201 Cf. comments in the foregoing.
- 202 Niesiołowski-Spanò 2016:108 astutely highlights that iron is not mentioned directly in 1 Samuel 13:19–23.
- 203 Cf. Hardt and Negri 2000:309–311; cf. the following, Chapter 8.
- 204 See comments in Maeir 2012:367 on the lack of archaeological evidence.
- 205 Cf. White 2011/1991.
- 206 The existence of mercenaries with David that included the Philistines (2 Samuel 8:18; 15:18; cf. Niesiołowski-Spanò 2016:115–116; Dietrich 2012:79n3; Singer 2013:20n2) can be compared with Egyptian practice of using Sea Peoples as mercenaries (cf. Chapter 3 in the foregoing), even when the employment of mercenaries by David may have been on a voluntary basis (cf. 1 Samuel 22:2).
- 207 Cf. Horowitz 2000/1985:61; more on the issue of intermarriage in Chapter 5.
- 208 More on this in Chapter 5.
- 209 As just indicated in the foregoing, it is difficult to be sure whether *nšyb* means garrison or prefect, either meaning is possible (see Klein 1983:91, 125). Here context seems to favour the meaning prefect as it seems odd how a single person could strike a garrison, however, it could also be that the victory was attributed to Jonathan who commanded a band of troops with him (It seems that the victory is then attributed more widely to his father Saul in the next verse [13:4]).
- 210 Hebrew (MT) of 1 Samuel 13:3 reads Geba, however, 1 Samuel 10:5 indicates that there is a garrison or prefect (*nšyb*) in Gibeah. Greek (LXX) indicates Gibeah for 1 Samuel 13:3 (cf. Klein 1983:91), however, the two towns are in any case located within Benjaminite territory (cf. Joshua 18:24; Judges 19:14) which itself is relatively compact.
- 211 Cf. also Joshua 18:24.
- 212 Cf. Singer 2013:25. In this case the word *mšb* is used in 2 Samuel 23:14 but *nšyb* in 1 Chronicles 11:16.

- 213 Cf. 2 Samuel 8:6 where a relationship between garrisons or prefects (*nšyb*) and taxes (*mnḥh*) is expressed in the context of Israelite control of Aram.
- 214 More on relationships between the Israelite areas is in Chapter 5.
- 215 Emanuel 2015:22. The quote within the quote is from B. Sass, 'Four Notes on Taita King of Palistin with an Excursus on King Solomon's Empire', *Tel Aviv* 37 (2010), 169–174 (171). I have added [East Aegean-West Anatolian] for clarity.
- 216 Emanuel 2015:22–23.
- 217 On those merchant colonies, see e.g. Aubet 2013/2007: esp. 267–363. A clear difference, however, is that the Old Assyrian merchants were directly connected with the Old Assyrian kingdom, but the Sea Peoples appear to have lost all political contact with their source.
- 218 In addition, the case of forced migration by Egyptians that was experienced by some of them should be added to the tally.
- 219 Cf. Mann's P in his IEMP; cf. further the foregoing, Chapter 2. Cf. also the case of the Kassites, and possibly Mittani as discussed in the foregoing, esp. Chapter 3.
- 220 In principle it could have been composed of more than one polity, especially before the time of Taita (cf. the five polities of the southern Philistines).
- 221 Cf. the map of Egyptian military bases in Canaan during the 20th century in Morris 2005:717.
- 222 Cf. the foregoing, Chapter 3.
- 223 Cf. Brug 2010:3.
- 224 Cf. White 2011/1991 from this perspective; cf. also e.g. Gosden 2004.
- 225 See ANET:282, 283.
- 226 See ANET:283.
- 227 ANET:285
- 228 ANET:286.
- 229 ANET:285, 286. Iamani is described as fleeing to Meluhha (Ethiopia), but the Ethiopians return him to Sargon in Assyria according to the text.
- 230 ANET:286.
- 231 ANET:287–288.
- 232 See ANET:291, 294 on tribute.

[233](#) See Stone 1995:20–22, 25.

[234](#) See Stone 1995:25; cf. Faust 2012:31 that is more pessimistic on continued occupation at these sites.

A Genesis 1-11, *Primeval History* of the world as background for the history of Israel

B1 Genesis 12-50, *The patriarchs* Abraham, Isaac, Jacob and Joseph. The promise of the land of Canaan to the patriarchs (to Abraham first in Genesis 12), circumcision (Gen 17), Jacob removes foreign gods at Shechem (Gen 35), move to Egypt with Joseph (Gen 37ff), burial of Jacob in Canaan (Gen 49:29-50:14), death of Joseph in Egypt (Gen 50:22-26).

B2 Exodus 1-12, *The exodus from Egypt*. Moses's divine encounter for rescuing the Israelites (Ex 3), the plagues and leaving Egypt (Ex 7-12), Passover (Ex 12:1-30) and Circumcision (Ex 12:43-48)

B3 Exodus 13-15, *Miraculous crossing of the Sea of Reeds* into the wilderness

B4 Exodus 16-18, *Wilderness* before arriving at Mount Sinai. The miracles of manna and quails as provision for food (Ex 16) and water from the rock (Ex 17:1-7)

B5 Exodus 19-24, *Covenant at Mount Sinai*, initial covenant stipulations

B6 Exodus 25-31, *Instructions for building the tabernacle* (a tent sanctuary) as a place where Yahweh dwells

B7 Exodus 32, The idol of the golden calf and *breaking of the covenant* by the Israelites

B8 Exodus 33, *Yahweh's presence* reaffirmed

B7' Exodus 34, *Renewal of the covenant*, additional covenant stipulations

B6' Exodus 35-40, *The building of the tabernacle* (tent sanctuary) and its initiation

B5' Leviticus 1-Numbers 10:10, *Further legal stipulations* in relation to the covenant

B4' Numbers 10:11 - 36, *Wilderness* after leaving Mount Sinai, *death of the first generation* due to rebellion. The miracles of manna and quails (Num 11) and water from the rock (Num 20)

B4' Deuteronomy 1-34, *Renewal of covenant for the second generation and further legal stipulations*. Installation of Joshua as the new leader of the Israelites (Dt 31:1-8) and the death of Moses (Dt 34)

B3' Joshua 1-4 *Preparations for the conquest* (Josh 1-2) and *miraculous crossing of the river Jordan* into the land of Canaan (Josh 3-4)

B2' Joshua 5-12 *initial conquest/invasion* (Josh 6-12) that begins with Jericho (Josh 6) and Ai (Josh 7-8). Circumcision (Josh 5:1-8), celebrating Passover (Josh 5:10-11), ceasing of manna as food (Josh 5:12), Joshua's divine encounter for war (Josh 5:13-15)

B1' Joshua 13-24, *Settlement of the land* as fulfilment of the promise to the patriarchs. Division of land (Josh 13-21), covenant renewed and foreign gods relinquished at Shechem (Josh 24) and the bones of Joseph buried in the promised land (Josh 24:32), Joshua dies and is buried (Josh 24:29-30). *Restoration of creation by setting up the tabernacle at Shiloh*, Josh 18:1 [A]

5 Ancient Israel

A. Sources and interpretation on the period

On the face of it, the books of Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, Deuteronomy, Joshua, Judges and 1–2 Samuel provide textual information about ancient Israel in the Late Bronze and Early Iron Ages. To these books can be added 1 Chronicles and Ruth. Then, 1–2 Kings and 2 Chronicles outline the history of ancient Israel after the time of David till the end of Iron Age II.

In the overall storyline presented by the ancient Israelite documents, the book of Genesis as a kind of prologue to the history of ancient Israel starts from the creation of the world. The origins not only of culture, but also of humans, are discussed. Then, after a cataclysmic flood, Yahweh, the god of the Israelites, tells a man called Abraham who lives in Mesopotamia to migrate to the land of Canaan and promises this land to him and his descendants. A famine causes Abraham's descendants to move to Egypt. In the book of Exodus, those descendants have become numerous; at the same time, they have fallen into slavery in Egypt. Yahweh however appears to Moses in a revelation and tells him to lead the Israelites out of Egypt to the land of Canaan that Yahweh had already promised to give to their forefather Abraham. Helped with plagues that Yahweh sends on Egypt, the Israelites leave Egypt and congregate at Mount Horeb, where Yahweh appears to them and, as also described in the book of Leviticus and Numbers, gives them laws that are to act as a foundation of their new society that is to be established in Canaan. Departing from Sinai, the book of Numbers describes how the people traverse through the desert towards Canaan, encountering some difficulties along the way. The book of Deuteronomy ends with Moses making a final sermon in the land of Moab at the edge of the promised land, providing further laws for the Israelites to keep in the new land. The book of Joshua continues the story and describes how the Israelites conquer and settle the land after the death of Moses, essentially fulfilling the divine promises. The book of Judges describes how the Israelites after the death of Joshua forsake Yahweh and as a result run into difficulties. They are oppressed by the surrounding peoples; however, Yahweh raises judges who deliver them from the oppressions. The books of Samuel describe how the Israelite society that had till then consisted of more or less independent tribes acting in solidarity gravitates towards kingship. The rule of the first king Saul does not prove to be lasting, but another person, David, rises to kingship in his stead. Yahweh promises a permanent dynasty for David, and his son Solomon succeeds him. The book of Ruth, quite independently from any wider sociopolitical developments, provides a family story from the period, but nevertheless with royal overtones as the main characters portrayed are ancestors of David.

This biblical storyline is included in the canonical collection of the Hebrew Bible, or the Old Testament for Christian communities. As was already indicated,² the texts were transmitted through history without a break. The

reception history was greatly bolstered by the adoption of Christianity as the official religion of the Roman empire in the fourth century CE and the resulting Christendom in Europe. Through European colonialism, knowledge about the Bible spread throughout the world. Also considering such further developments as post-Christendom in the West and the creation of the state of Israel, the readings of the biblical documents can be diverse in terms of their religious and political appropriations. That the documents do present an overall picture with, at least on the face of it, some fair amount of detail on ancient Israel in the late second millennium BCE at least arguably remains quite unique even in the context of contemporary study of the ancient Near East.

In terms of academics, modern study of the biblical documents began in the wake of the enlightenment. Pentateuchal studies are at the heart of the academic study of the Hebrew Bible, and, as just indicated, the Pentateuch (Genesis-Deuteronomy, or Torah in the Jewish tradition)³ as such also directly relates to the history of ancient Israel in the late second millennium BCE. Developments in Pentateuchal scholarship are accordingly of crucial significance for appropriating and evaluating the history of ancient Israel in the period in question here.⁴ Before the Enlightenment and the rise of biblical criticism, the Pentateuch was traditionally considered to be the work of Moses, with perhaps some discussion about how he could have written the account of his death in Deuteronomy 34. This view came to be shattered by the rise of Old Testament and Pentateuchal criticism. The first stage of that criticism was to divide the Pentateuch into sources. This is generally attributed to the French physician Jean Astruc in the eighteenth century, who detected separate sources in Genesis based on a distinction between the names Yahweh and Elohim in the Hebrew original. Soon the Pentateuch was divided into four sources of Yahwist (J; Ger. Jahwist), Elohist (E), Deuteronomy (D) and Priestly source (P). J and E are narrative sources, P consists of ostensibly priestly legal materials and narratives in a specific priestly style, and D essentially of the book of Deuteronomy. These divisions still broadly hold in today's scholarship, except that a so-called Holiness Code (H) that is concentrated in Leviticus 17–26 was identified within P in the mid-nineteenth century.

With Martin Lebrecht de Wette's 1805 dissertation,⁵ Deuteronomy came to be associated with Josiah's reform (2 Kings 22) and was accordingly dated to the seventh century BCE. The book was seen as a pious forgery by priests to support, and perhaps even drive, that reform. This can be considered as marking a second stage in the development of Old Testament criticism.

The third stage, a crucially important development, can be associated with Julius Wellhausen's monumental work *Prolegomena to the History of Israel* (*Prolegomena zur Geschichte Israel*), first published in 1878.⁶ What was important about this work was that, in contrast to dating the priestly materials

of the Pentateuch to an early time as had been the case previously, Wellhausen considered P as being the latest source. In this, he drew from the work of his predecessor and colleague Karl Heinrich Graf but succeeded in arguing the case so persuasively that the new hypothesis soon became the accepted basis for Old Testament scholarship. The order of sources was now J (ca. 900 BCE), E (ca 800 BCE), D (late seventh century BCE) and P (late sixth–fifth century BCE).⁷ Wellhausen also interpreted the history of ancient Israel based on these sources, with the older sources attesting spontaneous and decentralised religion that then developed into a more centralised, formalised and institutionalised one. The new paradigm, as it can be called, and also often labelled as the Wellhausenian or Newer Documentary Hypothesis, became so dominant that anyone who wanted to be part of the Old Testament academic guild essentially had to follow it. Some dissenting voices remained, but these were essentially relegated to the margins of scholarship.

Wellhausen considered the sources essentially to be the creation of the time of their composition, with no earlier tradition included. However, the work of Hermann Gunkel on the Psalms and on the book of Genesis in the turn of the twentieth century⁸ pioneered the so-called form criticism. This was connected with tradition-historical considerations in that various textual units, such as individual narratives, could have an oral prehistory behind them. This then indicated that the sources, even if they might have been written down at a particular (often late) time, could have a longer prehistory behind them. This obviously modified the Wellhausenian model and could in its own way be seen as a return towards a more traditional understanding of the documents.

All seemed to be settled in a unified manner within a modified Wellhausenian paradigm after these developments. However, later in the twentieth century, various scholars began to challenge the delimitation and dating of the sources. In particular, the division of sources into J and E, especially based on the criterion of divine names, was challenged,⁹ and the existence of the E source became suspect. Some also dated the J source late.¹⁰ In addition, the way in which the Pentateuch was redacted together according to the Wellhausenian model and what could be known about oral tradition was challenged.¹¹ In Germany, the existence of continuous sources was also challenged.¹² As one consequence of this, a break between Genesis and the rest of the Pentateuch was postulated. Approaches of this type were followed by such scholars as Blum and Schmid.¹³ A further development in Germany has been a redactional layers approach, according to which in essence Genesis-Numbers on one hand and Deuteronomy and Joshua on the other hand developed separately and were linked together only at a late stage. According to such approaches, Deuteronomic and priestly layers can be followed by redactional layers in narrative style, often creating unity to the Pentateuch as a

whole, even when separate individual narrative sources are still seen as earlier than the Deuteronomic and priestly layers.¹⁴ All in all, while rejecting the existence of continuous sources, these recent German-based approaches can otherwise be classified as in essence standing in the tradition of Wellhausen. Yet, at the same time, not everyone has abandoned the basic concept of the Wellhausenian Documentary Hypothesis and its (more or less) continuous sources. Instead, a number of scholars have sought to take it as a starting point for a renewed analysis¹⁵ that then has also been designated as neo-Wellhausenian. Within the overall scholarship, further issues, such as the extent and nature of the priestly materials in the Pentateuch, have also been discussed, with a distinct lack of consensus, except that mainstream scholarship has continued to see the Torah as having formed in the Persian period and as relating to the Second Temple, especially in terms of the priestly materials. Importantly, any other books in the Hebrew Bible that attest materials in a Priestly or Deuteronomic style are then dated based on the dating of those Pentateuchal sources; this highlights the centrality of Pentateuchal scholarship for the rest of scholarship on the Hebrew Bible.

An important question in connection to the Pentateuch is how Genesis-Deuteronomy relate to books that follow them. At the time of Wellhausen, the Pentateuch was seen together with the book of Joshua and the six books were called a Hexateuch. The situation was changed with the publication of Martin Noth's *Deuteronomistic History*.¹⁶ According to Noth, Deuteronomy-Kings were written as a unified work at the time of the Babylonian exile in the sixth century BCE, even if based on older pre-existing sources. In this process, the older narrative sources (J and E for Noth) that were part of a tradition independent from the Deuteronomistic tradition were cut off after Numbers when Genesis-Numbers was connected with Deuteronomy-Kings.¹⁷ More connecting links between Numbers and Deuteronomy and Joshua were added at a later stage, in a priestly style as Noth seems to indicate.¹⁸ Noth's view became a consensus, even if it did always have some detractors. Recently, however, the theory has come under vigorous criticism,¹⁹ and a number of scholars have returned to the concept of a Hexateuch, including those favouring a redactional-layers approach to the Pentateuch.²⁰

So, we can see that, as things stand at present, there has been a fragmentation of approaches to the Pentateuch and its composition, with implications for the study of the rest of the books of the Hebrew Bible, including the so-called historical books Joshua-2 Kings. And yet, practically all of these main approaches outlined follow the chronological order of development of sources from narrative to Deuteronomy to Priestly materials, and similarly the basic Wellhausenian idea of development of the Israelite society from simple to complex, at least *mutatis mutandis*. If one adopts such

an approach, it is clear that the ancient Israelite documents portraying the late second millennium BCE have been written centuries after the period they portray. It is also clear that, for example, according to this view, the institutions portrayed in the Priestly materials were not in existence at the time but are a later, fictional creation that rather reflects the circumstances and concerns of the later era. Also, the Pentateuch is on the whole not a coherent composition but rather a haphazard accretion of materials. In addition, any materials in a Deuteronomic or Priestly style in the historical books Joshua-2 Kings and also in the books of Chronicles must date from the seventh century BCE or later.

In all fairness, it is true that a fair bit of the Pentateuchal materials depict events that are difficult to verify externally, such as the Patriarchs in Genesis as individuals and events in the desert in the book of Numbers. Also, it is clearly true that Genesis 1–11 depict occurrences that do not tally with what is known about the history of the world based on modern scientific knowledge. At the same time, such ostensibly mythical features about origins are attested in Mesopotamian literature, such as the Mesopotamian creation epics, and in Sumerian and Assyrian king lists that are followed by a more or less seamless transition to actual history.²¹ A key question is about how the ancient Israelites used their ancient Near Eastern cultural background, mixing in mythical and historical features in their literature. As part of that, for one thing, once they had recounted the distant origins, one can ask how they might transition into more recent historical events they were portraying. For the purposes here, I shall concentrate on events portrayed from the book of Exodus on, even though making some comments on the so-called patriarchal narratives in Genesis 12–50 as well. Clearly the book of Exodus makes reference to slavery in Egypt and to an escape from there. This is followed by a sojourn and traversing through the desert of Sinai to the eastern part of Transjordan. The narrative of the conquest of the land in the book of Joshua makes numerous references to places and peoples in Canaan. The same is the case with the books of Judges and Samuel, together with their parallels in 1 Chronicles as the comments made in the previous chapter in relation to the Philistines already indicated.

Accordingly, there is some value in trying to consider the question of history in these books. In terms of previous scholarship, archaeology has provided further information that can be correlated with the depictions. The development of that discipline, as it relates to the Bible, dates back to the latter part of the nineteenth century.²² At first, archaeology in the “Holy Land” was very much driven by the concerns of those interested in the Bible, in trying to illuminate the Bible based on archaeological discoveries and verify the factual claims of the Bible. However, as time went on, archaeology also became very

much its own separate discipline, and what may previously have been called biblical archaeology is now often labelled as Syro-Palestinian archaeology, a separate discipline that is presented as largely independent from biblical studies. And yet, there is still very much interaction between archaeology and biblical studies. Many biblical scholars wish to understand the Bible based on relevant archaeological discoveries, and many archaeologists also explicitly attempt to bring out how their discipline can contribute to biblical understanding.²³ Once archaeological data from the southern Levant started to accumulate in any substantial amounts, problems about how it might relate to the Bible started to arise. While events from the period of the judges on were generally seen as reflecting actual history, events earlier than that became suspect from the beginning of the twentieth century on. Thus, the book of Joshua stood at the borderline of where going back in time would rather make fact become fiction in the biblical storyline.²⁴ As part of this, the origins of early Israel became a matter of debate. The conquest model, whose most notable proponents were William Albright and his disciple John Bright in the first half of the twentieth century, had argued for a general veracity of the biblical record, even though it had lowered the date of the conquest to the thirteenth century BCE instead of the fifteenth century BCE implied by the biblical chronology. This model was abandoned due to the lack of archaeological evidence for an Israelite conquest at sites such as Ai (Joshua 7–8), Jericho (Joshua 2, 6), Gibeon (Joshua 9) and Arad (Joshua 12:14; Numbers 21:1–3). Furthermore, two other possible ways of seeing the process of the Israelite settlement arose. The peaceful infiltration model, with Albrecht Alt and Martin Noth as its most notable proponents, suggested that the Israelites were nomads who immigrated to the land from outside. In this, importantly, the immigration was peaceful and did not involve a conquest. Secondly, the peasant revolt model advocated by George Mendenhall and Norman Gottwald suggested that the Israelites were Canaanites who revolted against the existing socioeconomic structure and withdrew to the highlands to form a new society.²⁵ Later scholarship has shown problems with all of these models. However, while the peasant revolt model was rejected, the idea of an indigenous origin of the early Israelites was generally retained. In other words, contemporary scholarship tends to think that Israel was a development indigenous to Canaan.²⁶ That said, for example, a recent detailed archaeological study by Faust argues that at least a significant number of the early Israelites originated from outside the area, allowing even for the inclusion of a group that escaped Egypt, even if Faust does not subscribe to the idea of a conquest.²⁷

In addition to this set of overall approaches, in the last few decades, some scholars have questioned the veracity of the biblical accounts even from the

time of the judges on. The most “minimalist” of them argue that the biblical Israel is a scholarly construct from the Persian period.²⁸ According to this view, very little can really be known about pre-exilic Israel based on biblical documents, including the portrayed time of the United Monarchy during David and Solomon.²⁹ At the same time, there have been those who would defend the historicity of the biblical materials from the time of Abraham on, even when they would consider Genesis 1–11 as “protohistory” where a link with any actual events is not clear.³⁰ In broad terms, then, one can divide the field into three camps of mainstream, minimalist and maximalist scholars, and, by and large, such a distinction still seems to apply, even if there is always variation between individual scholars.

One’s view on mainstream compositional approaches tends to correlate with their approach to the interpretation of archaeological evidence. Typically those who follow the overall Wellhausenian approach to the composition of the Pentateuch also tend to be in line with mainstream approaches to the interpretation of the archaeological evidence that pertains to ancient Israel. Minimalists tend to date biblical documents even later than those following the mainstream, with some even dating Deuteronomy in the postexilic time. The more maximalist scholars either tend to reject source-critical approaches or not comment on them at all, even if this not always the case, especially in recent times.

All in all, except that the boundaries between the camps are not always entirely clear, if one looks at Pentateuchal scholarship carefully, all three basic approaches of mainstream, minimalist and maximalist have existed throughout the era of biblical criticism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and into the twenty-first century.³¹ The reason for a split into such approaches seems clear. The first attestations of manuscripts of the Hebrew Bible come from the third century BCE in the context of the Qumran sect in the Dead Sea area.³² Accordingly, there is at least in principle room to date the documents at any point between the events portrayed in them and their earliest textual attestations, and this is indeed done in actual scholarly practice. Any dating proposal within this range cannot be proven conclusively but can only be argued to be plausible based on a variety of clues found within the texts in question and external to them.

Having outlined the history and current status of scholarship that pertains to the history of early Israel, the main problems that relate to current approaches will be outlined here, with a focus on mainstream approaches.³³ A first problem to highlight is that Wellhausenian-based approaches have generally struggled with seeing unity, coherence and strong authorial intent in the Pentateuch. Ultimately, the work is seen as a haphazard accretion of materials with little authorial purpose. The book of Numbers in particular is

considered a wasteland of materials. Redactional-layers approaches may have improved on this situation, but unity is with these approaches seen as resulting at a very late, or at least a late stage of the formation of the tradition. Even if some of the prophetic books, such as Jeremiah, are anthologies with only minimal coherence and narrative progression, does one need to consider this to be the case with the Pentateuch and with the book of Numbers, and, even if partially so, to what extent? The interpretation offered next will read the materials as attesting identifiable unity and coherence, and strong authorial intention.³⁴

Naturally, the problems with source criticism and finding a consensus over the last 150 years do not at least entirely serve to inspire confidence in the theory. This can be compared with Thomas Kuhn's famous proposal according to which proliferation of theories is typically a sign of a paradigm in crisis.³⁵

A further problem that has been increasingly pointed out recently is that in Wellhausenian approaches there is a discrepancy between the canonical order of the law codes and their postulated chronological order.³⁶ Why would the priestly materials precede Deuteronomy in the canonical order if they were created after Deuteronomy and were intended to supplant it? Wellhausenian scholarship has not been able to answer this question, and it has hardly been raised (or acknowledged) until recently.

In addition, looking at the development of Old Testament criticism from the vantage point of the present, it was developed prior to the development of social and anthropological disciplines. Interestingly, and as already indicated in the Introduction ([Chapter 1](#)), the early development of anthropological disciplines in the nineteenth century came under severe criticism in the twentieth century as going hand in hand with the colonial enterprise that considered unindustrialised native societies as primitive.³⁷ While anthropology has by now fully acknowledged such issues, for example, the West could still have similar approaches to the Orient even in the late twentieth century,³⁸ and one may ask to what extent some in the West still may see the rest of the world as more or less a primitive entity. As regards the study of the Hebrew Bible, considering Wellhausen's apparent romanticism and lack of modern understanding about the ancient Near East in the nineteenth century, his approach can be compared with the Western colonial approaches that approached non-Western societies as an exotic, primitive world that is gazed by the advanced Western mind. The basic premise of development from simple to complex in the ancient world has in reality also been completely refuted through the development of the study of the ancient Near East from the mid-to-late nineteenth century on that shows the existence of complex societies in the area already at least from the third millennium BCE on. This book has already made comments on the complex administrative and ideological

features that relate to ancient Near Eastern empires in the late second millennium, for example.

Nevertheless, it seems that many biblical scholars still keep considering especially the era of ancient Israel under study in this book as a period in which there could hardly have been complexity in thinking or societal structures in ancient Israel so as to produce such materials as the priestly documents in respect to which also, for example, similar concepts and rituals have demonstrably been found elsewhere in the ancient Near East from a time preceding ancient Israel. It is correct that human societies developed from simpler forms to more complex ones, but in terms of ideological and societal features reflected in the biblical documents, this had already taken place by the time of the late second millennium BCE when ancient Israel is portrayed to have arisen. In addition, as was already pointed out in the foregoing,³⁹ religious controls, often expressed through ritual, can be seen as having been important for early societies, as such societies only had limited means for controlling people otherwise. Thus, religious sanctions could be powerful regulators of behaviour that could be utilised, whether consciously or unconsciously. However, technologies of control have been greatly enhanced as part of the technological advancement of modern societies, and hence one can expect that there is less need for the role of ritual and religion in regulating behaviour.⁴⁰ It is therefore vital to point out that the idea of a development from simple to complex such as attested by the Wellhausenian synthesis that also included the idea that religion in ancient Israel evolved from free-spirited forms into more ritualistic ones is at best an unproven conceptualisation, and, on the contrary, one would rather expect development towards less ritualistic forms.⁴¹ Nevertheless, this study does agree that there are sources behind the composition of the Pentateuch along the lines of what has been suggested by mainstream scholarship, even when especially their date, mutual relationship and composition into a unified whole is construed differently.⁴²

As regards minimalist approaches, they are not followed here as, above all, in the end they seem to be overly sceptical about events portrayed in the biblical documents. I do not share the premise that is more or less followed by the minimalists that anything in the biblical documents must be verified by nonbiblical evidence before it can be accepted. Also, the issues of settler colonialism, the spread of highland culture towards the lowlands at the end of Iron Age I and the role of Shiloh in the premonarchical period in the texts and its rejection in favour of Jerusalem at the early stages of the monarchy are strong indicators of an early provenance and an overall historical plausibility of the biblical texts,⁴³ without denying the incorporation of embellishment and mythical features, and also additions to the texts at later periods.⁴⁴ It seems

completely unnecessary to be overly critical about the presentation of the biblical texts; on the contrary, it is appropriate to be sympathetic towards them as products of the ancient world just as much as it is fitting to be sympathetic towards other textual and material evidence from that world.

In this respect, it is vital to keep the reception history of the biblical texts recorded in the Hebrew Bible/Old Testament in sight here. As the texts were transmitted as part of the heritage of religious communities, they were often read by those communities from a religious perspective, even when political concerns have also been involved, such as with Zionism and the creation of the modern state of Israel.⁴⁵ The religious communities by virtue of acknowledging such texts as sacred for their communities would tend to attribute high value to them and what was said in them. It is then no wonder that, as things currently stand, there is an ongoing correlation between maximalist readings and religious establishments. However, such readings nevertheless relate to the reception of the texts in the contexts of later forms of religious expression, removed from the contexts of the original production of the texts. It is a *confusion* to *assume* that because the original authors believed in a particular religious system (and e.g. in Yahweh's descent on Sinai as part of that), later readers *should* do so. In connection with this, it is *mistaken* to *assume* that a maximalist-oriented reading of the texts should *necessitate* a religious or, for that matter, a particular political appropriation of the texts. Accordingly, a main issue for academics is to try to look at what the texts communicated to their audiences in their original contexts, as much as possible removed from the way those texts may have been read by later audiences. It certainly is completely legitimate, if not necessary, to engage in analysing how the texts have been appropriated in their afterlife, but the befitting direction is from the original setting to the later readings, not the other way around.⁴⁶ In this respect, it may be that an initial religious appropriation is the starting point and impetus for further study of the biblical documents and the ancient world more widely; however, again, this makes no difference as to the original setting of the documents, and the study may end up with new discoveries about that original setting and the nature of the documents in it. At the same time, I agree with minimalists that the Bible can (easily) be read from a secular perspective as a document that is part of world heritage; that is, any religious commitments in relation to the texts are not necessary,⁴⁷ and, for the purposes of this book as things relate to the ancient world, that is the approach taken here. In fact, the presentation does partially agree with the minimalist contention that ancient Israel as portrayed in the Bible is a highly fictionalised scribal creation from the late first millennium BCE; it is just that here it is suggested especially in relation to the books of Genesis-Joshua that early Israel is in many ways a moderately fictionalised scribal creation from the late

second millennium BCE.

The survey in this section has then highlighted how the biblical materials and the history of ancient Israel have been subjected to an extensive amount of scholarship for the last 200 years or so in the context of the (in many ways) unique reception history of the biblical texts and how interpretative presuppositions have played a major part in the reading of the texts. In the following, against the backdrop of past interpretation, the early history of Israel will be discussed in relation to pertinent textual and archaeological information. This will be done from the perspective of migration and colonialism, in line with what has been deliberated in the foregoing. Altogether, the foregoing comments should on their part have highlighted that there is at a minimum room for an enhanced approach on and synthesis of the issues. Much of the presentation will build on recent published work by this author that has produced a new reconstruction about the early history of ancient Israel.⁴⁸

B. Israel in Egypt

The so-called patriarchal narratives of Genesis (Genesis 12–50) indicate how the ancestors of Israel migrated to Egypt.⁴⁹ In the third generation from the patriarch Abraham, Joseph, due to a feud with his brothers, gets sold to Egypt where he, after a long spell in prison, becomes a high official in the Pharaoh's court (Genesis 37, 39–41). Due to this and a famine that is affecting Canaan, he asks his family to migrate to Egypt (Genesis 42–50). In Egypt, the family has descendants whose number increases so much that the Egyptians start to be concerned about them. They demote the Israelites into a status of slaves, even trying to restrict their numbers by genocidal means of killing male children who are born (Exodus 1). One baby is hidden, however, and then sent down the Nile in a floating basket. By coincidence, it is picked up by the daughter of a Pharaoh who adopts the boy and raises him as her son. Moses, however, learns about his background and tries to defend the slaves. But, he kills an Egyptian foreman in the process and has to flee Egypt (Exodus 2). After many years in the land of Midian, Moses feels that a god Yahweh is calling him to go back to Egypt and lead the Israelites out from there (Exodus 3). The Exodus succeeds despite the recalcitrance of the Pharaoh because of ten plagues that fall on Egypt, with the death of the firstborn of Egypt the final miracle that breaks the Pharaoh's resistance (Exodus 4–13). The people then exit Egypt through the Sea of Reeds into the desert of Sinai and congregate at Mount

Sinai where they are given laws in preparation for their entry into the land of Canaan that they believe has been given to them by Yahweh (Exodus 14–Numbers 10:10).

This narrative is particularly famous in Judaism in relation to the associated festival of Passover, depictions of which are integrated in the narrative (Exodus 12). Its actual historical value has been discussed extensively.⁵⁰ From the perspective of migration as discussed in this book, the key issue is that the narrative suggests that the Israelites who inhabited Canaan had an origin in Egypt. In fact, even before that, the patriarchs also had an origin in Mesopotamia (Genesis 11:27–12:5). One does not need to accept all of the details of the narrative to draw a parallel with the existence of Semites in Egypt in the second millennium BCE that is attested by both textual and archaeological evidence,⁵¹ and there had already been demonstrable contacts with southern Canaan in the predynastic period.⁵² In fact, one would be surprised if the two areas could be isolated from each other as they were adjoining, at least in the ebb and flow of centuries. The Hyksos period (ca. 1650–1540 BCE) was marked by Asiatic rulership in Egypt.⁵³ It was Kamose (ca. 1550 BCE) who established native rule over Egypt and inaugurated the new Kingdom period that also then was marked by Egyptian expansion into Canaan, in addition to Nubia.⁵⁴ In broad terms, then, the prosperity of Asiatics in the first half of the second millennium BCE fits with the Joseph narrative, and the deterioration of the status of the Israelites expressed in Exodus 1 is in line with the unification of Egypt by native rulers as against Asiatic ones. In addition, that the Pharaoh did not wish to let the Israelites go is in line with the coercive nature of early societies and their desire to keep people from moving away from the reach of the state which obviously would have been the case had the Israelites been able to leave.⁵⁵ Slavery was also practiced in Egypt, with slaves obviously a productive resource for their owners.⁵⁶ In that sense, then, the story of a group of Asiatic slaves in Egypt, or even Asiatics in general, who wished to emigrate in search of a better life is a completely plausible one in the context of the second millennium, and one does not need to accept all of the details given in the biblical narrative to think so.⁵⁷ As part of this, one does not even have to think that any migration from Egypt was a one-time event as indicated by the biblical narrative, but could instead have taken place over a longer period.

C. Transformations in the Hill Country

In terms of the destination, the hill country did provide an area that was more or less outside state control. Egyptian dominance was concentrated on the lowlands, with selected outposts in the highlands where Egyptian overlordship was explicit.⁵⁸ But, even in the lowlands, it turned out that the Philistines were able to make a bridgehead. That there were Israelites in the area by 1200 BCE is suggested by the Merneptah Stele that states:

The princes are prostrate, saying: "Mercy!"
Not one raises his head among the Nine Bows.
Desolation is for Tehenu; Hatti is pacified;
Plundered is the Canaan with every evil;
Carried off is Ashkelon; seized upon is Gezer;
Yanoam is made as that which does not exist;
Israel is laid waste, his seed is not;⁵⁹
Hurru is become a widow for Egypt!
All lands together, they are pacified;⁶⁰

The stele is dated to ca. 1207 BCE and celebrates victorious campaigns by the Pharaoh Merneptah. After a reference to the nine bows as a trope for Egypt's traditional enemies, he makes reference to the Libyan Tehenu and the Hittites. He did fight Libyan forces that also had allied with Sea Peoples and won a victory over them.⁶¹ However, the comments by the Pharaoh in relation to the Hittites seem to be fictional, as he clearly appears to not have campaigned against them. Even so, he could also be referring to the fact that there were no conflicts with the Hittites at his time, with an implication that it was due to his prowess. The description then moves to Canaan, with Ashkelon and Gezer on the seacoast referred to, followed by Yenoam that seems to be located in northern Palestine, not far from Beth Shean. It may not be entirely easy to determine the historicity and extent of the Pharaoh's actions towards these towns.⁶² After a mention of Israel, Hurru as a synonym of Canaan is listed.⁶³

The exact details of the mention of Israel have been discussed extensively. Ultimately, the mention is a short one, and one cannot read into it such issues as the more exact location and extent of the Israelite territory. Also, that the determinative that refers to people rather than a land is used does not seem to warrant any definitive conclusions about the nature of the Israelite society at the time. What is most important, however, is that Israel is listed. The clear implication is that an entity named Israel exists in Canaan at the end of the thirteenth century BCE.

From the perspective of this book, one important issue is that Merneptah's inscription indicates that Israel existed in the area already some decades before the Late Bronze collapse. Accordingly, any of the processes that relate to its

emergence already originate from before that collapse. At the same time, it seems likely that the Amarna letters do not leave room for Israel in the fourteenth century BCE. Accordingly, based on the present state of knowledge, its origins should most likely be sought in the period between the writing of the Amarna letters and the Merneptah Stele.⁶⁴ As archaeological evidence indicates a new way of settling the hill country in the Iron Age I period in contrast to the Late Bronze Age, it appears that one can assume that the mode of settlement that the hill country attests in Iron Age I was not something that early Israel had adopted from the start but was employed only at a later stage in the trajectory of the formation of the entity. Interestingly, the information in Joshua 19:40–48 (cf. Judges 18) that indicates that territory allocated to the Danites could not be settled by them, or, as the Hebrew indicates, went out from them,⁶⁵ is in line with the idea of such a “demarcation”.⁶⁶ At the same time, while referring to the earlier time, the passage implies that it was written after the Philistine settlement had started in Iron Age I during the twelfth century BCE.

As there is nothing in the Late Bronze Age material remains that can at least conclusively be read as indicating an entry of an external group of people into Canaan, the only indication one has about the matter is the biblical texts. However, we have already indicated that the presence of Egypt in Canaan in the early New Kingdom period is poorly attested in the material culture, with only the presence of Egyptian-style pottery implying an Egyptian character of the site.⁶⁷ By and large, the Egyptians utilised local buildings, and information about their doings has to be based on textual records.⁶⁸ Architecturally there are no differences except in some southern coastal sites.⁶⁹ Also, more widely, Isserlin has pointed out that the Norman conquest of England in the eleventh century CE and the Muslim conquest of the Levant are not easy to attest archaeologically.⁷⁰ Deuteronomy itself suggests that the Israelites utilised local structures (Deuteronomy 6:10–11), and the book of Joshua speaks of burning and other destruction only in connection with Jericho, Hazor and Ai (Joshua 6:20–24; 8:28; 11:13), with Judges adding Laish (Judges 18:27; identified as Tell Dan). In this, Joshua 11:13 even explicitly states that towns that existed on tells (*‘l-tlm*) were not burnt. Altogether, the biblical text is consistent with the initial invasion of the Israelites being more or less undetectable archaeologically. In regard to the four sites of Jericho, Hazor, Laish and Ai, evidence of destruction has been found at Hazor and Laish at the end of the Late Bronze Age.⁷¹ Jericho is badly eroded, and the evidence there is equivocal.⁷² It seems that Joshua 6:26 was added when the books from Genesis-Kings were connected into a single whole.⁷³ This leaves Ai, which remains a difficult problem, and the issue must be left open.⁷⁴ But, even if the narrative about Ai were to be considered to be at least partly fictional, this

would be the case with Ai only based on the evidence in relation to Ai. More widely within the books of Numbers and Joshua that contain most of the geographical references to places that relate to the Israelites in the early stages of their settlement, the places do attest occupation in the Late Bronze–Early Iron Age era, also keeping in mind that many sites cannot be identified definitively.⁷⁵ In this context, one can keep in mind that the book of Joshua can present past events in a telescoped manner and can, if is not even expected to, narrate those events in an ancient Near Eastern style that can include selectivity, bias and embellishment.⁷⁶ A clear exception to an attestation of site occupation in Late Bronze–Early Iron Age time is the extended description of the boundaries and towns of Judah in Joshua 15, but the town lists in particular in that chapter should be considered as having been reworked in the period of the Israelite monarchy.⁷⁷

The potential use of writing in early Israel does also need to be considered from the standpoint that Israel already existed at the end of the Late Bronze Age. Certainly the Canaanite entities that engaged in Amarna correspondence knew how to write in cuneiform, utilising Akkadian, the *lingua franca* of the Late Bronze Age in the ancient Near East.⁷⁸ Writing was, of course, also a standard tool in Egypt at the time, in a tradition that was already longstanding by then. In light of this, it seems completely incredulous that people in the area would not have been aware of writing, and in light of this it should not be surprising that the Israelite documents that portray the early history of Israel do refer to writing. That is, the *milieu* of the time portrayed was well connected with writing. Considering that inscriptions have been found from the area of ancient Israel from Iron Age I,⁷⁹ one can assume that the Israelites chose to employ the alphabet that itself had already been invented several centuries earlier. This should be considered a major innovation by the ancient Israelites.⁸⁰ Importantly, one does not have to assume widespread use of writing at this stage,⁸¹ with more extensive literacy coming only in the eighth century BCE.⁸² In this case, one can ask whether the burden of proof is on those who wish to assert that there was no writing in Israel or on those who claim that there was.⁸³ The latter option is generally followed, in line with Wellhausenian approaches to the history of ancient Israel; based on the discussion here thus far, however, it should be clear that such an assumption is nothing more than an assumption.

If, then, one can assume the plausibility of the existence of writing in early Israel and knowledge of complex societal and ritual features, one can expect that the ancient Israelites in the Late Bronze–Iron Age I would have had the capability to produce documents that describe early Israel. In this context, then, one can start to look at issues that arise in the documents in relation to migration and colonialism, with some comments already made on the

depiction of Israel in Egypt and migration from there into Canaan. In fact, the biblical documents can be seen as providing a unique window on ancient Israelite ideology that can be characterised as reflecting settler colonialism. Crucially in this respect, to appropriate the biblical books of Genesis-Joshua, one needs to read them as a programmatic set of documents. This is consistent with and even cannot be explained except by an early date.⁸⁴ But, one can also note here, in line with what was already just indicated, that it is not necessary to assume that everything in the texts originates from an early period. One can expect that later additions and modifications were also made, this being in line with what is known from documents elsewhere in the ancient Near East. In this respect, that differences exist across extant biblical manuscripts already suggests that the tradition was malleable.⁸⁵

The central aim of settler colonialism is to replace a native society with the settler society.⁸⁶ In this connection, David Day's *Conquest: How Societies Overwhelm Others*⁸⁷ outlines a number of ideological and practical ways of how this is done, and this in itself can already be compared to the concepts of centrifugal ideologisation and bureaucratisation of coercion outlined in the foregoing.⁸⁸ According to Day, with reference to numerous examples from recent world history, a "process of supplanting" by a society involves three stages: "Firstly, it must establish a legal or *de jure* claim to the land."⁸⁹ Then, "a supplanting society must proceed to the next stage of the process by making a claim of effective or *de facto* proprietorship over the territory that it wants to have as its own".⁹⁰ Such a claim "is commonly established by exploring the territory's furthest reaches, naming its geographic and other features, fortifying its borders, tilling its soil, developing its resources, and, most importantly, peopling the invaded lands".⁹¹ Lastly, "the last and most elusive step of the process . . . involves establishing a claim of moral proprietorship over the territory".⁹² For this to succeed, "such a claim must outweigh the claim that any other society, including the previous inhabitants, has the potential to assert".⁹³ In terms of the ancient Israelite society, in a broad sweep, the patriarchal promises reflect the first point, the conquest and settlement the second, and recourse to Yahwism as an exclusive ideology, together with the constitution of the new society (as in e.g. Deuteronomy and the Holiness Code in Leviticus) and its contrast with the practices of the previous inhabitants (e.g. Deuteronomy 7), the moral claim.

Day then goes further by identifying typical processes that accompany these three stages, commenting that these processes are often overlapping (as are the three main stages).⁹⁴ These are: staking a legal claim, mapping the territory, claiming by naming, supplanting the savages, claiming by right of conquest, defending the conquered territory, using foundation stories, tilling the soil, recourse to genocide where appropriate and peopling the land. The following

will outline how the early Israelite society reflects these aspects, with some slight modifications.⁹⁵

Abraham's travels in the land of Canaan and building of altars (e.g. Genesis 12) can be seen as staking a legal claim. The place for the first recorded altar is Shechem, and the Israelites are later instructed to build an altar on Mount Ebal in Deuteronomy 27, and the act of building, together with the accompanying ceremony prescribed by Deuteronomy 27:9–26, is described as having taken place in Joshua 8:30–35. This ceremony of conquest and supplanting by a new society harks back to the patriarchal promises in Genesis and also reinforces the interrelatedness of Genesis, Deuteronomy and Joshua, and arguably Genesis-Joshua as a whole.

In terms of mapping the land, we can see how Abraham traverses the land in Genesis (Genesis 12:6–9), also at Yahweh's instigation (Genesis 13:17). This can be seen as part of "knowing the land" and thus asserting a claim over it, even if the activity is rather incipient in the book of Genesis. However, in the books of Numbers and Joshua, matters are blown out completely explicitly. According to Numbers 13:1, Yahweh commands Moses to send out men to explore the land of Canaan.⁹⁶ The men do this and bring back a description of the land, and we can see in light of the earlier considerations how this can be seen as part of the process of laying claim to the land, in a way that humans would behave as part of such processes.⁹⁷ The book of Joshua then describes the successful conquest. Joshua 18:3–10 describes a mapping process as part of dividing the land to the Israelite tribes. This mapping process is part of Joshua 13–21 which, in a larger sense, describe the tribal allotments.⁹⁸ In this context, both the biblical documents, including Joshua 13–21⁹⁹ and Judges 1, and archaeological evidence indicate that the Israelite settlement and control was initially located in the central, eastern and northern highlands and expanded out from there, to include lowlands in the later course of Israel's history.¹⁰⁰

As regards claiming by naming, the biblical texts suggest a number of cases where the Israelites rename places. This is the case with Gilgal (Joshua 14:15), Hill of Foreskins (Joshua 5:2–3), Valley of Achor (Joshua 7:26), Hebron (Joshua 14:15; 15:13; Judges 1:10), Debir (Joshua 15:15), Jerusalem (Judges 19:10), Bethel (Judges 1:23), Dan (Joshua 19:47; Judges 18:29), Havvoth Jair (Numbers 32:31) and Nobah (Numbers 32:42). By way of comparison and contrast, interestingly, in the explicitly religious sphere, the Israelites are commanded to erase even the name of the gods of the previous inhabitants (Deuteronomy 12:3). Instead, the name of Yahweh is to be established in the land, and in a "chosen place" in particular (Deuteronomy 12:4–31).

As for foundation stories, clearly the Bible indicates, in the book of Genesis in particular, that the land was promised to the patriarchs by their god Yahweh, and this theme runs through the whole of Genesis-Joshua one way or

another (see e.g. Exodus 3:16–17; 4:5; Deuteronomy 1:8; 6:10; 9:5; 29:13; 30:20; cf. e.g. Numbers 13:2; Joshua 1:2, 12). The exodus and liberation provide another powerful foundation story, and the lawgiving at Sinai (Exodus-Leviticus), in the wilderness (Numbers) and at the edge of the promised land (Deuteronomy) add further strands to the set of foundation stories. The genealogies (see especially Genesis 10) serve to establish Israel's place among the nations, in the context of creation and the land Israel now occupies, and the patriarchal stories define Israel's relations with its close neighbours (e.g. the Edomites, Genesis 26–27, 32–33).

In terms of “supplanting the savages” and the genocidal imperative, the idea of the lower worth of the inhabitants is already grounded in Genesis 9:25 where Canaan is cursed. As already intimated, such texts as Deuteronomy 7 indicate that the inhabitants of Canaan are to be obliterated, and this settler colonial transfer corresponds to a genocidal imperative.

According to the biblical documents, lands would also belong to the Israelites by right of conquest, as with King Sihon,¹⁰¹ or apparently even by virtue of treading on them.¹⁰² Ancient battles already provided legitimation for Jacob according to Genesis 48:22.

As regards tilling the soil and peopling the land, with early Israel, there was a population explosion, as it has been called, in the highlands in Iron Age I.¹⁰³ The increase in population is especially attested by a large number of unfortified small settlements in the highlands. Such growth is consistent with examples of even phenomenal growth in numbers amongst first generations of colonists or successful migrants in favourable locations.¹⁰⁴ The population explosion also fits perfectly well with an expansion out from there in the ensuing centuries.

As for defending the territory, it should first be noted that there was no central government that controlled the area and could have mobilised a unified approach to defence. The book of Judges is in line with this, in that any political leaders (Judges) were *ad hoc* and their activity was mostly based on an ability to mobilise troops and win battles. There was also a relative lack of any fortifications. This is attested by both the biblical texts in Genesis-Joshua and the unfortified nature of new Iron Age I settlements in the highlands. Nevertheless, Numbers 32 does indicate that the Israelites fortified and possessed fortified towns in Transjordan, and Deuteronomy 3:5 similarly mentions fortified towns in Transjordan, in addition to “many” unfortified towns.¹⁰⁵ It would appear that the Israelites could take over fortified towns where they existed and where they could conquer them (cf. Joshua 10:20; 14:12; 1 Samuel 6:18, 20:6, 15). That the situation was slightly different in Transjordan from that in Cisjordan would seem to fit with the lack of any centralised administration in the area.¹⁰⁶ At a slightly later time, at the onset of monarchy

and centralised administration, David and Solomon are described as taking over fortified towns or fortifying themselves (e.g. 2 Samuel 5:6–10; 1 Kings 9:15; 1 Kings 12:25).¹⁰⁷

Some further important aspects should be added to the foregoing analysis. The legal materials in Genesis-Joshua can be seen as providing a blueprint for the new Israelite society, even when it is not certain how much this was a theoretical rather than a practical construct, in line with the general nature of ancient Near Eastern legal materials.¹⁰⁸ The materials were based on an already existing Near Eastern tradition,¹⁰⁹ worked into a new unique and innovative whole. We may here observe the following quote by Wolfe, also as a summary to our considerations just made: “settler colonialism has, as observed, two principal aspects – not only the removal of native society, but also its concomitant replacement with settler institutions. This latter, positive aspect involves the establishment and legitimization of civil hegemony.”¹¹⁰ And, “eliminator strategies all reflect the centrality of the land, which is not merely the component of settler society but its basic precondition”.¹¹¹ The centrality of the land surely also applies to the positive aspect(s). In this context, then, the biblical documents do conceptualise a system over the territory that they envisage as belonging to ancient Israel. There is to be no central administration, even though a king remains a future possibility (Deuteronomy 17:14–20). From the perspective of legal and criminal disputes, most cases are to be handled at a local level, but difficult ones can also be referred to a centralised judiciary (Deuteronomy 16:18; 17:8–9). This central place is where a central sanctuary that in the biblical documents traces its origins to Sinai is located, built as a portable shrine (tent of meeting) there.¹¹² In the biblical thinking that traces itself to the thinking of the wider ancient Near East, the sanctuary was the house of Yahweh, and Yahweh’s presence was localised at the ark. The ark was similar to cherubim thrones that are found elsewhere in the area at the time, and functionally this also tied with the use of god images in the wider Near East that were often housed in sanctuaries. However, Yahweh’s presence was at the ark rather than specifically on the ark as with cherubim thrones. A god image, where the presence or essence of the deity would dwell, was not used, in line with an uniconic character of the “official” cult.¹¹³

In Israel, as with the rest of the ancient Near East of the time, a sanctuary also involved cultic personnel and cultic rites. In analogy with a sanctuary as a house of god, the cultic personnel were Yahweh’s attendants in his service. In the service, or cult, sacrifices had a key role in Israel, as described in particular in Leviticus 1–7. The main purpose of the sacrifices and any accompanying rites was to keep the divine appeased, in line with the understanding of ancient peoples about the centrality of securing the favour of the gods.¹¹⁴ This

included atoning for any wrongdoings of the people, including a yearly ritual of atonement (Leviticus 16). Should the Israelites fail to appease Yahweh, this could force Yahweh to leave Israel, which itself would then in the thinking of the ancient world signal great calamities for the people and their land.¹¹⁵

All males of Israel were to gather at the central sanctuary three times in a year for festivals that were stipulated in the legal materials (Deuteronomy 16:1–17; cf. Leviticus 23; Numbers 28–29). Worship and sacrifices at any local altars were prohibited when a central sanctuary existed (Deuteronomy 12).¹¹⁶ The central place then had both an important cultic and legal role, however, again, it had no administrative role over the land. Shiloh was set as such a location in the design of Genesis-Joshua (Joshua 18:1; 22:9–34).¹¹⁷ In the context of the narrative of Genesis-Joshua, in the beginning, Adam had been placed in a garden at creation (Genesis 2:8) and he and his wife Eve could encounter Yahweh there (Genesis 2–3). However, he and Eve were expelled from the garden after the fall (Genesis 3, incl. 3:23–24). Yahweh's presence with people was then, after a long time, restored at Sinai when the tabernacle was built (Exodus 25–40), even when access to Yahweh then took place through cultic functionaries. These events at Sinai can be seen to be placed at the centre of a chiastic (“mirror”) literary structure that covers Genesis-Joshua.¹¹⁸ At the end of Genesis-Joshua, mirroring the events at creation at the beginning, the tabernacle is set up at Shiloh. Also considering that the tabernacle incorporates creation symbolism,¹¹⁹ the setting up of the tabernacle at Shiloh signified for the ancient Israelites a restoration of creation in the new land. The books of Samuel confirm that cultic activity associated with the tabernacle was carried out at Shiloh (1 Samuel 2:13–16; cf. Judges 18:31).¹²⁰

Figure 5.1 The literary-thematic and chiastic structure of Genesis-Joshua

Source: From Pitkänen 2015:23, based on J. Milgrom, “Numbers”, in *JPS Torah Commentary* (Philadelphia and New York: Jewish Publication Society, 1989), p. xviii.

Two important institutions that geographically cover the whole land are the Levitical towns and the towns of refuge.¹²¹ The Levitical towns are given to priests and Levites who constitute the cultic personnel in Israel, with the Levites subordinated to the priests. The Levitical towns are spread throughout the land. The explicit reason for allocating them is that the cultic personnel do not have any other landholdings in Israel (Numbers 35:1–8; Joshua 21), even when they are to also receive livelihood by taking a portion of offerings given to Yahweh as part of the cultic system (Numbers 18; Deuteronomy 18:1–5). Considering the role of priests and Levites, they were also meant to act as centres from which the Yahwistic religion could be disseminated throughout the land. In that sense they can be compared with contemporary colonial centres known from Egypt and Middle Assyria, even if the focus of the latter is

administrative. Here the towns given from Dan (Joshua 21:23–24) are also located in the southwestern coast, an area the Danites could not hold (Joshua 19:47) due to the arrival of the Sea Peoples there,¹²² and this supports the idea of a programmatic nature of the documents.¹²³ Another related institution is the towns of refuge where an accidental manslayer could be protected. These six towns were to be designated from among the Levitical towns (Numbers 35:6, 9–32; Joshua 20). Altogether, the early Israelite settlers weaved together distant myths of creation, their beliefs about the divine, ritual traditions of the ancient world and a vision about the new land they were settling into, together with stylised versions of their historical experiences, to craft Genesis-Joshua.

As the Israelite legal materials are clearly of priestly origin,¹²⁴ one can think that it was priests who envisaged the related institutions. Also considering their prominence in the cult and also in the legal sphere, they clearly formed an elite in the ancient Israelite society. The biblical documents also indicate that they traced their origins to Egypt and that their ancestor Aaron was a brother of Moses, the leader of the Israelites in their exodus from Egypt.¹²⁵ In the context of migration, this can be seen in the context of founder rank enhancement where a relatively unimportant person becomes prominent in a new place.¹²⁶ The newly forming priestly class would then have envisioned how the new society should operate. However, they did not have any tools of coercion available, but mostly could just employ threats of retribution from the divine should the people not follow their ideals. In the context of a hill country that could in practice be connected only by a common ethos in a similar geographical context, and for example with no printing press available, it seems very unlikely that they could even propagate their vision across the territory. On the whole, then, one can expect that the materials in Genesis-Joshua would have remained a vision of a small group of people. The authors themselves acknowledged that the vision was incomplete. While, in addition to indicating that creation had been restored in the new land,¹²⁷ they stated that the whole land had also been conquered (Joshua 21:43–45), at the same time they talked about the incompleteness of the conquest and encouraged the Israelites to continue following Yahweh and to not join with non-Israelite peoples that remain in the land (Joshua 13:1–7; Joshua 23). Many commentators on the texts have seen these two at least apparently contradictory viewpoints as puzzling and difficult to interpret.¹²⁸ However, from the perspective of settler colonial studies, it is typical that settler colonial societies generally somehow wish to “disavow” their violent origins.¹²⁹ According to Veracini, as one part of such processes, “an anxious reaction to disconcerting and disorienting developments produces a drive to think about a pacified world that can only be achieved via voluntary displacement”.¹³⁰ Also, while “settlers are natural men engaged in building a settled life in an

ahistorical locale, recurring representations of settler original idylls insist on an immaculate foundational setting devoid of disturbing indigenous (or exogenous) others”.¹³¹ And,

ultimately, the fact that these images coexist with ongoing (explicit, latent, or intermittently surfacing) apprehension may actually suggest the activation of a splitting of the ego-like process, where two antithetical psychical attitudes coexist side by side without communicating, one taking reality into consideration, the other disavowing it.¹³²

Altogether, the authors of Genesis-Joshua wanted to believe and convey to their audiences that Yahweh had given them the land and helped them create new institutions there, even when things were not quite going to plan in reality.

The biblical documents themselves clearly indicate that the Israelites mixed with locals, including through marriage. This is particularly expressed by the book of Judges that was written in a differing setting and by a different author (see e.g. Judges 3:5–6).¹³³ The intermixing brought in other influences, such as the worship of local deities (Judges 2:1–12; 3:5–6), with the biblical documents already indicating that this was a problem from the earliest times on (e.g. Exodus 32). Such an intermixing was an unintended consequence of colonialism from the perspective of the architects of the biblical texts. From the perspective of social hegemony also, something quite different arose from what was envisaged as attested in Genesis-Joshua.¹³⁴ To gauge that, we can look at issues that relate to ethnicity.

Ethnogenesis

An ethnogenesis took place in the context of the emergence of the Israelite society. As with the Philistines, one can look at the issues based on the characteristics of ethnicity.¹³⁵ In this case, potential textual data is available that can be combined with archaeological evidence.¹³⁶

As regards the first feature, the name Israel seems a unique identifier for the Israelites, first attested in extrabiblical documents on the Merneptah Stele. The biblical documents also clearly indicate that the Israelites self-identified by this name.

As regards the second feature, ancestry, the ancient Israelites saw themselves in terms of genealogies that described their descent in relation to the known surrounding world. This was expressed through the genealogies and stories in Genesis in particular. The twelve Israelite tribes were further

elaborated on in the narratives of Exodus-Joshua that could also include genealogies (e.g. Numbers 26). As was already indicated, Finkelberg suggests that relationships with surrounding countries were built into genealogy in Greek tradition.¹³⁷ From this perspective, the creation of genealogies can also be seen as a means of creating a common identity for regional entities in the highlands, with areas of settlement being assigned a common ancestor and the stories in Genesis and elsewhere in the Pentateuch assisting in the process.¹³⁸ In this sense, then, the tribal allotments can be seen as a mixture of programmatic vision and a recognition of the extent of the hill country and its division into smaller sociopolitical entities. The cooperation between such entities can be compared with the cooperation of the Philistine Pentapolis of Gaza, Gath, Ekron, Ashdod and Ashkelon. It should also be noted that the Israelites did imagine a relatively close common ancestry with the Edomites, Ammonites and Moabites, even if a perverse one for the latter two (see Genesis 19; 25). That the priests and Levites were not associated with a particular geographical place might highlight their intrusiveness in the area, and some genealogical manipulation would have been required.¹³⁹

As for the third feature, shared historical memories, the Israelite society saw itself as a product of migration. The Israelites have Mesopotamia and then a sojourn in and liberation from slavery in Egypt as important components of their foundation story. One may also note that, in the (later) Greek foundation stories, there was often an initial wave of settlement or exploration and then only later more extensive settlement,¹⁴⁰ and this may have some similarity with the Patriarchal stories. Clearly the story about slavery in Egypt and liberation from there provided a foundational story for the Israelites. Also, their societal institutions were portrayed as having been stipulated on their journey from Egypt to Canaan. If the Israelite society included migrants from the lowlands that were seeking for a better life while New Kingdom Egypt had a hold of those areas (till about 1150 BCE), one may expect that they would have easily identified with the Israelite foundation story of liberation from Egypt and could have been integrated in the Israelite society as exogenous others.¹⁴¹ More widely, such foundation stories, at least in their basic form, could also spread relatively easily in oral form among highland peoples.

In terms of the fourth feature, elements of common culture, one issue that distinguishes the highlands is the almost complete absence of pork bones, in contrast to the lowlands.¹⁴² The Iron I highlands are also marked by a particular style of pottery.¹⁴³ In addition, the Israelites are depicted in the biblical texts to be circumcised, however, it is very difficult to verify this issue archaeologically.¹⁴⁴ And, the highlands are marked by the use of a particular building style, a four-room house, even when this feature is as such not unique to the Israelites.¹⁴⁵ As a number of new features were more or less adopted in

Iron Age I,¹⁴⁶ it seems that the newly emerging society decided to make use of some of the new innovations of the time and generally produced a unique mix in terms of material culture as it settled in the rural areas of the highlands. Some local innovation could also have been possible, including the use of decorated pottery.¹⁴⁷ In a context of an originally similar culture of the invaders and the indigenes, these features should be enough to strongly suspect an archaeological identification of a new entity.¹⁴⁸

As regards the fifth feature, a link with homeland, it mostly relates to diaspora peoples. The Israelites do not seem to think of Mesopotamia or Egypt as their homelands all that strongly, even though there is some indication in the Bible that the former is considered thus in some respects (Deuteronomy 26:5–8; Joshua 24:2–4).

In terms of the sixth feature, a sense of solidarity, the biblical documents attest solidarity across twelve tribes that are all seen to descend from the patriarchs. As already indicated, some of this solidarity attested in the biblical documents may be programmatic, but it would appear that at least some of the tribes may in actuality have felt this way (e.g. Judges 5; 1 Samuel 11:7–8).¹⁴⁹

In the context of the above discussion, it then seems that the newly forming Israelite entity was able to achieve a form of unity and ethnic identity. However, from the perspective of the biblical documents, this unity only partially corresponded to them. A pork taboo and possibly circumcision were attested. The tribes could also apparently at times act in concert. There were, moreover, certain common aspects of material culture that were outside the domain of the documents. In the religious area, it seems already clear from the biblical documents that Yahwism was not followed uniformly.¹⁵⁰ But stories about common ancestry and liberation from Egypt would be likely to have been known to the Israelites and in many ways identified with.

We can now also take stock of the character of the Israelite society from the perspective of the summary in [Chapter 2](#).¹⁵¹ It appears that the degree of cultural change from indigenous culture to invader culture was low to moderate, also keeping in mind that the Israelite institutions envisaged in Genesis-Joshua were not entirely far removed culturally from the immediate environment of the new society. The relative composition of immigrants to the indigenes was initially low; however in Iron Age I, it seems that the newly emerging society accelerated its relative numbers in comparison to the indigenous societies somewhat, placing this category as moderate to high, even though the likelihood of a good amount of intermixing could be seen in the context of a lower end of this scale, i.e. in the moderate category. The biblical documents and material culture indicate that the new entity controlled most of the highlands by the end of Iron Age I,¹⁵² placing the category of proportion of areas controlled by immigrants versus indigenes as more or less separate

societal enclaves into the high end. It is difficult to gauge how many people were actually killed or expelled by the new society as it formed and expanded, but the book of Joshua does indicate that violent means were involved, even when the extent of killings are likely to have been exaggerated as part of the rhetorical strategy of the book. Also, assimilation is likely to have been at minimum at a moderate level, already based on the biblical documents. The grafting of the tribal areas into a genealogy on its part suggests assimilation, as does the mention of intermarriage in Judges 3:5–6. The book of Joshua already indicated that the Gibeonites were, even if exceptionally according to that book, taken in as forced labour (Joshua 9; Joshua 11:19). On the whole, one can make a cautious analogy with the case of Nuer and Dinka where societal expansion took place in a noncentralised concept and where there were some killings and expulsions, but even more of assimilation.¹⁵³ Finally, the rate of changes over time seems to have been moderate.

Altogether, the above considerations confirm that the form of colonialism in ancient Israel was clearly of the settler type, even though not its every feature was distinctively settler colonial when compared with the table in [Chapter 2](#). In terms of the question of genocide, it seems that the extent of genocide was partial. There is no doubt that some people would have been killed and expelled and that existing societies were destroyed with a new entity arising instead. At the same time, some changes were more or less voluntary, including by way of intermarriage, and the emerging Israelite society was not vastly different from existing societies in practice. Therefore, one can think in terms of a moderate cultural genocide with a degree of killing of individuals included when one counts in the unintended consequences of colonialism.

As to the reasons for why early Israel was able to expand as a society, if one compares the situation with the Nuer and Dinka, in the latter case the societal structure of the Nuer both necessitated expansion and was in line with a formation of larger social units that could prevail against the Dinka.¹⁵⁴ With early Israel, it is on the face of it perhaps difficult to see why the society was bent on expanding. However, the biblical documents indicate that the priestly elite considered that the land was given to them by Yahweh. It would not have been difficult to foster such feeling amongst ordinary people as well. But a decisive advantage was offered by the ability of the Israelites to act in concert as against individual city states. Together with a population explosion in the highlands, this would have given them an overall military advantage that proved to be decisive. As with the Nuer and the Dinka, the cumulative effect of even small skirmishes would have been enough to cover a large territory in the course of a long enough time frame, such as a century or two. The book of Joshua, read critically, also indicates that the Israelites were even able to hold their own against indigenous coalitions (Joshua 10–11). The same went with

surrounding entities that at times encroached into areas that Israel claimed for itself, as attested in the book of Judges.

D. The rise of kingship

In the course of the later stages of Iron Age I, the new society faced some added challenges that contributed towards further transformations. A key challenge was the rise of the Philistines and their expansion to dominate the Israelites, even when there were also other societies with whom the Israelites had already had difficulties. The events that led to the establishment of kingship took place in the south-central area of the hill country. It seems unlikely that any central authority would have been able to enforce its will over the whole of the hill country during Iron Age I. The only way that unity could have been achieved would have been through voluntary means. This is exactly how the biblical texts portray the developments that led to the rise of kingship. It is the people who ask for a king (1 Samuel 8). They perceive that kingship would mean enhanced power in unifying Israel further. In addition, the people are portrayed as wishing to be similar to other countries around them (1 Samuel 8:20). The people ask Samuel, a tribal non-hereditary chief, to choose a king for them. Samuel was also a prophet, with prophets in general fundamentally being independent cultic functionaries in Israel who could however also ally with the main religious establishment (Deuteronomy 13:1–5; 18:15–22; 1 Samuel 3). An important background event that had taken place was the capture of the ark of Yahweh from Shiloh by the Philistines (1 Samuel 4). The capture of the ark did, in line with ancient Near Eastern thinking, signal Yahweh's abandonment of Israel.¹⁵⁵ The ark was taken to the land of the Philistines but was soon returned, with the biblical texts attributing this turn of events to Yahweh's action (1 Samuel 5–6). However, the ark was not taken back to Shiloh, possibly because Shiloh was destroyed,¹⁵⁶ but was taken elsewhere, more or less for safekeeping (1 Samuel 6:13–21). In essence, the religious order that had been based on the setting up of the tent of meeting that the Israelites had understood as dating back to the period of migration from Egypt to Canaan had been disrupted (cf. Psalm 78:56–72).

The evolution of kingship in Samuel is described as institutionally rather slow. It is hard to see Saul as anything more than a “judge” in terms of his practical powers. There is hardly any royal court with its trappings and no description of any administrative structures that would cover the whole land. True, the text of 1 Samuel refers to such rights and administrative structures (1

Samuel 8:10–17) and indicates that once the structures will have been created, the process cannot be reversed (1 Samuel 8:18). Saul's reign ended up being relatively short,¹⁵⁷ with David taking his place. The whole of 1–2 Samuel can be taken as an apology for the rule of David, with a notable comparison of the genre in the Apology of Hattusili (III) from the Hittite realm. David is portrayed as a pious man chosen by Yahweh for kingship, acting reasonably even when the existing king Saul behaves badly towards him, even seeking to kill him. Eventually, Saul is killed in a battle with the Philistines (1 Samuel 31). The legitimization for his fate is stated as his having been impatient in waiting for Yahweh's instructions through Samuel (1 Samuel 10:8; 13:8–14) and in refusing to engage in a genocidal massacre of Amalekites, a people group living near the Israelites (1 Samuel 15), with such action also being broadly in line with the genocidal imperative of the tradition in Genesis-Joshua. Ultimately, one can see the problem as having been a lack of attention to the commands of Samuel, the religious leader of the nation. Accordingly, the leader sought to find another person as their protégé, and no indications of similar disobedience in respect to David are recorded in the text. Saul's final demise is indicated as having happened after he had sought a medium and talked with Samuel himself who had died! (1 Samuel 28; cf. 1 Chronicles 10, esp. 13–14). David had initially been ceremonially anointed as a king by Samuel (1 Samuel 16), and then after the death of Saul (and Samuel) he is first confirmed as a king through a ritual of anointing by his own tribe Judah (1 Samuel 2:4) and then by the rest of the Israelite tribes (1 Samuel 5:1–3). It is clear that the action by the rest of the tribes cannot have been of coerced nature; accordingly, David's rule must ultimately have been based on his personal charisma together with the backing that Samuel as a previous leader had given him. Again, it would not in any case have been easy, at least not in the time in question, to apply available rudimentary coercive mechanisms over a hill country that was relatively isolated and inaccessible and also characterised by a variety of geographical and climatic features.¹⁵⁸

Table 5.1 Kings of Israel and Judah

Saul (late 11th century BCE) David (ca. 1000 BCE) Solomon (ca. 950 BCE)	
Judah	Israel
Rehoboam (late 10th century BCE)	Jeroboam (late 10th century BCE)
Abijah	
Asa	Nadab
	Baasha
	Elah
	Zimri
	Tibni
	Omri
Jehoshaphat	Ahab
	Ahaziah
Jehoram	Joram
Ahaziah	Jehu
Athaliah	
Joash	Jehoahaz
Amaziah	Jehoash
Uzziah	Jeroboam II
	Zechariah
	Shallum
	Menahem
	Pekahiah
Jotham	Pekah
Ahaz	Hoshea (last king, till 722 BCE)
Hezekiah	
Manasseh	
Amon	
Josiah	
Jehoahaz	
Jehoiakim	
Jehoiachin	
Zedekiah (last king, till 586 BCE)	

In this connection, whereas the text of 1 Samuel indicates few administrative changes in respect to Saul, there are more of them in relation to David. An important innovation is the changing of the capital from David's initial town of Hebron to Jerusalem. The town had its history and cannot but have been considered a famous locality, already based on its prominence reflected in the Amarna letters. Its conquest by David is portrayed as a significant achievement (2 Samuel 5:6–10). A change of capital is always a significant event in at least attempting to forge new directions for a political entity, with the move to Amarna by Akhenaten and Kar Tukulti-Ninurta by Tukulti-Ninurta I having already been notable examples of such undertakings before the time of David. The change to Jerusalem was also carefully orchestrated from a religious perspective. The ark of Yahweh, as the locus where Yahweh was present, was brought into the town (2 Samuel 6; cf. 1 Chronicles 15–16), signifying Yahweh's choice of Jerusalem as a place for his

dwelling. This choice was really perceived as having been confirmed once a temple was built by David's son Solomon as a permanent dwelling for Yahweh, also paralleling Yahweh's more or less permanent choice of David and his descendants in the context of kingship (2 Samuel 7; 1 Kings 5–8; 2 Chronicles 2–7). In the wider sense, the proponents of Davidic monarchy saw the capture of the ark from Shiloh and its subsequent taking to Jerusalem as a sign that Yahweh had rejected Shiloh and the premonarchical religiopolitical system in favour of David and his monarchy and a choice of Jerusalem as a religiopolitical centre of Israel (Psalm 78:56–72).¹⁵⁹ The books of Chronicles also portray how David changes the arrangements that pertained to the service of the tent of meeting in the premonarchical time (e.g. Numbers 3–4) into a service that was fitting for the new temple (1 Chronicles 23–26). A certain amount of administration is also portrayed as having been created (1 Chronicles 27; 2 Samuel 20:23–26). The books of Samuel and Chronicles, and also the book of Judges, can be seen as having been written from the perspective of the Davidic monarchy, contributing towards its legitimization as the appropriate religiopolitical order of ancient Israel. On this basis, their portrayal of events should be seen, at least in their main outlines, as completely plausible and as depicting astute religiopolitical manoeuvring.¹⁶⁰

Interestingly, the portrayed developments also tally with the concept of frontier societies as proposed by Gerhard Lenski.¹⁶¹ In frontier societies, the common population of agrarian societies¹⁶² succeeds in escaping the cusps of the agrarian elite and establishes a more egalitarian order in a frontier zone that the elites are not able to control, at least not sufficiently.¹⁶³ In such a zone, that may previously have been uninhabited, or may have been inhabited by smaller societies that were less advanced, traditional patterns of life would often break down, resulting in the possibility of establishing the new form.¹⁶⁴ Lenski offers early Israel as the first known instance of such a society, and more recently the Norwegian-Irish settlement of Iceland, the settlement of North America by Europeans, the British settlement of Australia and New Zealand, the Boer settlement of South Africa and the Cossack settlement of the Russian steppes.¹⁶⁵ All of these examples can be seen in the context of agrarian societies. In addition, except for the Norwegian-Irish settlement which appears to have been on an uninhabited land, the other examples can be analysed as settler colonialism. Lenski's comments that frontier conditions last only a limited time after which traditional authoritative structures tend to establish themselves also applies to early Israel in that the monarchy took hold at the time of David and Solomon, some 200–300 years after the start of the Israelite settlement.¹⁶⁶ Interestingly, Lenski's suggestion that the closing of the frontier in America led to the reversal in the direction of traditional structures asserting themselves¹⁶⁷ fits with the idea of the frontier closing in the time of

David and Solomon as portrayed by the Hebrew Bible.¹⁶⁸ Such a state of affairs could be a result of shrinking of the available resource base from the perspective of the frontier society, as there was no more room for the society to expand, with eventual re-establishment of traditional authority structures.¹⁶⁹ While the above presentation has emphasised the voluntary nature of the rise of kingship, developments that relate to ancient Israel as a settler colonial frontier society are perfectly consistent with it as a backdrop.

An important related suggestion by Lenski is that had the new society been based on the governing class of the older society, the sociocultural patterns of the older society would be likely to have prevailed.¹⁷⁰ Such preservation, however, does not seem to have been the case in the Palestinian highlands; instead, archaeological evidence suggests a relative lack of social stratification. Also, and in more direct response to Gottwald's peasant revolt theory, Lenski suggests that elites do not give their power away voluntarily and that peasant revolts have been rarely successful in history, nor is there any evidence of peasant revolts in the late second millennium BCE; instead, such a revolt would have to be assumed.¹⁷¹ And, peasant revolts have been able not to establish a new order, but mostly just a change in those who hold power.¹⁷² At the same time, interestingly, the point that elites do not voluntarily cede their power also speaks against an indigenous development in the highlands. As attested by the Amarna letters, the indigenous polities largely consisted of fairly small city states, a picture confirmed also by the book of Joshua. Such city states would have had a monarchical based administration, and it seems quite unlikely that such an overall administrative and societal structure would have subsided even if those independent city states did unite into an overarching society in the highlands. It was only in the time of Saul, David and Solomon that any real monarchical structures started to arise for the new ancient Israelite entity in the highlands.

In this sense, then, one can see how the ancient Israelite legal materials in Genesis-Joshua that promote egalitarianism fit best in the milieu of premonarchical Israel in Iron Age I. It is correct that such egalitarianism was not all-encompassing, as, for example, foreigners could be taken as permanent slaves according to the documents (Leviticus 25:44–46), and in general indigenous peoples were not attributed any rights (Deuteronomy 7). Nevertheless, the people of the settler collective itself were by and large seen as equal in the thinking of the documents.¹⁷³ In that, even taxation, while stipulated, was voluntary and its rate as approximately ten per cent rather low (see e.g. Leviticus 27:30–33; Numbers 18; Deuteronomy 14:22–29; 18:1–4).¹⁷⁴ Such taxation envisaged in Genesis-Joshua also pertained only to the support of the religious establishment, without anything due to any political authorities. The lack of landholdings prevented religious personnel from

accumulating wealth even when they were otherwise conceptually part of a societal elite.

E. Expansion and empire

Altogether, the changes that took place with the establishment of kingship can be considered as momentous, even when they kicked in only slowly and took at the minimum several decades to take hold to any substantive degree. One of the express goals that the people were portrayed as having, an express desire to be stronger at war (1 Samuel 8:20), had been fulfilled according to the texts of the Hebrew Bible. David was able to win over neighbouring countries and even extract taxes from some of them (2 Samuel 8). The archaeological picture is consistent with this increase in social power, as the highland culture expanded into the lowlands at around the time when kingship is portrayed to have been established.¹⁷⁵ Clearly the mode of colonialism in the time of David is portrayed as franchise colonial, with prefects or garrisons¹⁷⁶ set in Aram Damascus and in Edom (2 Samuel 8:6, 14). The books of Chronicles (1 Chronicles 18:1) add to the picture by stating that David took Gath and its dependent towns from the Philistines. No clear archaeological evidence for such a takeover exists, however. If one then tries to correlate between text and archaeology, this suggests that the statement is either completely exaggerated or refers to an administrative takeover in a franchise colonial sense that ended up being relatively short-lived, not affecting material culture at Gath in any detectable way.¹⁷⁷ In addition, 2 Samuel 8:2 (cf. 1 Chronicles 18:2) claims that the Moabites became subject to taxation at the time of David. If an empire is defined as a polity that exerts political control over another polity,¹⁷⁸ then the biblical documents indicate that ancient Israel became an empire in the time of David, even when its footprint seems to have been a light one.¹⁷⁹

The texts of the Hebrew Bible describe how Solomon succeeds his father David (1 Kings 1) and consolidates his power (1 Kings 2). Solomon also appears to strengthen his administration (1 Kings 4).¹⁸⁰ In addition, the text implies that he ruled over a franchise colonial empire that was inherited from his father David (1 Kings 4:21)¹⁸¹ and engaged in international diplomacy (1 Kings 3:1; 5:1). He is moreover described as having fortified a number of towns (1 Kings 9:17–19) and building a fleet of ships (1 Kings 9:26–28), in addition to building a temple for Yahweh in Jerusalem. His administration and building projects required resources, and these he got through a combination of taxation and forced labour, with being coerced into forced labour only

applying to indigenous peoples that remained in the land (1 Kings 9:20–23). If one recalls the concept of cumulative bureaucratisation of coercion, the developments in the trajectory of Saul to David to Solomon provide a clear example of it, even when Malešević's comments in general relate to a longer historical trajectory in the context of technological innovation.¹⁸² However, with early Israel, the development of administrative structures can be seen in the context of the adoption of a new political system and its quick evolution based on both material and ideological technologies that were already more or less available in the area.¹⁸³

The developments just outlined are, as such, perfectly reasonable and plausible from a historical perspective. In this connection, the books of Samuel in particular were traditionally seen as at least relatively early and reliable documents by post-Wellhausenian scholarship, with the book of Judges adding to the picture by providing a broadly acceptable portrayal about Israel in Iron Age I, even when Genesis-Joshua was not regarded highly.¹⁸⁴ It is also probably fair to say that the picture given about Solomon was more or less accepted. However, as was already outlined, not everyone has agreed with such a portrayal by the texts, especially in recent times. The debate between proponents of mainstream and minimalist approaches illustrates the issues involved.¹⁸⁵ This includes an extensive debate between proponents of the so-called Low Chronology in the Iron Age of the southern Levant and those following traditional-based chronologies.¹⁸⁶ Here, of course, the presentation broadly sides with both mainstream approaches to the historicity of the United Monarchy and maximalist approaches to the early history of Israel, even when it is not necessary to establish in the context of this book whether anything in the patriarchal narratives is historical in the sense of portraying actual events. In line with what was said in the foregoing, the view taken here is that some of it may be "historical";¹⁸⁷ however, a fair number of aspects are likely to belong to a category of creating unity in the highlands in the context of ethnogenesis based on an idea of common descent for the ancient Israelites and for legitimating the presence of ancient Israel in the land in a settler colonial context.¹⁸⁸ Similarly, it is as such not necessary to consider many of the details that pertain to the wilderness period in Exodus-Deuteronomy as historical in a modern sense. The main point is that Sinai and the surrounding wilderness provides a narrative and conceptual frame for the founding of the institutions imagined for early Israel.¹⁸⁹ It is also important to note that ancient Israel was part of the ancient Near East, and accordingly, the documents could include literary features attested in other ancient Near Eastern documents. Such documents are known to attest selectivity, bias and embellishments.¹⁹⁰ In fact, such features are at the minimum arguably part of any political argumentation, at least once coercive civilisational sociopolitical entities had

arisen, in which it is not always important whether a feature referred to is based on reality but whether the target audience of the rhetoric at least sufficiently believes in the message or not.¹⁹¹ In this sense, then, one can evaluate critically any viewpoints and the coverage of information, and of course details provided by the authors of the documents included in the Hebrew Bible. At the same time, again, it is not necessary to be hypercritical of the documents, either, but one may let them also speak for themselves, dissociated as much as possible from their modern cultural, political and religious appropriations that may affect interpretation. In this sense, then, coming back to issues of kingship, empire and historicity of the narratives of Saul, David and Solomon, they do provide a clear and consistent picture in their outlines about developments in early Israel, even when certain details in them are likely to be embellished.¹⁹² As we have seen, such consistency also pertains to the books of Chronicles when seen together with the priestly documents that pertain to premonarchical Israel.¹⁹³ This is in some considerable contrast to the late dating of priestly documents in Genesis-Joshua and priestly materials in Chronicles and their relegation to the realm of (complete) myth that has been a dominant feature of Western scholarship since the time of de Wette and Wellhausen in the nineteenth century. However, as we have seen, a Wellhausenian (or a “minimalist”) appropriation is unnecessary and in fact prevents one from seeing early Israel as a new settler colonial society that through various transformations also became an empire, albeit a very short-lived one, and, based on both text and archaeology, an empire that left only a very limited cultural and material footprint in its colonies. On the main, as we have already seen in the previous chapter, it did not substantively differ from the adjacent Philistine society in its overall characteristics, and the same can be seen to be the case in comparison with the Arameans, the subject of the next chapter.

F. Aftermath

The Israelite state that was also an empire became divided into two in the time of Solomon’s son Rehoboam according to the Hebrew Bible. The story narrated in 1 Kings 12 presents how Rehoboam is approached by the representatives of all Israel. The representatives request that Rehoboam lessen the tax and labour burden that Solomon had imposed on Israel (1 Kings 12:1–4). Rehoboam, however, having taken advice that is unsound, refuses the request (1 Kings 12:5–14). As a result, ten of the twelve Israelite tribes secede (1 Kings 12:15–19).

A civil war is about to ensue, but this is averted based on prophetic intervention (1 Kings 12:21–24). In the process, a new leader, Jeroboam, is chosen to be king over the ten tribes that have seceded (1 Kings 12:20). Jeroboam then establishes two cultic centres in the new Northern Kingdom of Israel as the dominant religious institutions of the state that has just formed (1 Kings 12:25–33). These are viewed as illegitimate expressions of religious worship by southerners who wish to follow the Davidic tradition (1 Kings 12:30–31) that was already sanctioned as legitimate in the changeover from premonarchical Shiloh to Jerusalem in the time of the United Monarchy. The breach proves to be irreparable (cf. 1 Kings 12:19), with the two kingdoms existing in parallel until the northern kingdom is destroyed by the Assyrians in the eighth century BCE (2 Kings 17) and the southern one by the Babylonians in the early sixth century BCE (2 Kings 24–25). The territory of the Israelites also starts to reduce soon, not to mention the ability to control any empire. Much of this reduction is according to the texts of the Hebrew Bible caused by the resurgent Arameans in the northeast in the ninth century BCE (2 Kings 10:32–33). At this stage the neo-Assyrians who produced records that have been preserved for posterity have also already arrived at the scene, and their comments about encounters with the Israelites and other peoples in the area on their part provide a source of additional information that reasonably correlates with materials in the Hebrew Bible.¹⁹⁴

The portrayal of the events that relate to the division of the United Monarchy is perfectly plausible when looked at from the perspective of hegemony.¹⁹⁵ Coercion is not a sufficient feature of keeping societies together but also has to be backed by centrifugal ideologisation that is acceptable to the people. If the support of the people is lost, it is not possible to rule a state or an empire. This is exactly what is portrayed to have happened with the Israelites in 1 Kings 12. It should also be noted that a north-south division is already attested in the biblical documents themselves, with David first ruling over Judah only in the south and anointed a leader of the rest of Israel only later on (2 Samuel 2:1–4; 5:3).¹⁹⁶ That Benjamin stayed with Judah would seem to be connected with the fact that Jerusalem was a border town between those two tribes (cf. Joshua 15:8; 18:28) and that it was therefore reasonably possible to extend the rule of Judah into Benjamin. Considering that Shiloh had been located in the territory of Ephraim in the central hill country, northerners would have had a more volatile view of the monarchy and its ideologisation (cf. Psalm 78:56–72). They kept with it due to David's charismatic role and ability to defend Israel in relation to a number of its surrounding entities. They also kept with Solomon; however, they did feel the burden of his administration and sought to redress the issue at the transition of power to Solomon's son Rehoboam, resulting in secession at the refusal of their request.

Nevertheless, they had already grown accustomed to a monarchical style of life, appointing a king of their own to rule over the northern territory.¹⁹⁷ The south did not have a mechanism to coerce the north back in, especially when a religious representative with a degree of social power advised against it, keeping in mind the dominant role that religion had in ancient Near Eastern societies.

It was, then, the southern monarchy that kept to the ancient Israelite tradition that derived from the premonarchical period, even when it had been reinterpreted by the monarchy. New compositions were also added, such as psalms that extolled Jerusalem as the chosen city of Yahweh (see Psalms). There was also a prophetic movement that produced a set of prophetic books, and a set of wisdom compositions that were preserved by the community for posterity. Little of such influence and legacy can be detected for the northern kingdom.¹⁹⁸ Once the southern Israelite monarchy had been extinguished by the Babylonian conquests at the beginning of the sixth century BCE, the interpretation of Genesis-Joshua, and already the books of Samuel-Kings, regardless of whether the first edition of the books of Kings originates from the exile to Babylonia or before it,¹⁹⁹ would now focus on reflection on and interpretation of the documents based on the great catastrophe. To this collection would be added new books, such as Lamentations. If there was a further exilic redaction of the materials, or in case of an exilic composition of Kings *mutatis mutandis*, it could then have added the final chapters of Kings and inserted or retouched at least some of the materials that are linked to the exile in their present form in Genesis-Joshua in the context of the wider historical work of Genesis-Kings that was now emerging.²⁰⁰ It is also very possible that the exile acted as another major watershed in terms of how Genesis-Joshua *per se* was being read. As suggested by Sanders, the loss of immediate connection to the land for the exiles who were in Babylonia meant that the fulfilment of its conquest was now less important than before.²⁰¹ Nor would the returnees some decades later as a small community within the new Persian empire that was not independent be likely to have had the means to launch a settler colonial programme.²⁰² Instead, the *torah* of Moses (Genesis-Deuteronomy), a document that looked forward to the land, became a reference point for the now-emerging early Judaism, securing the identity of the early Jews, many of whom were and even would increasingly be scattered throughout the Mediterranean world and in practice could only hope to return to the land someday, rather in an “eschatological” sense.²⁰³ This identity did also have an increasingly individualising aspect.²⁰⁴ Accordingly, Ezra would read the Pentateuch as *torah* in postexilic times and Nehemiah would focus on separation from foreigners rather than their extermination. In general, looking back into the past was already attested in the second millennium BCE based on

the third-millennium empire of Agade, and the postexilic biblical books could attest broadly similar features and approaches.²⁰⁵ A selection of texts produced by the ancient Israelites and subsequent Jewish authors was considered as canonical by the New Testament authors in the first century CE and the texts then spread into the Roman empire as part of the advance of Christianity there. With Christendom in the fourth century and the expansion of the West that followed, the texts have travelled farther and wider than their original authors could have envisaged. Further comments on the influence of the texts in the contemporary world will be made in the final chapter of this book.²⁰⁶

Notes

- 1 Cf. e.g. van Seters 1992; this summary paragraph incorporates material from Pitkänen 2016b:26.
- 2 See Chapter 1.
- 3 Note that *torah* means law in Hebrew, and this designation for the Pentateuch reflects the prominence of legal materials in Exodus-Deuteronomy.
- 4 Material that follows has been adapted from Pitkänen 2017a:3–11. Note the references to further scholarship in *ibid.*, p. 3, listing Wenham 1996; Wenham 1999; Wenham 2003:159–186; Otto 2012:33–230, and also Frevel 2013 as representative samples. See also e.g. Anderson 2017:38–52. Note also that it is agreed that Pentateuchal research “has often been at the forefront of developments in biblical scholarship” (see Anderson 2017:37) and that, for example, the date of the book of Deuteronomy can be described as “the linch-pin of Old Testament criticism” (see Wenham 1985; cf. Otto 2012:33–230); cf. comments just ahead.
- 5 See de Wette 1830/1805; ET and commentary in Harvey and Halpern 2008.
- 6 Wellhausen 1905/1878.
- 7 Note that the so-called Holiness Code (H) that was also identified within the Priestly Code was dated by Wellhausen to a time somewhat before P, but after the book of Ezekiel.
- 8 See Gunkel 1925–1926; Gunkel 1997/1901.
- 9 Cf. Cassuto 2006/1941.
- 10 Cf. van Seters 1992; van Seters 1994.
- 11 Whybray 1987.

- 12 Rendtorff 1990/1977.
- 13 Cf. Dozeman and Schmid 2006.
- 14 See e.g. Otto 2012:231–257.
- 15 See e.g. Baden 2009; Baden 2012; Stackert 2014.
- 16 Noth 1991/1943; also Noth 1987/1943, both of these books are connected.
- 17 See Noth 1987/1943:141.
- 18 See Noth 1987/1943:143–148.
- 19 E.g. Westermann 1994.
- 20 See e.g. Otto 2012:231–257; cf. Dozeman, Römer and Schmid 2011.
- 21 See MC, incl. 117–144.
- 22 See e.g. Moorey 1991; cf. Pitkänen 2010:30–31 from which this paragraph has been adapted, with permission of Inter-Varsity Press; Pitkänen 2016a:3–4.
- 23 See e.g. Mazar 1992; Levy 2010.
- 24 Cf. e.g. Miller and Hayes 2006.
- 25 See Hawkins 2013:40–43 for a summary, with Gottwald 1979 the main work.
- 26 See e.g. Dever 2003.
- 27 See Faust 2006: esp. 170–187; cf. Hawkins 2013:43–48; Grabbe 2016a:47–50 for further recent models that broadly fall within the range expressed in the foregoing.
- 28 E.g. Lemche 1998; Thompson 1992; Davies 1992; cf. Liverani 2005/2003; Liverani 2014:401–419 who tends to be sympathetic towards such an approach but with some clear differences; this paragraph adapted from Pitkänen 2017a:7.
- 29 See e.g. Finkelstein 1996; Mazar 1997; and Thomas 2016 that includes comments on latest developments.
- 30 See e.g. Wenham 1987; Wenham 1994; Kitchen 2003; Provan, Long and Longman 2003.
- 31 See Otto 2012:62–230.
- 32 See Tov 2012:93–99.
- 33 Cf. e.g. Whybray 1987 for problems with redaction and oral tradition with the Well-hausenian Newer Documentary Hypothesis that will not be covered/repeated here, and see e.g. Dever 2001 and Kitchen 2003 as critiques of minimalist approaches.

- 34 For compositional considerations on Genesis-Joshua, see Pitkänen 2015; Pitkänen 2017a; Pitkänen 2019. The main suggestion there is that Genesis-Joshua was written by two authors working together, one producing Genesis-Numbers and the other Deuteronomy and Joshua.
- 35 See Kuhn 1962; cf. Wenham 1999. It is correct that in Humanities there is more (if not much more) leeway in terms of how much “certainty” one can claim for the theories presented. Yet, to illustrate a paradox (and really a fundamental problem in scholarship) here, at least some people who operate within Pentateuchal scholarship exactly do make such claims!
- 36 See esp. Kilchör 2015:1–30.
- 37 See e.g. Wolfe 1999.
- 38 See Said 2003/1978.
- 39 See Chapter 2.
- 40 Cf. Pitkänen 2018:20.
- 41 Note here also the compelling argument for the legal materials in Deuteronomy building on both the Covenant Code (and Ritual Decalogue) and Priestly materials (including the Holiness Code) in Kilchör 2015.
- 42 Altogether, for fuller articulations by this author of how the Pentateuch with Joshua has been composed from a literary-historical perspective, see esp. Pitkänen 2015; Pit-känen 2017a:16–33.
- 43 See comments ahead on these issues.
- 44 Cf. comments in the foregoing, including Chapter 1; on the issue of additions, see ahead in this chapter.
- 45 For further on Zionism and modern Israel, see ahead, Chapter 8.
- 46 Again, for more on issues that relate to reception, see esp. Chapter 8 that includes comments around Zionism and the modern state of Israel.
- 47 Cf. e.g. Davies 2004.
- 48 See esp. the monographs Pitkänen 2014/2003, the commentaries Pitkänen 2010 and Pitkänen 2017a, and the article length studies of Pitkänen 2014a; Pitkänen 2015; Pit-känen 2016a, and cf. comments in Chapter 1.
- 49 See esp. the so-called Joseph cycle in Genesis 37, 39–50.
- 50 See Hoffmeier 1997: esp. 3–51.
- 51 See Hoffmeier 1997:52–76.
- 52 On this, see Morris 2018:20–23.

- 53 Cf. Bryce 2009:325 for a short summary on the Hyksos.
- 54 See Morris 2018:117–120 for a summary, and cf. comments in Chapter 3.
- 55 Cf. Scott 2017 and the discussion in Chapter 2.
- 56 Cf. Hoffmeier 1997:83–84.
- 57 For a discussion of further details, see e.g. Hoffmeier 1997.
- 58 Cf. e.g. Jerusalem in the Amarna letters.
- 59 Egyptian: *ysrir fk.t bn prt.f*
- 60 ANET:378.
- 61 See Morris 2005:377, 616–621. Cf. also comments on Merneptah in Chapter 4.
- 62 Cf. Morris 2005:377–378.
- 63 Cf. Betz 2016:364.
- 64 On Egyptian evidence in relation to Pithom and Ramesses (Ex 1:11), see Hoffmeier 1997:117–121. The towns already existed before the time of Ramesses II (cf. LA 5:129 on Ramesses).
- 65 Heb. *yš' mhm*.
- 66 Cf. the discussion in Chapter 4.
- 67 Morris 2018:149–154; cf. the foregoing, Chapter 3.
- 68 Morris 2018:149–154, with the option that the local rulers might have built buildings for the Egyptians at their command included.
- 69 See Morris 2018:150–151.
- 70 See Isserlin 1983.
- 71 See Pitkänen 2010:232, 331 for summaries, also e.g. Hawkins 2013:111–117, 117–119.
- 72 See Pitkänen 2010:162–169; cf. Hawkins 2013:91–100.
- 73 This seems particularly plausible as LXX adds material similar to 1 Kings 16:34; cf. Pitkänen 2010:154, 160; and cf. more generally Dozeman, Römer and Schmid 2011.
- 74 For discussion, see Pitkänen 2010:182–184; Hawkins 2013:105–108.
- 75 See Pitkänen 2010 and Pitkänen 2017a for summaries of each site in Numbers and Joshua.
- 76 For discussion, see Younger 1990; Pitkänen 2010. Cf. also the expressions “on that day” (*bayyôm hahû'*) and “on the second day” (*bayyôm haššeny*) in

Joshua 10 (e.g. Joshua 10:32, 35) with “in a single day” (*i-na 1 u₄-me*) in the annals of Tiglath-Pileser I quoted in the following (Chapter 6).

77 For a discussion, see Pitkänen 2010:247–264.

78 Note also that except for papyrus that was usual in Egypt, wooden writing boards were also used at the time (see Postgate 2013:64 and *passim* for writing boards in Middle Assyria, and cf. e.g. LÄ 5:702 for writing boards in ancient Egypt).

79 See e.g. Millard 2012; Lemaire 2012.

80 I.e. the *utilisation* of alphabet, not the invention of it as such.

81 But cf. Judges 8:14 in terms of its portrayal of the period of Judges.

82 Cf. Sanders 2009.

83 I thank Christian Frevel for highlighting that the question of burden of proof in relation to this issue is an important matter (private communication).

84 For further comments on this, see just ahead. Note also that the biblical documents do not make any reference to Egyptian colonial hold in Canaan in the Late Bronze and the early part of the Early Iron Age (cf. Grabbe 2016b:56) is a moot point.

85 Cf. e.g. Carr 2011; Tigay 2002/1982; Tov 2012. One highlight in the textual evidence in this respect is the existence of two quite differing versions of the book of Jeremiah, see e.g. Tov 2012:137, 168.

86 See Chapter 2.

87 Day 2008.

88 See Chapter 2. The rest of the paragraph and the next are adapted from Pitkänen 2014a.

89 Day 2008:7.

90 Day 2008:8.

91 Day 2008:8.

92 Day 2008:8.

93 Day 2008:8.

94 Day 2008:7–9.

95 I will analyse based on: staking a legal claim, mapping the land, naming, foundation stories, supplanting the savages and the genocidal imperative, by right of conquest, tilling the soil and peopling the land, defending the

territory. What follows below is mostly a summary, fuller details in Pitkänen 2014a.

96 The Hebrew root *tur* in 13:1 has also the meaning “to spy”.

97 Cf. also Talbert 2012.

98 Cf. e.g. Pitkänen 2010:261–264, quoting HDT:109–111, for an example of Hittite border descriptions (in a treaty context). For further details on the extent of the territory, including differing visions on it in the biblical documents, see Pitkänen 2014a:12.

99 See Joshua 13:1–7 in particular.

100 See e.g. Finkelstein 1988:324–330; Faust 2006: esp. 159–166, 221–226; Junkkaala 2006; Van Bekkum 2010.

101 See also Day 2008:96–97, referring to the defeat of King Sihon, and making a parallel with later conquistadors.

102 Day 2008:96; see e.g. Joshua 1:3; 14:9.

103 See Dever 2003:98.

104 See Bellwood 2013:15, 247; cf. comments in the foregoing, Chapter 2.

105 This is consistent with archaeological evidence from Transjordan, see e.g. Pitkänen 2017a:192. Note further that this already implies that the early Israelites can be expected to have been aware of the existence of walled towns as attested in e.g. Numbers 35, Deuteronomy and Joshua 21.

106 Cf. also Chapter 7 ahead for further comments on the Transjordanian area.

107 For further comments on the early monarchy, see the following.

108 See e.g. Westbrook 2003a: esp. 18–19. For this paragraph, cf. Pitkänen 2014a:18–19.

109 Cf. e.g. Feder 2011 that points out how Hurrian rituals from Kizzuwatna in southeastern Anatolia provide particularly strong parallels to the biblical ones, also referring to Miller 2004. Interestingly, considerable Hurrian migrations took place into Palestine especially in the early part of the Late Bronze Age (see e.g. Niesiolowski-Spanò 2016:215–216; van der Steen 2016:159–160, 164, 171).

110 Wolfe 2008:130n71.

111 Wolfe 2008:103.

112 See Exodus 25–40.

113 Cf. Pitkänen 2014/2003: esp. 38–52.

- 114 See Pitkänen 2014/2003: esp. 25–52.
- 115 See Pitkänen 2014/2003:25–38.
- 116 See Pitkänen 2014/2003: esp. 95–110.
- 117 See Pitkänen 2014/2003 for a book-length study on the theme of central sanctuary in ancient Israel.
- 118 See Pitkänen 2017a:17, adapted from Milgrom 1990:xviii.
- 119 On this symbolism, see e.g. Meyers 2005:252, 282; Nihan 2007:59–68; Dozeman 2009:571–574.
- 120 The tabernacle is explicitly mentioned in the text of Samuel in 1 Samuel 2:22, even when the mention is lacking in the Greek text. Similarly, the ritual proceedings described in 1 Samuel 1–3 do not correspond exactly with the biblical rituals prescribed in Genesis-Joshua; however, the actual practice of ritual is not necessarily the same as its textual codification and standardisation (cf. Bell 2009/1992:137–140). One may further note that a more permanent structure is also involved in 1 Samuel 1–3, for one thing, one may ask if a structure made of perishable materials could really stand on its own and last for a long time (and see e.g. Pitkänen 2014/2003:140–143 for a related discussion).
- 121 For fuller considerations, including review of scholarship, see Pitkänen 2010:332–352; Pitkänen 2017a:204–209; cf. also Pitkänen 2014a:27–28.
- 122 Cf. discussion in the foregoing.
- 123 That the arrangement was not changed in the tradition even when it could not in reality be applicable to Dan would seem to suggest that it was known that the actual implementation of the system was at best partial; otherwise, a similar mention to that in Joshua 19:47 (and Judges 18) might have been expected (cf. also 1 Chronicles 7 from a later time that remains broadly the same as Joshua 21).
- 124 Except possibly for the Covenant Code (Exodus 20:22–23:33) and the related Ritual Decalogue (Exodus 34:11–2) that are relatively short compositions, even though they could also easily have been done by priests. The book of Deuteronomy attests priestly “lay theology” (see e.g. Otto 2000:253).
- 125 See e.g. Exodus 4:14; 6:16–26.
- 126 Cf. Bellwood 2013:14–15, and also cf. comments made on the issue in the foregoing.
- 127 Cf. the foregoing.

128 See e.g. Hess 1996:284–286; Nelson 1997: esp. 12–13, 242–243; cf. Knauf 2008.

The presentation in the book of Joshua is also often considered to be in contradiction with the book of Judges which clearly describes an incomplete conquest.

129 The comments in the rest of the paragraph adapted from Pitkänen 2014a:18.

130 Veracini 2010:89.

131 Veracini 2010:88.

132 Veracini 2010:89.

133 On dating and authorship of the book of Judges, cf. comments in Pitkänen 2014/2003:241–259. The book is often dated late, but this does not seem to be a must, even though it dates from the time of the monarchy at the earliest.

134 Cf. the discussion of hegemony in Chapter 2.

135 Cf. comments in the foregoing, Chapter 4.

136 Cf. the discussion in Chapter 2, including the list in Section B, p. 33. The rest of this section has been adapted from Pitkänen 2014b:254–257.

137 See Finkelberg 2005:24–41; cf. the foregoing, Chapter 4.

138 Cf. Hill 1996, *passim*, for some broadly comparable processes.

139 In the biblical narratives, Levi was part of the twelve Israelite tribes (e.g. Genesis 30; 34), however, the Levites are, due to their cultic role, considered differently from the rest of the tribes in the context of the conquest and settlement (Numbers 2:33; 3:12; Joshua 13:14), and Ephraim and Manasseh were seen as sons of Joseph (Genesis 46:20; Joshua 14:3–4) to keep to the number twelve for both the settling tribes “proper” and tribes as a whole. Cf. also e.g. Leuchter and Hutton 2011 for broad considerations on the priests and Levites.

140 Weinfeld 1993:6–9; cf. comments made in Chapter 4 in the foregoing.

141 Cf. also the “mixed multitude” (*ṛḇ ṛḇ*) in Exodus 12:38.

142 See e.g. Dever 2003:108; Faust 2006:35–40.

143 See Faust 2006:41–48.

144 Cf. Faust 2006:85–91.

145 See Faust 2006:71–84.

146 Lenski (2005:155) suggests a number of technological advantages, such as the use of iron, rock terracing, use of cisterns, etc.

147 Cf. Faust 2006:41.

148 Cf. also Kelly 1985:181–182 where the difference between the Nuer and Dinka was whether wet season settlements were spatially segregated (Dinka) or intermixed (Nuer) in terms of agriculture and herding.

149 If so, the textual reification of tradition and creation of an overarching ethnic identity would in this respect be attempting to be building on popular thinking, qualifying as a potentially successful attempt at creation of a hegemonic order.

150 For related archaeological issues, see e.g. Mazar 1992, *passim*.

151 Cf. esp. Table 2.2, p. 60.

152 See Joshua 13:1–13; Judges 1; cf. the overall distribution of four room houses in Faust 2006:76 and the overall distribution of collared rim jars in Faust 2006:192.

153 Cf. discussion in the foregoing, Chapter 2.

154 Cf. the discussion in Chapter 2.

155 See Pitkänen 2014/2003:38–52; and cf. comments made in the foregoing.

156 See Pitkänen 2014/2003:126.

157 The reference in 1 Samuel 13:1 is unclear, and the verse is also missing in LXX.

158 Cf. comments in C. Parker 2015.

159 For this reason, it is unlikely that (the later) biblical documents stemming from the southern kingdom of Judah or its intellectual descendants in the exilic and postexilic periods would have promoted Shiloh in the way Genesis-Joshua does, see esp. Pitkänen 2014/2003.

160 Again, the texts should be seen as political documents, with religious concerns intermixed.

161 The next two paragraphs are adapted from Pitkänen 2016a:8.

162 One could also envisage this as applying to horticultural societies.

163 Nolan and Lenski 2015:198–200.

164 Nolan and Lenski 2015:198.

165 Nolan and Lenski 2015:198–199.

166 Lenski 2005:157–158; Nolan and Lenski 2015:199; cf. Lenski 2005:160.

167 Lenski 2005:158, referring to the work of Turner.

- 168 Cf. 1 Kings 9:20–22; secondarily 2 Samuel 8; 10.
- 169 Cf. Nolan and Lenski 2015:199, and see further comments in the following. Note that in the United States, it seems that industrialisation halted this tendency that was already observable in the nineteenth century, enabling the maintenance of more egalitarian structures; see Nolan and Lenski 2015:199–200.
- 170 Lenski 2005:158
- 171 Lenski 2005:153–154, 159–160; and cf. related comments in the foregoing.
- 172 Lenski 2005:199; Nolan and Lenski 2015:183–184; and cf. related comments in the foregoing. The well-known exception of France in the eighteenth century would seem to have taken place at the onset of the industrial revolution, and even that was soon reversed by the rule of Napoleon until later developments in democracy in the nineteenth century that already falls well within the industrial era.
- 173 See esp. Berman 2008.
- 174 Cf. Pitkänen 2016a:9.
- 175 Cf. e.g. Finkelstein 1988 and Faust 2006 for the patterns of this settlement as seen in archaeology; cf. also Junkkaala 2006.
- 176 Cf. the discussion on the word *nšyb* in the foregoing.
- 177 Cf. the discussions in Dietrich 2012:97–98; Maeir 2012:362–385.
- 178 Cf. comments in Chapter 2 in the foregoing.
- 179 Cf. also e.g. the detailed considerations in Halpern 2001:107–226.
- 180 Note how the administration does not quite fall according to tribal territorial borders. This can be read as emphasising that there were at least some innovative aspects in its creation.
- 181 If Solomon had a degree of control over Damascus as inherited from his father, one could think that the path to Euphrates towards northeast from Damascus along semiarid or desert routes would not necessarily be too obstructed in terms of the claim in regard to Euphrates. If one adds to this Edom, and possibly Moab, also inherited from David, with or without any real basis of a claim of franchise colonial control over the Philistines, the overall claim of ruling “from the River (Euphrates) to the land of the Philistines and the border of Egypt” is not an entirely far-fetched one as a conceptualisation. But, 1 Kings 11:14–25 already indicate that not everything was entirely “orderly” in either Edom or in Damascus for Solomon and the Israelites in terms of their rule there, but that the rule

was in reality contested. In this sense, even the Solomonic districts in 1 Kings 4 could have at least partly been based on control of a franchise colonial type (cf. comments in Niesiołowski-Spanò 2016:116–117).

182 Cf. Malešević 2010 and the discussion in the foregoing, Chapter 2.

183 Cf. also Chapter 3.

184 Cf. comments in the foregoing.

185 Cf. the foregoing.

186 A summary of the issues can be found in Thomas 2016. The debate can be considered as initially having been kicked off by Finkelstein 1996 and Mazar 1997; cf. also e.g. Finkelstein and Silberman 2001 and Mazar 2007.

187 For a positive appropriation in regard to the traditions, together with arguments for early datings, see Wenham 1987; Wenham 1994. Wenham's detailed commentaries on Genesis were written after the significant works of Thompson 1974 and van Seters 1975 who argued for a late date for the narratives; cf. also the very brief discussion in Anderson 2017:99–100.

188 Note also the concept of “cultural memory” as proposed by Hendel (see Anderson 2017:100).

189 For a good number of fuller details in this respect, see Pitkänen 2017a; cf. also comments already made in the foregoing.

190 See e.g. Younger 1990; Pitkänen 2010, and cf. comments in the foregoing.

191 Cf. comments in the foregoing, Chapter 2.

192 Note also in this connection the brilliant argument for an early date of the books of Samuel based on their textual structure, together with additional overall historical considerations, in Patrick 2016.

193 Around this issue with a redating of Chronicles, see most recently Jelbert 2018.

194 Cf. e.g. Miller and Hayes 2006.

195 Cf. comments on the issue in Chapter 2.

196 Cf. comments in the foregoing.

197 Cf. also comments that bear on the relationship between the north and south in Pitkänen 2014/2003:127–158, 185–269.

198 The rest of this paragraph is based on Pitkänen 2015:19.

199 On this issue, cf. e.g. Nelson 2005.

200 Cf. Cross 1973:285–289.

201 See Sanders 2005:51–53, 102–104; cf. Sanders 2014:23–24.


202 Cf. Sanders 2005:52; Pitkänen 2017b:142.

203 Cf. Sanders 2005:48–49; Sanders 2014:23–24.

204 Sanders 2005:108.

205 Cf. Foster 2016:245–286.

206 See Chapter 8 ahead.



Aššur-bēl-kalā A.0.89.2.iii:27'-28' (RIMA 2:93)	On [many] campaigns against the land of the Ar[ameans], the enemies of Aššur, who in the land. . .] I continually pillaged [. . .]
Aššur-bēl-kalā A.0.89.3:6'-7' (RIMA 2:94)	On many [campaigns against the Ar]amacans, the enemies of Aššur, who in the land [. . .] I continually pillaged. . .]
Aššur-bēl-kalā A.0.89.6:6'-9' (RIMA 2:98)	[By the] command of the gods Aššur, Anu, and A[<i>dad</i> , the great gods, my lords, . . .] after the Aramacans, where <i>twice</i> in one year [I crossed the Euphrates]. I caused about their [defeat from the city An]at of the land Suhu and the city [<i>Tadmar as far as the city Rapiqu of Karduniaš</i> . I took their] tribute and [tax to my city Aššur. The. . .]-daiu, Sutu, [. . .] miraiu, who [live] at the foot of Mount [Lebanon . . . in] rafts of inflated goatskins [I crossed the <i>Euphrates</i> . I conquered the city . . . which (is) on] the opposite bank of [the Euphrates, (on the River Saggurru). At that time the region of the A]h[<i>lamu (a) ħ-la-mi-i</i>] that [. . .] the city Mi [. . .]
Aššur-bēl-kalā A.0.89.7.iii:1-32 (The Broken Obelisk; RIMA 2:101-103)	(iii 1-2a) In that year, in the same month, on campaign against the Aramacans, he struck them at the city Šasiru, which is in the district of the city [. . .] (iii 2b-3a) In that year, in the month Tammuz, on campaign against the Aramacans, he [struck them] at the city [. . .] of the land [. . .] (iii 3b-4a) In the month Iyyar, eponymy of Aššur-rēm-nišēšu, he took the city Tur [. . .] tu of the land Musri. (iii 4b-8a) In that year, in the month Shebat, the chariots and [. . .] went from Inner City (Aššur) [and] took the cities [. . .] indišulu and [. . .] sandū, cities which are in the district of the city Dūr-Kurigalzu. They captured Kadašman-Buriaš, son of Itti-Marduk-balātu, governor of that land. (iii 8b-9a) In that year, in the month Iyyar, on campaign against the Aramacans, he struck them at the city Pauza, which is at the foot of Mount Kašiiari. (iii 9b-10a) In that year, in the same month, on campaign against the Aramacans, he struck them at the <i>head</i> of the city Nabula. (iii 10b-13a) In that year, in the month Sivan, he uprooted the troops of the land Musri. In that year, in the same month, on campaign against the Aramacans, he struck them at the city [. . .] tibua, which is on the Tigris. (iii 13b-17a) In that year, in the month Ab, on campaign against the Aramacans, he struck them at the cities of Līšur-sa1a-Aššur that are in the district of the city Sinamu. In that year, in the same month, he uprooted the city Šū [. . .] ru of the land Hanigalbat. He took the city Hulzu, which is within Mount Kašiiari, and the city Eresu, which the people of the land Habhu held. He brought out 3,000 <i>captives</i>. (iii 17b-19a) In that year, in the month Elul, on campaign against the Aramacans, he struck them at the city Murarrir of the land Šubrū. (iii 19b-20a) In that year, in the month [Arah]samnu, he pillaged the Aramacans from the land Mahirānu to the city Šuppu (or Rupu) of the land Harrān.

(iii 20b-25) In the month Kislev, eponymy of Ili-iddina, on campaign against the Aramaeans, he struck them at the city Magrisu of the land

Iaru. In that year, in the same month, on campaign against the Aramaeans, he struck them at the city Dür-katlimmu.

In that year, in the same month, [he struck the Aramae]ans opposite the city Sangaritu [which is on] the Euphrates. [In] that [year], in the same month, [on campaign against the A] ramae[ans], he fought (with them) [at. . .]

(iii 26) [in] that [year, in the month. . .], on campaign against the Aramaeans, he struck them in the land Gulgulu.

(iii 27) [In that year, in the month. . .], he . . . the Aramaeans at the city (. . .) at [. . .] siku of Mount Hānu.


(iii 28–32) In that year, in the month Arahsamnu, [he . . . the Aramaeans. . .] up to the watering places. [In that year, in] the same [month], on campaign against the Aramaeans, [he struck them at. . .] *faces* [. . .] . . . [. . .]

Aššur-bēl-kala
A.0.89.9: 3'-10'
(RIMA 2:107)

By the command of the gods Aššur and Adad, [the great gods, my lords, . . . in pursuit of] the Aramaeans, which [*twice*] in one year [*I crossed the Euphrates*]. The Sutu, Naa [. . .] who [live] at the foot of Mount Lebanon [. . . in rafts] of inflated goatskins [I crossed the Euphrates. I took the city . . . which (is) (*on the opposite bank of the Euphrates*)], on the River Saggurru. At that time the region of [the *aḫlamū* which. . .] many [. . .]

- Aššur-dān II
A.0.98.1:6–32
(RIMA 2:132–133)
- (6–15) [In the beginning of my kingship, in] my first regnal year, after [I magnificently ascended] the royal throne, [. . .] the troops of the lausu came, [. . .] they trusted in their own power, *they brought* their [. . .]. With the support of Aššur, my lord, [I] assembled [. . . my chariots and troops]. I pillaged their settlements from the city Eka1-pī-nāri [(. . . to . . .] (and) inflicted [upon them a major defeat]. I slayed those that had survived. [I took as booty] a large number of their [. . . herds] (and) flocks. [I] burnt [(. . . and)] their [cities] (with) their inhabitants. I took from the Aramaeans [*valuable booty*]. (16–22) [. . . who] from the time of Šalmaneser, king of [Assyria, my forefather], had killed and destroyed [*people of Assyria* . . .], had sold their [sons (and) daughters]; [by the command of Aššur], my lord, I took prisoners, I caused upon [them] a major [defeat]. I took booty, possessions, [property, herds, (and)] flocks from them and [brought them] to my city [Aššur. . .] the land Ruqahu, the River Zab of the land [. . .] (23–32) [. . . I]ahānu, the land of the Aramaeans, which is behind the land of Pi [. . ., which from the time of Aššur-ra[bi] (II), king of Assyria, my ancestor, the cities of the district of [my land, . . .] they captured for themselves; [I assembled] chariots (and) troops. [I *plundered* . . .] (and) caused upon them a major defeat, [I destroyed], ravaged, (and) burnt their [cities. I pursued those that remained of their troops that] had fled from my weapons [from. . .] to the city Halhalaus in the land Sa [. . .] zi. I caused upon them a major defeat (and) [took their booty (and) possessions as spoils]. Those that remained I uprooted, [*settled them*] in [. . .], (and) included them [within] the borders of Assyria.
- Aššur-dān II
A.0.98.1:60–67
(RIMA 2:134–135)
- I brought back the tired [people] of Assyria [who] had abandoned [their cities and houses in the face of] famine, starvation and need and [had gone up] to other lands. [I settled] them in cities and houses [that were suitable] and they dwelt in peace. I built [palaces in] various districts of my land. [I prepared] plows in the various districts of my land and [piled up] more grain than ever before. I prepared [*numerous*] teams of horses [. . . for the forces of] Assyria.
- Adad-nārārī II
A.0.99.2:30–33
(RIMA 2:148–149)
- . . . and for a fourth time marched to the lands Nairi and conquered the land Habhu in which are the cities *Nahur (and) Ašnaku*. He also constantly traversed the mighty mountains. He conquered the cities of the land of Natbu. I entirely destroyed the land Alzu so that it looked like ruin hills created by the deluge. I took hostages from them and imposed on them tribute and tax. I caused the defeat of the field troops of the *aḫlamû*-Aramaeans. I received the tribute of the Suhū.

Adad-nārārī II A.0.99.2:49–60 (RIMA 2:150)	In the eponymy of Likberu I went out a fourth time to the land of Hanigalbat. At that time Muquru, the Temannu, broke the oath of the great gods and aggressively sought war and battle against me. Trusting in his fortified city, his strong bow, his extensive troops, and the Aramaeans, he rebelled against me. I assembled my chariotry and troops and marched to the city Gidara which the Aramaeans call Raqammatu and which the Aramaeans had forcibly taken away after the time of Tiglath-pileser, son of Aššur-rēša-iši, king of Assyria, a prince who preceded me. I cleverly placed redoubts around it, something that had not been done by the kings, my fathers, previously. Even though he had dug a moat around his city they were afraid in the face of my fierce weapons, my raging battle and my strong forces, and I entered the city Raqammatu with force and violence. Himself I brought down from his palace. I personally inspected his property, precious stones of the mountain, chariots, horses, his wives, his sons, his daughters – all his valuable booty. Him together with his brothers I fastened in bronze clasps and took them to my city Aššur. I established the victory and strength of Aššur, my lord, over the land of Hanigalbat.
Ashurnasirpal II A.0.101.19:92–97 (RIMA 2:261)	The cities Sinabu and Tīdu, fortresses that Shalmaneser (ii), king of Assyria, a prince who preceded me, had garrisoned on the border of the land of Nairi and that the Aramaeans had captured by force, I repossessed. I resettled in their abandoned cities and houses Assyrians who had held fortresses of Assyria in the land of Nairi and whom the Aramaeans had subdued. I made them dwell in peace. I uprooted 1,500 troops of the <i>ahlamû</i>-Aramaes belonging to Amme-ba'li, a man of Bīt-Zamāni, (and) took them to Assyria. I reaped the harvest of the land of Nairi and stored it in the cities of Tusha, Damdammusa, Sinabu, and Tīdu for the benefit of my land.
Shalmaneser III A.0.102.2:35b–40a (RIMA III:19)	At that time the city (Ana)-Aššur-utērasbat that the people of the land Hatti call Pitru and that is on the River Sagura [by the opposite bank] of the Euphrates, and the city Mutkinu, which is on this bank of the Euphrates, that Tiglath-pileser (I), my ancestor, a prince who preceded me, had established – at the time of Aššur-rabi (II), king of Assyria, the king of the Aramaeans had taken these two cities away by force – these cities I restored. I settled Assyrians in them. While residing in the city Kār-Shalmaneser, I received tribute from the kings of the seashore and kings on the banks of the Euphrates: silver, gold, tin, bronze, bronze and iron casseroles, oxen, sheep, garments with multi-coloured trim, and linen garments.



6 Ancient Arameans

A. The origins of the Arameans

The area where the Arameans can be found relates to the semiarid steppes of northern Mesopotamia. On the whole, this area is quite different from that pertaining to the Sea Peoples who were concentrated around the coasts, and the ancient Israelites who inhabited mountain areas in the southern Levant.¹ In the semiarid steppes of northern Mesopotamia, pastoralism provides an important mode of livelihood from an overall economic perspective. In this context, clearly the origins of the Arameans can be associated with pastoralists inhabiting the area. The first mention of Arameans appears to come from the reign of Amenhotep III (late fourteenth century BCE) in the context of a list of place names, with a reference to north-central Syria.² The mention is in the form of *p3-3rm(w)*, “that of Aram”, even when the “m” at the end of the name is based on a restoration.³ Thereafter, Papyrus Anastasi III from the time of Merneptah in the late thirteenth century BCE mentions a town “in the district of Aram”, and this may be a reference to the Arameans, even when the matter is not certain.⁴ It has also been claimed that Arameans are referred to in thirteenth-century BCE texts from Ugarit; however, these appear to be personal

names rather than gentilics.⁵

One is on more secure ground with Assyrian documents. Texts from the reign of Tiglath-Pileser I (1114–1076 BCE) offer the first securely identifiable sources about the Arameans. The mention of them is in the context of annals in the form of *aḥlamû* Arameans (*aḥ-la-mi-i KUR ar-ma-ia*.MEŠ).⁶ The *aḥlamû* are known from second-millennium non-Assyrian texts as a seminomadic people group.⁷ Importantly, these texts never refer to them in association with Arameans.⁸ In Assyrian texts themselves, the *aḥlamû* are mentioned without any connection to the Arameans in the time of Adad-nerari I (ca. 1295–1264), Tukulti-ninurta I (ca. 1233–1197 BCE) and Aššur-reša-iši (ca. 1132–1115 BCE).⁹ The Arameans are mentioned on their own in the time of Aššur-bel-kala (ca. 1074–1056 BCE) and Aššur-dan II (ca. 935–912 BCE). In the early neo-Assyrian period, in the time of Adad-nirari II (911–891 BCE), the Arameans can again be lumped together with the *aḥlamû*. On the whole, it seems fair to assume that the *aḥlamû* and the Arameans were differing people groups but similar enough so that they could be lumped together on occasion.

Clearly the non-Assyrian and Assyrian texts about the *aḥlamû* confirm that there were seminomadic pastoralists in the area in the second half of the second millennium and that they were also a problem for sedentary peoples that included Assyria. As the Arameans were lumped together with the *aḥlamû*, it seems fair to assume that they also were seminomadic pastoralists.¹⁰

Another people group that the Arameans are at least broadly associated with are the Sutu. These are already mentioned in the Mari texts from the nineteenth and eighteenth centuries BCE, but also in Middle Assyrian and Babylonian documents from the late second millennium BCE.¹¹ It is in particular the Babylonian documents that make the association between the Sutu and the Arameans, even when a text from the time of Adad-nerari I (ca. 1295–1264 BCE) does mention the *aḥlamû* and Sutu together.¹² In addition, a so-called *tamītu* (oath) text from a Babylonian king from between 1100 BCE and 900 BCE mentions the Sutu together with the *aḥlamû*, describing them as tent-dwellers living within the king's land by the edge of the sea.¹³

Again, the references to the Sutu and their association with the *aḥlamû* and the Arameans confirm that it is very reasonable to make an association between all these three groups. But it also seems clear that the groups were also seen as separate ones.¹⁴ That the Sutu and *aḥlamû* were clearly described as seminomadic pastoralists further supports the identification within this category.

Mari and pastoralism in the northern Levant

That the Sutu are already found in texts from Mari from the nineteenth and eighteenth centuries BCE suggests a continuum from the Mari times to the late second millennium. This, of course, is already implied by the suitability of the area for pastoralism from a geographical-climatic perspective.¹⁵ Nevertheless, pastoralism existed together with towns and settled agriculture, with pastoralism concentrated and more or less confined to areas that were outside settled localities and their agricultural hinterlands.¹⁶ In this sense, especially as pastoralism and settled agricultural life both existed in the geographical area in a mixed combination, one would also expect that pastoralists and sedentary people would be in constant interaction, and the textual record from Mari confirms that this was the case.¹⁷ The available texts also indicate a basic seasonal cycle in terms of pastoralism.¹⁸ The pastoralists would spend their winter months on the steppe and congregate at riverine water sources in the summer when there was little water available elsewhere.¹⁹ Comparable cycles can be detected elsewhere.²⁰ For example, a pattern of transhumance to summer pastures in elevated mountain locations took place in the Koksuz River valley in central Asia.²¹ The Nuer (and Dinka) would congregate in large camps along major rivers at the height of the dry season (January to April) and graze their cattle in the adjoining marshes that were partly drained. They would then, from April to June, prepare for moving back to the permanent village sites in order to prepare for farming maize and millet in the rainy season, with harvesting from late September on.²² Clearly these two other examples support the contention that the seasonal cycle would be adjusted depending on the geographic-climatic specifics of the area in question, and, of course, the discussion about the Nuer and Dinka in the foregoing has already highlighted that cultural and economic factors could also play their part in interactions between the two groups,²³ and politics in general would also be involved with interactions between societal entities.²⁴

At Mari, a number of pastoralist groups can be identified. These were the Hana, Sim'alites, Yaminites, Sutu, Numha and Yamutbal.²⁵ The Hana, though, are really an overall designation for the Sim'alites and Yaminites,²⁶ and the Numha and Yamutbal are closely connected.²⁷ Mari (modern Tell Hariri on the middle Euphrates) itself was a notable Mesopotamian city state, at least broadly comparable to Ugarit, for example.²⁸ A good-sized palace was at the centre of the town and included a sanctuary and royal quarters.²⁹ It is not clear when Mari had been originally founded; however, after a period of apparent abandonment, it became a city around the middle of the third millennium BCE.³⁰ Texts from Ebla, a large kingdom in what is now western Syria, south of

Aleppo, indicate that Mari had developed into a centre of a major regional power with a wide sphere of influence.³¹ Mari was destroyed by the empire of Agade, then lay abandoned and was built again near the end of the third millennium BCE before being destroyed again for a final time by Hammurabi of Babylon around 1761 BCE.³² At this stage Mari was contemporaneous with the strong southern Mesopotamian kingdom of Ur, and its architecture was in the style of that period that was marked by rule by men who referred to themselves as governors (*šakkanakkum*).³³ From an economic perspective, it would appear that Mari's control of the river traffic was a significant factor, including in relation to wood that was shipped downstream to southern Mesopotamia.³⁴ However, pastoralism also contributed to the economy. In this, it is significant that in the eighteenth century BCE, Mari was part of a wider Amorite dynasty of Yaggid-Lim, Yahdun-Lim and Zimri-Lim, with Mari destroyed in the time of Zimri-Lim.³⁵ A further Amorite, Shamshi-Adad, also ruled at Mari through his son Yasmah-Adad between the rule of Yahdun-Lim and of Zimri-Lim as part of his wider kingdom that covered Upper Mesopotamia but could not last beyond his time.³⁶ It is significant that Yaggid-Lim, Yahdun-Lim and Zimri-Lim said that they ruled a "land of tent-dwellers".³⁷ The Mari texts indicate a complex world of tribal affiliations that are far-flung and pertain to both settled and mobile pastoralist people and to both the fringe and centre of political power that includes the physical attestations of fortified palace centres. The texts then also speak of large flocks of sheep and goats and related transhumance.³⁸ Yahdun-Lim himself associated with the Sim'alites, while Shamshi-Adad identified with the Hana more generally. Also, during the time of Shamshi-Adad, the centre of gravity of power moved away from Mari to nearby cities, but was restored back to Mari by Zimri-Lim.³⁹

What this short summary of Mari indicates is that the town was part of a wider network of social and political relations that involved pastoralists. In this, significantly, more settled peoples could also identify with tribes that were otherwise associated with pastoralism. Accordingly, for the time of Mari, there is at the minimum no full separation between settled and pastoralist people. In terms of social organisation, it is typical for pastoralist or herding societies to be tribal based on patrilineality and patriarchy,⁴⁰ and this seems to be in line with the Mari texts, even when available evidence on the issue is not extensive.⁴¹ In terms of social organisation, herding societies can exhibit a fair bit of social inequality, with the size of herds and the importance of strong men or heads of strong families being significant factors.⁴² At Mari, clearly the existence of a ruling dynasty does indicate at least a degree of social stratification, and stratification would in any case be expected in the context of cities.⁴³ In this setting, tribes could bring taxes in the form of tribute to

authorities.⁴⁴ Some pastoralists are also known to have had slaves,⁴⁵ and this is the case at Mari.⁴⁶ That rulers could identify with a tribe that had a strong pastoral component would on its part show that a distinction between settled and mobile peoples was more or less fluid at Mari.⁴⁷ People belonging to the tribes could also practice agriculture,⁴⁸ and this is in line with the general characteristics of the area that enable the existence of towns and their hinterlands and areas suitable for pastoralism to exist together, as outlined earlier.

Figure 6.1 Mari and its environs

Source: Bryce and Birkett-Rees 2016.

In terms of the extent of the seasonal migration of the pastoralists, it is possible to reconstruct a picture of it based on the Mari texts. These indicate that the migrations covered most of Upper Mesopotamia and, on the other hand, the differing tribes had more or less their own specific areas in that respect. The Sim'alites, as might be expected based on their affiliation with the ruler, camped around Mari during the summer. They then migrated northwards to lands geographically around Upper Habur and Balih in the Jazira for winter pastures.⁴⁹ The Yaminites were located along the middle Euphrates north of Mari upstream in the summer and migrated westward for winter pastures.⁵⁰ It may be that the direction of the travels of these two tribes for winter pastures when looked at downstream is reflected in their names that mean left (Sim'alites) and right (Yaminites). As for the Sutu, they spent their summer south of Mari downstream and migrated towards west and northwest to areas somewhat south and east of the Yaminites.⁵¹ The Numha and Yamutbal were based around Jebel Singar⁵² for summer periods. Both travelled to upper Habur for winter,⁵³ more or less overlapping with areas that the Sim'alites might also have travelled to, with the Numha typically more eastward from the Yamutbal. The Numha also seem to have travelled to middle Habur and also to the surroundings of Ekallatum, not far north from Aššur.⁵⁴

Except for pastoralism and potential agriculture and city life, the economic activities of the tribes included raiding, hostage taking and acting as escorts, messengers and even spies. The tribes could also make alliances and treaties with other tribes and act as mercenaries or workers for palace-based polities.⁵⁵ Conflicts between tribes could also be possible as one might expect.⁵⁶ These activities are then also in line with the general idea of typical interactions between settled and pastoralist components in areas where pastoralism exists. In this case the interactions appear to be particularly close due to the overlapping of settled and pastoralist areas and dimensions of life in Upper Mesopotamia. This can at least partly be seen in contrast to some other areas such as western China, where the two domains were more separated

geographically; nevertheless, for example in the case of China, the activities and interactions were also similar.⁵⁷

Aramean ethnogenesis

The language of the Mari texts is Akkadian. However, they imply that at least much of the relevant population spoke Amorite.⁵⁸ Yaggid-Lim, Yahdun-Lim and Zimri-Lim themselves were Amorites. This conclusion, together with an ascription of Amorite affiliation to the population connected with Mari, is arrived at based on the personal names of these people. We can also keep in mind that Yahdun-Lim associated himself with the Sim'alites, directly implying that the Sim'alites were Amorites; and as the Yaminites were associated with the Sim'alites, this extends the scope of suggested Amorite affiliation yet further. The Amorite language itself is reconstructed almost exclusively from personal names, with a few geographical names and names of divinities adding to the mix.⁵⁹ No texts exist written in the language. More widely, the Amorites (Sum. MAR.TU) are generally associated with pastoralism and even nomadism. They first appear in the textual record in the ancient Near East in the third millennium.⁶⁰ Considering that states did not always appreciate those people outside their control,⁶¹ it is not entirely surprising that some negative rhetoric about them existed, such as the so-called Marriage of Martu text that exhibits stereotypical derision about them,⁶² even when the Mari texts give a more balanced view of interactions between the sedentary and mobile pastoralist world.⁶³

Altogether, then, one can visibly reconstruct the existence of Akkadian and Amorite based on the Mari texts in the early second millennium, with Amorite in particular associated with mobile pastoralists. There is no indication of the existence of Aramaic, even when one can also look back at Eblaite in the late third millennium BCE that was a Semitic language, even if written in Sumerian script.⁶⁴ Accordingly, one can assume that, at the minimum, Aramaic was not a prominent language in the area, also considering that the activities of the Mari tribes covered much of northern Mesopotamia, the area to which the Arameans later spread.

In this context, then, historical linguistics can assist with considerations of the origins of the Arameans. As was already discussed, historical linguistics assumes that languages originally consisted of protolanguages that then diverged into yet further languages, with the protolanguages and their descendants in effect constituting language families.⁶⁵ In the Near East, Semitic languages are considered to form a language family, with all of the languages

belonging to it accordingly related to one another. Much discussion has taken place in this respect. For the purposes here, interestingly, a recent phylogenetic analysis of Semitic languages that has been conducted by historical linguists has included an explication of the relationship and chronology of Akkadian as East Semitic and Ugaritic, Hebrew and Aramaic as Northwest Semitic languages as part of a wider analysis of Semitic languages that includes the Ethiosemitic, Modern South Arabian and Central Semitic, with Central Semitic including Arabic branches of Semitic.⁶⁶ In the analysis of the authors, East Semitic represented by Akkadian branches out from Protosemitic around 3750 BCE.⁶⁷ Of the remaining three nodes of South (leading to Ethiosemitic), West (leading to Modern South Arabian) and Central Semitic that also branch out at that time, Northwest Semitic initially diverges from Central Semitic around 2450 BCE.⁶⁸ Within the Northwest Semitic branch, Ugaritic separates out at approximately 2050 BCE, leaving a branch leading to Hebrew and Aramaic that form into their distinctive branches around 1500 BCE.⁶⁹ This result in respect to Aramean is compatible with the idea that Aramaic is not attested in any way in the Mari documents or prior to them in the ancient Near East. It is also consistent with the lack of demonstrable reference to the Arameans before 1500 BCE in available texts.⁷⁰

From a comparative perspective, it was noted that the Nuer and Dinka languages are closely related and diverged from a common ancestor.⁷¹ In their case, the two tribes were left living in close proximity to each other. In the case of the Arameans, it then seems likely that an Aramean group diverged from a protogroup around the middle of the second millennium, creating a form of Aramaic that was a distinctive language. In this, it has to be emphasised that the phylogenetic analysis and written records from the ancient Near East suggest that the Arameans did not exist before this point. As the Arameans are clearly an attested distinct group by the late second–early first millennium marked by a distinct language, all this suggests that an ethnogenesis occurred around the middle of the second millennium BCE. One may also keep in mind that glottochronology would suggest some 600–700 years of differentiation to achieve a form of Aramaic that was unintelligible from other languages,⁷² and as the differentiation took centuries, only an approximate time can be assigned when the Arameans became distinct from their surrounding peoples. Nevertheless, the overall pattern is well consistent with what is known about the broader history of the area.

Some pertinent comments can then be made from the perspective of the six main features of ethnicity that were outlined in Chapter 2.⁷³ The group clearly shares a common name, Arameans, that by the time of Middle Assyria started to be exclusively associated with them by the Assyrians as an outgroup from the perspective of the Assyrians.⁷⁴ It is difficult to say much about common

ancestry; however, as the Arameans were pastoralists, based on the Mari records and what is known about tribal societies, it is likely that the tribes did consider that they had a common ancestry of some kind. The later names of the Aramean states of Bit-Agusi, Bit-Adini, Bit-Zamani, Bit-Bahiani and Bit-Halupe could have some kind of reference to a mythical ancestor,⁷⁵ even if the designation could also be based on a later ruler, as with Bit-Hazaili in the second millennium BCE.⁷⁶ It seems clearly implied from the names of the Aramean entities that Aramean identity did not need to be based on actual descent but could also be constructed,⁷⁷ and this is in line with what is known from elsewhere about how ethnicity is exhibited and constructed.⁷⁸ Any ease of construction would also seem to enable assimilation into an Aramean group from outside the group more easily.⁷⁹ Any such flexibility could then at least potentially also mark the possibility of combination and fission in terms of group identity under a wider umbrella of Aramean identity.⁸⁰ There does not seem to be any evidence about shared historical memories, the third feature of ethnicity, for the Arameans from the second millennium. In terms of common culture, the fourth feature, much of what can be reconstructed really pertains to the Aramaic language that would have been a significant and probably decisive feature in defining of who was an Aramean. In terms of religion, an extrapolation from first-millennium sources would suggest the possibility of worship of the weather god Hadad as a more or less common religious feature.⁸¹ In terms of the homeland of the Arameans, there is no specific indication that they originated from outside northern Mesopotamia.⁸² Finally, it would appear that there would have been a sense of solidarity amongst the Arameans, with this linked to the existence of a common language.

It would seem that the Arameans originated in a fairly limited area of the northern Levant, distinguishing themselves from other pastoral-based groups. That each of the groups around Mari had more or less distinct territorial areas associated with themselves would clearly seem to support such a contention. From another perspective, if there had been a large sphere of interaction from a geographical perspective, intermixing and homogenisation would more likely have resulted. While such interaction and intermixing would be conceivable for distinct groups while preserving their distinctiveness, it would be more difficult to see how the divergence of the Aramean language and an ethnogenesis based on it could have taken place unless a degree of isolation was present.

As one then finds the Arameans spread over the whole of the northern Levant and even beyond already by the end of the late second millennium BCE, and even more so in the first millennium BCE, one can only suggest that migration took place, in addition to any seasonal migration that was part of mobile pastoralist life anyway. It would also appear that the Arameans

replaced other groups that existed in the area. Only the Sutu were left of the groups that were exhibited at Mari, and one may ask the question if the rise of Arameans might have played a role in the disappearance of the groups from record,⁸³ even when it may not be possible to draw any definitive conclusions in this respect. That the Nuer replaced Dinka in a large area in southern Sudan in a time period of less than a century strongly implies that the Arameans as a pastoralist-based group could also have expanded in their area and replaced similar groups in the process. Considerations relating to their interactions with the Assyrians that will be looked at in the next section give further strong support for the conclusion that this was indeed the case in reality.

But, before that, some comment will be made in regard to a likely, or at least possible, original homeland of the Arameans. In this, the texts of the Hebrew Bible can potentially shed light on the issue, with the previous chapter having suggested that the books of Genesis-Joshua originate from the late second millennium BCE. The patriarchal narratives indicate family relations between Abraham and his descendants with Laban who lived in Harran (Genesis 27:43; cf. Genesis 11:31–12:5). The Hebrew Bible also speaks of the area as Aram Naharaim (*naharaim* meaning [two] rivers), adding that the town of Pethor is located there (Genesis 24:10; Deuteronomy 23:4; cf. Numbers 22:5). Both Harran and Pethor are located in the upper Balih–upper Euphrates circuit, and Harran is mentioned in the inscriptions of Ashur-bel-kala in association with the Arameans.⁸⁴ In addition, the close relationship between the Israelites and Arameans indicated by the statement “my father was a wandering Aramean” in Deuteronomy 26:5 can be compared with the phylogenetic analysis of Semitic languages just referred to, according to which Hebrew and Aramaic diverged from a common ancestor around 1500 BCE. A location in this area would also be broadly consistent with the Mari record where the activity of the associated tribes did not quite extend to the upper Balih–upper Euphrates area, even when the Sim'alites did travel to Harran and north of it for winter pastures. In the context of possible broad correlation, it should also nevertheless be kept in mind that the Hittite stronghold of Carchemish was close by towards the end of the second millennium. Without trying to claim here more than broad correlation of all of the features just mentioned, including those attested in the materials contained in the Hebrew Bible,⁸⁵ if as a result the homeland of the Arameans can somehow be associated with the upper Balih–upper Euphrates area, it would seem that they had their summer pastures there by the rivers and would then, in addition to their seasonal migratory circuits, most likely have first expanded further out along the pastoral corridors that existed in the region. However, they would in the process also have taken over towns as their bases. In this connection, it is known that there was an increase in rural settlements in areas east and west of the Euphrates in Iron Age I, and these

could at least partly be associated with the Arameans.⁸⁶

B. Interactions with Assyria

In general, it is really only the Assyrian materials that offer textual information about early Arameans. It is worth highlighting that no references to them exist from the time of Mittani, also keeping in mind an overall lack of documents by the Mittanians themselves.⁸⁷ The Assyrian materials can then greatly aid in reconstructing the early history of the Arameans; conversely, it would be difficult to say much anything specific about them between 1200 BCE and 900 BCE without those materials, also as archaeological data does not offer distinctive material features that can be directly associated with the Arameans as a people group. As already indicated, the first references to them come from the time of Tiglath-Pileser I (ca. 1115–1076 BCE). The four or five occurrences are listed in the following table:⁸⁸

Tiglath-Pileser I A.0.87.1.v:44–63 (RIMA2:23)	With the support of the god Aššur. my lord, I took my chariots and warriors and departed for the desert. I proceeded against the <i>aḥlamû</i> -Arameans, enemies of the god Aššur, my lord. I pillaged from the edge of the land Suhu to the city Carchemish of the land Hatti in a single day. I killed them and carried back their booty, possessions, and goods in large numbers. The rest of their troops, who fled from the weapons of the god Aššur. my lord, crossed the river Euphrates. I crossed after them on rafts of inflated goatskins. I took six of their towns at the foot of Mount Bešri and burnt, razed and destroyed them. I took their booty, possessions and goods to my city Aššur.
Tiglath-Pileser I A.0.87.2:28–29 (R1MA 2:54)	I pillaged [the <i>aḥlamû</i> -Arameans] from the e[dge of the land of Suhu] to the city of Carchemish of the land of Hath in a single day. I crossed the

Euphrates after them in rafts of inflated goatskins. I took six of [their] towns [at the foot of Mount] Bešri. I took their booty, possessions, and goods to my city Aššur.

Tiglath-Pileser I A.O.87.3:29–35 (RIMA 2:37–38)	I have crossed the Euphrates to the land Hatti [. . .] times, twice in one year, in pursuit of the <i>aḥlamû</i> -Aramaeans. I effected their defeat from the foot of Mount Lebanon, the city Tadmar of the land Amurru and Anat of the land of Suhu as far as Rapiqu of Karduniaš. I took their booty and possessions to my city Aššur.
---	--

Tiglath-Pileser I A.O.87.4:34–36 (RIMA 2:43)	I have crossed the Euphrates twenty-eight times, twice in one year, in pursuit of the <i>aḥtomû</i> -Aramaeans. I effected their defeat from the city Tadmar of the land Amurru and Anat of the land Suhu as far as the city Rapiqu of Karduniaš. I took their booty and possessions to my city Aššur.
--	--

Tiglath-Pileser I A.O.87.13:4'–9' (RIMA 2:59–60; probable reference)	By the command of the gods Aššur and Ninurta, the [great] gods, [my lords], I vanquished [from the <i>edge</i> of the land of Suhu] to the city Carchemish in Ha[tti hi a single day. I <i>crossed</i>] the Euphrates as though it were [a <i>canal</i>]. Seventeen of their cities, from [the city Tadmar of the land Amurru, (Anat of the land Suhu), as far as Rapiqu of Karduniaš], I brunt in fire, [razed, (and) destroyed. I took their booty], their hostages, and [their goods to my city Aššur].
--	--

These accounts clearly refer to the area around the upper Euphrates. It would appear that the area between the Habur and the Euphrates at this time was not strongly held by the Assyrians, fitting with the idea of a clear Aramean presence there.⁸⁹ This had marked a decline from the time of Tukulti-Ninurta I, during whose time the Assyrian border appears to have reached the Euphrates, but certainly Balih.⁹⁰ The campaigns of Tiglath-Pileser can then be

seen in the context of trying to strengthen Assyria and re-establish the earlier border.⁹¹ As part of the campaigning, he crossed the Euphrates and reached Mount Bišri that already at the time of Mari was a popular destination of pastoralists for the winter season. He also claimed to have reached the Lebanese mountains and Tadmor (modern Palmyra). The land of Suhu refers to the western bank of the middle Euphrates south of Mari,⁹² and Rapiqu just a bit further south in a frontier zone between Assyria and Babylonia, counted within Babylonia (Karduniaš) by Tiglath-Pileser I, at least for the sake of rhetorics.⁹³ Carchemish is listed as a northern boundary point, and it would appear that the Assyrian king would not have attempted to reach the town itself that was a neo-Hittite stronghold, even when he did impose tribute on it.⁹⁴ Clearly the attestations indicate that by 1100 BCE, the Arameans had already spread to an area around the Euphrates ranging from northern Babylonia to Carchemish.

A further reference to the Arameans from the time of Tiglath-Pileser I occurs in a fragment of a Chronicle.⁹⁵

Chronicle of Tiglath-Pileser I, lines 2–12 (MC: 188–190)	[In the eponymy of. . . , the peopl]e ate another's flesh [to save (their) lives (?). Like a flood's (?) ra] ging [water (?)] the Aramean “houses” [increased], plundered [the crops (?) of Assyria]. Conquered and took [many fortified cities of] Assyria. [People fled to] ward the mountains of Habruri to (save their) lives. They (=the Arameans) took their [gold], their silver, (and) their possessions. [Marduk-nadin-ahhe. king of] Karduniaš, died. Marduk-[šapik]-zeri entered upon hi[s father's throne]. Eighteen years (of reign) of Marduk-[nadin-ah]he. [In the eponymy of. . .], all the harvest of Assyria was [min]ed. [The Aramean tribes] increased and seized the b[ank] of the Ti[gris]. They plundered. . .], Idu, the district of Nineveh, Kili[zi. In that year, Tiglath-Pil]eser (I), king of Assyria, [marched] to Katmuhu.
--	--

This fragmentary text implies that, seen from the perspective of the Assyrians, their troubles with the Arameans extended beyond the western borders and frontiers. They in fact reached all the way to the river Tigris and

plundered the district of Nineveh, not far from Aššur itself. This in itself does not necessarily indicate that the Arameans had settled in that area but that they were able to reach the heartland of Assyria by military means and to overpower a number of fortified places (*ḫalšu*), forcing at least some of the Assyrian people to flee.⁹⁶ The Aramean action also caused disruption in agriculture, causing famine. Altogether, the Assyrians clearly were on the defensive if the restorations of the text are appropriate.⁹⁷ It also appears based on the synchronism with the Babylonian kings that the text dates towards the end of Tiglath-Pileser I's reign.⁹⁸ This would then be in contrast to his successes, which would appear to have taken place during his first five regnal years.⁹⁹ In other words, the situation with the Arameans in reality deteriorated during his reign. Younger suggests that hostilities that took place between Assyria and Babylonia at this time were likely to have been a contributory factor.¹⁰⁰

After the time of Tiglath-Pileser I, the next references to the Arameans can be found from the reign of Ashur-bel-kala (1074–1056 BCE), who succeeded Tiglath-Pileser I after a short reign by Asharid-apil-Ekur who was with Ashur-bel-kala a son of Tiglath-Pileser I:¹⁰¹

Clearly the texts continue to indicate that the Arameans and Assyrians engaged with each other in a variety of places in and around the Jazira. This included the Habur region in the Jazira.¹⁰² But the Tigris area is also included, and in that sense, the situation would seem to be comparable to that around the end of the reign of Tiglath-Pileser I, even when there are no direct references to the Habur region in texts dating from his reign. All in all, there is a correlation between the later years of Tiglath-Pileser I and Ashur-bel-kala, and, on the whole, one can summarise that at this time the Arameans were present in one way or another throughout northern Mesopotamia. As Younger points out, Ashur-bel-kala does not indicate that he receives tribute from the Arameans or that he conquers any of their towns,¹⁰³ with this implying that he was not able to have control over them.

One may here keep in mind that Assyria had been resurgent against Mittani around 1350, had then reduced it to a vassal state and subsequently, in the mid-thirteenth century BCE, had incorporated it into the Assyrian state.¹⁰⁴ It is clear that Assyria had been strong at that point and had expanded across the Jazira. The Assyrians had also settled people in the area as part of their enterprise, in addition to moving Hanigalbatean people out from Hanigalbat or

from one place to another there.¹⁰⁵

In the early second millennium, the neo-Assyrians successfully engaged in a *reconquista* of territories lost to the Arameans. I quote here pertinent references to them, from the times of Ashur-dan II (943–912 BCE), Adad-nirari II (911–891 BCE), Ashurnasirpal II (883–859 BCE) and Shalmaneser III (858–824 BCE):¹⁰⁶

These texts indicate how early first-millennium kings engaged in a *reconquista* of areas that had been taken by the Arameans, and this then also led to further expansion by the neo-Assyrian state. The results of the campaigns included booty, but Ashur-dan II also indicates how he uprooted the Arameans and settled them elsewhere. Moreover, Ashur-dan II indicates that the Arameans had captured Assyrian towns for themselves. In addition, he indicates that he resettled those Assyrians who in the past had had to flee Assyria, perhaps at least partly referring back to the time of Tiglath-Pileser I. Adad-nirari II and Ashurnasirpal II also state that the Arameans had captured towns by force. Ashurnasirpal in addition resettles Assyrians in two towns the Arameans had earlier captured and also brings Aramean troops to Aššur by way of forced migration. Shalmaneser III states that he captured two towns on the Euphrates and resettled Assyrians there.

Altogether, then, there is a pendulum that first indicates Assyrian control and Assyrianisation of the Jazira in the thirteenth and twelfth centuries BCE. Then the Arameans expanded in (about) the eleventh century BCE, and the Assyrians made a successful *reconquista* from the late tenth century on. The scarcity of Assyrian records in the period between the latter part of the middle Assyrian empire and the early neo-Assyrian empire are consistent with the idea of a relative weakness of the Assyrian state at the time. However, it has to be kept in mind that Assyria did not as such collapse but carried on during the period. In terms of the pendulum swings, clearly the Assyrians and Arameans engaged in colonialism in three phases, of which two were conducted by the Assyrians, sandwiched by an expansionary phase of the Arameans.

In terms of the Aramean expansion, it would appear that it did at least initially take place in a situation where the Arameans had no centralised government. One can expect that, broadly in line with this, smaller units of Arameans engaged with people groups they encountered and fought against them with a successful trajectory overall, in a way comparable to the Nuer expansion against the Dinka. This resulted in an Aramean expansion. In

certain cases, the Arameans also fought against towns that were controlled by the Assyrians and captured them. They even were able to reach the Tigris area and the heartland of Assyria. That the Arameans could also control and settle localities does tie with the Mari evidence where not all people who identified with pastoralism were actually pastoralists but could also be settled.¹⁰⁷ With the Nuer and Dinka in any case, both engaged in farming as a mode of life in addition to pastoralism and seasonal migration. One can also keep in mind that since earliest times, relations between mobile pastoralists and settled people have included a variety of interactions ranging from more or less peaceful coexistence and trading to raiding and conquest,¹⁰⁸ with the Mongol conquests probably being the most famous of the latter instances.¹⁰⁹ In this sense, then, one should not consider it surprising that the Arameans might have fought against the Assyrians with some considerable success. It is, of course, possible that they were able to employ some charismatic leaders in the process that could unite at least some Arameans in a manner broadly comparable to the Mongols,¹¹⁰ but no records survive of such potential occurrences.¹¹¹ Altogether, then, an Aramean migratory conquest and expansion is a scenario that perfectly tallies with the available evidence and ethnographic parallels.

C. The spread of Aramean entities outside Assyria

There are two other areas where the Arameans spread except for that claimed by Middle Assyria. The first is the Levantine sphere southwest of Jazira and the second the neo-Hittite area to the west. The Arameans had somewhat differing interactions with local populations in these two areas.¹¹²

The Levantine sphere

The comments of Tiglath-Pileser I are already clear that the Arameans were active west of the Euphrates, and this is also consistent with the Mari archives that associated the activities of the Yaminites with the west side of the Euphrates. Discounting for the moment the neo-Hittite area more in the north, this area towards the southwest from the Jazira was not associated with strong local entities. It had more or less been claimed by Egypt early in the Late Bronze Age but more or less ended up falling to the Hittite sphere, and the

border between the two superpowers of the time was fixed at Kadesh in the early thirteenth century BCE after the battle there between Ramesses II and Muwatalli.¹¹³ But predominance of Hittite control was truer for areas closer to the west coast. In the east, as one descended from the coastal mountain ranges and approached the desert, a more pastoral landscape would emerge. This would by and large be suitable for the Arameans to expand into based on their lifestyle, and the areas where the Aramean kingdoms arose in the Levantine sphere roughly correspond to the 200- to 300-mm isohyets that lie at the border between where farming is viable and where it cannot be practised any more.¹¹⁴ In addition, any political units that existed in the area were relatively small, also keeping in mind that Egyptian power waned from ca. 1200 BCE, with a fair bit of this apparently being due to the arrival of the Philistines, but also with the emergence of ancient Israel seemingly being a contributory factor in blocking its projection towards the north.¹¹⁵ Accordingly, the Arameans, who on the whole were engaged in a process of expansion, would have found the area a possible destination for migration. That Tiglath-Pileser I refers to Tadmor of the land of Amurru as a place where he encountered Arameans serves as one indicator of Aramean expansion into the southwestern direction.

In fact, the texts of the Hebrew Bible give the first indications about the arrival of the Arameans to the southern Levantine sphere. The first reference is in the context of Othniel, the first judge according to the book of Judges (Judges 3:7–11). If one were to take the text at face value, the Israelites would have been ruled by the Arameans already even a bit before 1200 BCE if one were to place an Exodus and settlement into the thirteenth century BCE, as is typically done by those who are favourable towards the overall contours of the ancient Israelite narrative about the past (cf. Joshua 15:17–18; Judges 1:13–14). Such an early time for a reference to a king of Aram-naharaim as being able to oppress Israel seems to be anomalous, as the Arameans really come to the fore in Assyrian documentation in the time of Tiglath-Pileser I in the early eleventh century BCE. As such, Arameans would have been in existence in the late thirteenth century BCE;¹¹⁶ however, it would seem odd that they would have been able to reach the southern Levant already at that time. Clearly the book of Judges was written during the time of the monarchy in Israel. Accordingly, the reference is possibly to some king from the northeastern semiarid area that was then anachronistically attributed to the Arameans who existed in that area at the time when the book was written.¹¹⁷ The Israelites considered that the Arameans originated from the area of Aram-naharaim, and the author then used that designation for the oppressor.

A more realistic set of references to the Arameans emerges in the Hebrew Bible in the books of Samuel.¹¹⁸ They are first mentioned in connection with Saul, with Saul described as having fought against kings of Zobah (1 Samuel

14:47).¹¹⁹ Zobah is explicitly identified with the Arameans in 2 Samuel 10:6, 8, together with Beth Rehob. Both are located in the Beqa' valley, with Zobah north of Beth Rehob.¹²⁰ A third significant entity is Damascus, and it also features in the books of Samuel (e.g. 2 Samuel 8:5–6). It is interesting that the word Hadad features in the name of the leader of Beth Rehob, tallying with its affiliation with the Arameans (see 2 Samuel 8:3).¹²¹ The conflicts between David and the Arameans (see 2 Samuel 8, 10) should not be considered in any way surprising in the light of conflicts between them and the Assyrians as attested by the Middle and early NeoAssyrian texts. As already noted, the Israelite materials of course indicate that David was victorious against the Arameans and set garrisons or prefects (*nšbym*) at Damascus (2 Samuel 8:6; 1 Chronicles 18:5–6). Other entities that could be associated with the Arameans are Geshur, Maacah and Tob based on their being connected with each other and helping the Arameans (Joshua 13:11–13; 2 Samuel 10:6, 8), and the reference in 2 Samuel 15:8 speaking of Geshur in Aram, together with 1 Chronicles 19:6–7 reading Aram-Maacah. However, the affiliation is not clear, with the possibility to be preferred that the lumping together of Geshur and Maacah with the Arameans on two occasions is mainly due to their location in the north-northeast from the Israelite perspective (Joshua 13:11–13). The Israelite texts do, however, imply that they fell to the Arameans at the time of Hazael in the ninth century BCE (2 Kings 10:32–33) at the latest.

The Hittite sphere

As Younger on his part summarises it, the Hittite sphere between 1200 BCE and 900 BCE is characterised by a significant degree of political and cultural continuity with the Hittite empire that preceded it.¹²² In connection with this, as was already indicated, the dynastic line in Carchemish exhibited continuity with the past through the upheavals that accompanied the demise of the Hittite empire,¹²³ even when it appears that Carchemish had to pay tribute to Tiglath-Pileser I.¹²⁴ From a cultural and linguistic standpoint, Carchemish and the neo-Hittite areas were clearly different from the Assyrian and the Levantine spheres. From a climatic perspective, they broadly were located on the side of the 200- to 300-mm isohyet where agriculture was possible, rather than the other way round. It would seem that these differences had to do with it being more difficult for the Arameans to penetrate the neo-Hittite area.

Nevertheless, the border between the neo-Hittites and the Arameans was not a rigid one. Undoubtedly, it could not be, as there were no distinctive geographical features that could split the territory in a clear-cut manner,

except for the mountains by the coast. In such a situation one would be able to expect that people could move across the border. It would probably be more likely, however, that mobile pastoralists would be seeking pastures in well-watered areas.¹²⁵ This in itself would not necessarily mean that they would end up residing in such areas,

Figure 6.2 The Iron Age Neo-Hittite and Aramean kingdoms

Source: Bryce and Birkett-Rees, 2016.

but in the longer term, one might expect that some kind of interactions could result during stays, with Arameans diffusing across the border on a more permanent basis. Certainly the situation at Sam'al around modern Zincirli, that is as if an inlet into the neo-Hittite territory, is compatible with such a suggestion. Sam'al does attest continuity with the earlier Hittite period. On the other hand, inscriptions indicate both a Luwian and an Aramaic population, with Aramaic inscriptions being predominant.¹²⁶ Rulers from the late tenth century BCE bear Aramaic names, but those from the eighth century BCE are a mixture of Anatolian and Semitic.¹²⁷ The situation seems to indicate that it was possible for the neo-Hittites and Arameans to coexist. If so, it would appear that the relations between the two types of people were, for one reason or another, not as acrimonious as those between the Assyrians and the Arameans. Again, it would seem that as geography changed towards drier areas, it was not of particular interest for the Hittites on their part to expand. At the same time, the inscription of Tiglath-Pileser I indicates that Carchemish at his time was under Assyrian vassalage, implying that Carchemish was not strong enough to expand at the time. A situation of vassalage is also indicated in the ninth century BCE, even if this is a couple of centuries later.¹²⁸ In this area, any feelings of suspicion in relation to the Assyrians might also be a basis for feeling less hostile towards the Arameans who were enemies with the Assyrians. The neo-Hittites, however, did seem to take over from the Sea Peoples in Palistin, apparently in line with an overall interest of the Hittites and the neo-Hittites as their successors in the coastal areas also.¹²⁹

Be as it may, in the interactions between the neo-Hittites and the Arameans, the direction was more widely towards the expansion of Aramaisation towards neo-Hittite areas. The process seems to have progressed very slowly on the main, in the course of several centuries. At Hamath, the area attests clear cultural continuity with the Hittite era.¹³⁰ Neo-Hittites ruled till about 800 BCE when an Aramean king Zakkur came to power.¹³¹ While politics always play a part in such situations, and one cannot be entirely certain as to the shifting of demographics in the region, the enthronement of an Aramean at Hamath would at the minimum have increased the prestige of Arameans in the kingdom. That it was also a result of shifting demographics may be hinted

towards by the discovery of a fragment of a basalt stela with an Aramaic inscription in the ruins of a temple at Tell Afis.¹³² even if the evidence must be considered as slender. Nevertheless, keeping in mind that hegemonic considerations are typical for public inscriptions,¹³³ with language used in temple services likely to be of significance unless attesting to a minority setting, the indication is that Aramaic was at this time a well-used language there.¹³⁴ All this said, nevertheless, it is clear that day-to-day politics were of crucial importance as well. The Zakkur stele indicates that the new ruler faced opposition from most every other political entity around him, including Damascus, Que, and Sam'al, from both the Aramaic and neo-Hittite side. But the new ruler prevailed, perhaps based on his already attested political abilities, and stayed in power, attributing the success to the favour of his god Baal-Shamayim.¹³⁵

It is otherwise interesting that the Hebrew Bible indicates that Hamath was a significant kingdom during the time of David around 1000 BCE in its neo-Hittite era. The texts describe that Tou, the king of Hamath, had been at war with Hadadezer, the king of Zobah, and therefore was happy that David had beaten Hadadezer and subsequently brought his congratulatory greetings and gifts to David (2 Samuel 8:9–10; 1 Chronicles 18:9–10). In this case, there clearly was enmity between the neo-Hittite entity of Hamath and the Aramean entity Zobah. In the longer run, however, over the next couple of centuries, the Arameans ended up taking over at Hamath, and, as was just suggested, the issue may fundamentally have had more to do with demographics than with sudden political manoeuvres, even if the latter were also a very significant factor.

A further interesting example of a place where neo-Hittite rulership had to yield to Aramean influence was the kingdom of Masuwari. This was located just some 20 km south of Carchemish, with its seat of Tell Ahmar (ancient Til Barsib) located on the east bank of the Euphrates.¹³⁶ Younger suggests that Masuwari was initially part of Carchemish, including during the time of Tiglath-Pileser I and his exacting tribute from there, but broke away from it around 1000 BCE.¹³⁷ Neo-Hittite presence is attested by extensive hieroglyphic Luwian inscriptions that date to ca. 975–875 BCE. Nevertheless, the Assyrian inscriptions by Assurnasirpal II and Shalmaneser III (884–824 BCE) associate Til Barsip with Bit-Adini. The most straightforward explanation would seem to be that power had shifted from the neo-Hittites to the Arameans by the time the neo-Assyrian kings appeared on the scene.¹³⁸ Interestingly, the neo-Hittite kings imply in their inscriptions that they ruled over some sizable areas for at least a short time.¹³⁹ If so, this nuances the relationships between the neo-Hittites and the Arameans and suggests that the neo-Hittites could also seek to control Aramean areas. But, in the longer term, their hold could mostly not be

more than transitory, with the Arameans on the main ending up being the stronger party.

D. State formation

By about 1000 BCE the Arameans had established a number of political entities that can be described as states. This development is attested by Aramaic inscriptions and archaeological evidence.¹⁴⁰ The state of affairs is also compatible with the evidence in the Hebrew Bible that mentions a variety of kings of Aramean entities that the Israelites dealt with.¹⁴¹ An obvious question to ask is what made the Arameans form polities that could be described as states. It clearly seems that the formation of these entities was an advance in terms of societal complexity that began from a pastoralist-based political organisation. It would, however, seem that the developments were not as radical as it might appear at first sight. As was already clear from Mari, kingdoms could already incorporate pastoralist populations with the ruler identifying with them. Similarly, as the Arameans expanded, they would not be limited to pastoralist areas only but could also take over towns.¹⁴² On the whole, then, it would not be necessary, as such, to detect a particular sedentarising tendency in relation to the Arameans. However, archaeological evidence does indicate an increase of rural settlements in areas east and west of the Euphrates in Iron Age I.¹⁴³ If it is correct to attribute this increase at least partly to the Arameans, this would seem to imply that they were settling. If so, it would further imply adoption of agriculture to at least some degree. Harmanşah also points out that settlement was particularly intense in zones that were previously marginal, such as pasture land that was uncultivated, and hilly areas.¹⁴⁴ This would not necessitate complete abandonment of pastoralism, however; just that balance had shifted towards further utilisation of available agricultural land. On the whole, this development seems to be in line with the increase of agricultural settlements in the southern Levantine hill country during the period. In the latter case, the use of newly acquired, or at least newly applied,¹⁴⁵ technologies was important.¹⁴⁶ The same may have been the case in the northern Levant, and in fact one would rather expect so; otherwise it would be difficult to see how settlement could be extended to marginal areas, especially as it appears that climate did not become decisively wetter at the time.¹⁴⁷

As Scott indicates, grain provides the taxman a measurable and easily accessible product.¹⁴⁸ Sedentary farmers are also more easily accessible than

mobile pastoralists. Altogether, it would appear that little by little, it was easier to achieve a sufficient level of “caging” so that states started to form in the areas controlled by the Arameans, also in a situation where the Assyrians had more or less receded from the scene. Undoubtedly, in the process it was possible for charismatic individuals to achieve political clout and, little by little, start gravitating such clout from temporary charismatic efficacy into more bureaucratic-based power that would also be hereditary. The increasing availability of iron weapons would also have extended the possibilities of coercion available for political entities and their leaders in forging compliance. In this sense, it may be that the developments in the northern Levant paralleled those in the south. The size of the Aramean kingdoms, however, always seem to have remained relatively limited. No supranational entity arose as with the Israelite tribes. Instead, it seems likely that the various Aramean entities would have exhibited a certain level of solidarity with each other, even when conflict between them would also have been a possibility,¹⁴⁹ just as it was with the Israelite tribal bodies.¹⁵⁰ The idea of the Israelite tribes as one entity that descended from a common forefather as a uniting factor would have aided in the process of Israelite state formation. There is no evidence of corresponding thinking among the Arameans as an entity with a tribal heritage. As the Aramean polities arose more or less concurrently, they would have more or less been equal in terms of coercive power, and as there seems to have been no ideological reason for them to unite, such a unification did not take place in the lack of realistic processes of coercion that might have been available to one of the Aramean entities.¹⁵¹ By comparison, the Assyrians arose as a single entity and expanded from a small base over the course of several centuries, even when they had the Babylonians as their neighbours with a similar cultural and linguistic background and level of technological advancement. By and large the Babylonians checked the progress of the Assyrians towards the south, even when there was an ebb and flow to things over centuries and an ultimate denouement in the seventh and sixth centuries BCE, with this together with the subsequent rise of the Persians most likely having to do with the advancement of technologies towards the end of the Iron Age. The Assyrians in the late second millennium BCE did not specifically need an idea of a common descent for their expressions of unity; instead, they used other methods based on the supremacy of the king as the representative of the gods, backed by administrative bureaucracies.¹⁵² The Arameans apparently did not adapt, or did not sufficiently adapt, these technologies of empire during the time they existed as independent kingdoms in the Iron Age, or if they did adapt them, there was no realistic way for them to force their way into the territories of other Aramean entities. Nevertheless, they could seek to expand as states in certain cases, as attested by the Hebrew Bible in terms of the loss

E. Aramean expansion and colonialism

On the whole, the spread of the Arameans was a multifaceted process. As discussed in the foregoing, the Arameans first separated from other pastoralist groups through linguistic differentiation. Once the group had become differentiated, it also started to expand. In the initial stages, this would be likely to have taken place without the existence of a centralised authority among the Arameans, even though any unification around a local strongman could only have helped in the process. As with the Nuer and Dinka, it is not necessary to assume any vision of a territory that the Arameans should have been holding. Simply a continual cycle of seasonal migration, trading and raiding would in the longer term cause an expansion, just as with the Nuer against the Dinka. In the process, the Arameans would also take over towns and some of them would end up settling in the countryside, including its more marginal areas.

A key question would nevertheless concern what caused the expansion. This involves the question of what was the comparative advantage of the Arameans as against other groups, so that their activities proved to have an expansive effect as years, decades and centuries passed. With the Nuer, it was their bridewealth system combined with their social organisation that enabled the aggregation of larger Nuer units that gave them a competitive advantage against the Dinka that caused the Nuer to be able to successfully raid the Dinka and take over their villages, resulting in a continuous expanding trajectory. Some type of advantage in social organisation seems the most likely cause for the Aramean expansion as well, as it is unlikely that they possessed any decisive technological advantage over other groups in the area, as any technological innovations would have been likely to have been adopted by all pastoralist groups in the area. Also, the Assyrians as a state that had expanded its network of towns over the area would be unlikely to have been less advanced in terms of technology. That the Arameans were able to prevail over them is not unique in history as the Mongols successfully conquered China as a sedentary state and empire and expanded into the realm of other states as well in the thirteenth century CE. In that case, it was the leadership of Genghis Khan that was decisive in uniting the pastoralist tribes of Mongolia.¹⁵⁴ As for the Arab conquests in the seventh and eighth centuries CE, it was the new Islamic religion that enabled the unification of the Arab tribes under

Mohammad.¹⁵⁵ But, as no regional or transregional leader of the Arameans is mentioned by the Assyrians, the existence of such leadership has to be left in the realm of speculation. Altogether, the available evidence does not seem to allow for assigning a cause for the expansion. This said, if the expansion of agricultural settlements in northern Mesopotamia, including into marginal areas, can be associated with the Arameans, with associated gradual emergence of state power as social power, it could have been a factor in the expansion.

As was already indicated, the expansion took place in the pastoralist landscape, including in a southwestern direction from the Jazira past the river Euphrates and towards the southern Levant. The Arameans found it much more difficult to spread outside the pastoralist landscape, in areas that were either controlled by the neo-Hittites or peoples that were living in the coastal mountains. The Arameans could nevertheless diffuse into these areas, most likely as a combination of seasonal transhumance and cross-cultural migration. Such diffusion seems best attested at Sam'al, where a mixed population resulted. In other places, such as at Hamath, diffusion took centuries. But conquest could also be involved. In the southern Levant, at least according to the Hebrew Bible, Aram-Damascus eventually took over by military means territories from the eastern highlands that had belonged to Israel. Conversely, the same was the case with Masuwari just south of Carchemish that the neo-Hittites had claimed for themselves, with perhaps some wider territorial ambitions in the Aramean territory east of the Euphrates involved that did not seem to have been the case for the Neo-Hittites against them on the main, resulting in a generally unattested frontier situation between the Arameans and the neo-Hittites.

If one then looks at the types of colonialism that the Arameans exhibited,¹⁵⁶ in the initial stages in and around the Jazira and the non-Hittite Levantine sphere, it seems that these areas were inhabited by Semitic-speaking peoples with a culture that was relatively similar to that of the Arameans. Accordingly, the degree of cultural change that resulted with the spread of the Arameans would have been on the low side. In terms of the relative composition of the Aramean conquering immigrants to the indigenes, in parallel to the Nuer and the Dinka, it is not necessary to assume that the immigrants consisted of a proportionally huge number of people, making the categorisation of low to moderate a reasonable assumption. One can also assume that, as with the Nuer and Dinka, and all colonial situations, some enclaves of indigenes were left in place, especially in the initial stages of the expansion. In the Jazira, if the expansion utilised the pastoralist corridors of the area, and perhaps also at least some areas that had previously been marginal in terms of agriculture, the subsequent spread into the indigenous areas, with much of them controlled by

the Neo-Assyrians, could have been a secondary stage of the expansion.¹⁵⁷ It is then possible that the secondary stage, once it gathered momentum, resulted in attempted Assyrian countermeasures that probably failed because they were too late and ultimately too much of an *ad hoc* nature rather than being based on structural strengthening of the empire in Jazira. The countermeasures were also on the whole accompanied by an apparent overall internal weakening in Assyria, and any losses in the Jazira would also feed back into the centre, weakening it further due to, for example, loss of tax revenue and an overall weakening of a hegemonic confidence among both the elites and the general population of Assyria. A certain number of Assyrians would also have had to flee the area as refugees, probably also into the centre, at least potentially causing some social upheaval. Certainly, the Chronicle of Tiglath-Pileser I from the latter parts of his reign seems to attest that the Aramean activities closer to Aššur caused such an effect, with refugees in that case even having to flee Assyria itself. Altogether, it seems that in the end, the proportion controlled by immigrants in comparison to indigenes was relatively high, and that the documents of the Hebrew Bible speak of the Aramean entities of Zobah and Beth Rehob in the non-Hittite Levantine sphere would on its part be at least broadly in line with such a proposition.

As for the mix of assimilation, expulsion, killing and the rate of use of indigenous labour, as was already indicated, the rate of invaders as against the indigenous population is likely to have been at the level of low to moderate. It is also unlikely that a huge number of killings would have taken place, in line with the Nuer and the Dinka. It is possible, however, considering the effects attested in the Chronicle of Tiglath-Pileser I, that the number of refugees was sizable, especially in such areas that were agricultural. In this, one should keep in mind that any invaders would utilise for their own support the agricultural resources that they would encounter on a campaign, and might also employ a tactic of scorched earth, in addition to disrupting available infrastructure, and the descriptions in the chronicle are consistent with such scenarios. In more pastoralist situations, initially other groups would be able to simply evade any invaders, but if areas of summer camps were also taken over, much of the available room for manoeuvring would be considerably reduced. In such cases, the indigenes could either flee further or more or less submit to the rule of the invaders.

As the languages of the invaders and the indigenes were similar, being within the Semitic language family, it would not be hugely difficult for the conquered people to learn the new language and assimilate. With the Nuer and Dinka, where the languages were comparably similar, a lot of assimilation can very reasonably be seen to have taken place. Accordingly, one can infer that this would have been the case with the Aramean expansion as well. Some

slaves could also have been taken by the Arameans based on this being a cultural practice in the Mari archives. With the rise of state power, peoples from indigenous enclaves could also have been taken as slaves already based on the parallel with the Hebrew Bible in terms of Solomon, with another parallel being the Spanish conquests of South America and, for example, their silver mining projects, or hired as labour, as e.g. in Mari, or even utilised as mercenaries, as for example in Egypt with the Sea Peoples. On the whole, especially in the earlier stages of the expansion, it seems clear that the processes predominantly involved a degree of killing, some expulsion and a sizable amount of assimilation. The rate of change over time appears to have been relatively fast, even though the overall degree of change from indigenous to invader culture was limited. Clearly one can then classify the changes in the Jezira and the Levantine sphere as falling into the settler colonial side. As for the question of genocide, clearly a degree of genocide would have been involved, with much of it in terms of the wider definition deriving from Lemkin rather than the more narrow UN definition. As the cultural changes that resulted were not extensive, the extent of the cultural genocide was not immense; nevertheless, one did take place.

A different process took place in the Neo-Hittite areas. In those regions, more mixed populations resulted, much as part of cross-cultural migration. It also appears that in such situations, the mixture changed only relatively gradually, with little if any change in the relative composition in some places, as seems to be the case at Sam'al in particular. There is a case to be made for a potential gradual Aramaisation at Hamath, more or less enabling the rise of an Aramean ruler there. If so, it would mark a case of an ethnic enclave achieving power as part of a long process of transformation. On the whole, the neo-Hittite and Aramean cultures would also mix, influencing each other and likely resulting in new kinds of populations that at least ultimately were neither Aramean nor neo-Hittite. Of course, the cultures, as with any culture, would already have changed over centuries on their own anyway. But migration, in this case in many ways in peaceful cross-cultural ways, did effect clear additional transformations.

F. Aftermath

As was already indicated, the Assyrian *reconquista* of the Jazira started in the tenth century BCE. The Assyrian kings Ashur-dan II (943–912 BCE), Adad-nirari II (911–891 BCE), Ashurnasirpal II (883–859 BCE) and Shalmaneser III (858–824

BCE) record how they fought the Arameans, taking booty and towns from them. They also deport the Arameans elsewhere in the Assyrian empire and, on the other hand, bring in Assyrians to the area.¹⁵⁸ All of these actions can be seen as settler colonialism, whose purpose here was to Assyrianise the area. In the longer term, this proved to be successful, and towards the end of the Assyrian period, Hanigalbat became an integral part of Assyria.¹⁵⁹ Kühne summarises that in a period of over 500 years the state invested in “grand projects” such as construction of new towns, villages, palaces and store houses. There was also the construction of super-regional canals in the area of the Lower Habur River and a royal road system.¹⁶⁰ The Assyrian empire eventually managed to make indigenous peoples more or less “vanish” in the area, replacing them with Assyrian people and institutions, with assimilation and forced migration counted as part of the enterprise. The process was begun in the Middle Assyrian period, was then interrupted by the Arameans and resumed with the *reconquista*. In the end, the Assyrian empire had created a state in Hanigalbat as an extension of the core state in the former Assyrian heartland around the Tigris River.¹⁶¹

The Assyrian empire also extended beyond Hanigalbat. This process started contemporaneously with the *reconquista* of Hanigalbat.¹⁶² However, it accelerated from the time of Shalmaneser III (858–824 BCE) on to cover much wider areas.¹⁶³ Except for his interests in the north, including against the strong adversary of Urartu, Shalmaneser III campaigned in areas west of the Euphrates. The purpose of the Assyrians at this stage was primarily to collect tribute from those entities.¹⁶⁴ This in itself can, of course, be seen from the perspective of franchise colonialism. However, the results of the expeditions may not have been as rewarding from the perspective of the Assyrians as was claimed, considering the high cost of the campaigns even when collection of tribute was achieved.¹⁶⁵ This said, for one thing, Shalmaneser III managed to extinguish Bit-Adini on the east side of the Euphrates, consolidating the hold of the Assyrian state there.¹⁶⁶

The arrangements that Shalmaneser III had achieved in regard to the Levantine Aramean states changed with the accession of Tiglath-Pileser III (744–727 BCE) a century later. The approach of Tiglath-Pileser III was more or less to integrate the areas that he dealt with into Assyria as provinces. This would undoubtedly have provided a more secure means of controlling them. With the earlier system of tribute the only means to safeguard the income was threats by Assyria and accompanying promises by the local rulers controlled by Assyria in the form of treaties and loyalty oaths. In such situations, should the local ruler feel that Assyria either seemed internally weak or otherwise not appear prominent from the perspective of the local context, it would be cheaper to not pay the dues to Assyria. Local people could at least potentially

also rebel against the demands of Assyria. In general, with low level of cultural integration with the entities controlled, it would seem unlikely that local peoples would feel solidarity with Assyria or the need to cooperate with Assyrian wishes unless coerced or made to feel that they had better accept Assyrian demands.¹⁶⁷ In line with this, actual rebellions were not unusual.¹⁶⁸ The inclination of Tiglath-Pileser III to “innovate” in this respect was therefore understandable, even when the methods were familiar and closer to home. But it perhaps also reflects the strength of the Assyrian empire at the time, perhaps also broadly aided with the slight advance of coercive technologies towards the end of the Iron Age, in terms of being able to reach wider spheres and therefore attempt integration with the main Assyrian state. Tiglath-Pileser III first directed his efforts towards Aramean states in the Levantine sphere.¹⁶⁹ He proved to be victorious against most of the Aramean states southwest of the Euphrates, save for Hamath that was nevertheless reduced into a rump state.¹⁷⁰ As part of his administrative arrangements, he employed the method of population transfers, causing at least a partial destruction of previous social fabrics.¹⁷¹

After the subsequent short reign of Shalmaneser V (727–722 BCE), with Sargon II (722–705 BCE) rising to the throne, Hamath revolted. A coalition that included Arpad, Simirra, Damascus, Hatarikka and Samaria was organised against Sargon II.¹⁷² The Assyrian king defeated the coalition decisively at Qarqar where Shalmaneser III had fought against a regional coalition more than a hundred years in the past in the earlier stage of neo-Assyrian conquests that led to the establishment of tribute in the overall area.¹⁷³ Now destructions and deportations at Hamath followed, with Sargon claiming the epithet “uprooter of Hamath”.¹⁷⁴ In the overall processes, Samaria was also taken, with accompanying destructions and deportations (cf. 2 Kings 17), besides deportations already having been experienced in the time of Tiglath-Pileser III (cf. 2 Kings 15:29; 1 Chronicles 5:26).¹⁷⁵

Altogether, then, the Aramean states had been finished by the end of the eighth century BCE. On the other hand, with deportations and the mixing of populations, Aramaic as a language gained in popularity. Many Aramean scribes worked for the Assyrians after the annexation of the Levantine sphere and Aramaic became a second language, especially in international correspondence and in administration.¹⁷⁶ In the seventh century BCE, many Assyrian clay documents included additional commentary in Aramaic or were completely in Aramaic.¹⁷⁷ The use of Aramaic passed on into the Persian realm where it was the official administrative language of the Achaemenid empire.¹⁷⁸ Aramaic was also the main spoken language in first-century CE Palestine, where Christianity emerged. A minority of Syriac Christians whose language is a dialectal variation of Aramaic still exists today.

Notes

- 1 Cf. the foregoing.
- 2 See Younger 2016:35. There are also earlier mentions, even from the third millennium BCE, but these cannot according to Younger be “definitively” linked with the Arameans (Younger 2016:35; cf. Lipinski 2000:26–31 for fuller details).
- 3 See Younger 2016:35–36.
- 4 See Younger 2016:35–36. Lipinski 2000:32–35 is more sceptical about these two Egyptian attestations.
- 5 See Lipinski 2000:31–32 and Younger 2016:36 for fuller details.
- 6 Younger 2016:36; RIMA 2, *passim*. The texts are analysed in more detail ahead.
- 7 See Younger 2016:82–83 for the references (14 occurrences total). On issues that relate to seminomadism, see the following.
- 8 Younger 2016:84.
- 9 See Younger 2016:84–85 for the references (four references).
- 10 Similarly, Younger 2016:86–87, and this conclusion is in general not contested. Also see ahead for further nuancing on seminomadic pastoralism.
- 11 See Younger 2016:88–93.
- 12 See Younger 2016:91.
- 13 See Younger 2016:93–94.
- 14 For further discussion on this issue from the perspective of ethnicity, see ahead.
- 15 See Wilkinson 2003:17, 100, 120–122; cf. Richerson, Mulder and Vila 1996:76 (Chapter 5).
- 16 See Wilkinson 2003, 120–122.
- 17 See Kärger 2014. More on this issue ahead.
- 18 On the total of some 20,000 texts, of which most are of administrative nature, but which include some 3,000 letters, see Fleming 2004:2–4.
- 19 See Kärger 2014:6.
- 20 See Richerson, Mulder and Vila 1996:79–82 (Chapter 5) for a wider summary

from a worldwide perspective.

21 See Frachetti 2008: incl. 116–117.

22 See Kelly 1985:83–84, with some fuller details that have not been reproduced here.

23 Cf. the foregoing, Chapter 2.

24 Cf. P in Mann’s IEMP as discussed in Chapter 2.

25 See Kärger 2014; cf. Fleming 2004.

26 See Kärger 2014:79–80, even though this conclusion does not seem to be uncontested.

27 See Kärger 2014:230.

28 See Margueron 1995:885–886.

29 See Margueron 1995:888 for a picture of the layout of the palace.

30 See Fleming 2004:6.

31 See Fleming 2004:6–7.

32 See Fleming 2004:6–7.

33 See Fleming 2004:7.

34 See Fleming 2004:7–8.

35 See Fleming 2004:8, 11; Miglio 2014:233. More specifically, it is understood that the end of Zimri-Lim’s reign was marked by the taking of Mari by Hammurabi and that the city was destroyed a couple of years thereafter.

36 See Villard 1995:874, 881–882.

37 Fleming 2004:8.

38 Fleming 2004:9.

39 Fleming 2004:10–11.

40 See Richerson, Mulder and Vila 1996; Nolan and Lenski 2015:206. Note, however, e.g. the matrilineal features of the Dinka and also Nuer; see Kelly 1985.

41 See Fleming 2004:30–32.

42 Nolan and Lenski 2015:206.

43 Cf. Scott 2017.

44 See Kärger 2014:44–53, 104–109.

- 45 See Nolan and Lenski 2015:206 who note that slavery can be hereditary with herding societies.
- 46 See Kärger 2014:217–218.
- 47 Cf. the foregoing; Porter 2012:240–241; Kärger 2014:90–93.
- 48 See Kärger 2014: e.g. 88–90.
- 49 See the map in Kärger 2014:145.
- 50 See the map in Kärger 2014:161.
- 51 See the map in Kärger 2014:205.
- 52 Located east of middle Habur.
- 53 See the map in Kärger 2014:233.
- 54 See the map in Kärger 2014:233. The locations are approximate and not always fully known; see Kärger 2014:233–234.
- 55 See Kärger 2014, *passim*.
- 56 See Kärger 2014:244–248.
- 57 Cf. Scott 2017:219–256.
- 58 Cf. Gelb 1980:1–2.
- 59 See Gelb 1980, incl. 1; cf. e.g. Liverani 2014:176–177.
- 60 See e.g. Whiting 1995:1234. I will not attempt to discuss the origins of the Amorites here; see e.g. Porter 2012 for a variety of related considerations.
- 61 See e.g. Scott 2017.
- 62 See e.g. Porter 2012:293; Liverani 2014:178–179; cf. Whiting 1995:1234.
- 63 Cf. Liverani 2014:179.
- 64 Cf. e.g. Gordon 1987:154. The script mostly employed Sumerian logograms but also included phonetic representation.
- 65 See Chapter 2.
- 66 See Kitchen, Ehret, Assefa and Mulligan 2009.
- 67 See Kitchen, Ehret, Assefa and Mulligan 2009:2707 and the summary table in *ibid.*, 2706.
- 68 See Kitchen, Ehret, Assefa and Mulligan 2009:2707 and the summary table in *ibid.*, 2706. The authors do not use the term Northwest Semitic even though they are aware of it, I have included it as it is frequently used otherwise. The term is not to be confused with the term West Semitic used by the

authors.

69 See esp. the summary table Kitchen, Ehret, Assefa and Mulligan 2009:2706. The authors have not included Amorite or Eblaite in the analysis but are aware of them, noting that no Eblaite wordlists were available for their study (*ibid.*, 2708, 2710).

70 Cf. the short comments in Gzella 2014:71–72.

71 See the foregoing, Chapter 2.

72 See Ehret 2011:125–128; cf. the discussion in the foregoing, Chapter 2.

73 See esp. Section B, p. 33.

74 Cf. the foregoing.

75 Cf. the discussion in Younger 2016:43–48.

76 Cf. Younger 2016:47–48.

77 See Younger 2016:46.

78 Cf. the foregoing, Chapter 2.

79 On assimilation, see the following.

80 Cf. the discussion on ethnogenesis in Chapter 2.

81 See Niehr 2014b:129. See also Niehr 2014a as a whole for aspects of common culture more widely, mostly in the context of the first millennium.

82 See ahead for further comments on this issue.

83 I am not attempting to comment on the *aḥlamû* in this respect here.

84 Cf. Bryce 2009:292–293; *idem.*, 563, also referring to the map in Lipinski 2000:167, and assuming that Pitru is the same as Pethor and is located in modern 'Awšar; cf. also the following discussion.

85 Note e.g. the discussion and expressed complications in Younger 2016:94–107. Note also that Kir mentioned especially in Amos 9:7 as the homeland of the Arameans is clearly a first-millennium reference and cannot be localised (see Younger 2016:41–42). Of course, the place where Abraham lived originally is described to be Ur in southern Mesopotamia rather than Harran (Genesis 11:27–31). Altogether, it should be emphasised here that the Israelites perceived themselves as being related to the Arameans and expressed that through the patriarchal narratives, without having to assume that those narratives were “literally” “true”. Nevertheless, there seems to be a correlation between what the biblical documents state and what can be gleaned by historical and linguistic considerations that relate

to the Upper Mesopotamian area in the second millennium BCE .

- 86 Sader 2014:17, thinking that at least a partial association with Arameans is “cer-tainly” the case.
- 87 Cf. though comments made in Section A of this chapter; cf. also Chapter 3.
- 88 Translations based on RIMA 2, which see for Akkadian transliterations also. Italics in the translation indicate either a word in the original language or an uncertain translation (cf. RIMA 2:xiv). Note also that brackets generally indicate restorations.
- 89 See Younger 2016:155–157.
- 90 See Younger 2016:155–156.
- 91 See Younger 2016:169.
- 92 See Bryce 2009:666–668.
- 93 See Bryce 2009:590–591 (also *ibid.* map 10, p. xxxiii).
- 94 Cf. Tiglath-Pileser I A.0.87.4:28–30 (RIMA 2:42); Tiglath-Pileser I A.0.87.3:26–28 (RIMA 2:37); discussion in Bryce 2012:83–84.
- 95 Translation from MC:188–190, which see for the Akkadian transliteration also. I have not included diacritics with the names and toponyms listed. Note also that brackets indicate restorations.
- 96 The mountains of Habruri were in the northeast (see Zadok 2012:578).
- 97 See Younger 2016:175 for a discussion of the usability of the materials in this sense.
- 98 See Younger 2016:176. The death of Marduk-nadin-ahhe is dated to ca. 1082 BCE, some six years before the end of Tiglath-Pileser I’s reign (Younger has slightly different figures).
- 99 See Tiglath-Pileser I A.0.87.1.vi:39–45 (RIMA 2:25) that occurs after the mention of a campaign against the Arameans in the document: “Altogether I conquered 42 lands and their rulers from the other side of the Lower Zab in distant mountainous regions to the other side of the Euphrates, people of Hatti, and the Upper Sea in the west – from my accession year to my fifth regnal year”; cf. Younger 2016:169.
- 100 See Younger 2016:173–174.
- 101 Translations based on RIMA 2, which see for Akkadian transliterations also. Italics in the translation indicate either a word in the original language or an uncertain translation (cf. RIMA 2:xiv). Note also that brackets generally indicate restorations.

- 102 See Zadok 2012:578; Younger 2016:181.
- 103 Younger 2016:182.
- 104 Cf. Chapter 3.
- 105 See Szuchman 2007:26–28.
- 106 Translations based on RIMA 2 and RIMA 3, which see for Akkadian transliterations also. Italics in the translation indicate either a word in the original language or an uncertain translation (cf. RIMA 2:XIV; RIMA 3:XIV). Note also that brackets generally indicate restorations.
- 107 Cf. the foregoing.
- 108 Cf. Scott 2017.
- 109 See e.g. Morgan 2007 on the Mongol conquest.
- 110 Cf. also the book of Judges in the Hebrew Bible in this respect.
- 111 Note, however, 2 Samuel 10:16 in the Hebrew Bible that indicates that the Arameans could muster troops from elsewhere in the Arameans sphere; cf. also 2 Samuel 10:6 and the discussion on the biblical evidence in the following.
- 112 It is of course true that the Arameans also spread to further areas, including Babylonia, Phoenicia and southern Mesopotamia. However, southern Mesopotamia is really outside the scope here and considerations of Phoenicia and northern Arabia primarily pertain to a time well in the first millennium BCE. For details, see e.g. Nissinen 2014; and Younger 2016:655–740 specifically on southern Mesopotamia.
- 113 Cf. Younger 2016:191.
- 114 See Younger 2016:2–3.
- 115 Cf. Chapters 4 and 5; also Younger 2016:191.
- 116 Cf. earlier comments on linguistic evidence.
- 117 Cf. the anachronistic references to the Philistines in the book of Genesis (e.g. Genesis 21:32–34; 26); cf. also Judges 10:6. On the Judges 3 passage, cf. e.g. Block 1999:152–155; Sasson 2014:211–220.
- 118 Cf. e.g. comments in Halpern 2001:164–198 in the context of the Arameans.
- 119 Note that Greek has king rather than kings and also seems to mention Beth Rehob.
- 120 See Younger 2016:192–204 for localisation and further details about Zobah and Beth Rehob.

121 Cf. the foregoing; note also the later Ben-Hadad with Damascus (1 Kings 15:18).

122 Younger 2016:113.

123 See the foregoing, Chapter 3; Bryce 2012:83–93.

124 Cf. the foregoing.

125 On the main, imposing things, such as through accompanying raiding, would likely be more difficult in more settled areas.

126 See Younger 2016:144, 378–379.

127 See Younger 2016:390, also 391–422.

128 Cf. Bryce 2012:84.

129 Cf. the foregoing, Chapters 3 and 4.

130 See Younger 2016:144–145; Bryce 2012:133.

131 See Bryce 2012:137.

132 See Younger 2016:475–476.

133 Cf. the foregoing, Chapter 2.

134 The stela may also include a mention of Hazael which could imply control of Hamath by Damascus in the closing decades of the ninth century BCE, but the issue seems less than certain (cf. Younger 2016:475–476).

135 See Younger 2016:476–480. Baal-Shamayim can be translated as lord of the heavens.

136 See Younger 2016:135.

137 Younger 2016:137–139.

138 See Younger 2016:135–143 for a detailed discussion.

139 Younger 2016:137.

140 See Younger 2016: esp. 221–653; cf. Harmanşah 2013:68–70.

141 Cf. the foregoing.

142 Cf. the foregoing.

143 Cf. the foregoing; cf. also Harmanşah 2013:39.

144 Harmanşah 2013:39.

145 Cf. the foregoing, Chapter 5.

146 Iron did start to be used little by little in Iron Age I, with its use becoming

fairly common for tools in the eleventh century BCE; see Whincop 2008: Vol. 1:30–33.

147 Cf. Wilkinson 2003:20 for climate proxy records in the Levant in terms of rainfall.

148 Scott 2017:130.

149 E.g. in the case of Hamath with Zakkur as indicated in the foregoing.

150 Cf. e.g. Judges 19–21.

151 Cf. also the comments on the Mongols in the foregoing and the following.

152 Cf. the foregoing, Chapter 3.

153 Cf. comments in the foregoing.

154 See Morgan 2007.

155 See Kennedy 2007.

156 Cf. Table 2.2, p. 60.

157 Zadok (2012:572–574) suggests that the degree of integration of Suteans in both Assyrian and the preceding Mittanian reigns was low. He also extrapolates that this would apply to seminomads more widely during these reigns.

158 See the foregoing.

159 See Kühne 2015: esp. 69–70, and cf. comments made in the foregoing.

160 See Kühne 2015:69. See also Liverani 2017:195–202 on the Assyrian communication network more widely.

161 Cf. comments made in the foregoing.

162 See Liverani 2014:475–481 for a summary.

163 See Liverani 2014:481–484.

164 See Liverani 2014:481–482.

165 See Liverani 2014:481–482.

166 See Younger 2016:326–354.

167 Cf. Younger 2016:496–497.

168 Cf. Liverani 2014:485.

169 See Liverani 2014:485.

170 See Liverani 2014:487; Younger 2016:492–496.

171 Cf. Liverani 2014:487.

172 See Younger 2016:496–497. Damascus undoubtedly here is in the form of what had been left of it after the actions of Tiglath-Pileser III; cf. Younger 2016:647, 651–652.

173 See Younger 2016:497–498.

174 See Younger 2016:499.

175 Cf. Younger 2016:648–649.

176 See Kühn 2014:55.

177 See Kühn 2014:55; cf. *ibid.*, 62.

178 See Gzella 2014:73.

7 Other migrations and societies

A. Northern Syria and Phoenicia

On the whole, Syria in the Late Bronze Age was under the control of empires, also forming a frontier zone in a number of ways. In the north, Mittani held control in the earlier part of the era. In the south, Egypt was dominant. With Suppiluliuma in the mid-fourteenth century BCE, the Hittites more or less took over territories that Mittani had controlled, up to the river Euphrates. The Hittites also expanded their influence towards the south, taking over from Egypt territory that included the local political entities of Ugarit, Halab (Aleppo), Nuhashe, Amurru and Tunip, with vassal treaties surviving that were made with these entities.¹ Viceroyal towns were established in Carchemish and Aleppo to bolster the Hittite rule.² It is true that Amurru in the southern part of this territory remained friendly with Egypt; nevertheless, it was now in the Hittite sphere and remained so till the empire collapsed, even if it there was an episode of returning to the Egyptian fold for a while in the time of Seti I in the early thirteenth century BCE.³

In the south, in territory held by Egypt throughout the Late Bronze Age, the most important centres on the littoral were Gubla/Byblos, Beruta/Beirut, Siduna/ Sidon and Surri/Tyre.⁴ Sarepta to the south may also have been an important centre.⁵ The Beqa' valley was densely settled, and the area around Damascus features in the Amarna letters.⁶ As we have seen, these latter two areas are in the control of the Arameans by about 1000 BCE according to ancient Israelite documents included in the Hebrew Bible.⁷ The Sea Peoples settled in Palistin in the north and also, according to the inscription of Ramesses III, set camp in the land of Amurru.⁸ While textual evidence from the area is on the whole scarce from Iron Age I, archaeological work in the area reveals that a number of regional centres there were destroyed in the Late Bronze–Early Iron Age I transition.⁹ In general, all this confirms that the arrival of the Arameans and the Sea Peoples disrupted the area considerably during the Early Iron Age, even when it is not clear that all of the destructions can be directly attributed to them.

At the same time, not everything was destroyed. In particular, centres in the southern coastal area including Tyre and Sarepta show continuity with the preceding era.¹⁰ In addition, pottery sequences, except for the newly emerging

forms deriving from the Sea Peoples, show strong continuities, also reflecting the geographic-climatic division between the coastal west and the inland northern Levantine area.¹¹ In this respect, it was already discussed how the Sea Peoples intermixed with local populations in the coastal sphere. This was in many places via cross-community migration. In other places, such as in Palistin, and also Philistia in the southern Levant, they were able to establish political control but nevertheless did not form at least a completely dominant sector of the population. In Palistin they were also engulfed by the surrounding peoples and were acculturated back into those cultures and extinguished as a political entity in about a century or so, even when in Philistia they did remain a distinct, even if a highly acculturated entity. In the inland sphere, the Arameans spread through the predominantly pastoralist areas around the 200- to 300-mm isohyet. They already exhibited inland culture and hardly caused any archaeologically detectable changes in material culture. Some Philistines and Arameans then also spread as cross-cultural migrants into areas in between the coasts and the inland sphere that were more or less continuously held by the neo-Hittite entities. Altogether, it is interesting that the spheres of dominance of these two migratory phenomena did not go beyond their climatic-geographical spheres. This seems to be consistent with the idea that their spread was not supported by central governments but was more of a spontaneous expansion, comparable to that of the Nuer as against the Dinka. At least for this area, only empires that formed based on centralised states could march across a variety of geographic divisions. The Sea Peoples were probably not really accustomed to inland conditions, and the Arameans as a pastoralist-based people could, at least broadly speaking, make only limited headway against already settled peoples of northern Syria.¹²

In the migration of the Sea Peoples, it is interesting that the area of the southern littoral of northern Levant appears to not have been disrupted in the same way as a number of other places were.¹³ In support of such a contention, Tyre and Sarepta exhibit continuity with no evidence of destruction, the excavations from Sidon are less than illuminating and archaeological data from Byblos and Beirut is limited.¹⁴ The area on the whole is associated with the Phoenicians.¹⁵ Byblos and Tyre do feature in the Late Bronze Age documents. The two are attested in the Amarna letters as loyal subjects of Egypt, with goods, especially cedar wood, being sent from them to Egypt.¹⁶ That a statue of Ramesses III was discovered at Tyre shows that relations with Egypt were not cut in the twelfth century BCE.¹⁷ The Tale of Wenamun, however, does indicate that by the end of that century, Phoenicia was more or less lost to Egypt.¹⁸

The Phoenicians are known to have definitely become a maritime society with strong trading links and colonies in the Mediterranean in the first

millennium BCE.¹⁹ The documents of the Hebrew Bible indicate that Tyre had a special relationship with the Israelites from the beginning of the tenth century BCE on. Hiram is described to have sent cedar wood and craftsmen to help build a palace for David (2 Samuel 5:11), and then timber for the Jerusalem temple in the time of Solomon (1 Kings 5:1–11), with this being in line with sending of cedar wood to Egypt in earlier times. The materials of the Hebrew Bible also indicate that Hiram had a navy with sailors “who knew the sea” (1 Kings 9:27; 10:11, 22; 2 Chronicles 8:18). These references clearly suggest that at least Tyre already had maritime activities in the eleventh century BCE at the latest.²⁰ The Phoenicians, however, get bad press in the Hebrew Bible in later times, perhaps most notably in relation to Jezebel, a Sidonian wife of the northern Israelite king Ahab in the ninth century BCE (1 Kings 16–21). Even though on the whole conquered by the Assyrians and Babylonians, they were able to survive through these two empires and the following Persian empire, with Tyre taken by Alexander only in 332 BCE.²¹

Why the Phoenician coast was not strongly affected by the migrations of the Sea Peoples is not known. However, it is possible that close commercial ties between Aegean merchants and Phoenician sites in the thirteenth century BCE had brought in personal ties between peoples of the two places, and that this caused the Sea Peoples to spare the Phoenician sites, in contrast to Ugarit and other sites without such direct contacts with the Aegean.²² Certainly, Linear B archives from Knossos refer to people from Phoenicia,²³ even if one cannot attribute too much weight to such attestations that in any case are not extensive.

B. Transjordan and the Negev in the southern Levant

Except for the central highlands, the southern Levant also includes areas east of the Jordan River and the Negev, the latter for the purposes here an area roughly extending from modern Beersheba to the Gulf of Aqaba. In the Transjordan, a steep ascent eastward from the Jordan valley that includes the Dead Sea brings one to the so-called highlands of the Eastern Rim that reach heights of over 1,000 m above sea level. These highlands then gently descend towards the east into the desert.²⁴ In the Negev, the land remains hilly but the hills are not very high. In these areas, rainfall broadly decreases as one travels south and east from the central and eastern highlands.²⁵ The central and northern Transjordanian highlands receive more than 300 mm of annual

rainfall on average, making agriculture possible. With the decrease of rainfall, areas receiving 200–300 mm of rainfall are in the margins of cultivable areas and those receiving less than 200 mm are desert.²⁶ The centre of the Dead Sea Rift belongs to the desert areas, with marginal areas coming into play as one ascends towards the central and eastern highlands. On the east side, a number of wadis running from east to west cut through the territory, also offering sources of water.²⁷ It is clear, then, that the area offers a variety of environments that on the whole include areas suitable for both farming and mobile pastoralism, with farming less prominent but not necessarily completely excluded in the Negev.²⁸

The area has in general been inhabited for a long time, with shifts in habitation that are a result of both climate changes and human activities.²⁹ In terms of population, the Late Bronze Age witnessed very low levels in the southern areas, with population on the whole decreasing from the Early Bronze Age till the beginning of the Early Iron Age.³⁰ More extensive, but nevertheless relatively limited habitation also characterised the Transjordanian highlands in the Late Bronze Age, with settlement considerably increasing in the Iron Age I period.³¹

In general, historical sources refer to three people groups that are most prominent in relation to this area in the period in question. This is based on the Hebrew Bible. The groups are the Edomites, Ammonites and Moabites, on whom some extensive comments and mentions exist, even if, as one might at least by now expect, those have been contested in the context of past two centuries and more of modern biblical study. In addition, some further groups that seem to be semino-madic, such as the Midianites and Amalekites, are referred to in the Hebrew Bible; however, they are not localised as clearly as are the Edomites, Ammonites and Moabites. The Edomites and Moabites also seem to be referred to by the Egyptians. On the whole, in this connection the Egyptian texts refer to so-called Shasu bedouins that in general inhabit the area of Sinai and southern Palestine, and even to the Shasu tribes of Edom more specifically in the Nineteenth Dynasty (1292– 1186 BCE).³² The so-called Moabite stone that was produced by the Moabite king Mesha in the ninth century BCE is an additional significant document that can also be used to extrapolate on conditions in the area in the late second millennium BCE.

The writers of the Hebrew Bible considered that Edomites, Ammonites and Moabites did not belong to ancient Israel. They, however, saw them as peoples that were closely related to them. Edom/Esau was Jacob/Israel's elder twin brother (Genesis 25). In this conception, he should have qualified for the status of firstborn that would have ensured better rights and inheritance than Jacob. However, Jacob did wrest the right to being firstborn away from Edom and also then received the blessings accompanying the status of firstborn from his

father Isaac, who himself was the son of Abraham the patriarch to whom Yahweh had given a promise to grant him the land of Canaan (Genesis 27; cf. Genesis 12:1–3).³³ As for Ammon and Moab, they were sons of Lot, Abraham's nephew (Genesis 11:27). However, their origin is incestuous in that Lot was tricked by his daughters to have sex with them so that they could have children (Genesis 19). While the context is a time prior to the Mosaic legislation and the moral injunctions of that legislation do not apply directly,³⁴ the issue at least most likely can be seen in a negative light in the view of the writers. In this respect, due to Ham seeing his father Noah's nakedness, Canaan as a son of Ham was cursed (Genesis 9:18–26). In this way, the “worthiness” and relationship to Israel of these peoples was conceptualised and expressed in the Hebrew Bible by the writers. The treatment of the peoples is then also in line with such conceptualisation, even when some of the details as to how the conceptualisation was arrived at seem to be lost to us.³⁵ Edom is seen as a brother that is close, if not closest of any other nations, to the Israelites and accorded respect (Deuteronomy 23:7). The Edomites even have the option of integrating in the Israelite community in the thinking of the biblical book of Deuteronomy (Deuteronomy 23:7–8). This said, it is also true that the relationship of the Israelites and Edomites did later on go through a number of difficult episodes (see e.g. 2 Samuel 8:13; Psalm 137:7; Jeremiah 49:7–22). The Ammonites and Moabites are in a lower tier, with no opportunity for integration with the Israelites according to Deuteronomy (Deuteronomy 23:3–6). For comparison, the Canaanites are placed at the lowest level. They are cursed, and this is consistent with the idea that the Israelites were to take their land for themselves, whereas the Israelites were not to engage with the Edomites, Ammonites or Moabites to take their land (Deuteronomy 2:4–5, 9, 19). On the whole, the rights and claims to land by the Israelites and their surrounding nations are conceptualised as being rooted in prehistory for the ancient Israelites (cf. Deuteronomy 32:8),³⁶ in the context of ancient Israelite settler colonialism. In the following, some specific comments are made in regard to each of Edom, Moab and Ammon.

Edom

The Edomite territory was located in the area of the southern Negev. Only the documents of the Hebrew Bible delimit its northern border with any precision. According to the book of Joshua, the border ran from the southern end of the Dead Sea till the brook of Egypt, often identified as the Wadi el Arish some 50 miles southwest of Gaza, and from there to the Mediterranean Sea (Joshua

15:1–4).³⁷ This refers to areas west of the Jordan Rift; however, one does not need to assume that the Edomites would have been confined to that side of the rift. On the East, the river Arnon about midway between the northern and southern ends of the Dead Sea more or less marked the southern border of the Israelite Transjordanian tribes (see Joshua 13:9).³⁸ However, the Moabites are seen as occupying areas south of Arnon, down to approximately the brook of Zered at the southern end of the Dead Sea.³⁹ Altogether, then, the Edomite territory starts from the southern end of the Dead Sea and extends southwards from there, even when one cannot be precise beyond that in many respects, further keeping in mind that the location of Mount (or hill country of) Seir with which the Edomite territory is often associated by the Hebrew Bible (e.g. Genesis 36:8–9) is not clear.⁴⁰ It should also be kept in mind that, in addition to generally being porous, borders between ancient entities were not necessarily static over time but could vary, for example due to political conflict. However, the Israelite conquest tradition states that the Israelites were to not engage with Edom because Yahweh had given the mountain (or hill country) of Seir to Esau who was also Israel's brother (Deuteronomy 2:3–6).

What is interesting in the context of the discussion here is that according to the book of Deuteronomy,

The Horites lived in Seir in the past. The sons of Esau took over from them and destroyed them and lived in their stead. This was similar to what Israel did to the land that they took over, given to them by Yahweh.

(Deuteronomy 2:12)

And,

as he (Yahweh) did to the sons of Esau who lived in Mount (or hill country of) Seir. He destroyed the Horites from before them. They took over from them and lived there in their stead, till today.

(Deuteronomy 2:22)

Clearly the text suggests that the Edomites engaged in a settler colonial venture against previous inhabitants of the area, the Horites. That the area was sparsely inhabited in the Late Bronze Age and then experienced more settlement activity fits with this pattern.⁴¹ The pattern is also broadly similar to that exhibited in the central highlands, associated with the settlement of the ancient Israelites.⁴² It is correct that an analogy implies that the Edomite settlement could also have already started before the Iron Age, and the relative scarcity of settlement in itself already would have enabled the arrival of a new social group without too much resistance from any local populations. That the

arrival of the Edomites should be dated to the side of the Bronze Age finds support in Egyptian documents. A document from the reign of Seti II in ca. 1200 BCE mentions the tribes of Shasu of Edom in the context of a *hṯm* fortress of Tjeku.⁴³ Another apparent reference to Edom is made by Ramesses III, boasting that he had destroyed and enslaved the people of Seir among the Bedouin tribes.⁴⁴ The indication in biblical documents of a number of kings in Edom before the Israelite monarchy (Genesis 36:31–43) would also seem to support an earlier origin for the Edomites than Iron Age I.⁴⁵ In addition, Ramesses II may have referred to Seir even though this reference seems less than certain.⁴⁶ Finally, and interestingly, names of certain of Twentieth Dynasty towns in Egypt in the mid-twelfth century BCE appear to link with the Edomites, possibly due to forced migration of Edomites into Egypt, even though a link with the preceding thirteenth century BCE is in that case less than clear.⁴⁷

That no specific archaeological evidence can be adduced in support of the arrival of an external group⁴⁸ does not yet exclude the possibility of a settler colonial invasion. As we have seen, little evidence from material culture exists for the spread of the Arameans, either, but we know that they nevertheless expanded over the northern Levantine area, and as a settler colonial process at that as suggested in the foregoing.⁴⁹ In analogy with the Arameans, it is not necessary to assume that the Edomites were a group that was external to the overall area but could have been a more or less local-based group that differentiated itself from the surrounding populations by way of an ethnogenesis, and then found a way to take possession of the area in and around Negev. It is also not necessary to assume that the Horites and other groups in the area were completely destroyed; just that the Edomites became dominant there, with settler colonial processes associated with killing, expulsion and assimilation together with a likely preservation of indigenous enclaves in between involved. One does further not need to assume that the Edomite territory became completely fixed. In addition, the possibility, if not likelihood, of migration into and through that territory by other people and groups, many of which would have been pastoral nomads, should not be excluded. The comments in the Hebrew Bible about the Edomites dispossessing another people in the area are plausible and may help elucidate what happened in the area at the time, although in a most snappy and generalised manner.

The Moabites are associated with Transjordanian land north of the brook of Zered that is located in the southern end of the Dead Sea.⁵⁰ The territory extends to the river Arnon and beyond, more or less all the way to about the northern end of the Dead Sea.⁵¹ In the documents of the Hebrew Bible, however, there is more to this issue. First of all, the area is associated with the inheritance of the tribes Reuben and Gad, with the eastern Manassite tribe on the whole in addition located in the northern part of Transjordan. There is some unclarity about the respective locations of these two tribes, though.⁵² Numbers 21:34–38 seems to locate Gad in the south of Reuben, even though it also appears that some of the Gadite towns, such as Jogbehah, are located north of Reuben.⁵³ However, in the Deuteronomic tradition, including the book of Joshua (see Joshua 13:8–33), the Gadites are located north of Reuben.⁵⁴ The presence of Gad in the north is confirmed by the enumeration of the towns of refuge in Transjordan (Deuteronomy 4:41–43; Joshua 20)⁵⁵ and the location of these tribes in Judges-Samuel. It is also curious that Reuben is not mentioned in the Mesha stele that relates to these areas.⁵⁶ At the same time, Reuben is mentioned in the Song of Deborah, but not Gad. Some have suggested that Reuben came to be incorporated into Gad as time passed.⁵⁷ But, it should be noted that the overall area of settlement of the eastern tribes is more in the south in the book of Numbers than in subsequent books in the canonical order of the Hebrew Bible.⁵⁸ This seems to include eastern Manasseh which is also located slightly more in the south than in subsequent books.⁵⁹ In addition, it should be kept in mind that the book of Numbers indicates that the Israelites approached the land of Canaan from the south (and east). One may then suggest a possible scenario.⁶⁰ The list in Numbers is meant to indicate a situation at the beginning of the settlement, and the lists thereafter the situation later on. At that time, according to the canonical description, the Gadites and the eastern half of Manasseh were understood to have moved northwards, with the territorial lists reflecting the situation. Any Gadite places originally south of Reuben could then also be counted with Reuben in the lists that are canonically later. Such a scenario fits with the idea of shifting tribal frontiers in the area at the time.⁶¹

Potential confusion does not, however, stop there. The Israelites are described as having conquered the lands of Sihon, king of the Amorites, and Og, king of Bashan. The Amorites are mentioned in the Israelite conquest tradition as one of the seven nations of Canaan that were to be destroyed (see e.g. Deuteronomy 7:1). Their exact location throughout the land is not entirely clear.⁶² They may on the whole be associated with the name Amorite that is well known in wider ancient Near Eastern tradition.⁶³ Whatever the case, in the biblical texts, Sihon and Og are designated as Amorites, distinguishing them as belonging to a different social group from the Israelites and the

Moabites. Interestingly, according to Numbers 21:26 (cf. Num 21:13) Sihon had conquered land from the Moabites, in line with the idea of malleability of the territories of social groups in the wider ancient Near East. Accordingly, the Moabite area should be seen as contested, even though the biblical documents on their part also indicate that the Israelites were not supposed to, and did not try to, conquer Moabite territory due to the familial relationship they had with them and the promise of Yahweh about territory to the Moabites through Lot in the Israelite thought world (see Deuteronomy 2:9; cf. Genesis 13). One may also note that no specific eastern border is given for the Reubenites or Gadites. Finally, the Midianites can be added to the groups already mentioned for the area. On the whole, their overall location is less clear, and they appear to be a pastoralist group. Moses himself is portrayed as having escaped to Midian after killing an Egyptian (Exodus 2). He then marries a daughter of a Midianite priest (Exodus 2:21). In Transjordan, however, the Midianites become problematic for the Israelites (Numbers 22–25), with a genocidal campaign subsequently directed against them (Numbers 31).⁶⁴ In Numbers 22–24 they are portrayed as being associated with the Moabites, and in Joshua 13:21 they are said to be affiliated with Sihon as princes (*nsyḵ*) and living in his land. Altogether, then, the extant documents of the Hebrew Bible indicate that there is an ethnic mix in the area associated with Moab where borders are variable and where the territory of the Moabites is broadly known but its exact details are unclear, and those borders would also have been likely to fluctuate in the course of time. In that sense, in terms of anything definite, the documents really provide just partial snapshots from a time period that covers at least a couple of centuries, given from the perspective of the authors and written in a literary style characteristic to those authors.

In terms of an earlier history of the Moabites and their territory, according to the book of Deuteronomy,

The Emites lived there in the past, a big and numerous people, and tall like the Anakites. They were counted as Rephaites as were the Anakites, but the Moabites called them Emites.

(Deuteronomy 2:10–11)

The text at least may imply that the Moabites took over from the Emites based on Yahweh's grant of land to them, even when it does not state about such a takeover directly.⁶⁵ From an archaeological perspective, the situation is similar to that with the Edomites, in that settlement increased in the region over the Late Bronze– Early Iron Age transition, even when the area was on the whole better inhabited than that associated with the Edomites.⁶⁶ Again, it seems clear that no easy ethnic identification is possible; however, at the same time, as

with for example the Arameans, one does not have to expect that the variety of groups would have been easily distinguishable based on their material culture.

The Moabites clearly seem to be mentioned in Egyptian documents. According to reliefs at Luxor, Ramesses II (1279–1213 BCE) conducted an expedition to Moab and its environs in years 7–8 of his reign, attacking the town of *Yn(?)d* located in the mountains of *Mrrn* and the towns of *B(w)trt* and Dibon in Moab.⁶⁷ That no occupation for the Late Bronze Age has been found at Dhiban which is identified with Dibon is, however, a problem.⁶⁸ But, assuming the references to Moab are at least on the whole genuine, the implication is that the Moabites had already arrived in the area in the thirteenth century BCE, on the side of the Late Bronze Age, comparably with the ancient Israelites in terms of the overall timeframe.⁶⁹

Dhiban is also interesting as the Mesha stele was found there.⁷⁰ The text, written in Moabite that is close to ancient Hebrew, is worth quoting in full as it refers to the Israelites, to Gad and to settler colonialism in the form of killing people, taking away towns and adding them to the territory of Moab together with settling them with people from elsewhere:

I am Mesha, son of Chemosh, king of Moab, the Dibonite. My father reigned over Moab thirty years, and I then reigned after my father. I made this high place for Chemosh in Qarhoh [. . .] because he saved me from all the kings and caused me to triumph over all my adversaries. Now Omri, (5) king of Israel, humbled Moab for a long time, for Chemosh was angry at his land. His son succeeded him and also said, “I will humble Moab.” In my time he said so, but I have triumphed over him and over his house, while Israel has perished for ever! Moreover, Omri had gotten the land of Medeba and had dwelt there in his time and half the time of his son, forty years. However, Chemosh dwelt there in my time. I built Baal-meon, making a reservoir in it. I also built (10) Qaryaten. Now the men of Gad had always dwelt in the land of Ataroth, and the king of Israel had built Ataroth for them. I fought against the town and took it and killed all the people of the town as satiation for Chemosh and Moab. And I brought back from there Arel its chieftain and dragged him before Chemosh in Kerioth. I also settled there men of Sharon and men of Maharith.

In addition, Chemosh said to me, “Go, take Nebo from Israel!” (15) So I went by night and fought against it from the break of dawn until noon. I took it and killed everyone, seven thousand men, boys, women, girls and maidservants, for I had devoted them to destruction for Ashtar-Chemosh. I took from there the [. . .] of Yahweh, and dragged them before Chemosh. The king of Israel had also built Jahaz, and he dwelt there while he was fighting against me. But Chemosh drove him out before me. And (20) I took from Moab two hundred

choice men and set them against Jahaz and took it in order to add it to Dibon.

I built Qarhoh, the wall of the forests and the wall of the citadel. I also built its gates and towers and the king's house, and I made both of its reservoirs for water inside the town. There were no cisterns inside the town at Qarhoh, so I said to all the people, "Each of you, make (25) a cistern for yourselves in your house!" I moreover cut beams for Qarhoh with Israelite captives. I built Aroer and made the highway in the Arnon valley. I built Beth-bamoth for it had been destroyed. I built Bezer for it lay in ruins, with fifty men of Dibon, for all Dibon is a loyal dependency. I was king over hundred towns which I had added to the land. I built (30) [. . .] Medeba and Beth-diblathen and Beth-baal-meon, and I set there the [. . .] of the land. As regards Hauronen, there dwelt [. . .] Chemosh said to me, "Go, fight against Hauronen". And I [went] and Chemosh dwelt there in my time.⁷¹

The processes portrayed (or, better, boasted about) by Mesha resemble those already explored elsewhere in the area, including the Assyrian campaigns in the *reconquista* in the early first millennium BCE and their tradition of the Arameans having taken over towns earlier in the late second. There is no need to assume that the earlier late second millennium BCE context in the Transjordanian area had to be a peaceful one, including on the part of the Moabites themselves, and the biblical tradition about their possibly taking over from the Emites is then nothing less than completely plausible.

Ammon

The Ammonites are located north of Moab in Transjordan, with the modern name of the city Amman in the area apparently deriving from the ancient context. On the whole the area of the Ammonites seems to extend from about the northern end of the Dead Sea to the river Jabbok in the north. The ancient Israelite documents seem to indicate that the Israelites took possession of areas close to the Jordan valley in this area, with the Ammonites remaining on the eastern highlands, with a fortified border protecting them, in addition to the promise of Yahweh in the minds of the Israelites (Numbers 21:24; Joshua 13:24–27). At least parts of this land at lower elevations that would then also be associated with lower precipitation and lower productivity, save for areas by the Jordan River itself, were associated with King Sihon (Numbers 21:21–24), together with areas southwards that Sihon had taken from the Moabites.⁷² Further in the north in Transjordan was the land of Gilead that was associated with the kingdom of Og of Bashan. It was conquered by the Israelites according to the materials of the Hebrew Bible (Numbers 21:32–35;

Deuteronomy 3:1–7). While the materials in Genesis-Joshua are cautiously positive towards the Ammonites,⁷³ they feature in the books of Judges and Samuel as a strong nemesis of Israel, and David is portrayed as taking Rabbah as the main town of the Ammonites as part of his wars (2 Samuel 11–12). No references to the Ammonites seem to exist from the late second millennium BCE outside the context of the Hebrew Bible.

According to the book of Deuteronomy, in regard to the land of the Ammonites,

That is also counted as the land of the Rephaites. The Rephaites lived there in the past, with the Ammonites calling them Zamzummites. They were a big and numerous people, and tall like the Anakites. But Yahweh destroyed them before them. They took over from them and lived there in their stead.

(Deuteronomy 2:20–21)

The biblical text then clearly indicates that the Ammonites replaced another people and settled in their stead as a further instance of settler colonialism in the area. Again, the events cannot be verified based on archaeological data. However, equally, the events portrayed are again completely plausible, based on analogies presented thus far.⁷⁴

Notes

- 1 See e.g. Klengel 1992:113–114; cf. e.g. TLCANE.
- 2 Cf. the foregoing, Chapter 3; cf. also e.g. Klengel 1992:113–114.
- 3 See Klengel 1992:160–174; for political developments in northern Syria as a whole during the Late Bronze Age, see *ibid.*, 106–174.
- 4 Klengel 1992:177.
- 5 Klengel 1992:177–178.
- 6 Klengel 1992:178–179.
- 7 Cf. the foregoing, Chapter 6.
- 8 Cf. Chapter 4.
- 9 See Whincop 2008:22 for a summary table of destructions in the Northern Levantine centres.
- 10 On this in more detail, see just ahead.
- 11 See Whincop 2008 for a detailed analysis of pottery.

- 12 Cf. comments in the foregoing chapters.
- 13 Cf. e.g. Núñez 2018.
- 14 Cf. just above and Whincop 2008:98, 161–162, 167–168, 174–177; also see Klengel 1992:184.
- 15 The appellation Phoenicia is of Greek origin, first attested in the ninth–seventh centuries BCE. They however referred to themselves as Canaanites. See Aubet 2001:6–13 for a discussion.
- 16 See Aubet 2001:22–23;
- 17 See Morris 2005:707; cf. also Klengel 1992:185.
- 18 Cf. Morris 2005:709–710; Klengel 1992:186.
- 19 See Aubet 2001.
- 20 Cf. Bell 2005:3.
- 21 For further details, see e.g. Klengel 1992.
- 22 Thus Yasur-Landau 2010:169, referring to Bell.
- 23 See Yasur-Landau 2010:40 for the references.
- 24 See MacDonald 2000:21–29.
- 25 See Wilkinson 2003:18.
- 26 See MacDonald 2015:4–5, including map on p. 5; MacDonald 2000:29–34; including map on pp. 32, 37; cf. related comments on rainfall in the foregoing.
- 27 See MacDonald 2015:2–5; MacDonald 2000:28.
- 28 Cf. MacDonald 2000:4–5; Wilkinson 2003:168–181.
- 29 See MacDonald 2000:33–34; MacDonald 2015:4–5, 24–25. MacDonald suggests relative dryness in this area between 1300 BCE and 1000 BCE, however, he acknowledges that the issue does not seem entirely clear-cut.
- 30 See MacDonald 2015:22 for the east side of the rift valley. For the west side where there is evidence for certain localised activity in the Late Bronze Age but where Iron I evidence is also generally scanty, see Rosen 2009 and the comments in Pitkänen 2010:286–289.
- 31 See Finkelstein 1988:112–117; Routledge 2004:79, 87–88.
- 32 See ahead for further details, and cf. ANET:243 and e.g. Pitkänen 2010:286.
- 33 On the significance of blessings (and curses) in the Hebrew Bible in the context of the ancient world, cf. comments in Pitkänen 2017a:156–157, in

the context of the Balaam narrative of Numbers 22–24.

34 On this general issue, see Moberly 1992.

35 E.g. why the trickery incident in Genesis 27, even when Jacob’s name can in the Hebrew be associated with trickery (‘*qb*’)?

36 This is regardless of the reading “sons of israel” or “sons of god” at the end of the verse (cf. e.g. Tov 2012:248–249 for a discussion of the textual issues).

37 Cf. Pitkänen 2010:286–287.

38 Cf. Pitkänen 2010:239.

39 Cf. Routledge 2004, incl. the map on p. 144.

40 Cf. Pitkänen 2010:234.

41 Cf. just above.

42 Cf. the foregoing, Chapter 5.

43 The text reads: “Another (matter) to inform my [lord], n[amely we] finished with allow[ing] that the tribes of Shasu of Edom pass the *htm*-fortress [of] Merneptah Hotephirmaat, l.p.h., which is (in) Tjeku, to the pools of the temple of Atum [of Merne] ptah Hotephirmaat, which are in Tjeku, in order to sustain them and to sustain their flocks by the great will of pharaoh, l.p.h., the good sun of every land, in regnal year 8, day 8 upon [the birth] of Seth. I caused that they (i.e., their passings?) be brought as a tabular document to the (place) [where] my lord is [to]gether [with] the other names of the days of passing the *htm*-fortress of Merneptah Hotephirmaat, l.p.h., which is in [Tj] ek[u]”; see Morris 2005:486–489, including for a discussion in the context of Egyptian military fortresses in the New Kingdom. Morris (2005:486n376) also notes, however, that the equation of *idm* in the document as Edom is not fully certain even when she sides with the identification.

44 The full reference by Ramesses III reads: “I destroyed the people of Seir among the bedouin tribes. I razed their tents: their people, their property, and their cattle as well, without number, pinioned and carried away in captivity, as the tribute to Egypt. I gave them to the Ennead of the gods, as slaves to their houses” (see MacDonald 2015:25, quoting ANET:262; transliteration and transliteration in Peden 1994:214, 215).

45 That the Edomites are described in Genesis 36:31–43 as having had kings should not be construed as necessarily requiring an extensive administrative apparatus. The kings (*mlk*) can be seen as local leaders that could be less than sedentary (cf. comments in Kitchen 2003:196). At the

same time, the Israelite list comes from the period of the monarchy, and its historical value may be less than assured (cf. MacDonald 2015:26).

46 See Morris 2005:367.

47 Cf. Morris 2005:733.

48 See MacDonald 2015:24.

49 See Chapter 6.

50 Cf. comments made in the foregoing.

51 See MacDonald 2000:172; Routledge 2004:144.

52 The rest of this paragraph is adapted from Pitkänen 2017a:193. Cf. also the comments in Routledge 2004:46.

53 See ABD II:864–865; MacDonald 2000:103–125.

54 See MacDonald 2000:125–146; cf. ABD II:865.

55 Note that the towns of refuge link with the Levitical towns in Joshua 21 which tradition is priestly, at the minimum broadly linking back to Genesis-Numbers (and cf. discussion about the authorship of Genesis-Joshua in Chapter 5).

56 More on the Mesha stele in the following.

57 See MacDonald 2000:134.

58 See MacDonald 2000:123–125.

59 See MacDonald 2000:123–125.

60 This does not exclude other possibilities.

61 Cf. comments in the foregoing; cf. also Petter 2014.

62 Cf. Joshua 11:1–3 and Pitkänen 2010:211.

63 Cf. the foregoing, and cf. also e.g. Bryce 2009:40–41.

64 For further details, see Pitkänen 2017a under these chapters.

65 Note also that the Rephaites (Heb. Rephaim) in the passage at least resonate with some mythological features and therefore the reference has at least slight mythological overtones as well, cf. e.g. DDD:692–700.

66 Cf. the foregoing.

67 See Morris 2005:366–367.

68 See Morris 2005:367n89; cf. MacDonald 2000:84–85.

69 Cf. the foregoing, Chapter 5.

70 For a translation, see e.g. ANET:320–321.

71 Translation based on ANET:320–321.

72 Cf. comments in the foregoing.

73 Cf. comments in the foregoing.

74 Keeping in mind, however, the mythological aspects that relate to the Rephaites (Heb. *rephaim*); cf. comments in the foregoing. Also, interestingly, as e.g. Grabbe (2016a:37) points out, in KTU 1.108 the god *rpu* lives in Ashtaroth and Edrei (see UDB:401–411, esp 402–403) that are also associated with king Og in Bashan in the biblical conquest tradition (see Numbers 21:33–35; Deuteronomy 1:4; 3:10; Joshua 9:10; 12:4; 13:12). It appears that Ashtaroth and Edrei were so famous in connection with their association with the Rephaites that they were also known in Ugarit, mythologised there in the text in question in connection with the god *rpu*.

8 Migration and colonialism, ancient and modern

A. Summary and conclusions on the ancient world

This book has investigated migration and colonialism in the ancient world. It focused on the Levantine area and its environs in the ancient Near East in the late second millennium BCE. The first chapter provided an overview of previous studies in the region. The second chapter added in a set of social scientific considerations that pertain to migration and colonialism. The third chapter elucidated the role and significance of the Late Bronze empires that were dominant in the area. The following four chapters then looked at entities that developed in the area more or less in the shadow of the dominant empires. The Philistine migration that was unleashed by the collapse of the Mycenaean palatial centres was focused on first. This was followed by an analysis of ancient Israel. A treatment of the emergence and spread of the Arameans then followed. Finally, an overview of the Phoenicians, the Edomites, Moabites and Ammonites rounded up the coverage of the ancient world.

One important result of the study that can be highlighted here is that all of the migrations seem to have been more or less independent of each other. The Philistine migration originated in Mycenae that is well removed from the Levant. While it is correct that Mycenae had substantial trading connections with the Levant, it does not seem that the Mycenaean collapse was due to factors arising from the Levant. On the contrary, developments in the palatial area seem to have taken place from an internal perspective, or otherwise due to conquests from areas north of Mycenae. However, once the collapse took place, a substantial migration was directed towards the east into southern Anatolia and Cyprus and then southward towards Egypt. The arrival of the migrants seems to have caused, or at least strongly contributed towards, disruption of life in the Levantine coastal areas. It would as part of this have induced problems for trade and likely have been a factor in the collapse of the Hittite empire due to its finding greater difficulty in receiving grain shipments from Syria and Egypt. The migration, even if the Egyptians were able to stop it from reaching Egypt to any substantial degree, would also have disrupted

operations of the Egyptian empire in the Levant. As an exception, however, coastal areas in today's southern Syria were not substantially affected, but the Phoenicians managed to keep carrying on more or less as normal in them.

The ancient Israelites, who settled in the southern Levantine hill country, were seeking a better life in more or less remote areas where the Egyptians or any other states would not be able to impose their will on them. It would appear that the Egyptians were not strongly interested in the hill country until the reign of Merneptah. The victory stele by Merneptah then reveals that Israel was by that time already a force to be reckoned with, at least to a certain degree so as to be mentioned and acted against. Otherwise, it seems that conflicts with Egypt were rare, with the Egyptians leaving the Israelites to mostly fend for themselves. On the whole, any Egyptian operations in the hill country would appear to have been less common than, for example, during the Amarna age. Parallel to the Israelites, or even before their arrival on the scene, a number of new entities also arose as a result of migrations in the Negev and the Transjordanian area.

The Arameans diverged from their West Semitic peers in the northern Levantine pastoralist spheres sometime in the middle of the second millennium BCE, with linguistic differentiation into Aramaic being a characteristic feature that distinguished them from other pastoral-based groups. The Arameans were able to expand into settled areas and also apparently expand the areas of settlement in the northern Levant, or at the minimum contribute towards such expansion. In the process, they then ended up expanding as against their neighbours as well. This included taking over areas southwest from the Euphrates River and towns in the Jazira area that had previously been controlled by the Assyrians, the dominant empire-state in northern Mesopotamia. Once such takeovers by the Arameans had started happening, the Assyrians did feel that they had to do something. However, by that time of the close of the twelfth century BCE, the Assyrian response was not significant enough to be able to stem the tide. The Arameans even pushed into the heartland of Assyria on the eastern side of northern Mesopotamia, creating some considerable chaos. However, Assyria was able to survive and regrouped some 100–150 years later. The Assyrian *reconquista* resulted in the retaking of areas lost to the Arameans and the establishment of even tighter state control on the Jazira than had been the case in Middle Assyrian times.

As was highlighted in the study, the Sea Peoples, Israelites, Arameans and Edomites, Moabites and Ammonites were nonstate entities in the late second millennium. They only gravitated towards statehood subsequent to their spread into the area, with the Philistine Pentapolis forming relatively quickly. All of the migrants were initially more or less confined to the areas that they knew best, with the Philistines operating in the maritime areas, the Israelites in

the highlands and the Arameans in the pastoral areas of the northern Levant. A number of the entities did, however, subsequently seek to expand, or at least ended up expanding into other areas as well, at the minimum in some ways. The Philistines expanded their influence towards the hill country. The Israelites, especially after having blocked off the Philistine threat, increased their territory towards the lowlands. The Arameans as political entities mostly stayed in their broadly pastoralist environment; many of them, however, migrated to other societies as cross-community migrants. It appears that the Edomites, Moabites and Ammonites more or less stayed within their environments even though they at times came into conflict with the ancient Israelites, with Mesha at least taking towns from the Israelites in the first half of the first millennium BCE.¹ In this sense, the entities could exhibit characteristics typical to larger empires that had controlled extended areas and dominated a number of societies, such as the Mittanian, Hittite, Egyptian and Assyrian empires. It was only ancient Israel that could achieve something comparable to them, but only for a short time. And, the idea of rule by the Israelites from the Euphrates to the Brook of Egypt probably really meant a more or less indirect rule over Aram Damascus and Edom as an empire for a few decades or thereabouts so as to be able to make the claim.

The new entities seem to have come about via an ethnogenesis. For the Philistines this started with the mixing of the Sea Peoples themselves and then continued at their destination through mixing with locals. For the Israelites, this was achieved in the hill country environment by attributing a common forefather to the settlers, together with the prominence of the god Yahweh. The priesthood, especially as concentrated at Shiloh, would also promote some specific forms of Yahwistic worship and governance for the highland settlers, with mixed results. The Aramean ethnogenesis had much to do with language differentiation, even though some mixing with peoples they came into contact with as part of their normal interactions and expansion would be likely to have been a contributing factor, at least to some extent. It is difficult to say how the Edomites, Moabites and Ammonite groups distinguished themselves, including as there is no indication of sufficient linguistic differentiation; however, it is fair to expect that they were comparable to other areas and peoples considered in this book.

The mode of the Philistine migration involved both cross-community and colonising migration. In Philistia, and probably also Palistin at least to some extent, the migrants were able to wrest political control at least in a number of places. The result was a colonial process of a mixed mode where new identities were created based on a mixture of colonising immigrants and indigenous locals, together with unintended results of colonialism. In other places, the Sea Peoples integrated in local societies largely based on the terms of those

societies. In the southern Levantine highlands, a centralised plan was made in regard to the ancient Israelites, even if for a decentralised society; however, the actual course of events involved a number of unintended consequences of colonialism. The system that emerged only broadly resembled what was envisaged in the documents of Genesis-Joshua that modern readers can find in the Hebrew Bible. For example, indigenous religious influences of Baal worship became well established in many areas of the Israelite society. Or, as another example, the Danites could not hold on to the area where the Philistines arrived and ended up moving to the north. On the whole, settler colonialism was intended and achieved, but in ways different from what was envisaged by the architects of the programme. This even seems natural in the absence of centralising ideologisation and accompanying coercion that could be applied effectively for the region, and even if those means had been available for the ancient Israelites, one may still ask how unintended consequences of at least some kind could have been completely avoided. The Arameans also expanded in a settler colonial manner. However, in the absence of written documents from the Arameans in a situation where the immigrants were also archaeologically indistinguishable from the indigenes, it is difficult to be more specific as to how the expansion progressed and, for example, to what extent there might have been unintended consequences of colonialism. The same goes with the Edomites, Moabites and Ammonites.

An examination of colonialism has revealed that all of the basic modes of franchise, mixed mode and settler colonialism were operating in the area under study during the time period in question, also selectively extended into the first millennium so as to make some salient points and outline the further vicissitudes of the entities studied. It is particularly interesting that settler colonialism that can notably be associated with the Israelites and Arameans was not a new phenomenon even in the late second millennium BCE. We saw that settler colonial processes were at work already in the early dynastic Egypt in the late fourth millennium BCE. There, the issue was about state power extending across communities and homogenising them, and one may suspect that settler colonialism would have by conceptual extension been in operation already in earliest times when states started to form in the ancient Near East and beyond. However, with ancient Israel and ancient Arameans, the processes that took place are not associated with state power, even if the possibility of a unifying leader for a substantial part at least of the Aramean domain cannot be excluded. Considerations of the known expansion of the Nuer against the Dinka that did not involve state power or other planned means for the expansion demonstrated that such process are possible outside state contexts, on their part pushing the possibility of settler colonialism to pre-state societies in human history, also from another angle corroborated by DNA evidence

according to which Homo Sapiens replaced Neanderthals.² It was important to keep in mind that the Nuer expansion took place in an agrarian-pastoralist nonindustrialised setting that would not have been radically different from the setting of the ancient Near East in the late second millennium BCE, particularly in relation to the Aramean expansion. The Israelite setting was slightly different as central planning was involved, even if the settlement processes are likely to have been in many ways, if not primarily noncentralised. In reality, then, we can see that, except for being either based on centralised planning or spontaneously driven, settler colonialism can be a combination of both. Based on the concept of hegemony, it would seem difficult if expansion can be purely driven based on central commands rather than in combination with the will of the people of the expanding society, even if expansion of states via military means and subsequent expansion of administration followed by a long process of cultural flow from the coloniser to the colonised, as much as that can be unidirectional, and perhaps accompanied by some forced migration, would seem the closest that one can get to centrally driven settler colonialism.

As for the reasons to the changes in the area between ca. 1300 BCE and 900 BCE, it seems clear that no single overarching cause can be identified, but what transpired was a sum of a number of parts that contributed to the mix independently, even when a variety of societies also interacted with each other. Accordingly, it is doubtful that someone living in the Late Bronze Age would have been able to predict what was in store for the ensuing centuries. It is only through hindsight that can be achieved through historical study that comments can be made. The combination of factors is quite remarkably unique, and some remarks as to the legacy of this period will be made in the following.

A few comments that relate to the question of genocide can also be made here with the study of the ancient world in view. In the broader definition of Lemkin, settler colonial expansion of one society over another is included. In the narrower definition devised and promulgated by the UN, the settler colonial aspects of destroying the societal pattern of the oppressed group and imposing the societal pattern of the oppressor are more clouded. Instead, the focus appears to be on the treatment of minorities and individuals rather than on independent social groups. The item of “physical destruction” further serves to cloud the settler colonial aspects. The issue of “intent to destroy a group” also clouds the idea that war as conquest can result in the destruction of a group by, for example, suggesting that a conquest was an “accidental” result of a number of wars. The Nuer conquest then would probably not count as a genocide in the sense of the UN definition, but would certainly count as such in the context of the broader definition of Lemkin. The important point is that the UN definition leaves out a number of occasions where group violence is involved with a group ending up destroying another group as a group with its

unique human and cultural heritage. One might, of course, ask if Lemkin's definition is too wide; however, for example, if a group purely defends itself and its territory against a conquering foe without encroaching on the territory of the attacking group, it clearly would not count as genocide in Lemkian terms, as the group would not be imposing its societal pattern on the other group. Of course, also, if a group transforms into something else as a result of cultural diffusion, no group violence would be involved.

In this context, then, we can see that the territorial expansion of states is already genocidal in Lemkian terms. The same applies to ad hoc expansion of societal units without any state direction, as was the case with the Nuer and Dinka. In this sense, then, the arrival of the Sea Peoples and their taking over in Philistia, the expansion of the ancient Israelites in the southern Levantine hill country and the expansion of the Arameans in northern Levant and towards the southwest were all genocidal processes. Genocide in this respect is simply group violence where one group attacks and subjugates another group, comparable to violence at an individual level where one person attacks another. A problem that relates to discussions about genocide today is that while individual aggression is usually acknowledged as a crime, together with discussions about what is excessive force if an individual thus attacked defends themselves, group aggression is not acknowledged as a crime in the same manner. As far as the discussion pertains to the ancient world, genocide as group violence was clearly happening there all the time, including in the contexts and settings outlined in this book. To what extent genocide as defined by the UN definition was happening in the ancient world is obviously less clear.³ I shall not attempt to answer that question in full here, as I believe that the UN definition is ultimately a flawed one and misses the point of group violence. In addition, as will be commented on in the following, it in reality is a highly politicised conception that has served and continually serves to drive the agenda of certain interest groups, whether incidentally or by design.

More widely, the next sections of this final chapter will look at the relationship of the ancient and modern worlds both in terms of the reception of the documents that pertain to the ancient world, with the Hebrew Bible in the forefront due to its unique reception history, and typological parallels with societal formations and processes that have been highlighted in the presentation. The issue of technological development and its implications serves as a significant backdrop for the considerations, keeping in mind throughout that ancient societies focused on in the book were at an earlier stage(s) of that developmental trajectory than modern ones. First, an outline of overall developments that have led to the formation of the modern world will be made especially from the perspective of significant world empires. Then, comments will be made on the reception of the ancient Israelite tradition,

starting with the context of the Christian religion, with a specific focus on how the tradition has affected Western colonial enterprises, and then proceeding to considerations that relate to Zionism and the birth of the modern state of Israel. Finally, remarks on life in contemporary modern societies will be made in the context of the themes explored in the book. A main underlying pursuit in these final sections will be to identify and explicate a set of relevant processes, trajectories and correlations. The presentation assumes the existence of postcolonial literature that has become quite extensive in recent decades.⁴

B. Typological parallels with the modern world

It was already pointed out how the late second-millennium BCE Levant stands firmly in the agrarian era in terms of the trajectory of technological development of humankind. The first of the two great transformations, the development of agrarian stratified states, had already taken place, with writing supporting accompanying bureaucratic administration. In this process, early Egypt serves as an example of a state expanding as an empire and then further making that empire a state, and Agade in the latter part of the third millennium BCE as the first known transregional empire in world history. Altogether, the era in focus in this book was an era of empires in the Late Bronze Age that, however, either collapsed or shrunk as the new Iron Age dawned. In the Iron Age, what were essentially nonstate actors found a way to spring forward and create something of a new world in the ancient Near East. This respite from state power was not to last, however. The entities themselves soon started to gravitate towards state formation. Also, the Middle Assyrian state that had shrunk back to its core area after creating an empire over the Jazira reasserted itself in the neo-Assyrian period, first taking back what it previously had to give away to the Arameans. But the Assyrians were not satisfied with this state of affairs and pushed forward into further areas to conquer. In the process, Jazira was converted into an integral part of the Assyrian state and the Aramean, Philistine and Israelite entities were either destroyed, reduced or dominated. The Babylonians took over from the Assyrians in the late seventh century BCE, with some further conquests engaged in by them. The Babylonians themselves were then conquered by the Persians, followed by the empires of Greece and Rome. After the fall of the western part of Rome, the Islamic empire emerged in the seventh century CE, followed by the Mongols and Ottomans in the Near East.⁵ The Near East is,

however, not the only place where empires formed. For example, in China, a major empire formed by at least 1750 BCE.⁶ In the Americas, the Incas formed an empire in the late fourteenth century CE and the Aztecs in the early fifteenth century CE.⁷ Similar developments in a variety of areas in the world that were either relatively or completely unconnected show that what was at stake was not the characteristics of a particular people group as such, but the ability of enhancements to material and also ideological technologies to enable rule over increasingly large areas.

The European explorations from the fifteenth century on that more or less started to cover the whole of the globe in their scope heralded major changes for the world. Portuguese explorations were made possible by advances in ship technologies that enabled the covering of wider distances and, as an important milestone, the circumnavigation of the globe in the early sixteenth century.⁸ Columbus's landing at the Americas in 1492 was a monumental event. For the first time, Europeans had reached today's North America, even if the Vikings had already visited today's Nova Scotia in the late tenth century CE.⁹ The Spanish were able to expand in the Americas, quickly taking over the central and southern parts of the continent, with Portugal taking the area of what is now Brazil.¹⁰ In the north, the first British colony was established in Roanoke Island in 1584, but did not survive. The colony set up in Jamestown in 1607, however, did, and the settler colonial expansion of the British colonies in the eastern seaboard of northern America began.¹¹ Till the Declaration of Independence of the thirteen British colonies in 1776, the Europeans did have an overall controlling presence in the area of those colonies, but it was only after the Revolutionary War that followed the Declaration that an accentuated march westwards over the continent ensued, and that even only from the 1810s on.¹² The Spanish colonisation can be seen in the context of a mixed mode where relatively large indigenous enclaves were left and where people mixed substantially, even creating a new Latin American identity for which the emergence of latinos as people genetically mixed from whites and native Americans formed a backbone of such new identities.¹³ In North America, so-called "explosive" colonialism overwhelmed the native peoples so that only very limited enclaves of them remained, confined into more or less tiny reservations.¹⁴ Similar developments took place in Australia and New Zealand, with the indigenous people of New Zealand proving more resistant against the Europeans.¹⁵ In addition, while indigenous peoples were segregated in South Africa and many of their lands taken over by white colonists, they were left intact as a majority of the overall population.

The explosive colonialism in the United States, Canada and Australia was made possible by industrialisation, the second great transformation in world history. Britain industrialised first and consequently was able to obtain an

advantage in terms of power for expansion, creating the largest empire that the world had known until then, and controlling a quarter of the world's population by the early twentieth century. Meanwhile, the Russians also expanded over the northern part of the Eurasian continent in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but for them empire was more of a collage of differing people than an entity that was defined by racial purity, or at least by white domination, as it was for the British in their settler colonies of northern America, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa.¹⁶ The United States had subjugated all independent native polities on territory claimed by it by the 1870s.¹⁷ It had also already expanded to the Hawaiian Islands and annexed them in the 1890s.¹⁸ In addition, Alaska was taken in that century.¹⁹ Expansion to the Pacific was continued by the taking over from Spanish control and subjugation of Philippines in the turn of the twentieth century.²⁰ Cuba and Puerto Rico were also taken over from Spain by the United States.²¹

The colonisation of Africa largely took place in the late nineteenth century, enabled by the combination of the development of medicine to withstand tropical diseases and new, more efficient weaponry to impose the will of the colonists. As an interesting part of the process, most of the so-called black Africa was divided between major European powers in the late nineteenth century, more or less by mutual agreement between them.²² China was also in effect divided between the colonial powers, with Europeans otherwise having established control over most of Asia.²³ Altogether, by 1900 practically the whole world was under the control of Western powers, with Japan that had industrialised in the late nineteenth century being one significant exception and itself developing into an empire. This development can perhaps be considered as at least in some ways parallel to the rise of the Late Bronze Age empires in the ancient Near East.

Two rising powers then emerged from the late nineteenth century into the colonial circle, Germany and Japan. The First World War was in effect a battle between the European empires, with Germany as an important claimant to success. The war ended with Germany losing and with harsh conditions imposed on it by the victors.²⁴ The Ottoman empire was also dissolved, with the British and the French dividing much of the spoils.²⁵ The United States at this stage had largely taken part in the war by financing the Europeans, even when it also sent troops.²⁶ On the road to the Second World War, there was a resurgence of German power, with Germany wishing to expand further. Japan was also hoping to expand, having taken Korea in the beginning of the century and expanded into China in the 1930s.²⁷ In the Second World War, the United States, Russia, China, Britain and France proved to be the winners, with France really being able to call itself a victor only due to help from Britain and the United States. The United States emerged as the biggest beneficiary, even if

Russia in its communist form also triumphed, having suffered particularly extensive material losses and loss of life, however. At the end of the war, these five nations formed global institutions for the postwar world, including the UN, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. In the UN, the five empires held veto power in the Security Council that was to determine about international military action. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund were particularly shaped by the United States as global financial institutions.²⁸ In the postwar years, American advantage proved decisive, with the Soviet empire collapsing in 1989–1991, and with the British empire having been handed over to the United States in the 1950s. At this time there was also a wave of decolonisation from a political perspective in areas of Asia and Africa associated with the British and French empires, together with what was still left of the Spanish and Portuguese empires.²⁹ In this sense, the rise of independent entities in a variety of places around the globe has a parallel with the collapse of the Late Bronze Age empires in the ancient Near East, even when the emergence of the new entities was a political one rather than shaped by migration as in the ancient Near East in the Late Bronze–Early Iron Age transition.

Decolonisation, however, had little to do with the US empire.³⁰ After the collapse of communism in the late 1980s,³¹ the US empire, formulated via NATO in Europe, expanded into Eastern Europe, largely by the Eastern European countries voluntarily joining the organisation, but with the United States also conducting some wars in the Balkans in the 1990s. American expansion to the Middle East followed in the late twentieth century and early twenty-first century through wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, even when, for example, Israel and Saudi Arabia had been in the American fold already.³² A certain resurgence of Russia took place in the 2010s after a revolution in Ukraine, with Russia considering that the West had facilitated the revolution and in the course of events annexing Crimea. Russia has also recently backed a government in Syria in a war where the United States has supported rebels fighting against the government and has also acted as an occupying force especially in northern Syria. Another possible counterforce to the United States is China, with the Chinese economy predicted to overtake the US economy in the next decade or so and with the Chinese military at the time of writing this already competing with the United States in terms of technology and even in some areas at least potentially surpassing it.³³ As part of global competition between these two powers, while China has invested in Africa economically in recent decades, the United States is currently expanding there militarily, with the generation of AFRICOM in 2007.³⁴ In that sense, the decolonisation of the twentieth century has recently been reversed, with the continent serving as a crossroads between empires.

This summary has shown the outlines of how the modern world has been shaped. Clearly empires have had a major role in the development of world history. In that, the West has been hugely dominant over the last 500 years. Keeping in mind that the colonisation of Africa marked the conquest of the last frontier for Europe, more or less the whole world came into the sphere of European power by the end of the nineteenth century. This power was empire power, with state power in an industrialised context at the core of those empires. By this time, non-state entities had more or less lost their ability to expand, with the existence of many of such societies either extinguished or under threat, even when previously unknown societies sometimes come to light for the rest of the world even today. In this sense, the Nuer expansion may have marked one of the last such processes by noncentralised societies. In that respect, the modern world is a different place from that of the ancient Near East where state and nonstate entities could still be competing. From the perspective of both migration and colonialism, nonstate peoples are unlikely to cause the collapse of states at present. With this in mind, recent migration to Europe of people from the war-torn Middle East is unlikely to cause a revolution or a colonising process. On the other hand, migration always changes the fabric of societies. People from other places bring with them their customs, and large movements from areas that have differing customs will cause changes in the host population in the longer run via cultural diffusion.³⁵ The formation of ethnic enclaves can create specific centres of diffusion of such cultures; however, one may again ask to what extent those can really affect the main population(s) in the longer run unless demographics were to change radically in a short span of time. In this respect, one has to keep in mind that cross-community migration generally happens to the lower rungs of the society and therefore cannot directly challenge existing power structures. Also, from a slightly different perspective, for example, if ethnic enclaves form and are not integrated in the wider society, it is likely that as isolated enclaves they will not be able to benefit from societal networks and will remain poor and at least potentially alienated, with a strong possibility of associated social problems emerging.³⁶

In the wider contemporary context, then, it is really the state actors that people should be most concerned about. Only they have any major power to change the world, and this was already noticeable through the First and Second World Wars of the twentieth century, especially in connection to Western states.³⁷ Altogether, it is important to also recognise that the overall economic system of the modern world is more or less a Western creation and linked with Western state power.³⁸

Even the UN Genocide Convention can be seen as part of centrifugal ideologisation by the dominant world powers. The narrower UN definition

draws attention away from conquest and colonialism, instead focusing on minorities and individuals under state power. In this respect, the extensive Nazi violence against the Jews during the Second World War is often considered as providing a prime example of genocide. Such a conceptualisation then serves to attribute strong legitimization for the actions of the victorious empires in defeating Germany and Nazism.³⁹ What can often be forgotten from considerations is how the great powers of the twentieth century formed through colonisation and extreme violence against and dispossession of indigenous peoples, particularly in the nineteenth century. Interestingly in this respect, German actions in relation to settler colonialism in the twentieth century that are quite similar to the actions of the victorious empires of the Second World War prior to the twentieth century are generally not well known in public discourse,⁴⁰ whereas the issue of the Nazi genocide of the Jews remains a set of events that is constantly promulgated as something that the world should not forget. This also brings us to issues that relate to ancient Israel and its legacy.

C. Ancient Israel and its legacy

From ancient Israel to Christianity

As was discussed in the foregoing,⁴¹ the early Israelite society can be seen as an attempt to break free from the coercive effects of ancient agrarian states and empires. The Israelite narrative commemorates liberation from oppressive slavery in Egypt, itself a strong empire in the western-southwestern part of the ancient Near East in the late second millennium BCE. The highland settlers acted more or less independently from any wider coercive power. Nevertheless, the society did have its elites and an overall social hierarchy, even though a relatively flattened one. The Israelite documents in Genesis-Joshua reflect the programmatic vision of the priestly elite. While the vision was only partially fulfilled and was also modified by the emergence of state power and the establishment of the temple in Jerusalem, the written documents did survive and via such survival became part of the Israelite cultural memory. Genesis-Joshua was later augmented by other compositions, many of them dating from the late monarchic period and the time of the Babylonian exile and also the postexilic time. The books of Genesis-Deuteronomy in particular were demarcated as a separate unit, the *torah*

(law), and were read in a new way in postexilic settings of newly emerging Judaism. The fuller collection of canonical documents of Judaism as a group of writings recognised by the community as sacred also became a foundational set of writings for the newly emerging Christian religion that branched out from Judaism. To these were added documents written by early Christians. The latter collection was designated as the New Testament, and the Jewish documents that in the Jewish discourse were called the Law, Prophets and Writings were coined as the Old Testament for the Christian communities. The Old Testament was accordingly co-opted into being a group of Christian Scriptures, keeping in mind that the New Testament writings referred to it extensively, even if in a new style of readings that considered the Old Testament and the history of ancient Israel as foretelling and preparing for the coming of Jesus Christ, the founding figure of Christianity. Altogether, the Old Testament, including the documents that portray the history of early Israel, was in a sense masked behind a layer that consisted of the New Testament as a more central set of writings.⁴² Nevertheless, the Old Testament documents still remained a part of the canonical collection of the Christian scriptures and continued to be read and taken into account.

The new Christian religion, initially consisting of a handful of followers, spread in the Roman empire. The original purpose of the religion was to create a new community of believers without any specific aspirations for societal domination, except for hoping for God's purposes to be fulfilled in a future *eschaton*. Any future plan of God was, however, essentially independent of the efforts of believers whose task was to simply live a godly life and await for God to realise his purposes.⁴³ Even if Christianity was initially an illegitimate religion – and at times there were attempts by the empire to root it out – it eventually became sufficiently popular and was appropriated by an emperor, Constantine, in the early fourth century.⁴⁴ Constantine also changed the status of the religion from an illegitimate one into one recognised by the state.⁴⁵ By the end of the century, an edict by the emperor Theodosius made Christianity the only legitimate religion in the empire.⁴⁶ Henceforth Christianity went hand in hand with the state in Europe in a new era of Christendom, with the state thus having co-opted the religion.⁴⁷ Except for the newly divided Catholic and Orthodox churches at the beginning of the second millennium CE, most new expressions of Christianity that come out from the reformation in the sixteenth century CE continued operating within the Christendom paradigm, including the Lutheran, Anglican and Reformed churches. It is true that there were also dissidents to the approach of church and state going together, most notably in the Anabaptist tradition; however, these remained as minorities.⁴⁸ From a sociopolitical perspective, the beginning of overseas European empires from the fifteenth century on also meant the expansion of Christianity as part of the

related conquests, even when the papal conquests in the Baltics in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries were already an example of the expansion of Christian states.⁴⁹ From the perspective of the Christian religion, certainly, there were missions outside the context of empires from the earliest times; however, much if not most of the spread of Christianity went together with the expansion of the Western empires.⁵⁰ Altogether, it should be highlighted that Christianity was complicit with the European expansion, with representatives of the Western empires in addition not infrequently referring to the Bible and specifically also the documents within it that pertain to early Israel in support of their actions,⁵¹ even if this was not always the case.⁵² As a notable point in this respect, for example, even now there is only a limited amount of criticism by Christians on the conquest of northern America by European settlers, many of whom identified as Christians.⁵³ As for today, while the secularisation that started in Europe with the onset of modernity has resulted in the Church losing much of its power and privileges in terms of the state,⁵⁴ again, the current most powerful empire in the world may still use at least potentially co-optative Christendom rhetoric in its operations around the world – at least this clearly is the case for the so-called Christian right in that empire in particular. In that sense, the legacy of ancient Israelite settler colonialism still lives on in the West.

On the whole, then, the foregoing comments serve to highlight how the history of Christian religion has been tightly intertwined with the question of societal structure and political power, attested by the presence and history of empires and expansion into the lands of other peoples and changes to the societal contexts of the writers from the earliest roots of ancient Israel in the Old Testament on.⁵⁵ At times both the biblical and later Christian narratives have advocated conquest, with the writers perhaps also being in more or less commanding positions within empires or societies bent on conquest. At other times the existence and rule of empire has been taken as a given, and at certain times, such as with the biblical writers in the sixth century BCE, the writers have been subjugated by external empires and lamented about the state of affairs.⁵⁶ In terms of the Christian movement itself, despite its high social position in regard to the state during Christendom, cultural memory has often propagated a narrative of Christians being a powerless and persecuted minority, especially in reflection of the status of the religion during its first three centuries in the Roman empire. It is important to be critical of such a narrative as in many cases not reflecting actual realities. On the whole, the variety of actual settings for a variety of Christian individuals and communities fits with the flow of world history and the conceivable possibility of an individual or social group more or less being in any of the positions that may exist at a given time, at the top or bottom of a social pyramid, or

somewhere in between, in terms of power and influence. Interestingly, the move from the Exodus narrative into settler colonialism and the transformation of an initial persecuted minority of Christians into state power in the Roman empire parallel each other. A further interesting parallel is provided with narratives of persecuted Christian minorities in Europe finding freedom in the New World in North America, only to contribute to the destruction of the indigenous peoples of North America.⁵⁷

Overall, then, the study here on its part suggests that the search for freedom or other betterment in life by an individual or even a whole community may be achieved by oppressing or destroying another individual or community. As was already indicated, when a person acts violently or oppresses another, innersocietal frameworks generally come to play so as to respond to such actions. However, there is much more limited mitigation with violence between groups. Conquest by a society is not necessarily recognised in today's international relations as a crime that can also be punishable. This is especially the case with conquests by major state powers in the international scene. Of course, one can see parallel situations within societies where, for example, it is at the minimum perceived that the rich and powerful can often "get away" with serious financial misdeeds. In this sense, power and inequality operate at both innersocietal and intersocietal levels, with the two levels intertwined. Regarding the intersocietal context, more specifically, as Hardt and Negri put it at the turn of the millennium, their comments still having a good amount of currency even when the limits of US power have recently been shown, for example, in the war in Syria,

At the narrow pinnacle of the pyramid there is one superpower, the United States, that holds hegemony over the global use of force – a superpower that can act alone but prefers to act in collaboration with others under the umbrella of the United Nations . . . On a second level, still within the first tier, as the pyramid broadens slightly, a group of nation-states control the primary global monetary instruments and thus have the ability to regulate international exchanges.⁵⁸

Moreover:

[the second] tier is structured primarily by the networks that transnational capitalist corporations have extended throughout the world market-networks of capital flows, technology flows, population flows, and the like . . . The third and broadest tier of the pyramid, finally, consists of groups that represent popular interests in the global power arrangement . . . Who represents the People in the global constitution? Or, more important, what forces and

processes transform the multitude into a People that can be represented in the global constitution? In many instances nation-states are cast in this role, particularly the collective of subordinated or minor states. Within the United Nations General Assembly, for example, collections of subordinate nation-states, the majority numerically but the minority in terms of power, function as an at least symbolic constraint on and legitimation of the major powers. . . . Nation-states, however, are certainly not the only organisations that construct and represent the People in the new global arrangement. Also on this third tier of the pyramid, the global people is represented more clearly and directly not by governmental bodies but by a variety of organizations that are at least relatively independent of nation-states and capital. These organizations are often understood as functioning as the structures of a global civil society, channeling the needs and desires of the multitude into forms that can be represented within the functioning of the global power structures. In this new global form we can still recognize instances of the traditional components of civil society, such as the media and religious institutions.⁵⁹

Accordingly, any attempts at increased equality in the global context would have to address both intersocietal and innersocietal spheres. While it is clear that state power now dominates humanity, the examples from the ancient world studied in this book on their part show that simply abandoning state power is not necessarily the solution in that respect, as nonstate entities can also be destructive towards others.⁶⁰ Nor, for example, will religion readily provide a solution, as it has been seen that it can, for example, be complicit with or even directly advocate conquest and even genocide.

Zionism and the modern state of Israel

It is pertinent to make some comments here about modern Israel in the context of the legacy of ancient Israel and the canonical writings stemming from it. Ancient Israel as an independent state was finished by the early sixth century BCE through the Assyrian and Babylonian conquests.⁶¹ The Jews, more or less as inheritors of the ancient Israelite tradition, kept a memory of their homeland and its independence through the subsequent historical periods that spanned several empires over some two and a half millennia. The hope of an independent state in a homeland arose at the end of the nineteenth century with the emergence of modern Zionism.⁶² Soon many Jews started to emigrate to Palestine. This included buying land through legitimate transactions from the Palestinians, and little by little the Jewish presence grew stronger.⁶³ Palestine itself had been a province of the Ottomans in the nineteenth

century⁶⁴ and was then taken over by the British in 1917–1919 in the context of the First World War.⁶⁵ The Zionists managed to find support from Britain in the form of the Balfour Declaration that was basically a letter from the then Foreign Secretary Arthur J. Balfour to Lord Rothschild on 2 November 1917, according to which,

His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities of Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by the Jews in any other country.⁶⁶

This promise by and large ensured a favourable attitude towards the aspirations of the new Jewish immigrants to the area. The war of independence between 1947 and 1949 resulted in the establishment of the state of Israel. The United Nations made a proposal for the partition of Palestine in 1947, which basically divided the land of Palestine into two roughly equal portions for both Jews and the Palestinians, with Jerusalem designated as an internationally administered area.⁶⁷ In this connection, it should be kept in mind that, while the 1947 UN partition plan granted the Jews fifty-seven per cent of the land, they had only reached less than seven per cent of the total ownership of Palestine by then.⁶⁸ It is no wonder, then, that the plan was rejected by the Arabs at large as “absurd, impracticable and unjust”.⁶⁹

The actual borders for the state of Israel resulted in the division of the area that with some changes still exists today, with a much larger area for the Jews and a smaller area for the indigenous Palestinians than envisaged in the UN partition plan.⁷⁰ Also, in the course of fighting, whether unintentionally or systematically, some three quarters of a million Palestinians were forced to flee, with a number of Palestinians massacred and their villages destroyed and land taken from them in the area occupied by Israel.⁷¹ Shlaim claims that the relevant Plan D by the Israelis “was not a political blueprint for the expulsion of Palestine's Arabs: it was a military plan with military and territorial objectives”; however also commenting that by “ordering the capture of Arab cities and the destruction of villages, it both permitted and justified the forcible expulsion of Arab civilians”.⁷² It is estimated that some 700,000 Palestinian Arabs were displaced in the war,⁷³ many of whom or whose descendants still hope to return.⁷⁴ Altogether, what the Israelis call the War of Independence, the Palestinians designate as the Nakbah, the catastrophe. It should, however, be noted that, in November 1947, the Israelites made a secret pact with King Abdullah of Jordan which allowed Jordan to annex the West Bank to the

kingdom of Jordan, which also then took place.⁷⁵ The secret pact between Israel and Jordan in many ways helped to seal the fate of Palestinian national aspirations and the UN plan for an independent Palestinian state. As Shlaim notes, “The Palestinians were left out in the cold.”⁷⁶ Gaza was administered by the Egyptians as a result of the war.⁷⁷

The next important events in regard to territory came in the 1960s. After some escalation with Syria in particular in the mid-1960s, and in connection with Palestinian guerrilla attacks against Israel, Egypt, then allied with Syria by a defence pact, closed the Straights of Tiran in east Sinai to Israeli shipping on 22 May 1967.⁷⁸ The result was the so-called Six-Day War, in which Israel, in many ways also fortuitously, captured Gaza, Sinai, the West Bank and the Golan Heights. Israel had asked Jordan to stay out of the hostilities, but Jordan did not heed the warning and thus lost the West Bank.⁷⁹ The Israelites also captured the Golan Heights at the latter stages of the war when Syria had requested a ceasefire.⁸⁰

Since the Six-Day War, Israeli policy has been to build settlements into the occupied territories, the West Bank in particular included. While not all Israelis or Israeli parties or governments have subscribed to the idea of a “Greater Israel” involving territory up to the Jordan River, by and large, Israel has not stopped building settlements to the occupied territories, at great expense to the Palestinians in particular,⁸¹ and this state of affairs continues to date.⁸² It is true that peace was made with Egypt in 1979, with a withdrawal from Sinai.⁸³ Also, there was the peace movement of the 1990s under the premiership of Rabin which held much promise for the Palestinians and resulted in some agreements of principle for Palestinian autonomy and even statehood, and a peace treaty with Jordan in 1994.⁸⁴ However, these agreements did not in practice stop Israeli settlement and military rule and associated repression in the occupied territories, and the assassination of Rabin on 4 November 1995 resulted in the end of the peace process that proved to have been much dependent on him.⁸⁵ The policies of the government of Netanyahu in the late 1990s in particular contributed towards, if not outrightly caused, the resurgence of much bad blood between Israel and the Arabs, of course including the Palestinians.⁸⁶ The second intifada of 2000, with the first having taken place in 1987, lasted to about 2005, and the subsequent problems between the Fatah and Hamas parties added to the misery of Israeli military and economic retaliation. More recently, even though Israel withdrew from Gaza and took out its settlements from Gaza that were always of limited number, it sealed off Gaza in retaliation to Palestinian resistance. Israel has also periodically attacked Gaza, often citing rocket fire by Hamas, in most cases killing a disproportionate number of Palestinians. In 2018 Israeli sniper fire killed hundreds of Palestinians near the Gaza border fence and wounded some

20,000 persons. Israel has also in recent years built walls around West Bank, both cutting off further territory from the Palestinians and subjecting Palestinians to extreme controls in terms of mobility. In addition, Israeli violence by settlers and the military is a constant accompaniment to Palestinian daily life.⁸⁷

The modern Israeli expansion clearly falls under the category of settler colonialism.⁸⁸ Much of this has taken place with the support of Western empires. The Balfour Declaration is a witness to the Jews being able to make the British their ally. Later on, in the late 1950s, the Jews courted America, with increasingly friendly relations as a whole being formed between the two countries with the passage of time and through related political events and crises that took place.⁸⁹ This can be considered as a fairly natural development as the British empire passed to the United States at that time. There was some wavering in American support in the dying days of the Obama administration, but the election of Trump brought with it another spur of American backing for Israel. Altogether, the colonial efforts by the modern Israelis are backed by American imperial power. That there are many Jews in the United States with wealth and power in the American society who support the state of Israel adds to the intensity of colonial power.

From an ideological perspective, except for the American Jewry, Christian popular eschatology has caused many Christians to support Israel from a religious perspective. In particular, those who take a so-called dispensationalist premillennial view on the scriptures⁹⁰ argue that Israel as a literal concept still counts, the return of the Israelites to Palestine is foretold in the Bible, and even that the temple will be rebuilt in Israel, if only to administer sacrifices that serve as memorial for Jesus. However, the dispensationalist view is by no means the only one available. The so-called historical premillennialists and amillennialists, and probably postmillennialists, would, in the light of the New Testament, see the promises to Israel as now applying to the Church (Romans 9), even if the “literal” Israel still has some kind of role.⁹¹ These positions may appear outlandish to secular people not familiar with Christianity; however, there are a number of religious people for whom the issues feel “real”. What is significant is that support for modern Israel based on a religious perspective also translates to political support. In this way, many Christian people are drawn into the colonial orbit. On the whole, it is clear that the biblical documents that arose from ancient Israelite settler colonialism and the vicissitudes of the subsequent Israelite states and the experiences of their conquered people and descendants living through a succession of empires are being used to substantiate nationalist claims in modernity. However, there is nothing inherent in the documents of the Hebrew Bible that indicates that they can be used as legitimation for a much later nationalist enterprise as attested

by modern Zionism. In reality, Zionism has appropriated the Hebrew Bible for its purposes.

It is obvious that the modern Israeli expansion as settler colonial process is genocidal in Lemkin's terms. Clearly a national pattern of an oppressor is being imposed on an oppressed group. However, for example, the conditions in Gaza can also be seen as genocidal even in the terms of the UN Genocide Convention. There is no doubt that the Israelis are intentionally making the life of Palestinians there difficult, causing mental and bodily harm to them.⁹² That the Palestinians resist, with violent actions having been involved at times, is not unexpected when one sees genocide as a conflict, as has now been proposed in modern genocide scholarship.⁹³ The Israeli state also spends much effort in what one might call centrifugal ideologisation in gaining support for itself.⁹⁴ An interesting part of the Israeli rhetoric is an expressed victim mentality based on the Holocaust when at the same time often extreme violence is committed against the indigenous Palestinians.⁹⁵

At another level, one can see that the Israeli expansion into the Palestinian areas and the accompanying oppression is at its heart nothing different from Western expansion into the areas of indigenous peoples. The only essential difference is that the Israeli expansion is happening at present whereas the expansion of the British, Russians and Americans took place earlier. The same was also the case with the Chinese in a more distant past, and with ancient states and empires, and even nonstate entities expanding into the territories of others as discussed in this book. What is significant from the perspective of religion is that Western expansionism took place under the umbrella of Christianity, and Israeli expansion into Palestinian areas has been taking place under the umbrella of Judaism, with both religions tracing themselves back to ancient Israel and its experiences in relation to colonialism. While the concept of Christendom that dates to the reign of Constantine is now becoming more and more *passé*,⁹⁶ it appears that the idea of seeing the promises of God in the sacred scriptures of Christianity as having been fulfilled in the return migration of Jews to establish their own state can still resonate in the minds of many Christians. Of course, this is only one way to read the biblical scriptures, but to those doing so, things may look very promising as the kingdom of God now ostensibly becomes something tangible to be grasped.

D. Prospects for the third millennium

From a technological perspective, industrialisation transformed agrarian

societies of Europe into something new that was unprecedented in the history of mankind that is the hallmark of the contemporary world.⁹⁷ The first phase of this revolution relates to steam engines, iron, coal, textile machines and factories, circa 1760–1850.⁹⁸ The second pertains to railroads, steamships, steel, rubber and farm machines, circa 1850–1900.⁹⁹ This was followed by the third phase of automobiles, airplanes, telephones, electricity, petroleum, radios and movies, circa 1900– 1950.¹⁰⁰ The fourth phase has been marked by the development of television, computers, transistors, the internet and plastics.¹⁰¹ As the fourth phase advances,¹⁰² such areas as robotics, nanotechnology, virtual reality and the creation of cyberspace more widely, 3D printing and artificial intelligence are at the forefront of research. The results of such research and developments are then disseminated into a variety of areas of life and societal contexts. Globalisation has also accelerated in the fourth phase of the industrial revolution.¹⁰³ Nevertheless, as we have seen, it is also the case that the more things have changed, the more they have stayed the same. The contemporary world is still marked by individual and group violence in the context of great social inequalities that started with the move from hunting and gathering societies to the agrarian era, even when industrialisation in particular has improved the lot of many people in societies that have been able to industrialise.¹⁰⁴ We saw in the discussion of the ancient world how from the earliest times of the emergence of states, social stratification resulted where a small elite controlled most of the available resources and where much of the population lived in often abject poverty.¹⁰⁵ In the era focused on in the book, most explicitly, the ancient Israelite documents that relate to the birth of the new entity in the southern Levantine highlands expressed a desire to be liberated from oppressive state power. However, founding a new society of freedom for them was to be in replacement of others, and, at least in some way comparably, the Aramean expansions and Philistine migrations caused disruptions for existing societal entities, not to mention the effects of the expanding empires of the time as state players.

It is important to recognise that human nature is oriented towards self-interest, with least interest shown to those not seen as part of any social groups one may identify with,¹⁰⁶ as was already also reflected on in relation to the area and historical period examined in the book. At the same time, the other side of the coin of human self-interest is that people do not wish harm to be done for themselves. In relation to that, many religions in particular have reflected on the issue in the past. It was, however, seen in the foregoing how religion was tied with political considerations in the ancient world. In this respect, any related considerations noticeably expressed in the ancient Israelite legal documents contained in the Pentateuch were part of establishing and maintaining a social order, in that case in the context of a settler colonial

society. The legal system, in the context of wider ancient Near Eastern legal tradition that demonstrably stretches to the third millennium BCE,¹⁰⁷ includes providing safeguards for individuals, with the early second millennium BCE e king Hammurabi boasting about his legal code a notable example:

At that time, the gods Anu and Enlil, for the enhancement of the well-being of the people, named me by my name: Hammurabi, the pious prince, who venerates the gods, *to make justice prevail in the land, to abolish the wicked and the evil, to prevent the strong from oppressing the weak*, to rise like the sun-god Shamash over all humankind, to illuminate the land.¹⁰⁸

Considering the ancient legal context, both ideological and practical aspects would be involved, reminding one of issues that relate to centrifugal ideologisation and bureaucratisation of coercion that lie at the foundations of the constitution and operation of societies.¹⁰⁹ It was indicated in the foregoing that in postbiblical Judaism, the political aspects of the Pentateuchal legal materials would recede to the background and the interpretation of the Pentateuch, as *torah*, would move more towards the level of individual piety.¹¹⁰ In this continuum, the issue of justice would experience an interesting transformation, spearheaded by Jesus of Nazareth as an initiator of a reform movement of first century CE Judaism.¹¹¹ According to the New Testament, Jesus suggested that one should love one's neighbour as oneself (Matthew 22:37–39; Mark 12:28–33; Luke 10:27),¹¹² with the maxim tracing back to the *torah* (Leviticus 19:18). Jesus did claim that, combined with a maxim to love god above everything, this would summarise the teaching of all of *torah* and later *prophets* as a collection of writings considered sacred by the first-century CE Jewish communities.¹¹³ Jesus's parable of the Samaritan (Luke 10:30–37) also shows that good behaviour towards one's neighbour could be set as an ideal, not one's social and national status. And, the parable then clearly implies that loving one's neighbour involves more than one person, thus extending the issue to a communal sphere.¹¹⁴

A communal aspect can otherwise already be seen to have been highlighted at in ancient Israelite prophetic writings that relate to the actions of nations in the contemporary scene, with Amos 1–2 from about the eighth century BCE¹¹⁵ a case in point.¹¹⁶ One may then here be reminded of the discussions of genocide in this book in that genocide should be seen in the context of intergroup violence. All in all, one can see that the ancients did already exhibit some interest in the related issues.¹¹⁷ But, an interesting contrast can be seen between the settler colonial work of Genesis-Joshua that calls for the destruction of indigenous peoples of the land (Deuteronomy 7), and the book of Lamentations that expresses the sorrow and desperation of the people of

Judah over the conquest and destruction of their capital Jerusalem and their land by the Babylonian empire.¹¹⁸ Similarly, the complaints in Amos 1–2:3 that focus on atrocities committed by non-Israelite nations can be contrasted with an innersocietal focus in the subsequent passage of Amos 2:4–8 in regard to the southern and northern kingdoms of Judah and Israel and social justice within them,¹¹⁹ with Amos 2:9–10 directly referring to the past settler colonial actions by ancient Israelites in a most positive manner. Altogether, a focus on any negative aspects of intergroup violence committed by one's own group is lacking in these cases.

If groups then are viewed as collectives and the way groups operate may come under scrutiny, it is important to also consider their structures and embedded institutions, as societies often work through their structures and institutions.¹²⁰ This is where one may look back at the foregoing discussion about states and empires that are, or at least tend to be, situated at the top level(s) of world hierarchy, also keeping in mind that few if any places in the world can now be free from state power. At the same time, one may keep in mind that all social groups are constituted of individuals. Accordingly, all discussions will also bear on individuals, even if in the contexts of their relationships with wider collectives. Individuals at any levels of world hierarchy could reflect on how their actions might affect the hierarchies in question. Those at the top levels could ask the question if they would like to simply go by the status quo and the power and privileges they have or would wish to seek to also change things. In addition to thinking about social structures within nation-states themselves, individuals could reflect on whether the current world system of a dominant empire and the accompanying power and privileges it holds and the world hierarchy that has formed around it should be seen as an optimal system for the world to operate around. If a need for change is considered necessary, individuals might wish to join and collaborate with any others who seek to transform the system and otherwise seek to raise awareness about related issues. At the same time, in any case, it would be appropriate to consider carefully the methods to be used for changing things. For example, it is unlikely that anyone would wish to advocate the eruption of another world war, including considering the current nuclear stockpiles held by the world's major powers that are enough to destroy the whole planet.¹²¹ Of course, history shows that human life and human societies do not stand still, and there are identifiable indications that the current world system is changing.¹²² However, it is not yet clear what will take the place of the current world system and how. If a new empire were to take over an existing one, can there be any guarantees that people will consider it to be a more benevolent one, also if one looks back at the history of empires and their tendency to concentrate power, resources and privileges to

themselves at the expense of others? Changing the world system would also at least potentially help towards alleviating a variety of “push” and “pull” related issues that affect migration, including in case some societies are worried about the effects of migration on themselves. Undoubtedly, inequalities between source and destination can provide powerful push and pull factors.¹²³

The role of economics is a significant matter to specifically reflect on. We already saw in the discussion of the ancient world how access to resources was a significant factor in colonialism.¹²⁴ With state actors, in addition to conquest as such, tribute was a notable accompaniment to the operation of empires. With nonstate actors, raiding was not unusual. In this sense, groups might try to enhance their situation by gaining access to resources held by other groups. In innersocietal contexts, one can think that it is a small subgroup within the larger social group that gains a proportionally greater access to resources, often to a considerable extent. In the modern world, contemporary financial instruments are especially strongly interlinked with the current world system and have a strong global reach, with the United States and its empire in a dominant position to date.¹²⁵ In this context, one economist already some 15 years ago suggested ways towards a less concentrated distribution of resources.¹²⁶ Specific measures would include: moving away from the dollar as a reserve currency; allowing governments to issue credit to finance budget deficit so as to spur investment and employment at home; denominating international debts in domestic currencies; taxing those who hold private financial capital and less so with ordinary working people; reforming and replacing international financial institutions such as IMF and the World Bank; allowing countries to raise protective tariffs and subsidies where necessary, cutting down on capital flight, especially to offshore tax avoidance centres, and regulating intra-corporate fund and profit transfers; and restoring the classical distinction of earned and non-earned income.¹²⁷ These measures could help towards achieving a more evenly balanced system of trade and, through that, a more equal footing for the variety of peoples of the world. One might, of course, also add considerations of how there could be debt relief in the world, a concept that already goes back to the ancient world.¹²⁸ In addition, the economist suggests that the extensive network of American military bases acts as a strain to the world economy, and scaling them down considerably if not completely would thus be of relevance.¹²⁹ The pulling out of American military bases would of course also help towards making political power distributed more proportionally across the nations of the world, not to mention alleviating certain negative effects associated with the bases across their specific localities.¹³⁰ At the same time, one may consider that any related change could potentially lead to violence if competing social groups were to seek to fill any resulting power vacuums. And yet, one may also be reminded that history

shows that empires tend to create peaceful realms through conquest and associated, often extreme violence.

It is appropriate to include issues specifically relating to indigenous peoples in the context of world history of intergroup relations in the scope of considerations. As we saw, social groups could subjugate and even destroy other groups already in the ancient world. In more modern contexts, the predominance of the West has notably resulted in the destruction of many indigenous groups by way of settler colonial processes, as with the United States, Canada and Australia. In other cases, the West has exercised colonial control of the franchise type over them, and the mixed mode colonialism by Spain in central and Southern America can also be kept in mind.¹³¹ Recently, the formulation of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples has sought to advocate the wellbeing of such peoples.¹³² Especially in relation to settler colonialism, as possession of land is about possessing resources, issues that relate to restoration of land to these peoples and potential other compensation have also been raised.¹³³ In relation to Israel and Palestine, when one considers the security industry that has arisen around the expansion of modern Israel into the territory of the Palestinians and the oppression of the Palestinian population by the modern Israeli state, the Israel-Palestine issue also bears more widely on the use of technology for oppression.¹³⁴

As part of the issue of the role of the individual in relation to collectives, questions that relate to governance are pertinent. Societies may consider what might be a suitable form of governance that, if so desired, will also result in a more equitable distribution of resources to all across the global community as a whole. In this context, one may ask the question of to what extent “democracy” as defined by Western societies should serve as an ideal to strive towards, considering that a “democratic” form of government has not prevented societies from encroaching into territories of other societies.¹³⁵ One may here add that the current world legal system is in essence a Western creation even if it has its precursors in the ancient non-Western world. This means that disputes are often resolved based on Western ways of thinking.¹³⁶ And, one should note the often less-considered implications of the fact that the English language is now the *lingua franca* of the contemporary world. As language always comes together with a culture, this means that the Anglo-Saxon way of thinking is currently being spread throughout the globe.¹³⁷ In this context, it is useful to remember that the spread of the language is based on the great expansions of the British settler colonies especially in the nineteenth century that replaced existing native societies.¹³⁸ Otherwise, much of the current world map is a result of colonialism. The modern nation-states that formed around the world are at the very least arguably a product of Western ideas. In the two thirds world in particular, including in Africa and

Latin America, such nation-states incorporate but possibly also divide a number of indigenous groups, much due to the way the national borders formed. All in all, in the overall context of postcolonial criticism, there have been increasing calls for reflecting on the role of the West and its culture in a global context.¹³⁹

Finally, in local settings, it would seem appropriate to continually reflect on issues that relate to the conduct of individuals in relation to family, friends and, for example, colleagues at working places, also keeping in mind that at the minimum many of the related questions have already been discussed by ethical theorists. This might include considerations of how to relate to people encountered personally who are conceptualised as belonging to differing social groups, also in some cases as a result of recent in-migration. Altogether, one cannot forget that most humans in local situations are ordinary people living ordinary lives, even if sometimes in the midst of great social and political upheavals.

Notes

- 1 Cf. Chapter 7; cf. also Judges 3:12–30; 10:6–11:33.
- 2 Cf. the foregoing, Chapter 2.
- 3 Cf. e.g. Kiernan 2007.
- 4 The study of colonialism and settler colonialism as discussed in Chapter 2 in the foregoing can be seen to relate to that literature, with most of the literature pertaining to the modern world and related European colonialism.
- 5 See Cline and Graham 2011:80–340 for an overview of empires from the Neo-Babylonian empire to the Islamic empire, and Burbank and Cooper 2010:23–148 for a narrative of major empires from Rome to the Ottoman empire. Cf. also Mann 2012/1986:1–372.
- 6 See e.g. Burbank and Cooper 2010:42–59.
- 7 See Bakewell 2010:48–61 for a summary.
- 8 See Ferro 1997/1994:24–25 on this technological advancement.
- 9 See e.g. the discussion in Diamond 2011/2005:205–210.
- 10 See Bakewell 2010:97–139, 401–430; cf. Stannard 1992.
- 11 Cf. Hixson 2010:30
- 12 See Belich 2009:181–182.

- 13 See Bakewell 2010: esp. 499–501.
- 14 See Belich 2009 for this “explosive” colonialism.
- 15 See Belich 2009.
- 16 Cf. Burbank and Cooper 2010:271–286.
- 17 See e.g. Hixson 2013:137–139.
- 18 See Hixson 2013:145–160.
- 19 See Hixson 2013:160–165.
- 20 See Hixson 2013:167–184.
- 21 See Burbank and Cooper 2010:321–324.
- 22 See. Ferro 1997/1994:73–89; Burbank and Cooper 2010:312–321.
- 23 See Burbank and Cooper 2010:294–298.
- 24 See Burbank and Cooper 2010:369–381, 386, 398–400.
- 25 See Burbank and Cooper 2010:381–386.
- 26 Cf. Hudson 2003:39–79.
- 27 See Burbank and Cooper 2010:398–402.
- 28 See Hudson 2003:137–287; cf. McCoy 2017:51.
- 29 See e.g. Ferro 1997/1994:262–304 for further details.
- 30 A comprehensive recent study of the US empire is provided by McCoy 2017. Interestingly, McCoy (2017:82) notes how covert operations (or “covert netherworld”) was a new characteristic in the struggle of the Great Powers in the Cold War era, also becoming a central facet of the US empire that has continued to date. For one thing, considering this, and also that empires can often have a “bad name” especially in the so-called postcolonial era (see McCoy 2017:38–45 for discussions about the United States as an empire, with things recently gravitating towards acknowledging the matter more widely), it seems understandable that the American empire might often downplay or deny that it is an empire; cf. also the comments by McCoy (2017:44): “Compared to the countless books and articles that crowd library shelves covering every imaginable aspect of European colonial rule, there is surprisingly little serious study of history’s most powerful empire”, and note also his comment (2017:15), “Within the Cold War’s not-so-subtle pressures for affirmation of American foreign policy, critical voices, even within the academy, were few”, on its part also highlighting how academics does not necessarily take place in a neutral

environment. One should here keep in mind that some 800 US military bases exist around the world, with large concentrations of bases in the territories of the main defeated World War II enemies of Germany, Italy and Japan (see Vine 2015 for the bases on the whole). From the perspective of centrifugal ideologisation and hegemony (cf. Chapter 2 in the foregoing on these concepts in general), especially in the so-called postcolonial era where at least an ostensible national independence is seen as an important issue, it may not come as a surprise that countries with US military presence are referred to as allies, rather than vassals that would fit with the thrust of academic literature that relates to past empires (cf. McCoy 2017:65).

31 In the world of empires, the collapse of communism was of course about the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Soviet empire; cf. comments just above and McCoy 2017: esp. 34–38, 72–73.

32 See the following for more on Israel.

33 See McCoy 2017:159–256.

34 Cf. Vine 2015:308–314.

35 Cf. comments in Chapter 2.

36 Cf. riots in recent years in immigrant neighbourhoods in France and Sweden.

37 Cf. also comments in Pitkänen 2010:84–87.

38 On the development of the modern Western economic system(s) prior to the Second World War, see Polanyi 2001/1944.

39 Cf. comments in Pitkänen 2007:271–272; Short 2016:22–24.

40 See Kakel 2011 for an analysis of German settler colonialism. The parallels with America certainly hold at the minimum at a typological level; cf. also e.g. Belich 2009; Hixson 2013.

41 See Chapter 5.

42 Cf. Anderson 2017:173–175.

43 Cf. e.g. 2 Peter 3.

44 This paragraph adapted from Pitkänen 2018:17–18, 19–20.

45 For a stimulating exposition of this process from the first to the fourth century ce, see Ehrman 2018.

46 See e.g. Ehrman 2018:243–277 for an account of this.

- 47 For a summary of the period between 400–1500 in this respect, see e.g. the comments in Murray 2004:24–59 and *passim*. More extensive treatments that include coverage of the history of the church for this period include MacCulloch 2009.
- 48 Montanism would be an early example of this type of “radical” Christian movements that were not linked with the “establishment”.
- 49 See e.g. the comments on these in Murray 2004. The medieval crusades to Palestine can, of course, also be mentioned here, even if they only resulted in a temporary hold of the area.
- 50 Cf. also e.g. Bosch 2011/1991.
- 51 Postcolonial biblical criticism has analysed this issue to a considerable extent, cf. e.g. Prior 1997; Brett 2008; Crouch and Stökl 2014; also Warrior 1989; Boer 2008; Boer 2013, with e.g. the books of Deuteronomy and Joshua being specific examples of texts cited in support of colonialism. Note also that the rapid spread of Islam in its early stages where conquest was a significant factor in the process can also be linked with its Judeo-Christian heritage, even when the unifying character that is based on the faith more directly derives from Muhammad, cf. e.g. Kennedy 2007, *passim*.
- 52 The objections of Bartholomé las Casas to the Spanish conquests are famous. More widely, some of the biblical texts could also serve as sources of such mitigation, cf. the works cited in the previous note.
- 53 Note, however, e.g. the recent Heinrichs 2018 written for general audiences that addresses these very issues. It is also true that biblical studies as such in the context of postcolonial criticism, including e.g. Hawk 2010 in this connection, has addressed such issues, but the wider impact of those considerations may have remained relatively limited to date.
- 54 Cf. Murray 2004.
- 55 This paragraph is adapted from Pitkänen 2018:19.
- 56 See the book of Lamentations for a heart-rending poetic account around the conquest and destruction of Jerusalem.
- 57 Cf. also e.g. Warrior 1989.
- 58 Hardt and Negri 2000:309, also quoted in Pitkänen 2018:13n30; cf. McCoy 2017:51–52.
- 59 Hardt and Negri 2000:310–311, quoted in Pitkänen 2018:13–14n30; cf. McCoy 2017:51–52.
- 60 Cf. also e.g. Allen and Jones 2014.

- 61 Much of this section adapted from Pitkänen 2010, with permission of Inter-Varsity Press.
- 62 See e.g. Shlaim 2000:1–27; Pappe 2004:35–56.
- 63 Cf. the concept of ethnic enclaves here, as also discussed in the foregoing.
- 64 Or three sub-provinces, see Pappe 2004:14.
- 65 See Pappe 2004:62–72; cf. comments in the foregoing.
- 66 Quoted in Shlaim 2000:7.
- 67 See Pappe 2004:123–129 and the map in *ibid.*, 127.
- 68 As pointed out e.g. by Prior 1997. Note in this context the summary article by Brancato (2018) that includes considerations of more or less official Israeli narratives in trying to deny land ownership to the Palestinians (pp. 28–32). As one example, one may add to comments made in Brancato the idea that the land was “undeveloped” and thus not belonging to the Palestinians to such narrative “transfers”. It should be emphasised that Brancato’s article highlights how most modern Israeli historiography, including by the majority of the so-called New Historians, has served to further the interests of Zionism and the settler state.
- 69 See Shlaim 2000:27
- 70 See Pappe 2004:129–141 and the map in *ibid.*, 140.
- 71 See Pappe 2004:129–141.
- 72 Shlaim 2000:31.
- 73 See e.g. Prior 1997:137.
- 74 It should be highlighted here that Israel has to date not shown any interest in enabling the return of the refugees. Cf. Brancato 2018: esp. 17–18.
- 75 See Shlaim 2000:29–30, 31–47.
- 76 Shlaim 2000:47.
- 77 See Shlaim 2000:42.
- 78 See Shlaim 2000:237.
- 79 See Shlaim 2000:244
- 80 See Shlaim 2000:247–249.
- 81 See Shlaim 2000:250 ff. and *passim*.
- 82 Cf. comments on Gaza in the following.

- 83 See Shlaim 2000:352–383.
- 84 See Shlaim 2000:502–545.
- 85 See Shlaim 2000:546–563.
- 86 See Shlaim 2000:564–609.
- 87 See Halper 2015.
- 88 Cf. e.g. Veracini 2006.
- 89 See Shlaim 2000, *passim*.
- 90 See e.g. Clouse 1977 for a basic exposition; see also Court 2008:123–124 for its origins in nineteenth-century America.
- 91 For the basic positions, see e.g. Clouse 1977; for a historical dimension to millennial movements, see e.g. Court 2008.
- 92 Cf. Halper 2015.
- 93 Cf. Shaw 2015. In this connection, the issue is appropriately not about which group is “better” than the other. It is fitting to see the matter as relating to which group is engaging in taking away what another group possesses and perhaps also oppressing it otherwise. As already intimated in the foregoing, an analogy with individuals may prove helpful. If an individual forcibly takes or attempts to take away what another individual possesses, that is typically considered a crime (and treating another individual in an oppressive manner is typically considered at the minimum as morally reprehensible by humans). Any defensive actions, even if violent, are generally considered as acceptable so as to prevent such a crime, within reason. Conversely, it is possible that a victim of crime may themselves engage in criminal actions in another situation(s). Such concepts would seem to be applicable to groups by extension and analogy.
- 94 Cf. Halper 2015.
- 95 Cf. the short comments made in Brancato 2018:18, with references to Zertal 1998; Zertal 2005; and Finkelstein 2003.
- 96 Cf. comments in the foregoing.
- 97 Cf. comments already made in the foregoing. Also, for this paragraph, cf. Pitkänen 2018:5–6.
- 98 I am following Nolan and Lenski 2015:225–228 here.
- 99 Nolan and Lenski 2015:228–230.
- 100 Nolan and Lenski 2015:230–232.

101 Nolan and Lenski 2015:232–235.

102 Some have used the label post-industrial societies in terms of where things are heading (see Lenski 2005:105–106). However, I agree with *ibid.*, 106, that it is better to see the related phenomena as part of the industrial era and its ongoing revolutionary development.

103 Globalisation is listed as a characteristic of the fourth phase in Nolan and Lenski 2015:232, even though it is clear that its roots go earlier; see e.g. Ferro 1997/1994: 24–51, and see also e.g. the comments in Manning 2013:136–162 for the period between 1700 and 1900, and Harzig and Hoerder 2009:30–42 for 1600–1800. Of course, as we have seen, certain regions had a large degree of interaction within themselves already in earlier times, such as the ancient Near East in the Late Bronze Age in the second half of the second millennium BCE.

104 Cf. Nolan and Lenski 2015.

105 See the foregoing, Chapter 2.

106 See e.g. Lenski 1966: esp. 25–32.

107 On ancient Near Eastern legal systems, see e.g. TLCANE; Roth 1997; Westbrook 2003; cf. also comments in the foregoing, Chapter 5.

108 Laws of Hammurabi i.27–49; English translation quoted from Roth 1997:76–77; cf. TLCANE, 110–111, italics mine (Akk. for the text in italics: *mīšaram ina mātim ana šūpīm raggam u šēnam ana ḥulluqim dannum enšam ana la ḥabālim*). Note that the so-called Covenant Code (Exodus 20:22–23:19) exhibits a number of similarities with the laws of Hammurabi, and cf. Wright 2009 even on the idea that the biblical materials drew directly from the laws of Hammurabi. Cf. also comments on the Pentateuchal legal materials in Chapter 5.

109 Cf. the foregoing, Chapter 2; cf. also comments made in Chapter 5.

110 See Chapter 5.

111 On Jesus as a reformer within a Jewish context, see e.g. Mendenhall 2001:203–232.

112 Gk. Ἀγαπήσεις τὸν πλησίον σου ὡς σεαυτόν.

113 More specifically, the prophets would consist of Joshua-Kings and the books of the so-called writing prophets Isaiah-Malachi. The Hebrew prophets are well known to have spoken about (especially social) justice, in a number of cases as “against the stream” of the rest of the society of their time(s).

114 Cf. Pitkänen 2018:22.

- 115 For comments on the provenence and composition of the book, see e.g. Carroll R. 2014:845–846.
- 116 Cf. e.g. Barton 1980 specifically on Amos 1–2. Cf. also e.g. Habakkuk 1:6–7; 2:6–8.
- 117 On ethics more widely as it relates to ancient Israel and the Old Testament/ Hebrew Bible, see e.g. Barton 2002; Wright 2004; Barton 2014.
- 118 Note also for example how Hammurabi, keeping in mind his famous law code as just quoted from, dealt with Mari as mentioned in the foregoing, Chapter 6. Cf. also Deuteronomy 4:5–6 in the context of the quote from the laws of Hammurabi.
- 119 Keeping in mind the division of Israel after Solomon into the southern kingdom of Judah and the northern kingdom of Israel.
- 120 This paragraph is adapted from Pitkänen 2018:24.
- 121 Here, of course, one should also consider that possession of nuclear weapons goes together with power, and ultimately those possessing them will hold decisive military power as against countries that may not. In this, by way of an example, especially as North Korea is not part of the US empire, it should not be surprising that the United States has been trying to object as strongly as possible to the recent development of such weapons by North Korea. The approach should be contrasted with that towards Israel, an integral part of the US empire (on the development of the program in Israel, see comments in Shlaim 2000). The recent tendencies towards the weaponisation of space are commented on in McCoy 2017:159–190.
- 122 See esp. McCoy 2017.
- 123 Cf. also comments in Chapter 4 on push and pull.
- 124 Cf. also Mann’s IEMP discussed in Chapter 2.
- 125 Cf. related comments in the foregoing, and cf. e.g. Hudson 2003 for an analysis of the global economic system from the perspective of twentieth-century history and global power relations; cf. also McCoy 2017: esp. 51–52.
- 126 The rest of this chapter is adapted from Pitkänen 2018:27–33.
- 127 Hudson 2005/1977:XXIV–XXI.
- 128 Cf. the *mišarum* degrees of Old Babylonia and debt relief in the Hebrew Bible/Old Testament (see e.g. Kraus 1984 for Old Babylonia; and Leviticus 25; Deuteronomy 15 for the Hebrew Bible). However, interestingly, the concept could already be subverted in the ancient world itself, as described

in Otto 2016:1341–1349. Christians as one religious group have of course already on their part engaged with this issue, especially based on the biblical tradition; see e.g. [www.advocacyinternational.co.uk/ featured-project/jubilee-2000](http://www.advocacyinternational.co.uk/featured-project/jubilee-2000) [accessed 24/8/18]; cf. also e.g. [https:// jubileedebt.org.uk/](https://jubileedebt.org.uk/) [accessed 24/8/2018].

129 Hudson 2005/1977:XXIX–XXX, and see Hudson 2003 on the issue more generally.

130 On the bases on the whole and their wider effects, see Vine 2015.

131 One may also note the related ecological issues highlighted in Short 2016. Altogether, it is the poor people living in the world's poorest countries who generally tend to be most disadvantaged by pollution and now also from climate change that currently seems to be taking place. Note also here the comment by Rappaport 1984/1968:329, "When monetary logic is associated with production for gain, not only is ecological awareness obscured but the likelihood of ecosystemic degradation is increased. This likelihood is further increased in industrial societies, societies in which production is expanded to meet the voracious appetites of machinery for such substances as coal and petroleum." Pollution and environmental degradation are not restricted to the West, however, and at least the latter could already be found in the ancient world already (cf. e.g. Wilkinson 2003, *passim*).

132 See www.un.org/development/desa/indigenouspeoples/declaration-on-the-rights-ofindigenous-peoples.html [accessed 23/8/2018].

133 Cf. e.g. Veracini 2017; Held 2019.

134 For fuller details, see Halper 2015. This issue also relates to border walls and restricting the movements of people, with clear links to questions that relate to migration "proper".

135 Hardt and Negri 2000 (see esp. pp. 160–182), in fact, see the US political system as by nature having driven US expansion since its inception.

136 Cf. Pitkänen 2010:86.

137 Cf. Pitkänen 2010:86.

138 Cf. Belich 2009 which on its back cover asks the question "Why does so much of the world speak English?" and then responds to the question as a study of Anglo settler colonialism. It should also be noted here that the author of this book is writing in English as their second language. At the same time, one may be reminded of the fact that Akkadian was a *lingua franca* in the ancient Near East in the late second millennium BCE (cf. esp. the Amarna letters that were written in Akkadian), the time period focused on in this

book, with the popularity of Akkadian no doubt in a number of ways tracing back to the empire of Agade (cf. Foster 2016: esp. 213–214).

- 139 Cf. e.g. comments made in Held 2019, including that “Decolonization is a long-term process involving the bureaucratic, cultural, linguistic, and psychological divesting of colonial power by undoing ‘the privileging of dominant Euro-centred cultural values and beliefs in education, scholarship, knowledge production, the legitimization of intellectual capital, and the networks and systems of power’ ” (p. 8, referring to L.T. Smith and quoting S.D. Styres; cf. also e.g. Veracini 2017). A focus on “networks and systems of power” on the whole also ties with human history on the whole and issues that relate to social stratification, especially since the time of the move from hunting and gathering to agrarian (and later on industrial) societies (cf. also comments made in Chapter 2 in the foregoing).

Bibliography

- Adams, M.J. and M.E. Cohen. 2013. 'The "Sea Peoples" in Primary Sources', in A.E. Killebrew and G. Lehmann, eds., *The Philistines and Other "Sea Peoples" in Text and Archaeology*, SBL Archaeology and Biblical Studies 15, Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature, 645–664.
- Adams, W.Y. 1984. 'The First Colonial Empire: Egypt in Nubia 3200–1200 B.C.' *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 26, 36–71.
- Albers, P. 1996. 'Changing Patterns of Ethnicity in the Northeastern Plains, 1780–1870', in J.D. Hill, ed., *History, Power and Identity: Ethnogenesis in the Americas, 1492–1992*, Iowa City, IA: University of Iowa Press, 90–118.
- Allen, M.W. and T.L. Jones, eds. 2014. *Violence and Warfare Among Hunter-Gatherers*, Walnut Creek, CA: Left Coast Press.
- Anderson, B.A. 2017. *An Introduction to the Study of the Pentateuch*, second edition, London, UK: Bloomsbury T&T Clark. First edition by Paula Gooder 2000.
- Ando, C. and S. Richardson. 2017. *Ancient States and Infrastructural Power: Europe, Asia and America*, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Aubet, M.E. 2013/2007. *Commerce and Colonization in the Ancient Near East*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Spanish original 2007.
- Aubet, M.E. 2001. *The Phoenicians and the West: Politics, Colonies, and Trade*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Bachhuber, C. and R.G. Roberts, eds. 2009. 'Forces of Transformation: The End of the Bronze Age in the Mediterranean', Proceedings of an International Symposium held at St. John's College, University of Oxford 25–26 March 2006, Themes from the Ancient Near East BANEA Publication Series, Volume 1, Oxford, UK: Oxbow Books.
- Baden, J. 2012. *The Composition of the Pentateuch: Renewing the Documentary Hypothesis*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Baden, J. 2009. *J, E and the Redaction of the Pentateuch*, Forschungen zum Alten Testament 68, Tübingen, Germany: Mohr Siebeck.
- Bakewell, P. in collaboration with J. Holler. 2010. *A History of Latin America to 1825*, third edition, Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Barako, T.J. 2013. 'Philistines and Egyptians in Southern Coastal Canaan During the Early Iron Age', in A.E. Killebrew and G. Lehmann, eds., *The Philistines and Other "Sea Peoples" in Text and Archaeology*, SBL Archaeology and Biblical Studies 15, Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature, 37–51.

- Barton, J. 2014. *Ethics in Ancient Israel*, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Barton, J. 2002. *Ethics and the Old Testament*, London, UK: SCM.
- Barton, J. 1980. *Amos's Oracles Against the Nations*, Society for Old Testament Study Monograph Series 6, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Bar-Yosef, O. and A. Khazanov, eds. 1992. *Pastoralism in the Levant: Archaeological Materials in Anthropological Perspectives*, Monographs in World Archaeology 10, Madison, WI: Prehistory Press.
- Beckman, G.E. 1995. 'Royal Ideology and State Administration in Hittite Anatolia', in J.M. Sasson, ed., *Civilizations of the Ancient Near East*, New York, NY: Simon & Schuster Macmillan, 1996, 529–543.
- Beckman, G.M., T.R. Bryce and E.H. Cline. 2011. *The Ahhiyawa Texts*, WAW 28, Atlanta, GA: SBL.
- Bekkum, K. van. 2018. 'The "Language of Canaan": Ancient Israel's History and the Origins of Hebrew', in K. van Bekkum, G. Kwakkel and W.H. Rose, eds., *Biblical Hebrew in Context: Essays Semitics and Old Testament Texts in Honour of Professor Jan P. Lettinga*, Oudtestamentische Studiën 74, Leiden, Netherlands; and Boston, MA: E.J. Brill, 67–88.
- Bekkum, K. van. 2011. *From Conquest to Coexistence: Ideology and Antiquarian Intent in the Historiography of Israel's Settlement in Canaan*, Culture and History of the Ancient Near East 45, Leiden, Netherlands: E.J. Brill.
- Belich, J. 2009. *Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-World, 1783–1939*, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Bell, C. (Carol). 2005. *The Influence of Economic Factors on Settlement Continuity Across the LBA/Iron Age Transition on the Northern Levantine Littoral*, Ph.D. Thesis, University of London.
- Bell, C. (Catherine). 2009/1997. *Ritual: Perspectives and Dimensions*, New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1997, with a new foreword in 2009.
- Bell, C. (Catherine). 2009/1992. *Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice*, New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1992, with new foreword in 2009.
- Bellwood, P. 2013. *First Migrants: Ancient Migration in Global Perspective*, Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Ben-Shlomo, D. 2010. *Philistine Iconography: A Wealth of Style and Symbolism*, Orbis Biblicus et Orientalis 241, Fribourg, Switzerland: Fribourg Academic Press; and Göttingen, Germany: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
- Berlejung, A., A.M. Maeir and A. Schüle, eds. 2017. *Wandering Arameans: Arameans Outside Syria, Textual and Archaeological Perspectives*, Leipziger Altorientalistische Studien 5, Wiesbaden, Germany: Harrassowitz.
- Berlejung, A. and A. Schüle, eds. 2013. *Arameans, Chaldeans, and Arabs in*

- Babylonia and Palestine in the First Millennium B.C.*, Leipziger Altorientalistische Studien 3, Wiesbaden, Germany: Harrassowitz.
- Berman, J.A. 2008. *Created Equal: How the Bible Broke With Ancient Political Thought*, New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Betz, B.C. 2016. *The Land Before the Kingdom of Israel: The Southern Levant and the People Who Populated It*, History, Archaeology and Culture of the Levant 7, Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns.
- Bilby, K. 1996. 'Ethnogenesis in the Guianas and Jamaica', in J.D. Hill, ed., *History, Power and Identity: Ethnogenesis in the Americas, 1492–1992*, Iowa City, IA: University of Iowa Press, 119–141.
- Bintliff, J. and M. Pearce, eds. 2012. *The Death of Archaeological Theory?* Oxford and Oakville, UK: Oxbow Books.
- Block, D.I. 1999. *Judges, Ruth*, NAC, Nashville, TN: Broadman and Holman.
- Boer, R., ed. 2013. *Postcolonialism and the Hebrew Bible: The Next Step*, Semeia Studies 70, Atlanta, GA: SBL.
- Boer, R., ed. 2008. *Last Stop Before Antarctica: The Bible and Postcolonialism in Australia*, second edition, Semeia Studies 64, Atlanta, GA: SBL.
- Bosch, D.J. 2011/1991. *Transforming Mission: Paradigm Shifts in Theology of Mission*, twentieth anniversary edition, Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books.
- Brancato, A. 2018. 'The Settler Colonial Paradigm and the Israeli Official Narrative: An Example of Elimination of the Natives', *Journal of Mediterranean Knowledge* 3.1, 17–36.
- Brett, M.G. 2008. *Decolonizing God: The Bible in the Tides of Empire*, The Bible in Modern World 16, Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Phoenix Press.
- Brown, B. 2014. 'Settlement Patterns of the Middle Assyrian State: Notes Toward an Investigation of State Apparatuses', in B. Dominik, ed., *The Archaeology of Political Spaces: The Upper Mesopotamian Piedmont in the Second Millennium BC*, Berlin, Germany; and Boston, MA: De Gruyter, 85–106.
- Brug, J.F. 2010. 'Where Did the Name "Philistines" Come From?', paper presented at ASOR meeting in Atlanta, Georgia, 2010.
- Bryce, T. 2012. *The World of the Neo-Hittite Kingdoms: A Political and Military History*, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Bryce, T. 2009. *The Routledge Handbook of the Peoples and Places of Ancient Western Asia: The Near East from the Early Bronze Age to the Fall of the Persian Empire*, Abingdon, UK: Routledge.
- Bryce, T. 2005. *The Kingdom of the Hittites*, new edition, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Bryce, T. and J. Birkett-Rees. 2016. *Atlas of the Ancient Near East: From Prehistoric Times to the Roman Period*, Abingdon, UK: Routledge.
- Burbank, J. and F. Cooper. 2010. *Empires in World History: Power and the*

- Politics of Difference*, Princeton, NJ; and Oxford, UK: Princeton University Press.
- Calhoun, C. 1993. 'Nationalism and Ethnicity', *Annual Review of Sociology* 19, 211–239.
- Cancik-Kirschbaum, E., N. Brisch and J. Eidem. 2014. 'Introduction', in E. Cancik-Kirschbaum, N. Brisch and J. Eidem, eds., *Constituent, Confederate, and Conquered Space: The Emergence of the Mittani State, Topoi Berlin Studies of the Ancient World* 17, Berlin, Germany: Walter De Gruyter, 1–8.
- Carr, D.M. 2011. *The Formation of the Hebrew Bible: A New Reconstruction*, New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Carroll, R.M.D. 2014. 'Amos', in *Fortress Commentary on the Bible: The Old Testament and Apocrypha*, Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 845–859.
- Casad, E. 2005. 'Analyses of Intelligibility', in U. Ammon, N. Dittmar, K.J. Mattheier and P. Trudgill, eds., *Sociolinguistics: An International Handbook of the Science of Language and Society*, second edition, Handbooks of Linguistics and Communication Science 3, Berlin, Germany: Walter de Gruyter, Volume 2, 1261–1272.
- Casana, J. 2017. 'The Northern Levant: Archaeology', in M. Weeden and L.Z. Ullmann, eds., *Hittite Landscape and Geography*, Leiden, Netherlands: E.J. Brill, 159–176.
- Casana, J. 2012. 'Site Morphology and Settlement History in the Northern Levant', in R. Matthews, J. Curtis, M. Seymour, A. Fletcher, A. Gascoigne, C. Glatz, S.J. Simpson, H. Taylor, J. Tubb and R. Chapman, eds., *Proceedings of the 7th International Congress on the Archaeology of the Ancient Near East (7th ICAANE)*, 12–16 April 2010, the British Museum and UCL London, Wiesbaden, Germany: Harrassowitz, 593–608.
- Cassuto, U. 2006/1941. *The Documentary Hypothesis and the Composition of the Pentateuch: Eight Lectures*, with an Introduction by Joshua A. Berman, Jerusalem, Israel: Shalem Center. Hebrew original 1941, first English edition 1961.
- Charpin, D. 1995. 'The History of Ancient Mesopotamia: An Overview', in J.M. Sasson, ed., *Civilizations of the Ancient Near East*, New York, NY: Simon & Schuster Macmillan, 1996, 807–829.
- Chyleński, M., M. Grynberg and A. Juras. 2018. 'Late Bronze Age Migrations in the Mediterranean: Prospects for Approaching the Problem of Sea Peoples Using Ancient DNA', in L. Niesiołowski-Spanò and M. Węcowski, eds., *Change, Continuity, and Connectivity: North-Eastern Mediterranean at the Turn of the Bronze Age and in the Early Iron Age*, Wiesbaden, Germany: Harrassowitz, 444–450.
- Cline, E.H. 2014. *1177BC: The Year Civilization Collapsed*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

- Cline, E.H. 2009. *Sailing the Wine-Dark Sea: International Trade and the Late Bronze Age Aegean*, BAR International Series 591, Oxford, UK: BAR.
- Cline, E.H. and M.W. Graham. 2011. *Ancient Empires: From Mesopotamia to the Rise of Islam*, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Clouse, R.D., ed. 1977. *The Meaning of the Millennium: Four Views*, Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press.
- Collins, B.J. 2007. *The Hittites and Their World*, SBL Archaeology and Biblical Studies 7, Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature.
- Conrad, G.W. and A.R. Demarest. 1984. *Religion and Empire: The Dynamics of Aztec and Inka Expansion*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Court, J.M. 2008. *Approaching the Apocalypse: A Short History of Christian Millenarianism*, London, UK: I.B. Tauris.
- Cross, F.M. Jr. 1973. *Canaanite Myth and Hebrew Epic: Essays in the History of the Religion of Israel*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Crouch, C.L. and J. Stökl. 2014. *In the Name of God: The Bible in the Colonial Discourse of Empire*, Biblical Interpretation Series 126, Leiden, Netherlands: E.J. Brill.
- Crowley, T. and C. Bown. 2010. *An Introduction to Historical Linguistics*, fourth edition, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Curthoys, A. and J. Docker. 2010. *Is History Fiction*, second edition, Sydney, UK: University of New South Wales Press.
- Dassow, E. von. 2014. 'Levantine Politics Under Mittanian Hegemony', in E. Cancik-Kirschbaum, N. Brisch and J. Eidem, eds., *Constituent, Confederate, and Conquered Space: The Emergence of the Mittani State*, *Topoi Berlin Studies of the Ancient World* 17, Berlin, Germany: Walter De Gruyter, 11–32.
- Davies, P.R. 2004. *Whose Bible Is It Anyway?* second edition, London, UK: T&T Clark.
- Davies, P.R. 1992. *In Search of 'Ancient Israel'*, JSOTSS 148, Sheffield: JSOT Press.
- Davis, B., A.M. Maeir and L.A. Hitchcock. 2015. 'Disentangling Entangled Objects: Iron Age Inscriptions from Philistia as a Reflection of Cultural Processes', *IEJ* 65: 140–166.
- Day, D. 2008. *Conquest: How Societies Overwhelm Others*, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Dever, W.G. 2003. *Who Were the Early Israelites and Where Did They Come From?* Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans.
- Dever, W.G. 2001. *What Did the Biblical Writers Know and When Did They Know It? What Archaeology Can Tell Us About the Reality of Ancient Israel*, Grand Rapids, MI; and Cambridge, UK: Eerdmans.
- Diamond, J. 2011/2005. *Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Survive*,

- London, UK: Penguin Books, first edition 2005.
- Dietler, M. 2010. *Archaeologies of Colonialism: Consumption, Entanglement and Violence in Ancient Mediterranean France*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press.
- Dietrich, W. 2012. 'David and the Philistines: Literature and History', in G. Galil, A. Gil-boa, A.M. Maeir and D. Kahn, eds., *The Ancient Near East in the 12th–10th Centuries BCE: Culture and History*, AOAT 392, Münster, Germany: Ugarit-Verlag, 79–98.
- Dion, P.-E. 1997. *Les Araméens à l'âge du fer: Histoire politique et structures sociales*, Études bibliques 34, Paris, France: Gabalda.
- Docker, J. 2008. *The Origins of Violence: Religion, History and Genocide*, London, UK: Pluto Press.
- Doonan, O. 2012. 'Surveying Landscapes: Some Thoughts on the State of Survey Archaeology in Anatolia', in *Backdirt: An Annual Review of the Cotsen Institute of Archaeology at UCLA*, 118–123, Los Angeles, CA: Cotsen Institute of Archaeology Press.
- Dothan, T. and M. Dothan. 1992. *People of the Sea: The Search for the Philistines*, New York, NY: Macmillan Publishing Company.
- Doyle, M.W. 1986. *Empires*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Dozeman, T.B. 2009. *Exodus*, Eerdmans Critical Commentary, Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans.
- Dozeman, T.B., T. Römer and K. Schmid, eds. 2011. *Pentateuch, Hexateuch or Enneateuch: Identifying Literary Works in Genesis Through Kings, Ancient Israel and Its Literature*, Atlanta, GA: SBL.
- Dozeman, T.B. and K. Schmid, eds. 2006. *A Farewell to the Yahwist? The Composition of the Pentateuch in Recent European Interpretation*, SBL Symposium Series 34, Atlanta: SBL.
- Düring, B.S. 2015a. 'Introduction', in B.S. Düring, ed., *Understanding Hegemonic Practices of the Early Assyrian Empire: Essays Dedicated to Francis Wiggermann*, PIHANS 125, Leiden, Netherlands: NINO, 1–6.
- Düring, B.S. 2015b. 'The Hegemonic Practices of the Middle Assyrian Empire in Context', in B.S. Düring, ed., *Understanding Hegemonic Practices of the Early Assyrian Empire: Essays Dedicated to Francis Wiggermann*, PIHANS 125, Leiden, Netherlands: NINO, 299–315.
- Düring, B.S., ed. 2015c. *Understanding Hegemonic Practices of the Early Assyrian Empire: Essays Dedicated to Francis Wiggermann*, PIHANS 125, Leiden, Netherlands: NINO.
- Edzard, D.O. 1995. 'The Sumerian Language', in J.M. Sasson, ed., *Civilizations of the Ancient Near East*, New York, NY: Simon & Schuster Macmillan, 1996, 2107–2116.
- Ehret, C. 2011. *History and the Testimony of Language*, The California World

- History Library 16, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Ehrman, B.D. 2018. *The Triumph of Christianity: How a Forbidden Religion Swept the World*, London, UK: Oneworld Publications.
- Eidem, J. 2014. 'The Kingdom of Šamši-Adad and Its Legacies', in E. Cancik-Kirschbaum, N. Brisch and J. Eidem, eds., *Constituent, Confederate, and Conquered Space: The Emergence of the Mittani State, Topoi Berlin Studies of the Ancient World* 17, Berlin, Germany: Walter De Gruyter, 137–146.
- Eisenstadt, S.N. 1993/1963. *The Political Systems of Empires*, with a new introduction by the author, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, first edition 1963.
- Elkins, C. and S. Pedersen, eds. 2005. *Settler Colonialism in the Twentieth Century: Projects, Practices, Legacies*, New York, NY: Routledge.
- Emanuel, J.P. 2015. 'King Taita and His "Palistin": Philistine State or Neo-Hittite Kingdom?' *Antiguo Oriente: Cuadernos del Centro de Estudios de Historia del Antiguo Ori-ente* 13, 11–39.
- Esler, P.F.E. 2017. *God's Court and Courtiers in the Book of the Watchers: Re-interpreting Heaven in 1 Enoch 1–36*, Eugene, OR: Cascade Books.
- Faust, A. 2015. 'Pottery and Society in Iron Age Philistia: Feasting, Identity, Economy and Gender', *BASOR* 373, 167–198.
- Faust, A. 2012. *Judah in the Neo-Babylonian Period: The Archaeology of Desolation*, *Archaeology and Biblical Studies* 18, Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature.
- Faust, A. 2006. *Israel's Ethnogenesis: Settlement, Interaction, Expansion and Resistance*, London, UK: Equinox.
- Faust, A. 2004. '“Mortuary Practices, Society and Ideology”: The Lack of Iron Age I Burials in the Highlands in Context', *Israel Exploration Journal* 54, 174–190.
- Feder, Y. 2011. *Blood Expiation in Hittite and Biblical Ritual: Origins, Context and Meaning*, *Writings from the Ancient World Supplement Series* 2, Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature.
- Ferro, M. 1997/1994. *Colonization: A Global History*, London, UK: Routledge, 1997; original French edition 1994.
- Finkelberg, M. 2005. *Greeks and Pre-Greeks: Aegean Prehistory and Greek Heroic Tradition*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Finkelstein, I. 1996. 'The Archaeology of the United Monarchy: An Alternative View', *Tel Aviv* 23, 177–187.
- Finkelstein, I. 1988. *The Archaeology of the Israelite Settlement*, Jerusalem, Israel: Israel Exploration Society.
- Finkelstein, I. and A. Mazar. 2007. *The Quest for the Historical Israel*, edited by Brian Schmidt, Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature.
- Finkelstein, I. and N.A. Silberman. 2001. *The Bible Unearthed: Archaeology's*

- New Vison of Ancient Israel and the Origin of Its Sacred Texts, New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.
- Finkelstein, N.G. 2003. *The Holocaust Industry, Reflections on the Exploitations of Jewish Suffering*, second paperback edition, London, UK: Verso, first published by Verso 2000.
- Fischer, P.M. and T. Bürge, eds. 2017. ‘ “Sea Peoples” Up-to-date: New Research on Transformations in the Eastern Mediterranean in the 13th-11th Centuries BCE ’, Proceedings of the ESF-Workshop held at the Austrian Academy of Sciences, Vienna, 3–4 November 2014, Contributions to the Chronology of the Eastern Mediterranean XXXV/ Denkschriften der Gesamtakademie Band LXVIII, Vienna, Austria: Verlag der Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften.
- Fleming, D.E. 2004. *Democracy’s Ancient Ancestors: Mari and Early Collective Governance*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Foster, B. 2016. *The Age of Agade: Inventing Empire in Ancient Mesopotamia*, Abingdon, UK: Routledge.
- Foucault, M. 1977/1975. *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, London, UK: Allen Lane; French original 1975.
- Frachetti, M.D. 2008. *Pastoralist Landscapes and Social Interaction in Bronze Age Eurasia*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Frevel, C. 2013. ‘The Book of Numbers – Formation, Composition and Interpretation of a Late Part of the Torah: Some Introductory Remarks’, in C. Frevel, T. Pola and A. Schart, eds., *Torah and the Book of Numbers*, Tübingen, Germany: Mohr Siebeck, 1–37.
- Galil, G., A. Gilboa, A.M. Maeir, and D. Kahn, eds. 2012. *The Ancient Near East in the 12th–10th Centuries BCE: Culture and History*, AOAT 392, Münster, Germany: Ugarit-Verlag.
- Geertz, C. 1996. ‘Primordial Ties’, in J. Hutchinson and A.D. Smith, eds., *Ethnicity*, Oxford Readers, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 40–45, reproduced from *idem.*, ‘The Integrative Revolution’, in *idem.*, ed., *Old Societies and New States*, New York, NY: Free Press, 1963, 108–113.
- Gelb, I.J., with the assistance of J. Bartels, S.-M. Vance and R.M. Whiting. 1980. *Computer-Aided Analysis of Amorite*, Assyriological Studies 21, Chicago, IL: The Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago.
- Gelb, I.J., P.M. Purves and A.A. MacRae. 1943. *Nuzi Personal Names*, The University of Chicago Oriental Institute Publications 57, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Glatz, C. 2009. ‘Empire as Network: Spheres of Material Interaction in Late Bronze Age Anatolia’, *Journal of Anthropological Archaeology* 28, 127–141.
- Gonen, R. 1992. *Burial Patterns and Cultural Diversity in Late Bronze Age Canaan*, American Schools of Oriental Research Dissertation Series 7,

- Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns.
- Gordon, C.H. 1987. *Forgotten Scripts: Their Ongoing Discovery and Decipherment*, revised and enlarged edition, New York, NY: Dorset Press, reprint of 1982 edition by Basic Books.
- Gosden, C. 2004. *Archaeology and Colonialism: Cultural Contact from 5000 BC to the Present*, Topics in Contemporary Archaeology, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Gottwald, N.K. 1979. *Tribes of Yahweh: A Sociology of the Religion of Liberated Israel, 1250–1050 BCE*, Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books.
- Grabbe, L.L. 2016a. 'Late Bronze Age Palestine: If We Had Only the Bible. . . ', in L.L. Grabbe, ed., *The Land of Canaan in the Late Bronze Age*, European Seminar in Historical Methodology 10, Library of Hebrew Bible/Old Testament Studies 636, London, UK: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 11–56.
- Grabbe, L.L., ed. 2016b. *The Land of Canaan in the Late Bronze Age*, European Seminar in Historical Methodology 10, Library of Hebrew Bible/Old Testament Studies 636, London, UK: Bloomsbury T&T Clark.
- Grimal, N. 1992. *A History of Ancient Egypt*, new edition, Oxford, UK: Blackwell, original French edition 1988.
- Grimes, R.L. 2014. *The Craft of Ritual Studies*, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Grosby, S.E. 2002. *Biblical Ideas of Nationality: Ancient and Modern*, Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns.
- Gunkel, H. 1997/1901. *Genesis*, Mercer Library of Biblical Studies, Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, translated by M.E. Biddle, German original 1901, sixth edition 1964.
- Gunkel, H. 1925/1926. *Die Psalmen übersetzt und erklärt*, GHAT, II Abteilung, 2. Band, 4. Auflage, Göttingen, Germany: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
- Gzella, H. 2014. 'Language and Script', in H. Niehr, ed., *The Aramaeans in Ancient Syria*, Handbook of Oriental Studies, Section 1, Ancient Near East, Volume 106, Leiden, Netherlands: E.J. Brill, 2014a, 71–107.
- Hagman, T. and B. Korf. 2009. 'Panel 69: Revisiting the African Frontier', AEGIS European Conference on African Studies, 4–7 June 2009, Leipzig, Germany: Institute of African Studies, <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/2004/ee34dbe5db16a1e-315dca212182583879449.pdf> [accessed 27/9/2018].
- Halper, J. 2015. *War Against the People: Israel, the Palestinians and Global Pacification*, London, UK: Pluto Press.
- Halpern, B. 2001. *David's Secret Demons: Messiah, Murderer, Traitor, King*, Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans.
- Halualani, R.T. 2000. 'Rethinking "Ethnicity" as a Structural-Cultural Project(s): Notes on the Interface Between Cultural Studies and Intercultural

- Communication', *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 24, 579–602.
- Hardt, M. and A. Negri. 2000. *Empire*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Harmanşah, Ö. 2015. *Place, Memory and Healing: An Archaeology of Anatolian Rock Monuments*, Abingdon, UK: Routledge.
- Harmanşah, Ö. 2013. *Cities and the Shaping of Memory in the Ancient Near East*, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Harvey, P.B. Jr. and B. Halpern. 2008. 'W.M.L. de Wette's "Dissertatio Critica . . .": Context and Translation', *ZAR* 14, 47–85.
- Harzig, C., D. Hoerder, with D. Gabaccia. 2009. *What Is Migration History?* Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
- Hawk, L.D. 2010. *Joshua in 3-D: A Commentary on Biblical Conquest and Manifest Destiny*, Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock.
- Hawkins, J.D. 2011. 'The Inscriptions of the Aleppo Temple', *Anatolian Studies* 61, 35–54.
- Hawkins, R.K. 2013. *How Israel Became a People*, Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press.
- Heinrichs, S., ed. 2018. *Unsettling the Word: Biblical Experiments in Decolonization*, with illustrations by Jonathan Dyck and afterword by Sylvia McAdam, Altonia, Manitoba, Canada: Friesens for CommonWord/Mennonite Church Canada. Also published by New York, NY: Orbis Books.
- Held, M. 2019. 'Decolonizing Research Paradigms in the Context of Settler Colonialism: An Unsettling, Mutual, and Collaborative Effort', *International Journal of Qualitative Methods* 18, 1–16.
- Hess, R.S. 1996. *Joshua*, TOTC, Leicester, UK: Inter-Varsity Press.
- Higginbotham, C.R. 2000. *Egyptianization and Elite Emulation in Ancient Palestine: Governance and Accommodation on the Imperial Periphery*, Culture and History of the Ancient Near East 2, Leiden, Netherlands: E.J. Brill.
- Hill, J.D., ed. 1996. *History, Power and Identity: Ethnogenesis in the Americas, 1492– 1992*, Iowa City, IA: University of Iowa Press.
- Hinkson, J., P. James and L. Veracini. 2012. *Stolen Lands, Broken Cultures: The Settler-Colonial Present*, North Carlton, Australia: Arena Publications.
- Hixson, W.L. 2013. *American Settler Colonialism: A History*, New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hoffmeier, J.K. 2018. 'A Possible Location in Northwest Sinai for the Sea and Land Battles Between the Sea Peoples and Ramesses III', *BASOR* 380, 1–25.
- Hoffmeier, J.K. 2005. *Ancient Israel in Sinai: The Evidence for the Authenticity of the Wilderness Traditions*, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Hoffmeier, J.K. 1997. *Israel in Egypt: The Evidence for the Authenticity of the*

- Exodus Tradition*, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Hoffmeier, J.K. and A.R. Millard, eds. 2004. 'The Future of Biblical Archaeology: Reassessing Methodologies and Assumptions', Proceedings of a Symposium 12–14 August 2001 at Trinity International University, Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans.
- Horowitz, D. 2000/1985. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, reprint of 1985 edition with a new preface, Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press.
- Horowitz, W., T. Oshima and S. Sanders. 2006. *Cuneiform in Canaan: Cuneiform Sources from the Land of Israel in Ancient Times*, Jerusalem, Israel: Israel Exploration Society. Updated edition 2018; and Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns.
- Hu, D. 2013. 'Approaches to the Archaeology of Ethnogenesis: Past and Emergent Perspectives', *Journal of Archaeological Research* 21, 371–402.
- Hudson, M. 2005/1977. *Global Fracture: The New International Economic Order*, new edition, London, UK: Pluto Press. First edition 1977 by HarperCollins Publishers.
- Hudson, M. 2003. *Super Imperialism: The Origin and Fundamentals of U.S. World Dominance*, new edition, London, UK: Pluto Press. First edition 1972 by Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Huehnergard, J. 1995. 'Semitic Languages', in J.M. Sasson, ed., *Civilizations of the Ancient Near East*, New York, NY: Simon & Schuster Macmillan, 1996, 2117–2134.
- Hutchinson, J. and A.D. Smith, eds. 1996. *Ethnicity*, Oxford Readers, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Hutchinson, S., with a reply by R.C. Kelly. 1994. 'On the Nuer Conquest', *Current Anthropology* 35.5, 643–651.
- Imamura, M. 2014. 'Rethinking Frontier and Frontier Studies', *Political Geography* 45, 1–2.
- Isserlin, B. 1983. 'The Israelite Conquest of Canaan: A Comparative Review of the Arguments Applicable', *Palestine Exploration Quarterly* 115, 85–94, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1179/peq.1983.115.2.85>.
- James, P., in collaboration with I.J. Thorpe, N. Kokkinos, R. Morkot and J. Frankish. 1991. *Centuries of Darkness: A Challenge to the Conventional Chronology of Old World Archaeology*, London, UK: Jonathan Cape.
- Janeway, B. 2013. *Cultural Transition in the Northern Levant During the Early Iron Age as Reflected in the Aegean-Style Pottery at Tell Tayinat*, Ph.D. Dissertation, Toronto: University of Toronto. An updated and revised version of the thesis published as a monograph in 2017 by Eisenbrauns.
- Jelbert, P.R. 2018. *The Book of Chronicles and Colophonic Chronography*, PhD thesis, University of Gloucestershire.

- Jones, S. 2006. *Antonio Gramsci*, Routledge Critical Thinkers, Abingdon, UK: Routledge.
- Junkkaala, E. 2006. *Three Conquests of Canaan: A Comparative Study of Two Egyptian Military Campaigns and Joshua 10–12 in the Light of Recent Archaeological Evidence*, Turku, Finland: Åbo Akademi University Press. PDF version available for download from www.doria.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/4162/TMP.objres.80.pdf [accessed 4/9/2018].
- Kakel, C.P. 2011. *The American West and the Nazi East: A Comparative and Interpretive Perspective*, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Kärger, B. 2014. *Leben in der amurritischen Welt: Nomaden und Sesshafte im Reich von Mari im 19. und 18. Jahrhundert vor Christus*, Philippika – Altertumswissenschaftliche Abhandlungen/Contributions to the Study of Ancient World Cultures 68, Wiesbaden, Germany: Harrassowitz.
- Kelder, J.M. 2010. *The Kingdom of Mycenae: A Great Kingdom in the Late Bronze Age Aegean*, Bethesda, MD: CDL Press.
- Kelley, S. 2016. *Genocide, the Bible, and Biblical Scholarship*, Brill Research Perspectives in Biblical Interpretation, Volume 1(3), Leiden, Netherlands: E.J. Brill.
- Kelly, R.C. 1985. *The Nuer Conquest: The Structure and Development of an Expansionist System*, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Kennedy, H. 2007. *The Great Arab Conquests: How the Spread of Islam Changed the World We Live In*, London, UK: Weidenfeld and Nicholson.
- Kiernan, B. 2007. *Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Kilchör, B. 2015. *Mosetora und Jahwetora: Das Verhältnis von Deuteronomium 12–26 zu Exodus, Leviticus und Numeri*, BZAR 21, Wiesbaden, Germany: Harrassowitz.
- Killebrew, A.E. 2005. *Biblical Peoples and Ethnicity: An Archaeological Study of Egyptians, Canaanites, Philistines and Early Israel, 1300–1100 B.C.E.*, SBL Archaeology and Biblical Studies 9, Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature.
- Killebrew, A.E. and G. Lehmann, eds. 2013. *The Philistines and Other “Sea Peoples” in Text and Archaeology*, SBL Archaeology and Biblical Studies 15, Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature.
- Kitchen, A., C. Ehret, S. Assefa and C.J. Mulligan. 2009. ‘Bayesian Phylogenetic Analysis of Semitic Languages Identifies an Early Bronze Age Origin of Semitic in the Near East’, *Proceedings of the Royal Society B* 276, 2703–2710, doi:10.1098/ rspb.2009.0408.
- Kitchen, K.A. 2003. *On the Reliability of the Old Testament*, Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans.

- Klein, R.W. 1983. *1 Samuel*, Word Biblical Commentary 10, Waco, TX: Word Books.
- Klengel, H. 1992. *Syria 3000 to 300 B.C.: A Handbook of Political History*, Berlin, Germany: Akademie Verlag.
- Kletter, R. 2014. 'In the Footsteps of Bagira: Ethnicity, Archaeology, and "Iron Age I Ethnic Israel"', *Approaching Religion* 4.2, 2–15.
- Kletter, R. 2006. 'Can a Proto-Israelite Please Stand up? Notes on Ethnicity of Iron Age Israel and Judah', in A. Maeir and P. de Miroschedji, eds., *I Will Speak the Riddle of Ancient Time: Archaeological and Historical Studies in Honor of Amihai Mazar*, Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 573–586.
- Knauf, E.A. 2008. *Josua*, Zürcher Bibelkommentar, Zürich, Switzerland: Theologischer Verlag.
- Koliński, R. 2015. 'Making Mittani Assyrian', in B.S. Düring, ed., *Understanding Hegemonic Practices of the Early Assyrian Empire: Essays Dedicated to Francis Wiggermann*, PIHANS 125, Leiden, Netherlands: NINO, 9–32.
- Koliński, R. 2014. 'Settled Space: Evidence for Changes in Settlement Patterns of Northern Mesopotamia at the Advent and at the Turn of the Mittani Era', in E. Cancik-Kirschbaum, N. Brisch and J. Eidem, eds., *Constituent, Confederate, and Conquered Space: The Emergence of the Mittani State, Topoi Berlin Studies of the Ancient World* 17, Berlin, Germany: Walter De Gruyter, 11–32.
- Kopytoff, I., ed. 1987. *The African Frontier: The Reproduction of Traditional African Societies*, Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press.
- Kraus, F.R. 1984. *Königliche Verfügungen in Altbabylonischer Zeit*, *Studia et Documenta ad iura orientis antiqui pertinentia*, Volume XI, Leiden, Netherlands: E.J. Brill.
- Kuhn, T.S. 1962. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 50th anniversary edition 2012.
- Kühn, D. 2014. 'Society, Institutions, Law, and Economy', in H. Niehr, ed., *The Aramaeans in Ancient Syria*, *Handbook of Oriental Studies*, Section 1, Ancient Near East, Volume 106, Leiden, Netherlands: E.J. Brill, 2014a, 37–70.
- Kühne, H. 2015. 'Core and Periphery in the Assyrian State: The View from Dūr-Katlimmu', in B.S. Düring, ed., *Understanding Hegemonic Practices of the Early Assyrian Empire: Essays Dedicated to Francis Wiggermann*, PIHANS 125, Leiden, Netherlands: NINO, 75–87.
- Kuhrt, A. 1995. *The Ancient Near East: c. 3000–330*, 2 vols, London; and New York, NY: Routledge.
- Lattimore, O. 1962. *Studies in Frontier History: Collected Papers 1928–1958*,

- London, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Layton, R. 1997. *An Introduction to Theory in Anthropology*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Lemaire, A. 2012. 'West Semitic Epigraphy and the History of the Levant During the 12th-10th Centuries BCE', in G. Galil, A. Gilboa, A.M. Maeir and D. Kahn, eds., *The Ancient Near East in the 12th-10th Centuries BCE: Culture and History*, AOAT 392, Münster, Germany: Ugarit-Verlag, 291-307, 291-295.
- Lemche, N.P. 1998. *The Israelites in History and Tradition*, London, UK: SPCK; and Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press.
- Lemkin, R. 2008/1944. *The Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress*, second edition, Clark, NJ: The Lawbook Exchange Ltd; reprint with introductions of original of Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944.
- Lenski, G. 2005. *Ecological-Evolutionary Theory: Principles and Applications*, Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers.
- Lenski, G. 1966. *Power and Privilege: A Theory of Social Stratification*, New York, NY: McGraw-Hill. Reissue with author's introduction 1984.
- Leuchter, M. and J. Hutton, eds. 2011. *Levites and Priests in Biblical History and Tradition*, Ancient Israel and Its Literature 9, Atlanta, GA: SBL.
- Levene, M. 2005a. *Genocide in the Age of the Nation State, Volume I: The Meaning of Genocide*, London, UK: I.B. Tauris.
- Levene, M. 2005b. *Genocide in the Age of the Nation State, Volume II: The Rise of the West and the Coming of Genocide*, London, UK: I.B. Tauris.
- Levy, T.E., ed. 2010. *Historical Biblical Archaeology and the Future: The New Pragmatism*, London, UK: Equinox.
- Leyburn, J.G. 1935. *Frontier Folkways*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, reprinted 1970 by Hamden, CT: Archon Books.
- Lipinski, E. 2000. *The Arameans: Their Ancient History, Culture, Religion*, Leuven, Belgium: Peeters.
- Liverani, M. 2017. *Assyria: The Imperial Mission*, Mesopotamian Civilizations 21, Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns.
- Liverani, M. 2014. *The Ancient Near East: History, Society and Economy*, Abingdon, UK: Routledge.
- Liverani, M. 2005/2003. *Israel's History and the History of Israel*, London, UK: Equinox, 2005; Italian original 2003.
- Longman, T. 1990. *Fictional Akkadian Autobiography: A Generic and Comparative Study*, Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns.
- MacCulloch, D. 2009. *A History of Christianity: The First Three Thousand Years*, London, UK: Penguin.
- MacDonald, B. 2015. *The Southern Transjordan Edomite Plateau and the Dead*

- Sea Rift Valley: The Bronze Age to the Islamic Period (3800/3700 BC–AD 1917)*, Oxford, UK: Oxbow Books.
- MacDonald, B. 2000. *“East of the Jordan”: Territories and Sites of the Hebrew Scriptures*, ASOR Books, Volume 6, Boston, MA: American Schools of Oriental Research.
- Maeir, A.M. 2013. ‘Philistia Transforming: Fresh Evidence from Tell es-Safi/Gath on the Transformational Trajectory of the Philistine Culture’, in A.E. Killebrew and G. Lehmann, eds., *The Philistines and Other “Sea Peoples” in Text and Archaeology*, SBL Archaeology and Biblical Studies 15, Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature, 191–242.
- Maeir, A.M. 2012. ‘Insights on the Philistine Culture and Related Issues: An Overview of 15 Years of Work at Tell es-Safi/Gath’, in G. Galil, A. Gilboa, A.M. Maeir and D. Kahn, eds., *The Ancient Near East in the 12th–10th Centuries BCE: Culture and History*, AOAT 392, Münster, Germany: Ugarit-Verlag, 345–404.
- Maeir, A.M. and P. de Miroschedji, eds. 2006. *“I Will Speak the Riddle of Ancient Times”: Archaeological and Historical Studies in Honor of Amihai Mazar on the Occasion of His Sixtieth Birthday*, Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns.
- Malešević, S. 2010. *The Sociology of War and Violence*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Malina, B.J. 2001. *The New Testament World: Insights from Cultural Anthropology*, third edition, Louisville, KY: WJK Press.
- Mann, M. 2012/1986. *The Sources of Social Power, Volume 1: A History of Power from the Beginnings to AD 1760*, new edition, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Original in 1986.
- Mann, M. 1986/2013. *The Sources of Social Power*, 4 vols, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Manning, P. 2013. *Migration in World History*, second edition, Themes in World History. Abingdon, UK: Routledge.
- Manning, P. 2003. *Navigating World History: Historians Create a Global Past*, New York: NY: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Manning, S.W. 2010. ‘Chronology and Terminology’, in E.H. Cline, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of the Bronze Age Aegean (ca. 3000–1000 BC)*, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 11–28.
- Margueron, J.-C. 1995. ‘Mari: A Portrait of a Mesopotamian City-State’, in J.M. Sasson, ed., *Civilizations of the Ancient Near East*, New York, NY: Simon & Schuster Macmillan, 1996, 885–899.
- Markoe, G.E. 2000. *Peoples of the Past: The Phoenicians*, London, UK: British Museum Press.
- Martino, S. de. 2014. ‘The Mittani State: The Formation of the Kingdom of

- Mittani', in E. Cancik-Kirschbaum, N. Brisch and J. Eidem, eds., *Constituent, Confederate, and Conquered Space: The Emergence of the Mittani State*, *Topoi Berlin Studies of the Ancient World* 17, Berlin, Germany: Walter De Gruyter, 61–74.
- Mazar, A. 2007. 'The Search for David and Solomon', in I. Finkelstein and A. Mazar, eds., *The Quest for the Historical Israel*, Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature, 117–139.
- Mazar, A. 1997. 'Iron Age Chronology: A Reply to Israel Finkelstein', *Levant* 29, 157–167.
- Mazar, A. 1992. *Archaeology and the Land of the Bible 10000–586 BCE*, The Anchor Bible Library, New York, NY: Doubleday.
- McAnany, P. and N. Yoffee. 2010. *Questioning Collapse: Human Resilience, Ecological Vulnerability, and the Aftermath of Empire*, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- McCoy, A.W. 2017. *In the Shadows of the American Century: The Rise and Decline of US Global Power*, Chicago, IL: Haymarket Books.
- Mendenhall, G.E. 2001. *Ancient Israel's Faith and History: Introduction to the Bible in Context*, edited by G.A. Herion, Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press.
- Meyers, C. 2005. *Exodus*, NCBC, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Middleton, G.D. 2010. *The Collapse of Palatial Society in LBA Greece and the Postpalatial Period*, BAR International Series 2110, Oxford, UK: BAR Publishing.
- Miglio, A.E. 2014. *Tribe and State: The Dynamics of International Politics and the Reign of Zimri-Lim*, Gorgias Studies in the Ancient Near East 8, Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press.
- Milgrom, J. 1990. *Numbers*, The JPS Torah Commentary, New York, NY: The Jewish Publication Society.
- Millard, A.R. 2012. 'Scripts and Their Use in the 12th-10th Centuries BCE', in G. Galil, A. Gilboa, A.M. Maeir and D. Kahn, eds., *The Ancient Near East in the 12th–10th Centuries BCE: Culture and History*, AOAT 392, Münster, Germany: Ugarit-Verlag, 405–412.
- Millard, A.R. 2004. 'Amorites and Israelites: Invisible Invaders – Modern Expectation and Ancient Reality', in J.K. Hoffmeier and A.R. Millard, eds., *Proceedings of a Symposium 12–14 August 2001 at Trinity International University*, Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 148–162.
- Miller, J.L. 2004. *Studies in the Origins, Development and Interpretation of the Kizzuwatna Rituals*, Studien zu Boğazköy-Texten 46, Wiesbaden, Germany: Harrassowitz.
- Miller, J.M. and J.H. Hayes. 2006. *History of Ancient Israel and Judah*, second revised edition, London, UK: SCM Press.

- Miller, R.D. II. 2003. 'A Gazetteer of Iron I Sites in the North-Central Highlands of Palestine', in *Preliminary Excavation Reports and Other Archaeological Investigations: Tell Qarqur, Iron I Sites in the North-Central Highlands of Palestine*, edited by N. Lapp, in The Annual of the American Schools of Oriental Research, Volume 56 (1999), Boston, MA: American Schools of Oriental Research, 143–218.
- Moberly, R.W.L. 1992. *The Old Testament of the Old Testament: Patriarchal Narratives and Mosaic Yahwism*, Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press.
- Møller, J. 2017. *State Formation, Regime Change, and Economic Development*, Abingdon, UK: Routledge.
- Moorey, P.R.S. 1991. *A Century of Biblical Archaeology*, Cambridge: Lutterworth Press.
- Morgan, D. 2007. *The Mongols*, second edition, Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
- Morris, E.F. 2018. *Ancient Egyptian Imperialism*, Hoboken, NJ: Wiley Blackwell.
- Morris, E.F. 2005. *The Architecture of Imperialism: Military Bases and the Evolution of Foreign Policy in Egypt's New Kingdom*, *Probleme der Ägyptologie* 22, Leiden, Netherlands: E.J. Brill.
- Murray, S. 2004. *Post-Christendom: Church and Mission in a Strange New World*, Milton Keynes, UK: Authentic Media.
- Nash, M. 1996. 'The Core Elements of Ethnicity', in J. Hutchinson and A.D. Smith, eds., *Ethnicity*, Oxford Readers, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 24–28; reproduced from *idem.*, *The Cauldron of Ethnicity in the Modern World*, Chicago, IL; and London, UK: University of Chicago Press, 1989, 10–15.
- Nelson, R.D. 2005. 'The Double Redaction of the Deuteronomistic History: The Case Is Still Compelling', *JSOT* 29, 319–337.
- Nelson, R.D. 1997. *Joshua*, OTL, Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press.
- Niehr, H., ed. 2014a. *The Aramaeans in Ancient Syria*, Handbook of Oriental Studies, Section 1, Ancient Near East, Volume 106, Leiden, Netherlands: E.J. Brill.
- Niehr, H. 2014b. 'Religion', in H. Niehr, ed., *The Aramaeans in Ancient Syria*, Handbook of Oriental Studies, Section 1, Ancient Near East Volume 106, Leiden, Netherlands: E.J. Brill, 2014a, 127–203.
- Niemann, H.M. 2013. 'Neighbours and Foes, Rivals and Kin: Philistines, Shepheleans, Judeans Between Geography and Economy, History and Theology', in A.E. Killebrew and G. Lehmann, eds., *The Philistines and Other "Sea Peoples" in Text and Archaeology*, SBL Archaeology and Biblical Studies 15, Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature, 243–264.
- Niesiolowski-Spanò, Ł. 2016. *Goliath's Legacy: Philistines and Hebrews in Biblical Times*, Wiesbaden, Germany: Harrassowitz.

- Niesiołowski-Spanò, Ł. and M. Węcowski, eds. 2018. *Change, Continuity, and Connectivity: North-Eastern Mediterranean at the Turn of the Bronze Age and in the Early Iron Age*, Wiesbaden, Germany: Harrassowitz.
- Nihan, C. 2007. *From Priestly Torah to Pentateuch*, Forschungen zum Alten Testament 2, Reihe 25, Tübingen, Germany: Mohr Siebeck.
- Nissinen, M. 2014. 'Outlook: Aramaeans outside of Syria', in H. Niehr, ed., *The Aramaeans in Ancient Syria*, Handbook of Oriental Studies, Section 1, Ancient Near East Volume 106, Leiden, Netherlands: E.J. Brill, 2014a, 273–390.
- Nolan, P. and G. Lenski. 2015. *Human Societies: An Introduction to Macrosociology*, 12th edition, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Noth, M. 1991/1943. *The Deuteronomistic History*, second edition, JSOTSS 15, Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Academic Press. German original: *Überlieferungsgeschichtliche Studien I*, Halle: M. Niemeyer, 1943.
- Noth, M. 1987/1943. *The Chronicler's History*, JSOTSS 50, Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Academic Press. German original: *Überlieferungsgeschichtliche Studien II*, Halle: M. Niemeyer, 1943.
- Núñez, F.J. 2018. 'The Impact of the Sea Peoples in Central Levant: A Revision', in L. Niesiołowski-Spanò and M. Węcowski, eds., *Change, Continuity, and Connectivity: North-Eastern Mediterranean at the Turn of the Bronze Age and in the Early Iron Age*, Wiesbaden, Germany: Harrassowitz, 116–140.
- Osterhammel, J. 2005. *Colonialism: A Theoretical Introduction*, 2nd edition with expanded and updated selected readings, Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener publishers; German original: *Kolonialismus: Geschichte, Formen, Folgen*, München: C.H. Beck, 1995.
- Otto, E. 2016. *Deuteronomium 12:1–23:15*, Herder's Theologischer Kommentar zum alten Testament, Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany: Herder.
- Otto, E. 2012. *Deuteronomium 1,1–4,43*, Herders Theologischer Kommentar zum Alten Testament, Stuttgart, Germany: Herder.
- Otto, E. 2000. *Das Deuteronomium im Pentateuch und Hexateuch: Studien zur Literaturgeschichte von Pentateuch und Hexateuch im Lichte Des Deuteronomiumrahmens*, FAT 30, Tübingen, Germany: Mohr Siebeck.
- Pappe, I. 2004. *A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Pardee, D. 2002. *Ritual and Cult at Ugarit*, SBL Writings from the Ancient World 10, Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature.
- Parker, B.J. 2015. 'Power, Hegemony, and the Use of Force in the Neo Assyrian Empire', in B.S. Düring, ed., *Understanding Hegemonic Practices of the Early Assyrian Empire: Essays Dedicated to Francis Wiggermann*, PIHANS 125, Leiden, Netherlands: NINO, 283–293.
- Parker, C. 2015. *Deuteronomy's Place: A Philosophical Analysis of Place in*

- Deuteronomy, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Gloucestershire.
- Parkin, F. 2002. *Max Weber*, revised edition, Key Sociologists, Abingdon, UK: Routledge.
- Patrick, J. 2016. *The Prophetic Structure of 1–2 Samuel*, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Oxford.
- Payne, A. 2010. *Hieroglyphic Luwian: An Introduction with Original Texts*, second revised edition, Wiesbaden, Germany: Harrassowitz.
- Peden, A.J. 1994. *Egyptian Historical Inscriptions of the Twentieth Dynasty*, Documenta Mundi Aegyptiaca 3, Jonsered, Sweden: Paul Åströms Förlag.
- Pedersén, O. 1998. *Archives and Libraries in the Ancient Near East 1500–300B.C.*, Bethesda, MD: CDL Press.
- Petter, T.D. 2014. *The Land Between the Two Rivers: Early Israelite Identities in Central Transjordan*, Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns.
- Pfoh, E. 2016. *Syria-Palestine in the Late Bronze Age: An Anthropology of Politics and Power*, Copenhagen International Seminar, Abingdon, UK: Routledge.
- Pioske, D.D. 2015. *David's Jerusalem: Between Memory and History*, Routledge Studies in Religion 45, Abingdon, UK: Routledge.
- Pitkänen, P. 2019. 'Reconstructing the Social Contexts of the Priestly and Deuteronomic Materials in a Non-Wellhausen Setting', in M. Armgardt, B. Kilchör and M. Zehnder, eds., *Paradigm Change in Pentateuchal Research*, BZAR 22, Wiesbaden, Germany: Harrassowitz, 323–338.
- Pitkänen, P. 2018. 'Humans and the Fourth Industrial Revolution: Reading the World and the Canonical Word', *Canon&Culture* 12.2, 5–44.
- Pitkänen, P. 2017a. *A Commentary on Numbers: Narrative, Ritual and Colonialism*, Routledge Studies in the Biblical World, Abingdon, UK: Routledge.
- Pitkänen, P. 2017b. 'Ancient Israelite Population Economy: Ger, Toshav, Nakhri and Karat as Settler Colonial Categories', *Journal for the Study of the Old Testament* 42.2, 139–153.
- Pitkänen, P. 2016a. 'The Ecological-Evolutionary Theory, Migration, Settler Colonialism, Sociology of Violence and the Origins of Ancient Israel', *Cogent Social Sciences* 2.1210717, 1–23.
- Pitkänen, P. 2016b. 'Settler Colonialism in Ancient Israel', in E. Cavanagh and L. Veracini, eds., *The Routledge Handbook of the History of Settler Colonialism*, Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 25–36.
- Pitkänen, P. 2015. 'Reading Genesis-Joshua as a Unified Document from an Early Date: A Settler Colonial Perspective', *Biblical Theology Bulletin* 45.1, 3–31, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2016.1210717>
- Pitkänen, P. 2014/2003. *Central Sanctuary and Centralization of Worship in Ancient Israel: From the Settlement to the Building of Solomon's Temple*,

- reissue with a new introduction by the author, Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, first edition 2003, second publisher's edition 2004.
- Pitkänen, P. 2014a. 'Pentateuch-Joshua: A Settler-Colonial Document of a Supplanting Society', *Settler Colonial Studies* 4.3, 245–276.
- Pitkänen, P. 2014b. 'Ancient Israel and Philistia: Setter Colonialism and Ethnocultural Interaction', *Ugarit Forschungen* 45, 233–263.
- Pitkänen, P. 2010. *Joshua*, Apollos Old Testament Commentary 6, Leicester, UK: Inter-Varsity Press.
- Pitkänen, P. 2007. 'Memory, Witnesses and Genocide in the Book of Joshua', in J.G. McConville and K. Möller, eds., *Reading the Law: Studies in Honour of Gordon J. Wenham*, New York, NY; and London, UK: T&T Clark, 267–282.
- Pitkänen, P. 2004. 'Ethnicity, Assimilation and the Israelite Settlement', *Tyndale Bulletin* 55.2, 161–182.
- Piwowarczyk, D.R. 2018. 'Chronology and Dating of Linguistic Corpora', in L. Niesiołowski-Spanò and M. Węcowski, eds., *Change, Continuity, and Connectivity: North-Eastern Mediterranean at the Turn of the Bronze Age and in the Early Iron Age*, Wiesbaden, Germany: Harrassowitz, 328–333.
- Polanyi, K. 2001/1944. *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*, second Beacon paperback edition, with foreword by Joseph E. Stiglitz and with a new introduction by Fred Block, Beacon, MA: Beacon Press; originally published in 1944 by Farrar & Rinehart.
- Ponencias, E. 2015. 'King Taita and His "Palistin": Philistine State or Neo-Hittite Kingdom?' *Antiquo Oriente* 13, 11–39.
- Porter, A. 2012. *Mobile Pastoralism and the Formation of Near Eastern Civilizations: Weaving Together Society*, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Postgate, N. 2013. *Bronze Age Bureaucracy: Writing and the Practice of Government in Assyria*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Prior, M. 1997. *The Bible and Colonialism: A Moral Critique*, The Biblical Seminar, 48. Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Academic Press.
- Provan, I., V.P. Long and T. Longman. 2003. *A Biblical History of Israel*, Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press.
- Rainey, A.F. 2015. *The El-Amarna Correspondence: A New Edition of the Cuneiform Letters from the Site of El-Amarna Based on Collations of all Extant Tablets*, 2 vols, edited by W.M. Schniedewind and Z. Cochavi-Rainey, Handbook of Oriental Studies, Leiden, Netherlands: E.J. Brill.
- Rappaport, R.A. 1984/1968. *Pigs for the Ancestors: Ritual in the Ecology of a New Guinea People*, New Haven, CT; and London, UK: Yale University Press. Original 1968, with epilogue 1984.
- Rappaport, R.A. 1979. *Ecology, Meaning, and Religion*, Richmond, CA: North Atlantic Books.

- Redford, D.B. 1992. *Egypt, Canaan, and Israel in Ancient Times*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Rendtorff, R. 1990/1977. *The Problem of the Process of Transmission in the Pentateuch*, JSOTSS 89, Sheffield, UK: JSOT Press, 1990, translated by J.J. Scullion. German original *Das Überlieferungsgeschichtliche Problem des Pentateuch*, BZAW 17, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
- Renfrew, C. 1987. *Archaeology and Language: The Puzzle of Indo-European Origins*, London, UK: Pimlico 1998 edition, first published by Jonathan Cape 1987.
- Richerson, P.J., M.B. Mulder and B.J. Vila. 1996. *Principles of Human Ecology*, London, UK: Pearson Custom Publishing.
- Roberts, B.K. 1996. *Landscapes of Settlement: From Prehistory to the Present*, London, UK: Routledge.
- Rosen, S.A. 2009. 'History Does Not Repeat Itself: Cyclicity and Particularism in Nomad-sedentary Relations in the Negev in the Long Term', in J. Szuchman, ed., *Nomads, Tribes, and the state in the Ancient Near East: Cross-disciplinary Perspectives*, Oriental Institute Seminars 5, Chicago, IL: The Oriental Institute, 57–86.
- Roth, M.T. 1997. *Law Collections from Mesopotamia and Asia Minor*, second edition, with a contribution by Harry Hoffner, WAW 6, Atlanta, GA: SBL.
- Routledge, B. 2014. *Archaeology and State Theory: Subjects and Objects of Power*, London, UK: Bloomsbury Academic.
- Routledge, B. 2004. *Moab in the Iron Age: Hegemony, Polity, Archaeology*, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Sader, H. 2014. 'History', in H. Niehr, ed., *The Aramaeans in Ancient Syria*, Handbook of Oriental Studies, Section 1, Ancient Near East, Volume 106, Leiden, Netherlands: E.J. Brill, 2014a, 11–36.
- Sader, H. 1987. *Les états araméens de Syrie: depuis leur fondation jusqu'à leur transformation en provinces assyriennes*, Beirut Textes und Studien 36, Beirut, Lebanon; and Wiesbaden, Germany: Steiner.
- Said, E.W. 2003/1978. *Orientalism*, London, UK: Penguin, original in 1978 by Routledge & Kegan Paul, reprinted with a new preface 2003.
- Salah, S. 2014. *Die mittelassyrischen Personen- und Rationenlisten aus Tall Šeh Hamad/Dur-Katlimmu*, Berichte der Ausgrabung Tall Šeh Hamad/Dur-Katlimmu 18, Wiesbaden, Germany: Harrassowitz.
- Sanders, J.A. 2014. *The Monotheizing Process: Its Origins and Development*, with a contribution from Paul E. Capetz, Eugene, OR: Cascade Books.
- Sanders, J.A. 2005. *Torah and Canon*, second edition, Eugene, OR: Cascade Books.
- Sanders, S.L. 2009. *The Invention of Hebrew*, Urbana, Chicago, and Springfield, IL: University of Illinois Press.

- Sasson, J.M. 2014. *Judges 1–12: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary*, The Anchor Yale Bible, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Sattler, R.A. 1996. ‘Remnants, Renegades and Runaways: Seminole Ethnogenesis Reconsidered’, in J.D. Hill, ed., *History, Power and Identity: Ethnogenesis in the Americas, 1492–1992*, Iowa City, IA: University of Iowa Press, 36–69.
- Schloen, J.D. 2001. *The House of the Father as Fact and Symbol: Patrimonialism in Ugarit and the Ancient Near East*, Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns.
- Schwartz, G.M. 2014. ‘Reflections on the Mittani Emergence’, in E. Cancik-Kirschbaum, N. Brisch and J. Eidem, eds., *Constituent, Confederate, and Conquered Space: The Emergence of the Mittani State, Topoi Berlin Studies of the Ancient World* 17, Berlin, Germany: Walter De Gruyter, 265–277.
- Schwartz, G.M. 1995. ‘Pastoral Nomadism in Ancient Western Asia’, in J.M. Sasson, ed., *Civilizations of the Ancient Near East*, New York, NY: Simon & Schuster Macmillan, 1996, 249–258.
- Schwarzmantel, J. 2015. *The Routledge Guidebook to Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks*, Abingdon, UK: Routledge.
- Scott, J.C. 2017. *Against the Grain: A Deep History of the Earliest States*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Seters, J. van. 1994. *The Life of Moses: The Yahwist as Historian in Exodus – Numbers*, Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press.
- Seters, J. van. 1992. *Prologue to History: The Yahwist as Historian in Genesis*, Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press.
- Seters, J. van. 1975. *Abraham in History and Tradition*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Sharon, I. 2014. ‘Levantine Chronology’, in M. Steiner and A.E. Killebrew, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of the Archaeology of the Levant: C. 8000–332 BCE*, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013, 44–65.
- Sharon, I. and A. Gilboa. 2013. ‘The SKL Town: Dor in the Early Iron Age’, in A.E. Killebrew and G. Lehmann, eds., *The Philistines and Other “Sea Peoples” in Text and Archaeology*, SBL Archaeology and Biblical Studies 15, Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature, 393–468.
- Shaw, M. 2015. *What Is Genocide?* second edition, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
- Shlaim, A. 2000. *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World*, London, UK; and New York, NY: Penguin Books.
- Short, D. 2016. *Redefining Genocide: Settler Colonialism, Social Death, and Ecocide*, London, UK: Zed Books.
- Singer, I. 2013. ‘The Philistines in the Bible: A Short Rejoinder to a New Perspective’, in A.E. Killebrew and G. Lehmann, eds., *The Philistines and Other “Sea Peoples” in Text and Archaeology*, SBL Archaeology and

- Biblical Studies 15, Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature, 19–27.
- Singer, I. 2012. 'The Philistines in the North and the Kingdom of Taita', in G. Galil, A. Gilboa, A.M. Maeir and D. Kahn, eds., *The Ancient Near East in the 12th–10th Centuries BCE: Culture and History*, AOAT 392, Münster, Germany: Ugarit-Verlag, 451–471.
- Singer, I. 2011. *The Calm Before the Storm: Selected Writings of Itamar Singer on the End of the Late Bronze Age in Anatolia and the Levant*, Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature.
- Smith, A.D. 2003. *Chosen Peoples: Sacred Sources of National Identity*, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Smith, A.D. 1986. *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
- Sommerfeld, W. 1995. 'The Kassites of Ancient Mesopotamia: Origins, Politics and Culture', in J.M. Sasson, ed., *Civilizations of the Ancient Near East*, New York, NY: Simon & Schuster Macmillan, 1996, 917–930.
- Southwood, K.E. 2012. *Ethnicity and the Mixed Marriage Crisis in Ezra 9–10: An Anthropological Approach*, Oxford Theological Monographs, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Stackert, J. 2014. *A Prophet Like Moses: Prophecy, Law, and Israelite Religion*, New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Stager, L.E. 2006. 'Biblical Philistines: A Hellenistic Literary Creation?' in A.M. Maeir and P. de Miroschedji, eds., *"I Will Speak the Riddle of Ancient Times": Archaeological and Historical Studies in Honor of Amihai Mazar on the Occasion of His Sixtieth Birthday*, Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 375–384.
- Stannard, D.E. 1992. *American Holocaust: Columbus and the Conquest of the New World*, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Stephan, C.W. and W.G. Stephan. 2000. 'The Measurement of Racial and Ethnic Identity', *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 24, 541–552.
- Stern, E. 2013. *The Material Culture of the Northern Sea Peoples in Israel*, Studies in the Archaeology and History of the Levant 5, Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns.
- Stern, P.D. 1991. *The Biblical Herem: A Window on Israel's Religious Experience*, Brown Judaic Studies, Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press.
- Stojanowski, C.M. 2013. 'Ethnogenetic Theory and New Directions in Biodistance Research', in M.C. Lozada and B. O'Donnabhain, eds., *The Dead Tell Tales: Essays in Honor of Jane E. Buikstra*, Los Angeles, CA: Cotsen Institute of Archaeology Press, 71–82.
- Stojanowski, C.M. 2010. *Bioarchaeology of Ethnogenesis in the Colonial Southeast*, Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida.
- Stone, B.J. 1995. 'The Philistines and Acculturation: Culture Change and Ethnic Continuity in the Iron Age', *BASOR* 298, 7–32.

- Strobel, K., ed. 2011. *Empires After the Empire: Anatolia, Syria and Assyria After Suppiluliuma II* (ca. 1200–800/700 B.C.), Eothen: Collana di studi sulle civiltà dell'Oriente antico 17, Vicchio, Italy: LoGisma Editore.
- Szuchman, J.J. 2007. *Prelude to Empire: Middle Assyrian Hanigalbat and the Rise of the Aramaeans*, Ph.D. Thesis, UCLA.
- Talbert, R.J.A., ed. 2012. *Ancient Perspectives: Maps and Their Place in Mesopotamia, Egypt, Greece and Rome*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Tate, W.R. 2008. *Biblical Interpretation: An Integrated Approach*, third edition, Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic.
- Tenu, A. 2015. 'Building the Empire: Settlement Patterns in the Middle Assyrian Empire', in B.S. Düring, ed., *Understanding Hegemonic Practices of the Early Assyrian Empire: Essays Dedicated to Francis Wiggermann*, PIHANS 125, Leiden, Netherlands: NINO, 75–87.
- Tenu, A. 2009. *L'expansion médio-assyrienne: Approche archéologique*, BAR International Series 1906, Oxford, UK: BAR Publishing.
- Thomas, Z. 2016. 'Debating the United Monarchy: Let's See How Far We've Come', *BTB* 46.2, 59–69.
- Thompson, T.L. 1992. *Early History of the Israelite People: From the Written & Archaeological Sources*, Leiden, Netherlands: E.J. Brill.
- Thompson, T.L. 1974. *The History of the Patriarchal Narratives: The Quest for the Historical Abraham*, BZAW 133, Berlin, Germany: Walter de Gruyter.
- Tigay, J. 2002/1982. *The Evolution of the Gilgamesh Epic*, Wauconda, IL: Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers. A reprint of 1982 edition published by Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Tov, E. 2012. *Textual Criticism of the Hebrew Bible*, third edition, revised and expanded Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press.
- Turner, F.J. 1893. 'The Significance of the Frontier in American History', *Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1893*, 199–207.
- Van Bekkum, K. 2010. *From Conquest to Coexistence: Ideology and Antiquarian Intent in the Historiography of Israel's Settlement in Canaan*, Ph.D. Thesis, Theologische Universiteit van de Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland te Kampen.
- Van de Mieroop, M. 2016. *A History of the Ancient Near East, Ca. 3000–323 BC*, third edition, Chichester, UK: Wiley Blackwell.
- Van der Steen, E. 2016. 'The Archaeology of the Late Bronze Age in Palestine', in L.L. Grabbe, ed., *The Land of Canaan in the Late Bronze Age*, European Seminar in Historical Methodology 10, Library of Hebrew Bible/Old Testament Studies 636, London, UK: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 159–175.
- Venturi, F., ed. 2010. 'Societies in Transition: Evolutionary Processes in the

- Northern Levant Between Late Bronze Age II and Early Iron Age', Papers presented on the Occasion of the 20th anniversary of the new excavations in Tell Afis. Studi e testi orientali Collana, diretta da Giorgio Renato Franci 9, Serie Archeologica 2, Bologna, Italy: Cooperative Libreria Universitaria Editrice Bologna.
- Veracini, L. 2017. 'Decolonizing Settler Colonialism: Kill the Settler in Him and Save the Man', *American Indian Culture and Research Journal* 41.1, 1–18.
- Veracini, L. 2010. *Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview*, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Veracini, L. 2006. *Israel and Settler Society*, London, UK: Pluto Press.
- Villard, P. 1995. 'Shamshi-Adad and Sons: The Rise and Fall of an Upper Mesopotamian Empire', in J.M. Sasson, ed., *Civilizations of the Ancient Near East*, New York, NY: Simon & Schuster Macmillan, 1996, 873–883.
- Vine, D. 2015. *Base Nation: How U.S. Military Bases Abroad Harm America and the World*, New York, NY: Henry Holt Co. Reissue with a new foreword by Simon Winchester in 2017.
- Voss, B.L. 2015. 'What's New? Rethinking Ethnogenesis in the Archaeology of Colonialism', *American Antiquity* 80.4, 655–670.
- Voss, B.L. 2005. 'From Casta to Californio: Social Identity and the Archaeology of Culture Contact', *American Anthropologist* 107.3, 461–474.
- Warrior, R.A. 1989. 'Canaanites, Cowboys and Indians: Deliverance, Conquest and Liberation Theology Today', *Christianity and Crisis* 49.12, 261–265.
- Weber, M. 1996. 'The Origins of Ethnic Groups', in J. Hutchinson and A.D. Smith, eds., *Ethnicity*, Oxford Readers, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 35–40; reproduced from 'Ethnic Groups', in *idem.*, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, Volume 1, edited by G. Roth and C. Wittich, Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1978, 389–395.
- Weeden, M. and L.Z. Ullmann, eds. 2017. *Hittite Landscape and Geography*, Leiden, Netherlands: E.J. Brill.
- Wegner, I. 2007. *Hurritisch: Eine Einführung*, 2. überarbeitete Auflage, Wiesbaden, Germany: Harrassowitz.
- Weinfeld, M. 1993. *The Promise of the Land: The Inheritance of the Land of Canaan by the Israelites*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Wellhausen, J. 1905/1878. *Prolegomena zur Geschichte Israel*, sechste Ausgabe, Berlin, Germany: Druck und Verlag Georg Reimer. First published 1878. An English translation of the Prolegomena is available from Project Gutenberg at www.gutenberg.org/etext/4732 [accessed 1/11/2018].
- Wenham, G.J. 2003. *Exploring the Old Testament, Volume I: The Pentateuch*, London, UK: SPCK.
- Wenham, G.J. 1999. 'Pondering the Pentateuch: The Search for a New

- Paradigm', in D.W. Baker and B.T. Arnold, eds., *The Face of Old Testament Studies: A Survey of Contemporary Approaches*, Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 116–144.
- Wenham, G.J. 1996. 'Pentateuchal Studies Today', *Themelios* 22.1, 3–13.
- Wenham, G.J. 1994. *Genesis 16–50*, Word Biblical Commentary, Waco, TX: Word Books.
- Wenham, G.J. 1987. *Genesis 1–15*, Word Biblical Commentary, Waco, TX: Word Books.
- Wenham, G.J. 1985. 'The Date of Deuteronomy: Linch-pin of Old Testament Criticism', *Themelios* 10.3, 15–20 and 11.1, 15–18.
- Westbrook, R. 2003a. 'Introduction: The Character of Ancient Near Eastern Law', in R. Westbrook, ed., *A History of Ancient Near Eastern Law*, Leiden, Netherlands: E.J. Brill, 1–90.
- Westbrook, R., ed. 2003b. *A History of Ancient Near Eastern Law*, Leiden, Netherlands: E.J. Brill.
- Westermann, C. 1994. *Die Geschichtsbücher des Alten Testaments: Gab es ein deuteronomistisches Geschichtswerk?* Gütersloh, Germany: Chr. Kaiser/Gütersloher Verlagshaus.
- Wette, W.M.L. de. 1830/1805. 'Dissertatio critica qua a prioribus Deuteronomium Pentateuchi libris diversum, alius cuiusdam recentioris auctoris opus esse monstratur', pro venia legendi publice defensa Ienae a. 1805, in *idem.*, *Opuscula Theologica*, Berlin: G. Reimerum, 149–168.
- Whincop, M. 2008. *Pots, People, and Politics: A Reconsideration of the Role of Ceramics in Reconstructions of the Iron Age Northern Levant*, 2 vols, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Durham, UK. Also published in the British Archaeological Reports International Series 1902 in 2009.
- White, R. 2011/1991. *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650–1815*, Studies in North American Indian History, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, twentieth anniversary edition of the 1991 edition with a new preface.
- Whiting, R.M. 1995. 'Amorite Tribes and Nations of Second-Millennium Western Asia', in J.M. Sasson, ed., *Civilizations of the Ancient Near East*, New York, NY: Simon & Schuster Macmillan, 1996, 1231–1242.
- Whybray, R.N. 1987. *The Making of the Pentateuch: A Methodological Study*, JSOTSS 53, Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Academic Press.
- Wilhelm, G. 1989. *The Hurrians*, Warminster, UK: Aris & Phillips, translated from German by Jennifer Barnes, and with a chapter by Diana L. Stein.
- Wilkinson, T.J. 2003. *Archaeological Landscapes of the Near East*, Tucson, AZ: The University of Arizona Press.
- Wolfe, P. 2008. 'Structure and Event: Settler Colonialism, Time and the Question of Genocide', in A.D. Moses, ed., *Empire, Colony, Genocide*:

- Conquest, Occupation and Subaltern Resistance in World History*, Oxford, UK; and New York, NY: Bergahn Books.
- Wolfe, P. 2006. 'Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native', *Journal of Genocide Research* 8.4, 387–409.
- Wolfe, P. 1999. *Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology: The Politics and Poetics of an Ethnographic Event*, *Writing Past Colonialism*, London, UK: Cassell.
- Woods, C., with G. Emberling and E. Teeter. 2010. *Visible Language: Inventions of Language in the Ancient Middle East and Beyond*, Oriental Institute Museum Publications 32, Chicago IL: The Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago.
- Wright, C.J.H. 2004. *Old Testament Ethics for the People of God*, Leicester, UK: InterVarsity Press.
- Wright, D.P. 2009. *Inventing God's Law: How the Covenant Code of the Bible Used and Revised the Laws of Hammurabi*, New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Yasur-Landau, A. 2012. 'Chariots, Spears and Wagons: Anatolian and Aegean Elements in the Medinet Habu Land Battle Relief', in G. Galil, A. Gilboa, A.M. Maeir and D. Kahn, eds., *The Ancient Near East in the 12th–10th Centuries BCE: Culture and History*, AOAT 392, Münster, Germany: Ugarit-Verlag, 549–567.
- Yasur-Landau, A. 2010. *The Philistines and the Aegean Migration*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Yener, K.A. 2013. 'Across the Border: Late Bronze–Iron Age Relations between Syria and Anatolia', Proceedings of a Symposium held at the Research Center of Anatolian Studies, Koç University, Istanbul, 31 May–1 June 2010, Ancient Near Eastern Studies Supplement Series, 42, Leuven, Belgium: Peeters.
- Younger, K.L. Jr. 2017. 'Tiglath-Pileser I and the Initial Conflicts of the Assyrians With the Arameans', in A. Berlejung, A.M. Maeir and A. Schüle, eds., *Wandering Arameans: Arameans Outside Syria, Textual and Archaeological Perspectives*, Leipziger Altorientalistische Studien 5, Wiesbaden, Germany: Harrassowitz, 195–228.
- Younger, K.L. Jr. 2016. *A Political History of the Arameans: From Their Origins to the End of Their Politics*, *Archaeology and Biblical Studies* 13, Atlanta, GA: SBL Press.
- Younger, K.L. Jr. 2014a. '“War and Peace” in the Origins of the Arameans', in H. Neumann, R. Dittmann, S. Paulus, G. Neumann and A. Schuster-Brandis, eds., *Krieg und Frieden im Alten Vorderasien: 52e Rencontre Assyriologique Internationale/International Congress of Assyriology and Near Eastern Archaeology, Münster, 17. – 21. Juli 2006*, AOAT 401, Münster,

- Germany: Ugarit-Verlag, 861–874.
- Younger, K.L. Jr. 2014b. 'Recent Developments in Understanding the Origins of the Arameans: Possible Contributions and Implications to Understanding Israelite Origins', Unpublished conference paper.
- Younger, K.L. Jr. 2007. 'The Late Bronze Age I/Iron Age Transition and the Origins of the Arameans', in *idem.*, *Ugarit at Seventy-Five*, Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 131–174.
- Younger, K.L. Jr. 1990. *Ancient Conquest Accounts: A Study in Ancient Near Eastern and Biblical History Writing*, JSOTSS 98, Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Academic Press.
- Zadok, R. 2012. 'The Aramean Infiltration and Diffusion in the Upper Jazira, 1150–930 BCE', in G. Galil, A. Gilboa, A.M. Maeir and D. Kahn, eds., *The Ancient Near East in the 12th–10th Centuries BCE: Culture and History*, AOAT 392, Münster, Germany: Ugarit-Verlag, 569–579.
- Zertal, A. 2004/2016. *The Manasseh Hill Country Survey*, 3 vols, Leiden, Netherlands: E.J. Brill.
- Zertal, I. 2005. *Israel's Holocaust and the Politics of Nationhood*, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Zertal, I. 1998. *From Catastrophe to Power: The Holocaust Survivors and the Emergence of Israel*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press.
- Zohar, M. 1992. 'Pastoralism and the Spread of Semitic Languages', in O. Bar-Yosef and A. Khazanov, eds., *Pastoralism in the Levant: Archaeological Materials in Anthropological Perspectives*, Monographs in World Archaeology 10, Madison, WI: Prehistory Press, 165–180.

General Index

abject others 46; *see also* colonialism, settler colonialism

Abraham 135, 140, 144, 149, 152, 180, 207

acculturation 55, 78, 205

Africa, African 8, 43, 48–49, 78, 224, 225, 238; South Africa 160, 223–224

agrarian 28, 31, 32, 38, 42, 43, 92, 94, 112, 124, 160, 222, 226, 234; agrarian societies 31, 32, 38, 42, 92, 112, 160, 234

Alalah 13, 80–81, 106

Alashiya 105, 108

alphabet 4, 20, 103, 115, 147; alphabetic 19, 115; *see also* writing

America(s) 43, 54, 223; American(s) 58, 117, 223–225, 232, 233, 237; North America 45, 53, 117, 160, 223, 229; South America(s) 58, 59, 117, 196; United States of America 40, 53, 58, 117, 223–225, 229, 232, 237

Amorite, Amorites 31, 50, 175, 177, 210

analogy 30, 53, 151, 156, 209, 213; *see also* typological

Anderson, B. A. 26n90, 166n4, 172n187, 172n188, 240n42

Argentina 118

ark (of the Covenant) 151, 158, 160

Asia 3, 21, 32, 124, 174, 224, 225; Asiatic(s) 144, 145; Eurasia 24n52, 224

assimilate, assimilation 35, 46, 48, 51–52, 55, 56, 58, 59, 82, 111, 116, 156, 157, 179, 195–197, 209; forced assimilation 58, 111

Australia 45, 160, 223, 224, 237

Babylonia 14, 165, 181, 182; Babylonian(s) 16, 115, 127, 138, 164, 165, 174–175, 182, 193, 206, 222, 223, 227, 230, 235; neo-Babylonian 127, 238

Bachhuber, C. 13

Baden, J. 166n15

Balih 176, 180, 181

Beckman, G. 92, 94

bedouin 207, 209

Bell, C. (Carol) 13

Bellwood, P. 43, 47

Berlejung, A. 14

Bethlehem 123

Betz, B. C. 15

Birkett-Rees, J. 7, 72, 79, 87, 92, 113, 176, 190

Block, D. I. 133n196, 202n117

Boer, R. 160

Boğazköy 19

Britain 58, 223, 224, 230

British 117, 160, 223–225, 230, 232, 233, 238

Bryce, T. 7, 72, 79, 82, 84, 85, 87, 92, 94, 113, 176, 190

Burbank, J. 37

bureaucracy 45, 90, 103, 193; bureaucratic 87, 91, 94, 222; bureaucratisation 31, 38, 41, 148, 162, 235; bureaucratisation of coercion 38, 103, 148, 162, 235; cumulative bureaucratisation of coercion 38, 162

Bürge, T. 14

caging 28, 39, 90, 192

Canaan 8, 14–16, 77, 78, 81, 102, 109, 112, 117, 119, 124, 135, 139, 140, 144–146, 148–150, 155, 158, 207, 210

Canaanite(s) 38, 116, 140, 147, 207

Canada 223, 224, 237

canon, canonical *see* writings (sacred/ canonical)

Carchemish 83–85, 108, 111, 180–182, 189–191, 195, 204

centrifugal ideologisation 38–40, 70, 103, 148, 164, 226, 233, 235; *see also* bureaucracy; cumulative bureaucratisation of coercion; ideology

chariots 181, 183, 185, 186

cherubim thrones *see* ark (of the Covenant)

China 29, 177, 194, 223–225; Chinese 225, 233; Chinatowns 125; *see also* ethnicity, ethnic enclaves

Christianity 1, 2, 7, 136, 166, 198, 227, 228, 233; Christian(s) 15, 136, 198, 222, 227–229, 232, 233, 234

church 227–228, 233

Cilicia 106, 109, 125

circumcision 155–156

Cline, E. H. 12, 13, 70, 92, 102

colonialism 1, 3, 5, 6, 28, 30, 31, 43–49, 52, 54–60, 70, 71, 75–78, 88–89, 94, 116–118, 126, 127, 136, 142, 144, 148, 150, 154, 157, 160, 162, 187, 193, 195, 197, 208, 211, 213, 217, 219, 220, 223–226, 228, 229, 232, 233, 236–238; definitions of 44–46; colonial 33, 44–47, 52, 54–59, 71, 73, 76, 78, 104, 114–118, 120, 123–125, 141, 150, 153, 154, 157, 161–163, 165, 195, 196, 208, 209, 219–224, 232, 233, 235–237; colonies 45, 47, 58, 164, 205, 223, 224, 238; colonising migration 44–45, 47–48, 219; franchise colonialism 45, 56, 58–59, 75–77, 78, 94, 124, 127, 163, 197, 237; metropole/ metropolis 37–38, 44–46, 52, 116–117; mixed mode colonialism 116, 219, 220, 223, 237; settler colonial 46, 47, 57–59, 73, 76, 117, 120, 150, 153, 154, 157, 161, 163, 165, 196, 208, 209, 219–221, 223, 233, 235–237; settler colonialism 45–48, 52, 56–59, 75–78, 116, 142, 148, 150, 157, 160, 163, 197, 208, 211, 213, 219, 220, 226, 228, 229, 232, 233, 237, 238; settler colony 47, 118, 224, 238; settler collective 46, 161; settler idylls 154; settlers 45, 46, 84, 153, 154, 219, 227, 228, 232; settler society 46–47, 148, 150; *see also* postcolonial

communism 38, 42, 224–225

conquest 2, 5, 16, 44, 58, 59, 70, 75–77, 79, 114, 139, 140, 146, 148–150, 153, 159, 165, 187, 194, 196, 198, 208, 210, 217, 221–222, 225, 226, 228–230, 235–237

Cooper, F. 37

Court, J. M. 241n91

cremation 85

Cross, F. M. Jr. 172n200

cultural memory 227, 228

cumulative bureaucratisation of coercion 38, 162; *see also* bureaucracy; centrifugal ideologisation; ideology

cuneiform 4, 12, 18–20, 85, 147; *see also* writing

Cyprus 105–107, 109, 110, 112, 120, 124, 217; Cypriot(s) 10, 106, 124

Damascus 122, 162, 189, 191, 198, 204, 219

David 6, 16, 120–123, 135, 136, 140, 150, 158–165, 189, 191, 205, 213; Davidic 160, 164

Day, D. 148, 181

democracy 238; democratic 39, 238; democratisation 39

deportation 46, 82, 89, 127, 198; *see also* colonialism; migration

Dever, W. G. 15, 20
Dietler, M. 44
diffusion 21, 48, 55, 56, 58, 76, 77, 79, 85, 118, 194, 221, 226; cultural diffusion 55, 56, 58, 76, 77, 85, 118, 221, 226; demic diffusion 48
Dinka 32, 49–53, 110, 156, 157, 174, 178, 179, 187, 194–196, 205, 220, 221
Dinka-Nuer 51
disavow(ing) 154
Dothan, T. and M. Dothan 14
Dozeman, T. B. 166n13, 166n20, 168n73, 169n118
Düring, B. S. 89
Dür-katlimmu 184
economy 31, 32, 46, 175, 225, 237; economic(s) 13, 32, 40, 41, 42, 52, 57, 81, 173–175, 177, 225–226, 232, 236
egalitarian 43, 160; egalitarianism 161
Ehret, C. 115
Elohist source 136
Emanuel, J. P. 125
empire-definition 37
empire-state 37, 218
endogamous 35
England 115, 117, 126, 146
enlightenment 2, 136
eschatology 165, 232; eschaton 227; *see also* millenarianism
ethnicity 15, 30, 33–36, 42, 47, 54, 55, 58, 118, 154, 178, 179; ethnic ancestors 120; ethnic boundaries 35; ethnic enclaves 47, 59, 80, 125, 196, 226; ethnic groups 33–38, 42, 53–57; ethnic identity 34, 55, 83, 121, 156; ethnic solidarities 35; ethnic ties 34; ethnies 33; ethnocide 56, 58; ethnogenesis 15, 54–55, 118, 120, 154, 163, 178–179, 209, 219; ethnonym 119; instrumentalism 34, 35; primordialism 34, 35; *see also* group identity
Euphrates 9, 10, 19, 32, 85, 122, 175, 176, 180–184, 186–188, 191, 192, 194, 195, 197, 198, 204, 218, 219
Europe 2, 28, 31, 46, 57, 136, 225–229, 234; European(s) 15, 17, 36, 45, 53, 117, 136, 160, 223–225, 228, 238; Eurasia 24n52, 224
evolution 17, 28, 31, 158, 162; evolutionary 17, 28
exogamous 35
exogenous others 46, 47, 120, 121, 154–155; *see also* colonialism, settler colonialism
expulsion 46, 54, 56, 59, 77, 82, 116, 151, 156–157, 195, 196, 209, 231
extrapolate 30, 49, 179, 207
Ezra 165
Faust, A. 15, 20, 140
Finkelberg, M. 104, 119, 155
Finkelstein, I. 15, 20, 21
First World War 224, 226, 230
Fischer, P. M. 14
forced labour 156, 162
foreigners 161, 166
Foster, B. 13, 29, 37, 157
founder rank enhancement 153
four-room house 155
franchise colonialism *see* colonialism

frontier 47, 77, 93, 108, 160, 161, 181, 195, 204, 225; definition of 47; frontier society 160–161
 France 126, 224; French 4, 77, 224, 225
 Galil, G. 13
 genealogy 119–120, 149, 154–156
 genetic, genetics 43, 48, 117, 223
 Genghis Khan 194; *see also* Mongolia
 genocide 40, 46, 56–58, 60, 73, 148, 157, 196, 221, 226, 230, 233, 235; definitions of 56–58;
 genocidal 58, 144, 150, 158, 211, 221, 233; *see also* Lemkin, R.
 Germany 137, 224, 226
 Gilboa, A. 13
 glottochronology 49, 178
 Gottwald, N. K. 140, 161
 Grabbe, L. L. 15
 Graf, K. H. 137
 Graham, M. W. 13, 70
 Gramsci, A. 42; *see also* hegemony
 Great Rift Valley 8, 9, 16, 21
 Greece 6, 8, 9, 13, 91–93, 102–104, 223; Greek 2, 10, 57, 78, 91, 93, 94, 103–105, 110, 114, 119, 120,
 124, 155
 Grimal, N. 12
 group identity 36, 54, 119, 179; *see also* ethnicity; nation; state-definition
 Gunkel, H. 137
 Halpern, B. 132n193, 132n94, 133n199, 166n5, 171n179, 202n118
 Hamath 86, 191, 194, 196, 198
 Hammurabi 175, 235
 Hana 175
 Hanigalbat 82, 86, 87, 89–91, 183, 184, 186, 197; Hanigalbatean 184; Hanigalbateans 81; *see also*
 Jazira
 Hardt, M. 229
 Harmanşah, Ö. 21, 192
 Harran 180, 183
 Harvey, P. B. Jr 166n5
 Hatti 108, 145, 181, 186; Hattians 82; Hattic 82
 Hawkins, J. D. 129n59, 129n60, 129n61, 129n62, 129n63, 129n68
 Hawkins, R. K. 15, 20
 Hazael 189
 Hazor 146, 147
 Hebron 149, 159
 hegemony 21, 42, 43, 53, 56, 106, 150, 154, 164, 220, 229; hegemonic 42, 56, 85, 103, 191, 195; *see also*
 Gramsci, A.
 Held, M. 243n133, 243n139
 herding societies 36, 175
 Higginbotham, C. R. 14, 21
 Hill, J. D. 68n257, 170n138
 historical bloc 42; *see also* Gramsci, A.
 historical linguistics *see* linguistic(s)
 historical premillennialists 233
 Hoffmeier, J. K. 21
 homicide 40, 57

Horowitz, D. 33
 horticulturalists 40; horticultural societies 31
 hunting and gathering, hunting and gathering societies 1, 28, 31, 32, 36, 41, 43, 234
 Hurrian immigrants 80; Hurrian migrations to Palestine 169n109
 Hutchinson, J. 33, 34
 Hyksos 77, 144
 ideology 3, 13, 15, 39–42, 53, 54, 56, 87, 89, 148, 165; centrifugal ideologisation 38–40, 70, 103, 148, 164, 219, 226, 233, 235
 idylls 154; *see also* colonialism, settler colonialism
 IEMP 40; *see also* Mann, M.
 immigration 47, 106, 107, 114, 123, 140; immigrant/immigrants 46–48, 51, 54, 80, 106–109, 111–112, 115–118, 120–121, 125, 156, 195, 219, 220, 231
 indigenous 44–49, 54, 56, 58–60, 73, 75, 77, 106, 116–118, 125, 140, 154, 156, 157, 161, 162, 195–197, 209, 219, 223, 226, 229, 231, 233, 235, 237, 238; indegenes 56; indigenous labour 59, 116, 195; indigenous peoples 45–47, 48–49, 58–59, 73, 75, 116–117, 125, 156, 161, 162, 195, 197, 223, 226, 229, 233, 235, 237; indigenous others 46–47; *see also* colonialism, settler colonialism
 Indo-European 82, 91, 114; Indo-Europeans 82
 industrial 1, 31, 36, 40, 43, 114, 234; industrialised 28, 42, 223–225; industrialisation 1, 31, 223, 234; industrial revolution 234; industrial societies 31, 36, 40, 43
 instrumentalism 34, 35; *see also* ethnicity
 intensive word borrowing 78; *see also* linguistic(s)
 intermixing 104, 117, 121, 123, 154, 156, 179, 205
 internalising 56
 invaders, invading 44, 56, 58, 59, 75, 104–105, 109, 111, 116, 148, 155–156, 195–196; invasion 44, 46, 59, 73, 83, 103–105, 108, 110, 115–117, 147, 209
 Islam 1, 194, 223, 238n5
 Israel (modern) 6–7, 21, 136, 143, 222, 225, 230–233, 237; Israel-Palestine 237
 Isserlin, B. 146
 Italy 42; Italian 42
 Jacob 150, 152, 207
 Janeway, B. 14
 Japanese colonialism 77
 Jazira 9, 10, 18, 82, 109, 112, 116, 126, 176, 184, 187, 188, 194, 195, 197, 218, 222; *see also* Hanigalbat
 Jericho 140, 146, 147, 152
 Jerusalem 72, 142, 149, 159, 160, 162, 164, 165, 205, 227, 231, 235
 Jesus 227, 233, 235
 Judaism 1, 7, 144, 165, 227, 233, 235
 Kahn, D. 13
 Kelder, J. M. 93
 Kelly, R. C. 50–52
 Kiernan, B. 69n288, 238n3
 Killebrew, A. E. 14, 15, 114
 kill/killing 40, 51, 56–59, 73, 82, 116, 122, 144, 156–158, 181, 185, 195–196, 209, 211–212, 232
 Klengel, H. 98n127, 213n1, 213n2, 214n3, 214n4, 214n5, 214n6, 214n14, 214n17, 214n8, 214n21
 Korea 77, 224
 Kuhn, T. S. 141
 Kuhrt, A. 12

latinos 59, 117, 223
 Lehmann, G. 14
 Lemkin, R. 57, 58, 60, 196, 221, 233; *see also* genocide
 Lenski, G. 39–41, 48, 160–161
 Levites 153, 155; Levitical 153
 linguistic(s) 3, 43, 48–49, 54, 83, 104, 115, 178, 189, 193, 218, 219; historical linguistics 48, 178
 Lipinski, E. 15
 Liverani, M. 12–13
 Long, V. P. 167n30
 Luwian 19, 82, 84, 85, 106, 114, 190, 191; Luwians 82, 85
 MacDonald, B. 21
 Maeir, A. M. 13, 14
 mainstream 17, 39, 138, 140–142, 163
 Malešević, S. 38–40, 43, 162
 Mann, M. 40–41, 43, 238; *see also* IEMP
 Mari 31, 32, 50, 174–181, 187, 188, 192, 196
 maritime society 31, 205
 massacre 158, 231
 matrilineal 52, 53; matrikin 52
 maximalist 17, 18, 36, 37, 140, 143, 163
 Mazar, A. 15, 21
 Mendenhall, G. E. 140
 mercenaries 112, 177, 196
 Mesha 207, 212, 219
 mestizaje 55
 metissage 120
 Middleton, G. D. 127n7, 127n8, 128n26
 Midian/Midianite 144, 207, 210–211
 migration 5, 6, 14, 16, 28, 30, 32, 38, 43–49, 51, 55, 56, 58–60, 70–71, 77–79, 82, 84–86, 91, 94, 102, 104–107, 108–112, 114–121, 124–126, 135, 144–145, 148, 153, 155, 158, 176–177, 179, 187–188, 194, 196, 197, 205, 209, 217–220, 225–226, 233, 236; colonising migration 44–45, 47–48, 219; cross-community migration 44, 47, 59, 205, 218–219, 226; as cross-cultural 44, 47, 49, 107–108, 125, 194, 196, 205; forced migration 45–47, 77, 82, 84, 104, 111, 182, 186–187, 197, 209, 220; home-community migration 44, 47; mass-coordinated migration 45; migrants 8, 45–47, 49, 89, 106, 108, 110, 111–112, 116, 118–119, 121, 126, 150, 155, 205, 217–219; migrations 5, 8, 10, 31, 44, 45, 47, 48, 50, 53, 84, 91, 103, 107, 119, 124, 176, 204, 206, 217, 218, 234; migratory 51, 180, 187, 205; prehistoric migrations 43, 47, 53; push and pull 105, 110, 236; whole community migration 44, 47
 Miletus 93
 Milgrom, J. 152
 millenarianism 232–233; amillennialism, amillenialist 233; dispensationalism 232, 233; premillennialism 232–233; postmillennialism 233; *see also* eschatology
 Miller, J. L. 166n24, 172n194
 Miller, J. M. 166
 Miller, R. D. II 20
 minimalist 18, 36, 37, 140, 142–143, 163
 mixing of populations 198, 219
 Mohammad 194; *see also* Islam
 Mongolia 194; Mongol(s) 114, 187, 194, 223

Morris, E. F. [13](#), [14](#), [21](#), [71](#), [75](#)
 Mycenae [5](#), [8](#), [71](#), [91–93](#), [102](#), [103](#), [110](#), [127](#), [217](#); Mycenaean(s) [6](#), [8](#), [9](#), [71](#), [91–94](#), [102](#), [103](#), [105](#), [107](#), [114](#), [217](#)
 myth [29](#), [33](#), [35](#), [39](#), [153](#), [163](#); mythical [139](#), [142](#), [179](#); mythology/mythological [12](#), [19](#), [32](#); semi-mythical [18](#)
 Møller, J. [36](#), [37](#)
 nation [35](#), [37](#), [42](#), [57](#), [83](#); definition of [35](#); nationalism [35–36](#), [42](#), [83](#); nation-state [37](#), [83](#), [229–230](#), [236](#), [238](#)
 Neanderthals [47](#), [48](#), [220](#)
 Negri, A. [229](#)
 Nehemiah [165](#)
 neo-Assyria [87](#), [88](#); neo-Assyrian(s) [13](#), [19](#), [20](#), [86](#), [116](#), [164](#), [173](#), [184](#), [186](#), [187](#), [189](#), [191](#), [195](#), [198](#), [222](#)
 neo-Hittite [14](#), [19](#), [84–86](#), [125](#), [182](#), [187–192](#), [196](#), [205](#); neo-Hittites [189–192](#), [194](#), [195](#)
 Neolithic [11](#)
 Nesites [82](#)
 New Zealand [160](#), [223](#), [224](#)
 Niehr, H. [15](#)
 Niesiolowski-Spanò, L. [14](#)
 nomadism [177](#); nomadic [28](#), [31](#), [32](#), [41](#), [44](#), [47](#); nomads [140](#), [209](#); seminomadic [32](#), [47](#), [49–50](#), [90](#), [173](#), [174](#), [207](#); seminomadism [32](#), [44](#), [50](#)
 non-Western [28](#), [141](#), [238](#)
 Noth, M. [138](#), [140](#)
 Nubia [6](#), [13](#), [71](#), [72](#), [75–78](#), [81](#), [85](#), [89](#), [90](#), [112](#), [116](#), [145](#); Nubian(s) [75–76](#)
 Nuer [32](#), [49–53](#), [110](#), [156](#), [157](#), [174](#), [178](#), [179](#), [187](#), [194–196](#), [205](#), [220](#), [221](#), [225](#)
 Nuzi [13](#), [81](#)
 Osterhammel, J. [44](#)
 Otto, E. [23n12](#), [166n4](#), [166n14](#), [166n20](#), [167n31](#), [170n124](#), [243n128](#)
 ox carts [109](#)
 Palaians [82](#)
 Palestine [2](#), [6](#), [7](#), [14](#), [21](#), [107](#), [109](#), [112](#), [113](#), [118](#), [125](#), [146](#), [207](#), [230–232](#), [237](#); Palestinian(s) [161](#), [230–233](#), [237](#)
 Palistin [119](#); Palistinean [106](#)
 paradigm [137](#), [141](#), [228](#); paradigmatic [71](#)
 pastoral [31](#), [32](#), [75](#), [176](#), [180](#), [188](#), [209](#), [218](#); pastoral-based [179](#), [218](#); pastoralist(s) [32](#), [173–177](#), [179](#), [181](#), [187](#), [189](#), [192–196](#), [205](#), [211](#), [218](#)
 patriarch [138](#), [144](#), [149](#), [152](#), [156](#), [207](#); patriarchal [139](#), [144](#), [148](#), [149](#), [155](#), [163](#), [180](#); patriarchy [175](#)
 patrilineal [52](#), [53](#), [175](#)
 patrimonialism [31](#)
 peasant revolt [104](#), [140](#), [161](#)
 Pentapolis [125](#), [155](#), [218](#)
 Pentateuch [136–138](#), [140–142](#), [155](#), [165–166](#), [234](#), [235](#); *see also* [Torah](#)
 Pethor (Pitru) [180](#)
 Petter, T. D. [21](#)
 Pfoh, E. [15](#)
 pharaoh [18](#), [80](#), [108](#), [111](#), [112](#), [144–146](#)
 Phoenicia [19](#), [107](#), [204–206](#); Phoenician(s) [31](#), [115](#), [205](#), [206](#), [217](#)
 Pitkänen, P. [15](#), [18](#), [21–22](#), [144](#), [152](#)
 Pitru *see* [Pethor \(Pitru\)](#)

pork [155](#), [156](#)
Portugal [223](#); Portuguese [2](#), [223](#), [225](#)
postbiblical [235](#)
post-Christendom [3](#), [136](#)
postcolonial [3](#), [85](#), [86](#), [222](#), [238](#); *see also* [colonialism](#)
postexilic [15](#), [140](#), [165](#), [166](#), [227](#)
Postgate, N. [13](#)
post-Wellhausenian [162](#)
pottery [10](#), [14](#), [21](#), [89](#), [93](#), [106](#), [107](#), [109](#), [112](#), [114](#), [125](#), [146](#), [155](#), [204](#); pots versus peoples argument [49](#), [85](#), [112](#), [125](#)
prehistory [43](#), [45](#), [48](#), [78](#), [137](#), [208](#)
premodern [36](#), [37](#), [49](#)
premonarchical [17](#), [142](#), [160](#), [161](#), [163–165](#)
Priest, priests [136](#), [153](#), [155](#), [211](#), [219](#); priestly [136–138](#), [141](#), [142](#), [153](#), [157](#), [163](#), [166](#), [227](#); Priestly source [136](#)
primordialism [34](#), [35](#); *see also* [ethnicity](#)
Prior, M. [240n51](#), [241n68](#), [241n73](#)
race [57](#); racial [17](#), [56](#), [224](#); racism [35](#)
radiocarbon dating [10](#)
raid [111](#), [194](#); raiders [109](#); raiding [32](#), [45](#), [50–53](#), [111](#), [126](#), [177](#), [187](#), [194](#), [236](#)
reconquista (Assyrian) [184](#), [186–187](#), [197](#), [212](#), [218](#)
Redford, D. B. [14](#)
Rendtorff, R. [166n12](#)
Rephaites [211](#), [213](#)
resettle, resettlement [46](#), [75](#), [78](#), [85](#), [186](#), [187](#)
Rift Valley *see* [Great Rift Valley](#)
ritual [17](#), [32](#), [142](#), [147](#), [151](#), [153](#), [158](#); ritualistic [142](#)
Roberts, R. G. [13](#)
Rothschild [230](#)
Routledge, B. [21](#), [42](#), [43](#)
Russia [224](#), [225](#); Russian [160](#), [224](#), [233](#)
Sader, H. [15](#)
sanctuary [151](#), [175](#); *see also* [temple](#)
Sanders, J. A. [165](#)
Saul [121–123](#), [136](#), [158–159](#), [161–163](#), [189](#)
Schmid, K. [137](#)
Schüle, A. [14](#)
Scott, J. C. [192](#)
Sea Peoples groups [109](#)
Second World War [57–59](#), [224](#), [226](#)
semi-historical [18](#); *see also* [myth](#)
semi-mythical *see* [myth](#)
seminomadic *see* [nomadism](#)
settler colonialism *see* [colonialism](#)
Sharon, I. [24n41](#), [24n42](#), [121](#), [129n79](#)
Shasu [207](#), [209](#)
Shlaim, A. [231](#)
Short, D. [69n283](#), [69n284](#), [240n39](#), [243n131](#)
Singer, I. [12](#)

slavery 16, 135, 139, 155, 227; slave 93, 111, 144, 145, 161, 176, 196
 Smith, A. D. 33, 34
 social and cultural transformation 44, 45
 social control 32, 38
 social group 6, 38, 40, 209, 210, 228, 234, 236–238
 social stratification 28, 41, 112, 161, 176, 234; social strata 112, 114
 societal types *see* agrarian, agrarian societies; herding societies; horticulturalists, horticultural societies; hunting and gathering, hunting and gathering societies; industrial, industrial societies; maritime society
 society-definition of human societies 36
 Solomon 6, 122, 126, 136, 140, 150, 160–165, 196, 205
 Spain 224, 237; Spanish 58, 114, 117, 196, 223–225
 state-definition 36
 Stern, E. 14, 107
 Stone, B. J. 207
 Sutu 174, 175, 177, 179, 183, 184
 suzerain 83; *see also* vassal
 syncretism 55
 tabernacle 151, 152
 Taita 106
 tax/tribute 81–82, 84, 122, 126–127, 162, 164, 176, 182–186, 189, 191, 195, 197–198, 236–237; taxation 77, 84, 92, 124, 161, 162
 temple 18, 76, 84, 93, 138, 160, 162, 191, 205, 227, 233; *see also* sanctuary
 tent-dwellers 174, 175; *see also* nomadism
 tent of meeting 151, 158, 160
 Tenu, A. 13, 21
 Torah 136, 138, 152, 165–166, 227, 235; *see also* Pentateuch
 transhumance 174, 175, 194
 tribute *see* tax/tribute
 typological 17, 50, 222; *see also* analogy
 Ugarit 13, 19, 32, 38, 72, 103, 105, 107, 173, 175, 204, 206; Ugaritic 20, 178
 Ullmann, L. Z. 21
 undesirable others 146; *see also* colonialism, settler colonialism
 United Monarchy (ancient Israel) 10, 140, 163, 164
 United Nations 229, 231, 237
 urban 117, 124; urbanism 117, 122; urbanization 114
 Van Bakkum, K. 15, 20
 Van de Mieroop, M. 12
 vassal 18, 82–83, 84, 86–87, 90, 91, 93, 184, 204; vassalage 190; *see also* suzerain
 Venturi, F. 13
 Veracini, L. 46, 154
 violence 6, 28, 33, 38–40, 47, 56, 58–60, 73, 103, 186, 221, 226, 229, 232–237; violent 40, 59–60, 107, 115–116, 154, 156, 229, 233
 Voss, B. L. 54, 55
 Walistin 106
 war 40, 46, 56, 82, 84, 85, 110, 162, 164, 186, 191, 221, 224, 225, 229, 231, 236; warfare 38, 45, 52, 94, 105; warriors 51, 108, 109, 111, 181; wars 84, 104, 213, 221, 225
 Weber, M. 61n25, 64n98, 62n63, 63n80; neo-Weberians 41
 Węcowski, M. 14

Weeden, M. [21](#)

Wellhausen, J. [17](#), [136–137](#), [138](#), [141](#), [163](#); Wellhausenian [17](#), [18](#), [137–138](#), [140–142](#), [147](#), [163](#); neo-Wellhausenian [138](#)

Wenham, G. J. [26n90](#), [166n4](#), [167n30](#), [167n35](#), [172n187](#)

Westermann, C. [166n19](#)

Wette, W. M. L. de [17](#), [136](#), [163](#)

white (skin colour) [28](#), [223](#), [224](#)

Whybray, R. N. [166n11](#), [167n35](#)

Wilhelm, G. [14](#)

Wolfe, P. [45](#), [150](#)

writing [1–4](#), [12](#), [13](#), [19](#), [20](#), [28](#), [29](#), [39](#), [82](#), [85](#), [103](#), [104](#), [115](#), [117](#), [119](#), [146](#), [147](#), [222](#), [225](#); alphabet [4](#), [20](#), [103](#), [115](#), [147](#); alphabetic [19](#), [115](#); cuneiform [4](#), [12](#), [18–20](#), [85](#), [147](#); leather [117](#); ostrakon [19](#), [117](#); papyrus [18](#), [20](#), [108](#), [111](#), [117](#), [173](#); pictographic, logographic, syllabic [4](#); writing board [117](#)

writings (sacred/canonical) [136](#), [141](#), [166](#), [210](#), [227](#), [230](#), [235](#)

Yahweh [135](#), [136](#), [143–144](#), [149](#), [151–154](#), [157–158](#), [160](#), [162](#), [165](#), [207](#), [208](#), [210–212](#), [213](#), [219](#); Yahwism [148](#), [156](#); Yahwistic [153](#), [219](#)

Yahwist (Ger. Jahwist) source [136](#)

Yasur-Landau, A. [14](#), [106](#), [114](#)

Yener, K. A. [13](#)

Younger, K. L. Jr. [14](#), [182](#), [184](#), [189](#)

Zertal, A. [20](#)

Zionism [143](#), [222](#), [230](#), [233](#); Zionists [230](#)

Index of Ancient Sources

Assyrian texts:

Assyrian archives [18–19](#); Middle Assyrian archives [26n99](#); harvest records [92](#); Offerings Archive [92](#), [100n222](#)

Assyrian king list [86](#), [99n172](#), [139](#)

Assyrian chronicles [19](#)

Text from the time of Adad-nerari I [174](#)

Tukulti-ninurta I A.0.78.1.iii.30–iv.23 [97n111](#)

Annals of Tiglath-Pileser I [168n76](#), [173](#), [180](#), [190](#)

Chronicle of Tiglath-Pileser I [182](#), [195](#)

Tiglath-pileser I a.0.87.1.v:44–63 [181](#)

Tiglath-pileser I a.0.87.1.vi:39–45 [201n99](#)

Tiglath-pileser I a.0.87.13:4'-9' [181](#)

Tiglath-pileser I a.0.87.2:28–29 [181](#)

Tiglath-Pileser I A.0.87.3:16–25 [86](#)

Tiglath-pileser I a.0.87.3:26–28 [201n94](#)

Tiglath-pileser I a.0.87.3:29–35 [181](#)

Tiglath-pileser I a.0.87.4:28–30 [201n94](#)

Tiglath-pileser I a.0.87.4:34–36 [181](#)

Aššur-bel-kala A.0.89.2.iii:27'-28' [183](#)

Aššur-bel-kala A.0.89.3:6'-7' [183](#)

Aššur-bel-kala A.0.89.6:6'-9' [183](#)

Aššur-bel-kala A.0.89.7.iii:1–32 (The Broken Obelisk) [183](#)

Aššur-bel-kala A.0.89.9: 3'-10' [184](#)

Aššur-dan II A.0.98.1:60–67 [185](#)

Aššur-dan II A.0.98.1:6–32 [185](#)

Adad-nārārī II A.0.99.2:30–33 [185](#)

Adad-nārārī II A.0.99.2:49–60 [186](#)

Inscriptions by Assurnasirpal II [191](#)

Ashurnasirpal II A.0.101.19:92–97 [186](#)

Inscriptions by Shalmaneser III [191](#)

Shalmaneser III A.0.102.2:35b-40a [186](#), [197](#)

Tiglath Pileser III campaign in Philistia [126](#)

Sargon II campaign in Philistia [126](#)

Sennacherib campaign in Philistia [127](#)

Egyptian texts:

Egyptian records [18](#), [82](#), [93](#), [109–112](#), [119](#), [130n104](#), [207](#)

Annals of Thutmose III [93](#)

Amarna letters [18](#), [80](#), [109](#), [146–147](#), [159](#), [161](#), [168n58](#), [204–205](#), [243n138](#)

List of place names from the time of Amenhotep III [173](#)

Kom el Hetan text [93](#)

Medinet Habu records [18](#), [20](#), [108](#), [111](#), [114](#); Year 8 inscription [108–110](#), [114](#); Year 5 inscription [110](#)

KRI iv, 4: 14–15 [130n104](#)

KRI iv, 4: 15 [130n104](#)

KRI v:39–40 [129n83](#)

KRI v:40 [130n84](#)

Papyrus Anastasi [173](#); on Shasu of Edom [209](#), [215n43](#)

Papyrus Harris [18](#), [20](#), [108](#), [111](#), [130n114](#); summary of northern wars [108](#); on Seir [209](#), [215n44](#)

Onomasticon of Amenope [117–118](#)

Tale of Wenamun [18](#), [109](#), [130n92](#), [205](#)

Egyptian inscription from the Third Intermediate Period (Padeset) [119](#)

Hittite/Hurrian texts:

Hittite sources [19](#), [20](#), [80](#), [92](#), [93](#), [105](#), [130n99](#); treaties [83](#), [105](#); border descriptions [169n98](#)

Kizzuwatna rituals [169n109](#)

Administrative texts from Alalah [80](#)

Tushratta letter (EA 17) [80](#)

Luwian hieroglyphic inscriptions [19](#), [85](#), [129n59](#), [191](#)

Ugaritic texts:

Archives in Ugarit [19](#), [26n103](#), [173](#)

KTU 1.108 [216n74](#)

Aegean or Aegean-type texts:

Archives from Knossos [206](#)

Linear A script and archives [91](#), [100n221](#)

Linear B script and archives [91–93](#), [100n234](#), [102](#), [103](#), [128n33](#), [206](#)

Linear inscriptions from Philistia [20](#), [115](#)

Tell es-Safi-Gath inscription [115](#)

Other Northern Levantine and Mesopotamian texts:

Gilgamesh epic [2](#)

Sumerian king list [86](#), [99n172](#), [139](#)

mišarum decrees of Old Babylonia [243n128](#)

Laws of Hammurabi i.27–49 [235](#), [242n108](#)

Mari archives [174–177](#), [179–180](#), [188](#), [196](#)

Treaty between Alalakh and Kizzuwatna [81](#)

Treaty between Alalakh and Tunip [81](#)

Treaty between Hattusili III and Ramesses II [83](#)

Treaty between Tudhaliya IV and Shausgamuwa [105](#)

Emar archives [19](#), [26n103](#)

Records from Halab (modern Aleppo) [81](#) Records from Terqa [81](#)

Meharde inscription [106](#)

Sheizar inscription [106](#)

Taita inscription (Aleppo) [106](#)

Tell Tayinat inscription [106](#)

tamītu (oath) text from Babylonia [174](#)

Phoenician inscriptions [19](#)

Aramaic inscriptions [19](#), [190–192](#); Aramaic inscription from a temple at Tell Afis [191](#); Zakkur stele [191](#)

Southern Levant and the Hebrew Bible:

Cuneiform from Canaan [20](#), [26n114](#),

Merneptah Stele [145](#), [146](#), [154](#)

Gezer calendar [19](#)

Izbet Šzbet ostrakon [19](#)

Tell Zayit abecedary [19](#)

Khirbet Qeiyafa ostrakon [19](#)

Mesha Stele [210–212](#), [219](#)

Qumran manuscripts [25n73](#), [140](#)

Genesis [2](#), [25n76](#), [119](#), [133n196](#), [135–138](#), [144](#), [149](#), [154](#), [155](#), [172n187](#), [202n117](#)

Genesis 1–11 [26n90](#), [139–140](#), [152](#)

Genesis 2–3 [151](#)

Genesis 2:8 [151](#)

Genesis 3 [151](#)

Genesis 9:18–26 [207](#)

Genesis 9:25 [150](#)

Genesis 10 [149](#)

Genesis 11:27 [207](#)

Genesis 11:27–12:5 [144](#)

Genesis 11:27–31 [201n85](#)

Genesis 11:31–12:5 [180](#)

Genesis 12 [148](#), [152](#)

Genesis 12:1–3 [207](#)

Genesis 12:6–9 [149](#)

Genesis 12–50 [139](#), [144](#), [152](#)

Genesis 13 [210](#)

Genesis 13:17 [149](#)

Genesis 19 [155](#), [207](#)

Genesis 21:32–34; 26 [202n117](#)

Genesis 24–35 [19](#)

Genesis 24:10 [180](#)

Genesis 25 [207](#)

Genesis 26–27, 32–33 [149](#)

Genesis 26 [132n178](#)

Genesis 26:1 [133n196](#)

Genesis 27 [207](#), [214n35](#)

Genesis 27:43 [180](#)

Genesis 30; 34 [170n139](#)

Genesis 36:8–9 [208](#)

Genesis 36:31–43 [209](#), [215n45](#)

Genesis 37, 39–41 [144](#)

Genesis 37, 39–50 [167n49](#)

Genesis 38 [68](#)

Genesis 42–50 [144](#)

Genesis 46:20 [170n139](#)

Genesis 48:22 [150](#)

Genesis-Numbers [137](#), [138](#), [167n34](#), [215n55](#)

Genesis-Deuteronomy [136](#), [138](#), [165](#), [227](#)

Genesis-Joshua [16](#), [143](#), [148–154](#), [156](#), [158](#), [161–163](#), [165](#), [167n34](#), [169n120](#), [171n159](#), [180](#), [213](#), [215n55](#),
[219](#), [227](#), [235](#)

Genesis-Kings [147](#), [165](#)

Exodus [16](#), [25n76](#), [135](#), [139](#), [144–145](#), [229](#)

Exodus 1 [145](#)

Exodus 2 [144](#), [211](#)

Exodus 2:21 [211](#)

Exodus 3 [144](#)

Exodus 3:16–17; 4:5 [149](#)

Exodus 4–13 [144](#)

Exodus 4:14; 6:16–26 [170n125](#)

Exodus 12 [144](#)

Exodus 12:38 [170n141](#)

Exodus 14–Numbers 10:10 [144](#)

Exodus 20:22–23:19 [242n108](#)

Exodus 20:22–23:33 [170n124](#)

Exodus 25–40 [169n112](#)

Exodus 25–40 [151](#)

Exodus 32 [154](#)

Exodus 34:11–2 [170n124](#)

Exodus-Leviticus [149](#)

Exodus-Deuteronomy [163](#), [166n3](#)

Exodus-Joshua [154](#)

Leviticus [25n76](#), [135](#), [148](#)

Leviticus 1–7 [151](#)

Leviticus 16 [151](#)

Leviticus 17–26 [136](#)

Leviticus 19:18 [235](#)

Leviticus 23 [151](#)

Leviticus 25 [243n128](#)

Leviticus 25:44–46 [161](#)

Leviticus 27:30–33 [161](#)

Numbers 1–2 [130n110](#)

Numbers 2:33; 3:12 [170n139](#)

Numbers 3–4 [160](#)

Numbers 10:10 [144](#)

Numbers 13:1 [149](#)

Numbers 13:2 [149](#)

Numbers 18 [153](#), [161](#)

Numbers 20:14–21 [130n111](#)

Numbers 21:1–3 [140](#)

Numbers 21:21–24 [213](#)

Numbers 21:24 [213](#)

Numbers 21:26 [210](#)

Numbers 21:32–35 [213](#)

Numbers 21:33–35 [216n74](#)

Numbers 21:34–38 [210](#)

Numbers 22:5 [180](#)

Numbers 22–24 [211](#), [214n33](#)

Numbers 22–25 [211](#)
Numbers 26 [21n](#), [25n76](#), [135](#), [138](#), [141](#), [147](#), [149](#), [154](#), [168n75](#), [210](#)
Numbers 28–29 [151](#)
Numbers 31 [211](#)
Numbers 32 [150](#)
Numbers 32:31 [149](#)
Numbers 32:42 [149](#)
Numbers 35 [169n105](#)
Numbers 35:1–8 [153](#)
Numbers 35:6, 9–32 [153](#)
Deuteronomy [16](#), [25n76](#), [135–138](#), [140](#), [141](#), [146](#), [148](#), [149](#), [166n4](#), [167n34](#), [168n34](#), [169n105](#), [170n124](#),
[207](#), [208](#), [211](#), [213](#), [240n51](#); 1–34 [152](#)
Deuteronomy 1:4; 3:10 [216n74](#)
Deuteronomy 1:8; 6:10; 9:5; 29:13; 30:20 [149](#)
Deuteronomy 2:10–11 [211](#)
Deuteronomy 2:12 [208](#)
Deuteronomy 2:20 [132n175](#)
Deuteronomy 2:20–21 [213](#)
Deuteronomy 2:22 [208](#)
Deuteronomy 2:23 [131n132](#)
Deuteronomy 2:24–3:10 [130n111](#)
Deuteronomy 2:3–6 [208](#)
Deuteronomy 2:4–5, 9, 19 [207](#)
Deuteronomy 2:9 [210](#)
Deuteronomy 3:1–7 [213](#)
Deuteronomy 3:5 [150](#)
Deuteronomy 4:41–43 [210](#)
Deuteronomy 4:5–6 [242n118](#)
Deuteronomy 6:10–11 [146](#)
Deuteronomy 7 [148](#), [150](#), [161](#), [235](#)
Deuteronomy 7:1 [210](#)
Deuteronomy 12 [151](#)
Deuteronomy 12:3 [149](#)
Deuteronomy 12:4–31 [149](#)
Deuteronomy 13:1–5; 18:15–22 [158](#)
Deuteronomy 14:22–29; 18:1–4 [161](#)
Deuteronomy 15 [243n128](#)
Deuteronomy 16:1–17 [151](#)
Deuteronomy 16:18; 17:8–9 [151](#)
Deuteronomy 17:14–20 [151](#)
Deuteronomy 18:1–5 [153](#)
Deuteronomy 23:3–6 [207](#)
Deuteronomy 23:4 [180](#)
Deuteronomy 23:7–8 [207](#)
Deuteronomy 23:7 [207](#)
Deuteronomy 25:5–10 [68](#)
Deuteronomy 26:5 [180](#)
Deuteronomy 26:5–8 [156](#)
Deuteronomy 27 [149](#)

Deuteronomy 27:9–26 [149](#)
Deuteronomy 32:8 [208](#)
Deuteronomy 34 [136](#)
Deuteronomy-Kings [138](#)
Joshua [21](#), [25n76](#), [135](#), [137–139](#), [146](#), [147](#), [149](#), [151](#), [153](#), [156](#), [157](#), [161](#), [165](#), [167n34](#), [168n75](#), [170n128](#),
[208](#), [210](#), [213](#), [240n51](#)
Joshua 1–4 [152](#)
Joshua 1:2, 12 [149](#)
Joshua 1:3; 14:9 [169n102](#)
Joshua 2, 6 [140](#)
Joshua 5:2–3 [149](#)
Joshua 6:20–24; 8:28; 11:13 [146](#)
Joshua 6:26 [147](#)
Joshua 7–8 [140](#)
Joshua 7:26 [149](#)
Joshua 8:30–35 [149](#)
Joshua 9 [140](#), [156](#)
Joshua 9:10; 12:4; 13:12 [216n74](#)
Joshua 10 [168n76](#)
Joshua 10:20; 14:12 [150](#)
Joshua 10:32, 35 [168n76](#)
Joshua 10–11 [157](#)
Joshua 11:13 [146](#)
Joshua 11:1–3 [215n62](#)
Joshua 11:19 [156](#)
Joshua 12:14 [140](#)
Joshua 13:1–13 [171n152](#)
Joshua 13:11–13 [189](#)
Joshua 13:14 [170n139](#)
Joshua 13:1–7 [153](#), [169n99](#)
Joshua 13:21 [211](#)
Joshua 13:24–27 [213](#)
Joshua 13:8–33 [210](#)
Joshua 13:9 [208](#)
Joshua 13–21 [149](#)
Joshua 13–24 [152](#)
Joshua 14:15 [149](#)
Joshua 14:15; 15:13 [149](#)
Joshua 14:3–4 [170n139](#)
Joshua 15 [147](#)
Joshua 15:1–4 [208](#)
Joshua 15:15 [149](#)
Joshua 15:17–18 [188](#)
Joshua 15:8; 18:28 [165](#)
Joshua 18:1; 22:9–34 [151](#)
Joshua 18:24 [133n210](#), [133n211](#)
Joshua 18:3–10 [149](#)
Joshua 19:40–48 [123](#), [146](#)
Joshua 19:47 [123](#), [149](#), [153](#), [170n123](#)

Joshua 20 [153](#), [210](#)
 Joshua 21 [153](#), [169n105](#), [170n123](#), [215n55](#)
 Joshua 21:23–24 [153](#)
 Joshua 21:43–45 [153](#)
 Joshua 23 [153](#)
 Joshua 24:2–4 [156](#)
 Joshua-Kings [138](#), [242n113](#)
 Judges [16](#), [112](#), [122–124](#), [135](#), [139](#), [146](#), [150](#), [154](#), [157](#), [160](#), [162](#), [168n81](#), [170n128](#), [188](#), [201n110](#), [213](#)
 Judges 1 [149](#), [171n152](#)
 Judges 1:10 [149](#)
 Judges 1:13–14 [188](#)
 Judges 1:23 [149](#)
 Judges 2:1–12; 3:5–6 [154](#)
 Judges 3 [19](#), [202n117](#)
 Judges 3:12–30; 10:6–11:33 [238n1](#)
 Judges 3:31 [122](#), [132n196](#)
 Judges 3:5–6 [154](#), [156](#)
 Judges 3:7–11 [188](#)
 Judges 5 [156](#)
 Judges 8:14 [168n81](#)
 Judges 10 [122](#)
 Judges 10:6 [202n117](#)
 Judges 13–16 [121–122](#)
 Judges 14:1–3 [123](#)
 Judges 14:10–18 [123](#)
 Judges 14:19–16:31 [123](#)
 Judges 16:21 [120](#)
 Judges 18 [123](#), [146](#), [170n123](#)
 Judges 18:27 [146](#)
 Judges 18:29 [149](#)
 Judges 18:31 [152](#)
 Judges 19–21 [202n150](#)
 Judges 19:10 [149](#)
 Judges 19:14 [133n210](#)
 Judges-Samuel [20](#), [120](#), [210](#)
 Ruth [16](#), [25n77](#), [68](#), [135](#), [136](#)
 Books of Samuel [16](#), [112](#), [121](#), [122](#), [135](#), [139](#), [152](#), [158](#), [160](#), [162](#), [169n120](#), [172n192](#), [189](#), [213](#)
 1 Samuel [115](#), [158–159](#)
 1 Samuel 1–3 [169n120](#)
 1 Samuel 1–20 [123](#)
 1 Samuel 2:13–16 [152](#)
 1 Samuel 2:22 [169n120](#)
 1 Samuel 2:4 [158](#)
 1 Samuel 3 [158](#)
 1 Samuel 4 [158](#)
 1 Samuel 4:1; 5:1; 6:1 [132n172](#)
 1 Samuel 5–6 [158](#)
 1 Samuel 5:1–3 [158](#)
 1 Samuel 6:13–21 [158](#)

1 Samuel 6:17 [132n158](#)
1 Samuel 6:18, 20:6, 15 [150](#)
1 Samuel 8 [157](#)
1 Samuel 8:10–17 [158](#)
1 Samuel 8:18 [158](#)
1 Samuel 8:20 [162](#)
1 Samuel 8:20 [158](#)
1 Samuel 10:5 [133n210](#)
1 Samuel 10:8; 13:8–14 [158](#)
1 Samuel 11:7–8 [156](#)
1 Samuel 13:1 [171n157](#)
1 Samuel 13:3 [133n210](#)
1 Samuel 13:3 [123](#)
1 Samuel 13:19–23 [133n202](#)
1 Samuel 13:19 [122](#)
1 Samuel 14:47 [189](#)
1 Samuel 14:52 [122](#)
1 Samuel 14 [122](#)
1 Samuel 15 [158](#)
1 Samuel 16 [158](#)
1 Samuel 17 [120](#), [131n137](#)
1 Samuel 21:10–15; 27:1–7 [132n190](#)
1 Samuel 22:2 [133n206](#)
1 Samuel 27:8–12; 29:1–11 [132n191](#)
1 Samuel 28 [158](#)
1 Samuel 31 [122](#), [158](#)
2 Samuel [20](#)
2 Samuel 2:1–4; 5:3 [164](#)
2 Samuel 5:11 [205](#)
2 Samuel 5:6–10 [150](#), [159](#)
2 Samuel 6 [160](#)
2 Samuel 7 [160](#)
2 Samuel 8–10 [19](#)
2 Samuel 8; 10 [171n168](#)
2 Samuel 8 [122](#), [162](#), [189](#)
2 Samuel 8:2 [162](#)
2 Samuel 8:3 [189](#)
2 Samuel 8:5–6 [189](#)
2 Samuel 8:6 [133n213](#), [189](#)
2 Samuel 8:6, 14 [122](#), [162](#)
2 Samuel 8:9–10 [191](#)
2 Samuel 8:13
2 Samuel 8:18; 15:18 [133n206](#)
2 Samuel 10:6, 8 [189](#), [201n111](#)
2 Samuel 10:16 [201n111](#)
2 Samuel 11–12 [213](#)
2 Samuel 15:8 [189](#)
2 Samuel 20:23–26 [160](#)
2 Samuel 23:14 [123](#), [133n212](#)

Samuel-Kings [16](#), [165](#)

1 Kings [150](#)

1 Kings 1 [162](#)

1 Kings 2 [162](#)

1 Kings 3:1; 5:1 [162](#)

1 Kings 4:21 [162](#)

1 Kings 4:21 [122](#)

1 Kings 4 [162](#), [172n181](#)

1 Kings 5–8 [160](#)

1 Kings 5:1–11 [205](#)

1 Kings 9:15 [150](#)

1 Kings 9:17–19 [162](#)

1 Kings 9:20–22 [171n168](#)

1 Kings 9:20–23 [162](#)

1 Kings 9:26–28 [162](#)

1 Kings 9:27; 10:11, 22 [205](#)

1 Kings 10–11

1 Kings 11:14–25 [171n181](#)

1 Kings 12:1–4 [164](#)

1 Kings 12:15–19 [164](#)

1 Kings 12:19 [164](#)

1 Kings 12:20 [164](#)

1 Kings 12:21–24 [164](#)

1 Kings 12:25–33 [164](#)

1 Kings 12:30–31 [164](#)

1 Kings 12:5–14 [164](#)

1 Kings 12 [164](#)

1 Kings 15:18 [202n121](#)

1 Kings 16–21 [206](#)

1 Kings 16:34 [168n73](#)

2 Kings [121](#), [135](#), [138](#)

2 Kings 10:32–33 [164](#), [189](#)

2 Kings 15:29 [198](#)

2 Kings 17 [164](#), [198](#)

2 Kings 18:8 [126](#)

2 Kings 22 [136](#)

2 Kings 24–25 [164](#)

Books of Chronicles [16](#), [121](#), [126](#), [132n192](#), [135](#), [138](#), [160](#), [162](#), [163](#), [172n193](#), [205](#)

1 Chronicles [121](#), [135](#), [139](#)

1 Chronicles 5:26 [198](#)

1 Chronicles 7 [170n123](#)

1 Chronicles 10 [158](#)

1 Chronicles 11:16 [123](#), [133n212](#)

1 Chronicles 15–16 [160](#)

1 Chronicles 18–19 [19](#)

1 Chronicles 18:1 [122](#), [162](#)

1 Chronicles 18:2 [162](#)

1 Chronicles 18:5–6 [189](#)

1 Chronicles 18:9–10 [191](#)

1 Chronicles 19:6–7 [189](#)
1 Chronicles 23–26 [160](#)
1 Chronicles 27 [160](#)
2 Chronicles 1 [19](#)
2 Chronicles 2–7 [160](#)
2 Chronicles 14:14; 17:11; 26:6 [126](#)
2 Chronicles 21:16–17; 28:18 [126](#)
Psalms [137](#), [165](#)
Psalm 78:56–72 [158](#), [160](#), [165](#)
Psalm 137:7 [207](#)
Isaiah-Malachi [242n113](#)
Jeremiah [141](#), [168n85](#)
Jeremiah 49:7–22 [207](#)
Lamentations [165](#), [235](#), [240n56](#)
Ezekiel [166n7](#)
Amos 1–2 [235](#), [242n116](#)
Amos 1–2:3 [235](#)
Amos 2:4–8 [235](#)
Amos 2:9–10 [235](#)
Amos 9:7 [200n85](#)
Habakkuk 1:6–7; 2:6–8 [242n116](#)

New Testament:

Matthew 22:37–39 [235](#)
Mark 12:28–33 [235](#)
Luke 10:27 [235](#)
Luke 10:30–37 [235](#)
Romans 9 [233](#)
2 Peter 3 [240n43](#)